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THE ETHICAL RECORD

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APRIL, 1888.

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IT is the purpose of this RECORD to present NEWS OF THE ETHICAL MOVEMENT at large, but especially of the work in progress in the different Societies belonging to the Union of Societies for Ethical Culture. The general spirit and aim of the Movement will receive expression in regular contributions by Prof. Felix Adler, Mr. W. M. Salter, Mr. S. B. Weston, Mr. W. L. Sheldon, and Dr. Stanton Coit.

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THE ETHICAL RECORD.

APRIL, 1888.

ETHICS AND CULTURE.

AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE HARVARD PHILOSOPHICAL CLUB, JANUARY 9, 1888, BY PROF. FELIX ADLER, PH.D.

My subject this evening will be "Ethics and Culture." The meaning of the former of these terms is sufficiently clear; that of the latter is uncertain. I shall endeavor to bring its proper meaning to light and to show its decisive bearings on the whole conduct of life. The marks of culture as commonly understood are three: literary taste, æsthetic sensibility, and fine manners. One who is familiar with the best literature, displays a discriminating appreciation of the products of art, and uses with ease and fluency the forms and phrases of polite society, is said to be cultured. And since these accomplishments in their *ensemble* reach their fairest development in an atmosphere of leisure, and since leisure is, as a rule, the privilege of the wealthy, a very intimate connection has thus been established in the popular mind between wealth and culture; so intimate, indeed, that, judging from the way the two words are used together, one might be led to suppose that culture cannot exist without wealth. The rich, those favored children of fortune, enjoy a certain external luxury, as fine houses, fine furniture, fine equipages, fine apparel. They are also able to indulge in a certain intellectual and æsthetic luxury, in fine art, fine literature, fine forms of social intercourse. This inward luxury, correspond-

ing to the luxury in external things, is supposed to be culture. Now I mention this superficial view of culture at the outset not so much to disprove as to dismiss it. For I shall have failed utterly in the more positive statements which will be attempted later on unless the utter inadequateness of this cheap philosophy of culture follows from them as a matter of course without need of further comment.

But what is culture? If literary and æsthetic taste and good manners alone do not constitute it, is it perhaps the fruit of knowledge? To answer this question let us pause for a moment to consider some of the various motives which have determined the pursuit of knowledge. First the utilitarian motive, the desire to get knowledge for the sake of its uses in enhancing material well-being. Of course, the utilities are not to be underrated. They have their assured place in the scheme of human existence. But when we come to consider the interests of science as such, all questions of mere utility must stand aside. As Huxley says in his essay "On the Advancement of Science in the Last Half-Century," "The physical philosopher sometimes intentionally, much more often unintentionally, lights upon something which proves to be of practical value. Great is the rejoicing of those who are benefited thereby; and, for the moment, science is the Diana of all the craftsmen. But, even while the cries of jubilation resound, and this flotsam and jetsam of the tide of investigation is being turned into the wages of workmen and the wealth of capitalists, the crest of the wave of scientific investigation is far away on its course over the illimitable ocean of the unknown." The benefits which accrue to the material side of life from the increase of knowledge are mere way-side flowers, gleanings of the harvest, incidents of the march of science towards its goal. To make them the aim, to make science the handmaid of utility, is not only to degrade it but effectually to check its further progress. For, as the same writer tells us, "The growth of knowledge beyond imaginary utilitarian ends is the condition precedent of its practical utility." A second motive is ambition. Many an author consoles himself for a life of obscurity and privation with the

hope that he will some day write "the great book" which shall make him famous. Many a scientist is spurred to his work by the hope that he will be able to publish some great discovery which shall win him the applause and homage whether of the many or of the select few. But this motive, too, is low because it is selfish, and the greatest minds have been notably free from it. Fresnel (I am again quoting from Huxley) said, "'I labor much less to catch the suffrages of the public than to obtain an inward approval which has always been the mental reward of my efforts. All the compliments which I have received from MM. Arago, De Laplace, or Biot never gave me so much pleasure as the discovery of a theoretical truth or the confirmation of a calculation by experiment.'" And Darwin, while the world rang with his praises and he had attained a degree of celebrity which has rarely fallen to the lot of any scientific thinker, was grandly indifferent to the reception of his works. It was enough for him to have reached the results he did; how they affected his personal credit with others was a matter which concerned him very little. A motive of a higher kind is the desire to satisfy intellectual curiosity, to appease that appetite for knowledge which in some men is almost as strong as the physical appetites are in others. But of this motive, too, we cannot fully approve. The intellectual appetite, precisely because it is an appetite, often becomes an overmastering passion in the man whom it rules, wholly absorbing him, withdrawing him from life and its varied interests, dwarfing and crippling his nature on other sides, and destroying that evenness and harmony of development which from the time of the Greeks down to the present day has remained the true ideal.

The motive commonly ranked as the highest of all is the desire to extend the boundaries of truth, to add to the sum of assured knowledge, to pursue this purely objective aim without reference to any reflex influence on the subjective state of the scientist. Nevertheless I cannot bring myself to believe that objective truth, standing apart in sheer isolation, out of connection with the truth-seeker, should be the aim. Simply because the object, Truth, is out of our reach, and

I do not believe that we can make that the deliberate aim of our efforts which we know at the outset to be unattainable. The object, Truth, is out of our reach: first, because the extent of what we know compared with what we do not, and never can know, is infinitesimally small; secondly, because even those facts of which we have certain knowledge might receive a totally new interpretation could we see them in their relations to other facts which we do not know. For instance, the law of gravitation is a great positive result of science. Yet who can doubt that this law is connected with other as yet occult determinations of matter? And if these hidden determinations could be brought to light what a different meaning might the law of gravitation assume in our eyes! Objective truth in the strict sense is and will remain forever unattainable by man in his finite state. And I do not think that we are bound to reach out after what we know beforehand to be unattainable. *À l'impossible nul est tenu*.* Therefore it seems to me that we are justified in saying that the right and reasonable aim of mental effort in the acquisition of knowledge is the development of mind itself, irrespective of the ultimate, absolute certainty of results. It seems to me we are justified in saying that the whole world exists only as food for the mind, as a foil for the mind, as a grindstone on which to sharpen the blade of the mind; that the aim of scientific pursuits is to educate the intellectual eye so that it can see better, to strengthen the intellectual grasp so that it can hold better. And from this stand-point I may explain my whole view of life to be,—that life is a vast gymnasium, that we exist on earth for the purpose of developing our innate faculties: our intellectual faculty, our emotional faculty, our volitional faculty. Nor would I have you call this a subjective view, for to my way of thinking, the soul—that is, our consciousness—is the one most real object, and all other objects have but a secondary, a derived reality. And to my view, the whole world exists, so far as we are concerned, for the sake of the souls that inhabit it. That these souls shall be

* Absolute truth like absolute goodness is an ideal. It serves as the corrective of our aims, but it cannot itself be an aim in the precise sense in which the word is used in the above.

developed, that this divine company of souls shall rise higher and higher, that spiritual power shall be liberated among them, that the empire of souls, "*das Reich des Geistes*," shall be established on earth,—that seems to me the sufficient aim and purpose of our being. Those who take this attitude take the attitude of culture. Those who consistently apply it are cultured persons. The true mark of culture is not to be found in any acquirements and attainments which a man may possess, but in his attitude towards all these attainments, whether, namely, he regard them as ends in themselves, whether he value the exterior results as such, or whether he fixes his attention on the inward equivalents of these results, and regards them all as so many blossoms and fruits on the tree of his humanity, as so many means towards inward culture.

And this standard of culture is capable of application and, I think, ought to be applied even to the most practical pursuits. The engineer who threw the bridge across our East River created a great utility. He supplied an avenue through which the traffic of two great cities pours; he satisfied a long-felt want. But the highest value of his work, after all, is not to be found in the visible bridge, but in the invisible bridge which existed in his mind before it existed in steel and stone. The highest value of the bridge is in the mastery of mind over nature, of which it is the token, in the problems which were solved in connection with it, in what the engineer learned while he built it, and what he teaches others who are willing to learn. The highest value of Newton's law does not consist in the fact that this law is now known and can be repeated by every school-boy, but in the expansion of mind which Newton experienced on the road towards his discovery, and which is shared to some extent by all his scientific successors. And the same point of view holds good in the domain of art. Those paintings, those statues, those stately edifices, which constitute the glory of Art, are chiefly valuable not for what they are but for what they taught the men of genius who produced them, and for what they teach us who study them. Those paintings, those statues, are open windows, as it were, through which we look down vast vistas of light, catching

glimpses of the essential nature of the Beautiful. Even to the humblest callings may this idea be applied. When the shoemaker makes his shoe, the value of his work is not to be gauged by the utility of the article which he turns out, but by what the work teaches the worker, by the skill which it develops in him, by the fidelity to things and their properties which he learns whilst making it, by the patience which he learns. It is possible to be an uncultured person as an artist, and to be cultured as a shoemaker, then, namely, when the man who works at his trade gains from it all the spiritual nutriment, all the access of power which is to be obtained from that particular occupation.

But the idea of which I speak has its grandest application in the realm of ethics. The very notion of culture, as I have explained it, is an ethical notion. Ethical culture is the ripest fruit of all culture. In the hierarchy of our faculties the ethical faculty stands highest. A great point is gained for humanity when men learn to think justly. A great point is gained when their feelings are elevated and refined. But the most august and sublime revelation of human nature is in action. The ideal of theology itself, the Infinite One who pervades the All, has ever been worshipped as the Creator. But we, too, are privileged to consider ourselves so far partakers of the divine nature, inasmuch as we are not spectators only but creators, fashioning a world of our own. And the laws by which we fashion this human world are called the ethical laws. Mankind, in the course of their development, have invented the family, an organization more admirable in its co-relations than crystal or flower. Mankind are slowly evolving and trying to carry forward into greater perfection the ever-growing idea of the State. We began with moral chaos, and we are gradually evolving cosmos out of chaos, separating the dry land from the sea, and summoning out of their obscurity the stars which are destined to shine in our moral firmament. But again, the value of this work is not so much in the outward results achieved as in the inward equivalents, in the development of the creative faculty itself, in the soul-power which is liberated in the act

of creation. There are those who sneer at mere morality, who question whether the moral impulse alone, apart from the doctrines of the creeds, can be a source of inspiration and support. Their scepticism is not to be wondered at, considering the external standards by which morality is commonly measured. To the great majority of men morality is an outward thing; it consists in doing certain things and leaving undone certain other things. Men do what public opinion approves and try to leave undone what public opinion condemns. Public opinion is their chief guide; they are mere atoms determined by the impulses which govern the mass to which they belong,—mere drops, obedient to the set of the current in which they move. They have no inner moral life at all, and hence no moral life in the true sense. How often when discussing with merchants the vices of trade—base falsehood, unworthy mental reservations, trickery, and deceit—have we received the answer, “The practices which you denounce are general; every one shares in them to a greater or less extent”! As if that were a reason, if it were true, why a man with the priestly fillet of humanity on his brow should soil himself with the filthy practices of the market because others do the same,—because, forsooth, as is alleged, “they all do it.” How often when appealing to young men to lead clean lives, to evince that true chivalry which sees in every woman an object of sacred regard,—a *sister* in the bond of humanity,—have I been told, “The vices which you condemn are shared by all”! As if that were a reason why a young man should drag his self-respect into the mire and delve among the dunghills of great cities, because, forsooth, “they all do it.” How often in my college days have I seen the best men of the class, men of upright intentions, wink at if not actually participate in petty frauds at examinations, simply because they were afraid to offend the base public opinion of the class, afraid to expose themselves to ridicule, afraid to lose caste, afraid to live up to the ideal of manliness lest they might seem to derogate from a false and artificial standard of gentlemanliness! The moral life which consists merely in doing what public opinion sanctions and in leaving undone what

public opinion stigmatizes is not a moral life at all. Would we lead a true moral life we must lead an inner life, and to lead an inner life we must lead an independent life, we must be strong enough to judge for ourselves what is right and live according to the leadings of our own reason. Nor is it difficult to mention obvious marks by which the inner moral life may be distinguished from mere conformance to external standards. In the province of personal ethics we may say that he leads the inner moral life who ever strives to progress in inward purity, inward truthfulness, self-control, humility. He who scrupulously guards not only the purity of his acts but of his imagination; who sweeps out the cobwebs of passion from the corners of the chambers of the soul; who remembers the words of Jesus: "You have heard that it was said, Thou shalt not commit adultery: but I say unto you, Whosoever looketh upon a woman with an impure eye has already committed adultery in his heart;" he who preserves not only the purity of the act but the purity of the eye,—he leads the inner life. He who is truthful not only in speech but in his thinking; he who not only avoids all ebullitions of anger but expels every secret resentment from his heart; he who is humble, who does not allow a counterfeit estimate of himself to delude him, but is willing to see himself exactly as he is, with all his faults and shortcomings; he who is ever intent on the condition of his soul, who is forever asking himself, "What news?"—not, "What news from Europe?" or, "What news on the Exchanges?" but, "What news of my own inner life? where do I stand? have I retrograded? how far have I progressed?"—he who regards the answer to that question, "What news?" as of supreme importance,—he leads the inner moral life. And in the province of social ethics he leads the inner as contrasted with the outer life who keeps before his mind the ideal scheme of our relations to others; the idea of the family as it ought to be, and works up to that; the idea of the professions as they ought to be; the idea of the state as it ought to be, and exerts himself as a citizen to realize that; who regards these relations, like the Platonic arch-types, as divine entities, which are to be embodied in the terrestrial life of man, and

does not permit himself to be swerved from fidelity to them by the play of personal attractions or personal repulsions.

And this doctrine of culture comes home to us with all the force of a religion. The supreme test of the efficiency of a religion is its ability to help us in the hour of affliction. Now the thought that the development of our faculties is the aim of life is capable of giving us such help. For, be it briefly said, grief is an education, the most painful, the most searching, the most efficacious kind of spiritual education. Grief, if we will use it so, is the chisel whose keen point carves lines of ineffaceable beauty on the statue of the soul. Grief, if we will permit it to do so, purges us of the last dregs of selfishness. Grief teaches us a more perfect patience, a more profound humility, a more complete renunciation. The ministry of grief, therefore, is the last ordeal through which we must pass in order to reach our highest and purest development as human beings. And the whitest and sweetest flower of spiritual culture is that which grows on the tree of our humanity when it is watered by the tears of sorrow.

Thus it has come about that in expressing my views on culture I have practically laid before you a kind of confession of faith. And why should not one earnest person when coming in contact with others equally in earnest reveal his convictions, and try to awaken similar convictions in them? Especially at the present time, when the faith of so many has been shattered, when so many go about mourning over the beliefs of their childhood which they have lost, and the world seems dark and desolate to them, because what was once the light of their life is extinguished. I wish I could thunder in their ears the words of Emerson: "There is no need of wailing and of gnashing teeth;" I wish I could make them see that nothing is really lost, that the essential truths remain as eternally true as ever, that the sanctities of humanity cannot be forfeited because "they need not be brought down from heaven or searched for across the sea, but are hidden in our own hearts." What if many of us have come to think the mystery of the origin of things insoluble and the mystery of the hereafter impenetrable, *the distinction*

between the higher life and the lower is still as clear as ever. We shall eschew the lower life and live the higher,—that is enough for us, that is a sufficient goal for our earthly endeavors. What if it were true, as has been said, that life is like a midnight sea, illumined by a single streak of light, and man like a ship crossing for a moment that illumined pathway, coming out of darkness and disappearing again into darkness, still would it be worth while in the brief moment of our existence to catch the light upon our sails, to live in the light while we live. Ethical culture is needed for the benefit of those who still retain the old faith. For culture, ethical culture, is the fountain out of which faith must ever and ever again be renewed, if it is to retain its vitality. And it is needed for those who have lost their religion, in order that by its help they may gain a new one, or, if not, that they may, without too great injury to their inner life, be able to do without one.

But there is one aspect of culture upon which I must dwell for a few moments before I close, because it seems to me to involve a serious and imminent danger. The life of the masses at the present day, and especially in America, is largely given over to material pursuits; the culture of the age, on the other hand, is pre-eminently intellectual or scientific. Of ethical culture proper there is very little. Now the maxim of science is *de omnibus dubitandum est*, every question has two sides, the whole truth can never be known, and, therefore, a too exclusive scientific training tends to breed a kind of tacit scepticism, a kind of cautious reserve which is unfavorable to whole-souled earnestness and moral enthusiasm. I may be mistaken, but I think that I have noticed among some of the ablest students of Harvard with whom it has been my good fortune to become acquainted an anxiety not to commit themselves, not to become too warm in any cause, to maintain the superior position of reflective observers rather than of hearty participants; in one word, to apply standards which are perfectly proper in scientific investigation to the totally different sphere of conduct. A too exclusive accentuation of the intellectual element of culture tends to produce this misapplication of the canons of science to the affairs of life. Now

it would be extremely unfortunate if the kind of preparation which young men receive in the highest educational institutions of the country were to break their earnestness, if the impression were to gain ground that one needs to be an ignorant or half-educated fanatic in order to become a devoted leader or follower in any practical movement, that those who have their eyes open to both sides of every question must perforce lose the power of hearty attack. I think, therefore, it should be clearly stated that the rules by which we are to be guided in practical affairs are different from those which govern scientific inquiry, simply because the problems which confront us in actual life, in economics, in politics, in ethics, are so complicated that we cannot hope to reduce them to scientific formulas, that we cannot *wait* until they are reduced to scientific formulas. We must act in the mean time. The principle, I think, that should guide us in such questions is not the absolute, the scientific rule,—*de omnibus dubitandum est*,—but having obtained what light we can, having made up our minds as carefully as we know how with the help of precedent, analogy, experience, we should venture boldly forth upon the sea of action,—action itself, in these cases, is the great corrective of error. By trying our theories we test their validity,—action itself teaches us how we ought to act.

When Brunelleschi was summoned to build the dome over the great cathedral of Florence, when he was asked how he would arch over that immense span more than one hundred and thirty-five feet in diameter, at a dizzy height above the ground and without any supports from below, this great artist, who had spent years in studying the remains of ancient architecture, did not reply saying how he would do it, but gave the characteristic answer, "*La pratica insegna quello che si ha da seguire*."—The practical attempt will teach us how to proceed about it.

And so in all similar problems, practice will teach us how to proceed. We must take a provisional truth as our starting-point, and treat it for the time being as if it were the absolute truth, and try to carry it out with all the fervor and loyalty of which our nature is capable, yet holding ourselves ready at

all times to retrace our steps, to correct our errors, and thus we shall in time get nearer to the real truth.

And thus I end my address to you with a plea for moral earnestness, for without moral earnestness there can be no moral force, and that is what the world needs to-day more than anything else,—an influx of moral force to quicken the dry bones of our politics, our economics, and our creeds. In our political life we are at last awaking from the flattering dream by which we deceived ourselves so long, as if our institutions were perfect of their kind and fashioned to last for a thousand years. The evils attendant on universal suffrage, the ascendancy of unscrupulous politicians, the secret and sinister influence of powerful cliques at the centres of government, conspire to awaken a sense of the dangers by which we are threatened. And how shall these dangers be averted unless the efforts which are beginning to be made in the direction of reform are carried forward and supported by the aroused moral sense of the community? The economic life of the people is disturbed as it never has been before in human history; society is stirred to its lowest depths; the hewers of wood and drawers of waters are tired of the burdens which the comfortable classes have been so willing to impose on their backs; the multitude are everywhere clamoring for better conditions. The labor question is at bottom a moral question. And how shall it be settled peaceably unless the moral forces are roused into activity to a degree never before equalled among both parties to the conflict? There has never been a time when there existed a more distinct need of moral teachers, of moral leaders, of men capable at once of clear thinking and resolute action. Here a new profession is opening up. There is general complaint that the old-time professions are overcrowded. There are more physicians, more lawyers, more engineers, than the community requires; the walks of commerce and industry are thronged with a promiscuous multitude of competitors, who fight for every inch of standing-room. But the profession of which I speak is well-nigh empty. It waits for those who will see and realize its noble possibilities.

THE ADORATION OF JESUS.

AN ADDRESS DELIVERED ON CHRISTMAS-DAY, 1887, BY STANTON
COIT, PH.D.

PROBABLY no one has come this morning expecting to hear me approve of the worship of Jesus. The fact of a man's being an ethical lecturer instead of a Christian preacher, if it shows nothing else, does imply that for some reason or other he condemns Christ-worship, since otherwise he would be in the Church if he knew his true place. Christ-worship has become more and more exclusively the mark of distinction between Christian and not Christian. The Church has gradually ceased to emphasize other points, but it lays the more stress on the complete and absolute rendering up and giving away of the soul to Jesus. That is the one act of commitment which all preachers, Romish, Episcopalian, Presbyterian, and Methodist, are trying to bring us outsiders to make. They all strive to do what the revivalists, by their greater vehemence, tact, and directness, easily accomplish among the half-educated classes. Through the revivalist's pictures of Christ's perfections, presented week after week without abatement of ardor, and by his swinging songs of glowing and ecstatic admiration of the loveliness of Jesus, the simple-minded are induced in a sort of wild abandon to throw themselves at their Saviour's feet, dazzled to blindness, confused and half frightened by the vision thrust upon them. But all preachers aim at the same result; if it appears otherwise, it is only because we see more plainly the fruits of the revivalist's labor. The people he addresses have no refined shrinking from making a public exhibition of their feelings, and they more easily take the evangelist's word for it that it is their duty to drag out their heart of hearts and show it to the lookers-on. Still, however different the methods, the purpose is the same, and the self-restrained of the higher classes adore in spirit as much as the

people, only with more outward grace and poise. For nowadays to believe in Christ, to have faith in him, to follow him, to love him, to obey his commandments, all these are interpreted as if they were the same mental act as to adore, to worship him. But whether I am right in saying that the adoration of Jesus is the one thing Christians emphasize, it at least is a fact in my own case that an instinctive moral recoil from bowing down in worship to Jesus in unbounded admiration, even at a time when I felt that he was all-perfect and holy, was the one thing that held me back from uniting with the body of Christian believers. Good reasons for this instinctive moral recoil I think I now clearly see, and I wish to point them out.

It is the opinion of many whose judgment I respect that Christianity is dying out, but my own individual conviction is that living, personal devotion to Jesus the Christ as the only hope of the world, devotion that reaches the point of jealous adoration, was never intenser than now; and if that be the essence of Christianity, then, as I think, Christianity is growing stronger day by day. For one, I am in the ethical movement, heart and soul, instead of in the Church; not because I think Christianity is out of date, but because I think it ought to be out of date. I am not allured by the hope that we are to have great success either in doing much good, although I believe we shall, nor in gaining a name either now or ever; but I am urged by the conviction that it would be well for men if we should triumph, if Christianity should give way to us, if simple devotion to the good of the community should take the place of the adoration of Jesus. I would that the time might come when all preachers should exercise the magic of eloquence and song and personal influence to bring men directly into one complete and absolute commitment, inwardly felt and openly avowed, of devotion in deed and thought to the elevation of all mankind out of misery and self-contempt, and out of the selfishness and ignorance that beget this suffering and hate! Therefore, to me, the subject of the adoration of Christ is an intensely practical one; to me more practical—because the evil is more fundamental—than the elevation

of the poor, the reform of tenement-house life, the purification of politics, the suppression of monopolies, the introduction of ethical principles into trade and industry. For I believe that were the religious fervor that now spends itself in adoration but to assume the shape of direct devotion to the community, soon all these special vices would be driven out. And further, I have little hope of a general, manly, and persistent grappling with the great evils of the day so long as almost all the forces of religious enthusiasm and nearly all the leisure time of the devout is consumed in praise of the one God-Man. Often the time and energy of the devout is so given up to praise- and prayer-meetings the whole week through that it is impossible for them to join in practical philanthropies. So great is this evil that a leading worker in one of our city charities has felt called upon at a recent conference to lament the fact that the churches pre-eminent for religious ardor send the least personal helpers to the poor. When I visit the city missions for fallen men and women, it becomes painful to me, almost beyond endurance, to note the time and means and fervor and tact spent in praising the founder of Christianity. At such times I am more anxious to convert the preacher than the poor victims of drunkenness and vice; for, converting him,—these men have a wonderful power of appeal and persuasion,—I should be reaching through him hundreds of benighted souls. But the point I want to make is that this is a vital issue of the day; that Christianity, so far as the adoration of Jesus is concerned, is not a thing of the past, and that therefore in condemning it I cannot be charged with harping on a dead issue, as it is said freethinkers find their chief delight in doing.

Nor, again, shall I be guilty, this morning, of what liberal preachers are often justly accused,—criticising the follies and foibles, and rebuking the vices of every one except their own hearers. It is said that nothing pleases a freethinking congregation like a well-dealt side-thrust at Christianity. Not long ago I made an address to a certain audience in another city, and spoke as severely as I could against a certain idea in popular Christianity which seemed to me false and per-

nicious; and I was told afterwards by a Christian that as I made the remarks there came over the faces of my audience a supreme smile of self-satisfaction as if I had made my hearers feel, "We are the salt of earth; we have no such follies. How fine it is not to be so foolish as other men!" Now I am aware that in speaking on the adoration of Jesus I am dealing with a state of mind which, probably, not a member of this Society ever falls into, and some of you have never been acquainted with it in experience, and only by an effort of imagination can bring it before the mind. But I would rather that my tongue should be paralyzed than that in speaking of other men's errors I should flatter our own vanity or pride of intellect. If you, members of this Society, are free from any error of fanaticism or superstition which still prevails among the people, it only means that you are bound by another duty, an added obligation, a higher responsibility,—that of doing all in your power by persuasion, by eloquence, by writing, by cultivating your own gift of speech and sharpening your logical faculties, by spreading enlightened literature, by conversation, by the silent respect you win, by tact and consideration, by judicious praise and blame,—I say that by all these ways of influencing others, if freed from what seems to you an error, you are only in duty bound to a new task,—that of freeing others who still remain in the error. Therefore, when I condemn the adoration of Jesus, I beg you to let the whip fall on your own back, as I shall let it fall on mine. I shall be preaching to myself as well as to you; for I feel that we all are grievously at fault in not doing more to change the popular religious ideas of the time. Our very self-respect demands that among our practical works one of the chief should be to seek every fair opportunity of showing why the mark of the Christian—the adoration of Jesus—is not upon our brow, and what is in its place. But how much more than the thought of self-respect must our immediate devotion to every human being as a brother demand that we bring whomever we can to look upon that same devotion as the all-purifying passion, the perfect enthusiasm, instead of Christ-worship.

But at present in the community if any man is earnest to spread to others the light he has received, you will be almost certain to find that it is the Methodist light, or the Baptist, or the Romish, or some other particular shade of the Christian light, that he is carrying about. I wish that you each might take up the ethical torch, and drawing near to any poor mortal you know whose lamp has been blown out by the wrongs and vanities that whirl past him, would let the holy flame of moral enthusiasm, pure and simple, communicate its virtue. And if you meet any one whose lamp is burning with the lurid glare of fanaticism or bigotry, or with the fitful sputter of false sentiment, all that you need do is to see that your own torch is burning with a pure white light and a steady flame; then others will come to you and ask you why it is; and you should be ready to explain and to help them extinguish the false fire, and put their lamp in order for the true. It is with such motives as these that I have wished to speak of the adoration of Jesus.

And I chose this special day because it seemed that not being a Christian, and yet professing to be a teacher of morality, the most appropriate tribute of respect which I could pay to the memory of Jesus, on this celebration of his birth, would be to raise a warning voice against what I feel to be a dire mistake into which, from the first, Christian enthusiasm has fallen, and with all candor, but without malice, to censure and rebuke those who practise it and to point them the way out of it. To speak thus would be appropriate, inasmuch as it would be after the manner of Jesus himself, for the corruptions of religious sentiment were the only human failings which he almost hated. Only these made him forget his wonted gentleness and patience; only the perverters of religion—and these whether the evil they wrought was intentional or not—were to him “hypocrites and vipers;” only they stood directly in between him and the task he had bent his strength to,—the reform of religion by an infusion of fresh moral vigor.

But how pre-eminently fitting if it should turn out that Jesus never wished to be adored and worshipped; if, in fact,

Christ-worship directly violates Christ's spirit! I have lately been reading the Gospels through with the special purpose of seeing whether Jesus is recorded anywhere there as having enjoined the worship of himself upon his followers, or whether it is implied in what he said or did. Of course, if he had done so, it would not change our judgment of the right and wrong of it; still, I must confess that my respect for the man has always been so great and, indeed, my gratitude so heartfelt, that I should have been sorely disappointed if one whose intuitions were in so many points clear and profound had devised the adoration of himself, or of any one else, as the mark whereby the righteous were to distinguish themselves from the workers of iniquity; and, therefore, because Jesus was so good and pure a man, I was glad I could find no passage which implies that he demanded the worship of himself, or expected it, or would have wanted it; nay, for all the Gospels say, he might have repelled it. And this is the more remarkable inasmuch as his New Testament biographers themselves, at the time they wrote, did undoubtedly worship him. One finds it related that Satan showing to Jesus the kingdoms of the world said, "All these things will I give thee if thou wilt fall down and worship me." But I cannot find that for the great riches which Jesus promised his followers he ever once makes the condition, "If thou wilt fall down and worship me." That were a thought most fitting to the character of Satan, but not to him who over and over again declares that he came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, not to be served, but to be a servant, and that in his kingdom those that make the least of themselves were the truly greatest, and that he himself was an example of this. According to all accounts, his conduct, as well as his beatitudes and parables, are directly opposed to his wishing to be worshipped. It is true he did make high pretensions: he declared himself to be the Messiah, the looked-for deliverer of the people of Israel, but he refused the paraphernalia of royalty; he made himself of no account. It is true he tried to establish about him a little band of personal followers who were to go into all the world to preach his doctrine and tell

the story of his way of life; and he did without doubt set himself up as the moral king of men; but did he maintain that the *moral king* was to be worshipped? Fortunately for his good name, as it seems to me, he did not want this prostrate homage of the heart. In the stories where persons are said to have fallen down on their knees before him after he had wrought some mighty miracle, he bade them "Arise, and fear not;" likewise in the story of the Transfiguration, when it is said that the fashion of his countenance was altered and his raiment became white and dazzling, and Moses and Elias appeared with him in glory, Peter suggests making three tabernacles,—one for Jesus, one for Moses, and one for Elias; but instead of approval of this desire to do homage, Peter is told by a voice out of the cloud to hear Jesus. He sought not his own glory,—did he wish others to seek it?

But his absolute losing of himself in his sense of fellowship with the poor and unfortunate, as he surely must have done, else it could not have been so reported by his worshippers, makes me wonder how those who truly love the man could dare violate his spirit thus. Take the description of the final judgment in Matthew which Christ is made to utter: "Then shall the King say unto them on the right hand, Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world." Let us note closely, now, what follows, for he is going to tell for what reason they are to inherit the kingdom,—surely here he will say, "For I was holy and ye worshipped me." But no! "For I was an hungered, and ye gave me meat: I was thirsty, and ye gave me drink: I was a stranger, and ye took me in: naked, and ye clothed me: I was sick, and ye visited me: I was in prison, and ye came unto me. Then shall the righteous answer him, saying, Lord, when saw we thee an hungered, and fed thee? or athirst, and gave thee drink? and when saw we thee a stranger, and took thee in? or naked, and clothed thee? . . . And the King shall answer and say unto them, Verily I say unto you, Inasmuch as ye did it unto one of these my brethren, even these least, ye did it unto me." And the wicked shall ask, "When saw we thee an hungered, or

athirst, or a stranger, or naked, or sick, or in prison, and did not minister unto thee? Then he shall answer them, saying, Inasmuch as ye did it not unto one of these least, ye did it not unto me." Behold his identification of himself with the hungry, the poor, the sick, the stranger, so that he is aware of no distinction in hunger or imprisonment between himself and them; he is in them, and they in him. Behold deeds of practical kindness made the mark of his followers and not the adoration of himself.

But, further, while Christ did not enjoin worship, he did demand imitation of himself; and I wish you to note not only the difference between adoration and imitation, but the antagonism. We cannot adore and imitate well at the same time; and if the duty to do the one were always upon us we should never have opportunity for the other. Furthermore, adoration is not a preparatory state that leads up to imitation. From the first we must imitate. It is always the moment to begin. Take two lovers of art gazing at the statue of Praxiteles' Hermes or at the torso of Hercules. One of these gazers will himself become a sculptor; because of his purpose, the very sight of this perfection of form maddens him into a creative mood. He feels the power within himself which the masters have. He must become one of them. There is no such thing for him now as the giving of himself up to unbounded delight in what another has done. He himself must achieve. Give him at once the pencil that he may draw, or the clay that he may model, or the chisel that he may cut the stone. But, alas! discipline is necessary; the closest study and years of laborious application. And he will continually bear two things in mind: first, that he must find out the method which the master pursued by which he wrought the seeming miracle of beauty, he must know the special cause of each effect, he must trace the variety within the unity of lines and shades, and he will not be content simply to feel vaguely the sculptor's thought which suffuses itself like a living soul throughout the marble, making it soft and radiant with life and meaning; and, secondly, he will remember that no masterpiece is the complete embodiment of the ideal form,

that every genius had his limitations, that imitation, therefore, must not be servile. Accordingly, he will curb his enthusiasm, turning it into working force. But the other lover of art has no notion of becoming, himself, a creator of beauty. It is enough for him to contemplate the masterpieces of others. Not being driven by any practical purpose, there is no occasion for that severe and conscientious discipline of himself. He wishes rather to give himself up in unalloyed delight and admiration. He will let the grace and beauty stream into his soul as it will. He will cultivate the passion of adoration. Or take the sentimental dreamer looking with rapture towards the stars at night; and on the other hand the philosophic astronomer who will wring the secret of their journeyings from those wondrous travellers of the sky. His science must be an accurate reflection, a perfect imitation in thought of the splendid reality spread out before him. In the completeness of his reproduction will he take delight and in nothing else. And this delight is infinitely higher than that of the passive drinking in of beauty. The passion to become like another torments us the moment we begin to rejoice in the perfection we behold in another without attempting to make it a reality in ourselves; while the passion of adoration recoils and shrinks from the thought of effort. It is full of false modesty. It abases itself in fond surrender. It is idolatrous. It throws itself at the feet of the beloved object; it would fain lose its individuality and become one in mystic union with the thing or person adored. It is true we may worship and at the same time wish to imitate, but in that case each passion mars the other; or we may alternate in our emotions, but then the one does not reinforce the other. The desire to worship what is perfect is weak and unmanly; the desire to imitate what is perfect is strong and self-reliant, and active and willing to endure hardship and privation. It is dignified and not given to excess. It uses the excellence of another only as a hint to the excellence it may itself attain.

Now, such directions as believing in Jesus, following him, taking up the cross, obeying him, keeping his commandments, doing the will of the Father, all undoubtedly have to do with

imitating him. They constrain one to go about doing good, to be chaste and guileless. They force one to choose the companionship of the poor and neglected. They make one discontented with mere riches and outward pomp. The philosophy of it is too simple to need explanation. But lest any one might think I intend to set up Jesus as the only person whose virtues communicate themselves to others in this way, let me say that the imitation of Emerson, or even of a gentle soul like Whittier, in the same way would beget in us serenity and simplicity and sweetness of temper; the imitation of Lincoln, large-heartedness and the earnest sense of responsibility in the carrying out of a public trust; of Washington, an absorbing passion of patriotism. And, further, even though the life of Jesus were perfect, it would be a mistake for any religion to set him up as the one example. Twenty imperfect men with special virtues prominent were a better example for us than one, although absolutely holy. For the same balancing of virtues which would have constituted perfection in Jesus, with his surroundings and with his special mission of reform, would be a defect in us. Only the spirit with which he was animated would it be safe to follow, and that was all, so far as I can see, that he enjoined.

But while the copying of his character constrains one simply to go about doing good, what is the effect of giving one's feelings up to unbounded admiration for him? We need only to see what it has led to in the history of Christian thought to recognize it as a most vicious habit that never should have been indulged. Men cast themselves down as worthless before him, and they invented the doctrine of total depravity to account for their own meanness of spirit and to exalt him the more. Instead of studying minutely his character in each trait and as a whole, men fell to magnifying it; and having invented a being more than natural, they devised strange theories to account for his existence. He must have been born of a virgin (it is a sin even to this hour, a heresy, not to believe so); he must have existed from the beginning of time; he must have been equal to God, "the very God of very God," as the Creed will have it. The fires of the Inqui-

sition were enkindled from this enthusiastic admiration of Jesus, and, correspondingly, on the other side, from the smothered but hot hate in the breast of those who would not confess his name in the orthodox way. The splitting up into sects has always arisen from quibbling about these theories that are intended for his glory, never once from questions as to the practical conduct of life. The adoration of Jesus is the mother of the Dark Ages, the mother of Theology.

That I am not inventing the distinction I make between adoration and imitation you will see if you will recall the difference between Christian and Christ-like. To be known as a Christian many have no desire; but to the end of time every good man will long to be Christ-like, and to have it said of one "He is like Jesus in character" is all one need have given him of loving praise and trust; for it is saying, in a word, that one is gentle, tender, wise, bearing the burdens of others, considerate of the poor, not afraid to rebuke the pride of riches or to scorn hypocrites, far-sighted in plans of social reform, willing to wait and abide the fulness of time, a searcher of hearts, harboring no malice, suffering pain and ignominy, without a murmur, for others' sake. To one who does not believe that Christ was anything more than a good man, or that he helps us in any supernatural way, and yet who feels the ennobling influence of his example, it sounds like a mockery of what is true and good when his worshippers set forth these ingenious doctrines that magnify his name.

Whether Christian will ever come to mean, simply, Christ-like; no one can say. But it will, if his professed followers can be made to see that the worship of Christ is the idolatry of Christ; if they can be made to realize that they are, in fact, no longer moral servants and spiritual slaves, but brothers, joint heirs in humanity along with him and all good men; if they can be made to see that true admiration would lift them out of the prostrate attitude of supplication and praise and set them upright on their feet along with him. We who are not Christians can help them to see this if we do our duty in the matter. We shall then be hastening the evolution of Christianity on to a higher and its final stage, when Christian shall

mean Christ-like. Then, too, it will not be long before Christianity will outgrow itself. That will be when the figure of Christ shall have entirely ceased to come in between man and man.

This is the most lamentable evil of all those evils that have arisen out of the adoration of Jesus, that if men to-day do anything for others, it must be for Christ's sake, so that if you have not that motive to unselfish conduct, Christians, if they do not suspect you of putting on your philanthropy for display, are utterly mystified and come to you and ask, "But pray what motive have you in living for others, if not for Jesus' sake?" Is not that an appalling corruption of religious sentiment, which cannot comprehend that in feeding a starving child you do it for the child's sake, that in moistening the parched lips of some wretched sufferer, although he be a stranger, you do it for the sufferer's sake, that in trying to rescue some criminal from deeper degradation you do it for the criminal's sake? The adoration of Jesus has brought it to this in our midst, that if you give water to a thirsty dog, and yet not for Christ's sake, that if some little bird has fallen from its mother's nest and you put it gently back, but not for Christ's sake, people wonder what you do it for.

We can only answer: As our religious sentiment becomes purer, as we live more in the joy and pain of others, we find more and more that if others be an hungered, or thirsty, or a stranger, or naked, or sick, or in prison, behold, we are an hungered and thirsty; if any one do not minister unto others, he refuses to minister unto us; but if any one give others meat, or drink, or clothe them, or visit them in sickness or in prison, lo! he hath given us meat and hath visited us!

I cannot believe it is my vanity or self-righteousness or pride of intellect that makes me feel that to relieve the pain of others for our own sake and for those we help is nobler and higher than to do it for Christ's sake. Therefore I beg you, when people ask you, as they will, if you live aright, what your motive is, that you preach to them our Gospel, to the end that you may persuade them.

WORK OF THE NEW YORK SOCIETY.

THIS Society was organized in May, 1876, with a membership of one hundred and twenty-eight, and was legally incorporated February 21, 1877. Its present membership is about five hundred and fifty. Experimental reforms in the line of preventive charity were promptly undertaken by this Society.

Charitable Reforms.—In 1877 “a free kindergarten” for the children of the poor; then a “District Nursing Department;” and later “The Workingman’s School.” These charities are under the control of a separate legal organization, incorporated in 1879 under the name of the “United Relief Works of the Society for Ethical Culture.”

The Workingman’s School graduated its first class in June of last year. The number of pupils now in both departments is about three hundred and seventy. None but the children of parents who are too poor to pay the tuition are admitted.

The importance of this school consists in the fact that it is the first attempt to add a system of manual training, art modelling, and the laboratory method in the teaching of science to the ordinary branches of elementary education. The cost of maintaining this school is about twenty thousand dollars each year, and this is supplied by voluntary contributions.

Other philanthropic enterprises which owe their original inception to this Society are: the “Tenement-House Building Company,” an association which, in December of 1877, completed the building of its first model houses, designed to accommodate one hundred families, and also the “Schaefer Home” and the “Amery Home.” These are family homes, giving shelter and careful nurture, the one to ten, the other to five orphan children.

Ethical Classes and Plans of Study.—There are at present four of these classes,—Class I., in charge of Professor Adler; Class II., in charge of Dr. Coit; Class III., in charge of Miss

Laura C. Sheldon; also an evening class for young men under Dr. Coit.

The scheme of instruction may be outlined as follows:

I. For the youngest children, selected stories from the Bible. Such stories only are used as clearly convey a valuable moral lesson. The form of the narrative is frequently modified, the voice of God, for instance, being everywhere interpreted as the voice of conscience. A collection of such stories, adapted to the needs of our classes, has been prepared in manuscript by Miss Josephine Lazarus.

II. A class on Duties follows the Bible lessons. The whole system of duties is divided into two main groups,—self-regarding and other-regarding duties. In the first group, the duties with regard to the body, and the duties with regard to the culture of the mind, of the feelings, and of the will, form the essential topics. In the second group, duties to parents, brothers, and sisters, to inferiors in station, duties of friendship, duties to the poor, duties to humanity as such, form the chief topics. This general course is to be supplemented later on by special lessons on the ethics of the professions and on political ethics.

The method of instruction pursued is the Socratic. The uniform experience of the teachers is, that the children are intensely interested in the casuistical discussion of moral problems. Many fine points which may have escaped the teacher himself are suggested by the children. On the whole, it is found that their moral judgment, being unbiassed by the selfishness of later life, is clear and delicate, often more so than that of adults. The course on duties has been the most successful part of the scheme of moral instruction.

III. This course is followed by a brief account of the *History of the Great Religions*, especially of Judaism and Christianity. It is important that the young shall understand the religious situation of the world into which they must enter. It is the object of this historical account to fill them with a proper reverence for all that is true and good in the world's religion, and at the same time to emancipate them from the errors of the past.

IV. The last step in this scheme of education consists of a course on the *practical philosophy of life*, in which such questions are discussed as "Why is life worth living?" "What are our consolations in times of affliction?" etc.

Maxims and Speeches.—Golden sayings drawn from the book of Proverbs, etc., are used, incidentally, throughout the course, the children being required to commit them to memory. Speeches inspired with noble moral sentiments, such as the first chapter of Isaiah, are recited in class by the more gifted pupils.

Charity.—Each child is required to contribute one dollar monthly for the support of the charities connected with the Society. The pupils feeling that this money is contributed by their parents rather than by themselves, have, of their own accord, organized an additional contribution of five cents per week, which is collected by one of their number, and is likewise expended, whenever the aggregate amount is sufficiently large, upon some special benevolent object.

Songs.—Pupils of the ethical classes receive weekly instruction in singing, and it is designed to arrange special Sunday exercises for their benefit. A number of texts have been written and set to music with this purpose in view, and these will be published from time to time in the RECORD.

Evening Classes for Young Men.—These are conducted by Dr. Coit. The pupils have read under his direction the writings of Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius, and are now reading and discussing essays on the science of ethics.

The Young Men's Union.—In 1883 the "Young Men's Society for Ethical Culture" was organized. It now numbers about one hundred and thirty members.

Lectures on important questions of the day, debates, and frequent social reunions at the school building are the main features of its programme of exercises. A course of lectures just begun is upon phases of the labor question. The first one, delivered recently by Mr. Morris S. Wise, was upon "Home Labor as applied to the New York Cigar Industry."

The Union aids in the charitable work of the Society, and

has projected a library for working-people, which now numbers about twelve hundred volumes, and has been presented to the Workingman's School.

A New Ethical Society.—Since 1886, when the multiplying duties devolving upon Professor Adler made an assistant necessary to him, Dr. Coit has filled that post. Last year, when in England, he delivered several lectures before the South Place Religious Society of London,—the well-known Society so long presided over by Mr. Moncure D. Conway, —and he is now called to lead this Society. The association will change its name to the South Place Ethical Society of London, and in bidding Dr. Coit farewell we are glad to know that the ethical movement is the richer through our loss.

WORK OF THE PHILADELPHIA SOCIETY.

THREE years have not yet passed since the Society for Ethical Culture of Philadelphia was organized. Aside from the regular series of Sunday lectures and Sunday ethical classes for children, two or three important undertakings have been devised by this small Society, and now are being shaped to good effect.

The Ethical Society School and Kindergarten.—A regular day-school for boys and girls is the earliest and dearest of these enterprises. Its educational methods are the same as those of the New York Workingman's School, manual training being carried on from the kindergarten through all the higher grades. This is not a charitable school, but is designed to be self-supporting through the charge of a moderate tuition. The Society has established two whole and two half-free scholarships. This school was opened in October, 1886, at 136 North Seventeenth Street. The second school-year, now drawing towards its close, finds the school in a

sufficiently flourishing condition to make it necessary to rent a larger house for the coming year.

The Society has established a Kindergarten in West Philadelphia, which now has twenty-five pupils.

The Neighborhood Guild Association.—The establishment of Family Guilds among the working-people of various neighborhoods of the city is the object of this association of citizens, organized December 28, 1887, through the initiative of the Ethical Society.

In design and method this Family Guild enterprise is the direct outcome of a work carried on, for a year and more, by this Society, under the name of the "Working-Boys' Guild." The possibilities for good, to which this Boys' Guild showed the way, suggested an enlarged plan of operation. If, to the boys' classes in modelling, brass-work, carpentry, singing, etc., classes for girls could be added,—if the books and games and the club-rooms, at the service of the boys, could be open to girls too,—and if their elders could be induced to come also,—here might be formed a kind of club, with the family as a basis, which could become to the neighborhood a centre of practical good influences.

At a business meeting, held the first Sunday in November, it was decided that the Society, through its Lecturer, should endeavor to inaugurate an unsectarian movement of public-spirited citizens to attain this broader project, and it was unanimously resolved that the Working-Boys' Guild should be merged in this larger enterprise, and that the funds raised for its support should be devoted to the boys' and girls' department of the Family Guild. The Society has already contributed two hundred and fifty dollars to the Association.

Family Guild No. 1 has been established at 2134 Vine Street. The distinctive features of the Guild are that its basis is the family, that it is entirely unsectarian, and that it is neither a charity nor a money-making enterprise. A coffee-bar has been started, and, also, a free library and reading-room. Both are open to all the people of the neighborhood every day and evening of the week, including Sunday.

A cooking class and a chorus class have been formed, and classes in light carpentering for boys and girls will soon be begun. A small tuition fee is paid by all who enter these classes. Other attractions of the Guild, such as the game-rooms and the gymnasium, are for its members only. A yearly family ticket costs one dollar and fifty cents, a single membership ticket one dollar, or fifty cents for boys and girls under fifteen years. A series of Saturday evening entertainments of a light character, together with occasional lectures, have been begun in a hall in the neighborhood, and are well attended by men, women, and children.

The Home Section has been following out a series of programmes, made for its bi-monthly Sunday evening meetings, consisting of selected readings and papers, with discussions, assigned to different members, upon subjects connected with physical and domestic welfare.

The Young People's Section, also, meets twice each month. Two or three short papers on some social, economic, or religious question, followed by discussion of the papers, make up its regular exercises.

The Business Section has recently been reorganized, and hereafter will hold regular bi-monthly Sunday evening meetings, alternating with those of the Home Section.

WORK OF THE CHICAGO SOCIETY.

THE Chicago Society will celebrate its fifth anniversary in April, 1888. It has never been in such a flourishing condition as at present, and the future outlook seems more hopeful than at any time in the past. Surrounding conditions have not always been favorable to its development, and hence the struggle for existence has at times been quite severe. But we feel now that we have established a firm footing.

The membership of the Society numbers one hundred and

thirty-eight resident and fourteen non-resident members. Although the membership has but slightly increased this year, the attendance at the lectures has grown about fifty per cent. larger.

An Important Move.—This encouraging sign of the usefulness of the Society is, in good measure, due to the opportunities given by a larger and more convenient audience-room. Last year the lectures were delivered in the Madison Street Theatre. At the beginning of this year, some of the members favored using the small Society Hall on Randolph Street for the Sunday lectures, but others were in favor of holding these meetings in a still more public place than the Madison Street Theatre. After an animated discussion, some eleven hundred dollars were subscribed, over and above the regular subscriptions already made, to enable the Society to pay off existing indebtedness and hold its Sunday meetings in the Grand Opera-House. That this was a wise and prudent step has been evidenced by the increased attendance. Above all, however, it proved that the members had a deep interest in the movement and faith in its future, and were willing to make substantial pecuniary sacrifices in order to further its prosperity.

The Season's Lectures.—The following lectures have been delivered this year, by Mr. Salter, unless otherwise stated: "What can we give in place of the Old Faith?" "Transitional Religion," "Courage," "What shall be done with the Anarchists?" "The Cure for Anarchy." By Mr. Sheldon: "Henry Ward Beecher," "The Supremacy of Ethics," "Convention Sunday," "Good and Ill from abandoning Prayer," "The Reform of Charity," "Reform in our Public Charities," "The Presbyterian and the Agnostic." (Field-Ingersoll correspondence), "Buddha and Jesus compared." By B. F. Underwood: "Society and the Individual," "Ethics for Young People," "The Work of Parents in Moral Education," "Transitional Religion" [repeated]. By Jos. W. Errant: "Justice for the Friendless and the Poor." By Henry D. Lloyd: "The New Conscience," "Child Labor," "Remedies for the Evils of

Child Labor," "Is it a Good World we live in?" "Darwinism and the Problem of Evil," "Does Evolution explain all?" "Does Death end all?"

Special Organizations.—A year ago last November the Society rented a hall on Randolph Street, with a seating capacity of about two hundred people. Here the "Ethical School," the "Ladies' Charitable Union," the "Young People's Union," the "Monthly Conferences," and other meetings of the Society are held.

Conferences are held in the Society Room, 45 Randolph Street, every month. Their object is the stimulation of the individual intellectual life of the members. A paper is read, and a discussion follows.

The Ethical School meets at the Society Room every Sunday morning during the lecture season from ten to eleven o'clock. The first quarter of the hour is devoted to singing and the remainder of the time to instruction. There are six classes. The average attendance of the school is about forty. The instruction covers courses in fables, legends, systematic ethics, history of religions, and the philosophy of life. Children are received from eight years of age and upwards, and are welcome, whether the parents are members of the Society or not. Great care has been exercised in selecting songs which contain pleasant melodies and appropriate words. Through the generosity of Mr. E. C. Hegeler, the school has been provided with a library, named in honor of the donor the "Hegeler Library." Only the very best books on travels, classics, history, fiction, etc., for young people have been selected.

The Ladies' Charitable Union meets every two weeks at the Society Room. It aims to meet the needs of the *sick* poor of the city, by providing clothing, bed-linen, and delicacies, the cases met being reported to it by the "Charity Organization Society." The ladies, accordingly, devote themselves to cutting and sewing and other appropriate work, and they have recently established a diet kitchen at the "North Side" office of the "Charity Organization Society."

The Young People's Union holds monthly meetings at the Society Room for intellectual and social improvement. Any person over seventeen years of age, recommended by the Membership Committee, is eligible. There have also been organized the North and West Side reading classes of the Young People's Union, which meet every two weeks. Both classes are at present reading Taine's *Ancient Régime*, and intend to take up his *French Revolution* later. The North Side Dramatic Club of the Young People's Union has also been organized to prepare farces and comedies for the entertainments of the Young People's Union and for other social gatherings.

WORK OF THE ST. LOUIS SOCIETY.

THE most notable event of the St. Louis Society in the course of the last three months was the presence of Professor Adler for two Sundays. He gave two addresses on the subjects: "Are we Agnostics?" and "The Bible from the Human Stand-point." The addresses excited a great deal of attention. The attendance was phenomenally large. Memorial Hall was found inadequate, either in regard to its sitting or standing capacity, to admit the number of people who sought to be present. The attendance was largely of church members. His lectures, therefore, excited a good deal of attention among the clergy and from the religious press.

A Mothers' Club.—"The Ladies' Home Club," which was organized in the fall, has continued its session on alternate Wednesdays. It has been for the winter practically "A Mothers' Club." The subjects for discussion have been confined to the treatment of children. Rousseau's *Émile* has been taken as the literary starting-point of the discussions. A paragraph is read from this writing, and that leads to the discussions, which have often been quite animated. The ladies have taken up, for example, such questions as the method of dealing with children in regard to truth-speaking;

methods of enforcing obedience ; and such theoretical problems as that raised by Rousseau in the beginning of his volume, as to the point whether a child is by nature perfect in its disposition. The Lecturer of the Society, who organized the Club, was especially desirous of bringing these experiences of the mothers to bear on the preparation of the lessons for the children's ethical classes.

Work with the Children.—The children's classes have met Sunday afternoons at the rooms of the Society. A group of the younger children have been studying the fables of Æsop, as prepared in verse by Mrs. Clara Doty Bates. A group of the older children have been studying the Bible stories. The Lecturer of the Society, who has charge of the Sunday-School, has not sought to make it large in numbers, as he was more especially anxious to work with the children personally, and to have them aid him in developing the course of instruction. All children, however, between the ages of six and fifteen are cordially welcome to the Sunday-School.

Studying Plato.—The group of young men who were studying Tolstoi in the fall are now reading together a translation of Plato's *Republic*, and making it the starting-point for discussions in ethics.

Organizing Philanthropic Work.—Quite a number of ladies in the city have this winter taken an active interest in the work of the Society. Through their cordial assistance and co-operation steps have been taken towards organizing philanthropic work in St. Louis. This work bids fair to be of great success, and it received very substantial recognition and support from the business men of the city. As it is now only recently inaugurated, a description of this work will be reserved for the next number of the RECORD.

CITY OF THE LIGHT.

Words by FELIX ADLER.

REINHOLD HERMAN.



1. Have you heard the golden city Mentioned in the legends old, Ev - er
 2. We are builders of that cit - y, All our joys and all our groans Help to
 3. It will be, at last, made perfect, In the u - ni - ver - sal plan, It will

last - ing light shines o'er it, Wond - 'rous tales of it are
 rear its shin - ing ram - parts, All our lives are build - ing
 help to crown the la - bors Of the toil - ing hosts of

told; On - ly righteous men and women Dwell with - in its gleam - ing
 stones; But the work that we have builded Oft with bleeding hands and
 man; It will last and shine transfigured In the fi - nal reign of

wall, Wrong is ban - ished from its bor - ders, Wrong is banished from its
 tears, And in er - ror and in anguish, And in er - ror and in
 right, It will merge in - to the splendors, It will merge in - to the

bor - ders, Jus - tice reigns su - preme o'er all.
 an - guish, Will not per - ish with our years.
 splen - dors, Of the Cit - y of the Light.

TASK OF THE AGES.Words by **FELIX ADLER.****B. OWEN.**
Art. by **HOLST HANSEN.***Andante Religioso.*

Legato. cres.

The piano introduction consists of two staves. The right staff features a melodic line with a crescendo marking. The left staff provides a rhythmic accompaniment with eighth-note patterns.

1. Task of the a - ges,

The first line of the song begins with a vocal melody on the right staff and piano accompaniment on the left staff. The tempo is marked 'Andante Religioso'.

To thee our lives we give, Pledged to the

The second line of the song continues the vocal melody and piano accompaniment. The lyrics are: 'To thee our lives we give, Pledged to the'.



high - est, its ser - vants we would live, May

This system contains the first three staves of the musical score. The top staff is the vocal line, the middle is the piano accompaniment, and the bottom is the bass line. The key signature has one flat (B-flat), and the time signature is 4/4. The lyrics are written below the vocal staff.



we be strong and true When darkness round us draws,

This system contains the next three staves of the musical score. The notation continues from the first system, with the vocal line, piano accompaniment, and bass line. The lyrics are written below the vocal staff.



daunt - less to dare and do . . . in . . . that great cause.

This system contains the final three staves of the musical score. The notation concludes with a double bar line. The lyrics are written below the vocal staff.

CHARITY.

FRANZ SCHUBERT.

Words by FELIX ADLER.

Arr. by HOLST HANSEN.

1. There is a gracious friend that came to earth our steps to
 2. For oth-ers' woes she bids us care And feel for oth-ers'
 4. O Char-i-ty, O Love, O Light, Hope, strength in Thee we

guide, Sweet Char-i-ty they call . . her name And loveshe
 need, To heal the sick, to clothe the bare, And hungry mouths to
 find To live as servants of the Right, True, tender, real, and

scat- ters wide She ban- ish- es our dis- mal fears She
 feed. Our deepest, bitt- 'rest grief 'twill soothe To think of
 kind; To make life glo- rious with- out cease Un- til our

soothes each smarting pain. . . She leads us thro' the vale of
 oth- ers more; To spread.. the light of joy and truth Where
 day be pass'd, Un- til . . . we sleep in end- less peace The

tears Un- to the light a- gain, the light a- gain.
 dark- ness reign'd be- fore, Where darkness reign'd be- fore.
 dreamless sleep at last, The dreamless sleep at last,

THE CHILDREN'S SONG.

Words by FELIX ADLER.

FRANZ SCHUBERT.
Arr. by HOLST HANSEN.

1. We hold our lives like lil - y flow'rs, May we be pure as

they and white, May sun - light shine up - on our hours, And

we be sweet in all men's sight; And when at last our winter nighs, Oh


may on earth our seeds we strew, Which from the dust shall

re - a - rise To bloom in oth - er flow'rs a - new.


NEW YEAR'S SONG.

Words by TENNYSON.

C. GOUNOD.




1. Ring out, wild bells, to the wild sky, The fly-ing cloud the frosty



light, The year is dy-ing in the night; Ring out, wild



bells, and let him die. Ring out, Ring out, Ring



out, wild bells and let him die, and let him die.

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THE ETHICAL RECORD

ISSUED QUARTERLY.

JULY, 1888.

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IT is the purpose of this RECORD to present NEWS OF THE ETHICAL MOVEMENT at large, but especially of the work in progress in the different Societies belonging to the Union of Societies for Ethical Culture. The general spirit and aim of the Movement will receive expression in regular contributions by Prof. Felix Adler, Mr. W. M. Salter, Mr. S. B. Weston, Mr. W. L. Sheldon, and Dr. Stanton Colt.

This publication is established by order of the Union of Societies for Ethical Culture. Editorial Committees in each Society, consisting of its Lecturer, President, and Corresponding Secretary, have in charge the reports of their respective Societies. The chief managerial and editorial control is delegated by the Union to the PHILADELPHIA EDITORIAL COMMITTEE.

All matters directly concerning the editorship of the RECORD should be addressed to

MISS CHARLOTTE PORTER,
3810 LOCUST ST., PHILADELPHIA.

The members of the Societies, and the friends of the Ethical Movement everywhere, should remember that the success of this publication depends upon their support. He gives twice who gives promptly. It is hoped and expected that each one will welcome the establishment of an official review of the Ethical Movement, and that he will give the publication substantial support by subscribing for it AT ONCE; and, also, by making a special effort to gain other subscriptions from friends who may be interested.

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THE ETHICAL RECORD.

JULY, 1888.

WHAT CAN WE GIVE IN PLACE OF THE OLD FAITH?

A LECTURE BEFORE THE SOCIETY FOR ETHICAL CULTURE OF
CHICAGO, OCTOBER 2, 1887, REPEATED IN SUBSTANCE IN ST.
LOUIS AND PHILADELPHIA, BY W. M. SALTER.

THE world, at least the earnest part of it, is impatient with mere negations. What we do not believe is not of half so much importance as what we do believe. The weakness of liberalism is that it has been largely critical and iconoclastic. Audiences have gathered to applaud popular lecturers, but new societies have rarely been formed that have had any strength. To that end there must be something inspiring, something positive. The method of attack and ridicule may hold an audience for two or three hours; it could scarcely hold a society together two or three months. In this age of the world one can do one's own doubting; one can hardly help it; the spirit of free thought is in the air. But a new conviction, a new belief, a new religion is not so omnipresent; it is yet to be preached; it scarcely even exists.

We come—if our movement has any significance—with something like a proclamation; we come holding out thoughts for men to live by; we come to gather people into a new fellowship.

First, we hold up an ideal of life. The time was when the old faith held up a noble and commanding ideal. This was

of the Kingdom of God. It meant something so different from anything already existing in the world, that it was not to be brought about by any natural evolution, but by miraculous Divine interference. The mind of prophecy soared towards a perfect order of society and committed its realization to Infinite Hands. The ideal could not fail to enrapture sensitive and suffering hearts; could not fail to soften the hard-hearted and the proud; could not fail to ameliorate morals and manners. It did these things. But it is not too much to say that, except on a small scale, it does them no longer. The ideal has come to be scarcely more than a beautiful dream of the past. Christians themselves do not think for a moment now that a great revolution is impending in human affairs; that in fifty or a hundred or even five hundred years a righteous and just judge is to descend from the skies, and, with the help of God and the angels, succor all who unjustly suffer and punish all who oppress, and establish a perfect order of society on the earth. They would look, with the rest of the world, upon those who should preach such ideas as alarmists or visionaries or fanatics; they do not even wish to allow that Jesus and the apostles taught such things; they try to explain away their clear and emphatic utterances; they try to harmonize the gospel of Jesus with life as they themselves live it and with the world and the course of the world as they know it, while the very charm and power and triumph of Jesus consisted in the fact that the life he summoned men to so contrasted with that they actually lived, and that the old order of things was, to his mind, so soon to pass away and the new to come. Christianity at the outset, like Israelitish prophecy from which it was born, was a magnificent assertion of moral idealism; but as the hoped-for Kingdom of God did not come,—as not only the generation which Jesus addressed passed away without seeing the fulfilment which he promised to it, but generation on generation afterwards, and century on century,—men came to doubt whether it would ever come in this world, and relegated it to the cloud-land of the dim and shadowy hereafter. The world meanwhile went its way, and religion became more and more a thing apart, until now the practical influence of the thought

of the Kingdom of God is almost null. It is no better than a Utopia; it is a Utopia to most men's minds, whether they call themselves Christians or not.

Yet here is a grievous loss. The world is now living to a great extent without any high aim,—that is, any aim that is embraced with the passionateness of religious conviction. Most of us, most Christians or people of whatever religious persuasion, if asked what they are living for, would hardly know what to answer. There is no grand goal before us. Our thoughts, as a matter of fact, hardly go beyond gaining a livelihood, succeeding in our profession, or providing for our children. We have no cause; nothing to take us out of ourselves; no sense of contributing to some great event; nothing to cause enthusiasm and support us through trial and the dark hours of life. A few men in the community seem to be in deadly earnest; they have the fervor and passion characteristic always of real religion. But it is chiefly a fervor of hate and a passion for destruction, and bodes little good to society. Not out of wrath and resentment can any great benefit come to man, nor from such sentiments can any noble ideal be born. The ferment through which society is now passing makes us feel the need of an ideal, but does not itself give it. The only true solution of our social difficulties, the only true ideal of life, is to be found in the suggestions of morality. Let me pass straightway to my conclusion. The ideal which we hold up is that of a perfect order of society. Bound by our senses as we are to the actual order of things about us, we can free ourselves from it in thought, and picture a social order immensely purer, juster, happier than anything we now behold. It is in this direction we would turn men's minds. The aim of religion is to bring about a higher social state. The difference of religion from all else is simply that it aims at a perfect social state. We often combine together to attack special evils or to promote special reforms. Such associations may spring from the moral motive, but they do not exhaust it. A temperance society, an anti-poverty society, a White Cross society can never take the place of what in the past has been so often called "the Church," and will continue to exist under what-

ever name. There is an instinct in man that does not allow him to rest short of the perfect. The church or religious fellowship of the future should breed all good causes, but limit itself to none. It should satisfy not only our activities, but our souls.

Yet by a perfect social state do not think I mean an abstraction. It is a state in which all will attain to complete manhood or womanhood. It is a state in which all will most thoroughly and completely live. It is a state in which no one's capacities will be lost because they never had a chance to grow. It is a state in which no one's mind will have to be darkened, no one's sympathies thwarted, no one's body stunted, no one's conscience seared. It is a state in which there will be no sacrificed classes. In the ideal order, one class will not labor and another enjoy the fruits of their labor. All who are able will render some useful service to society, and those who do not shall not live. Then man, every man, shall be honored for his own sake, and every man shall live for his own ends as well as for those of others. Such is the ideal which morality gives us, and which we wish to give to the world. It makes not the slightest difference that we do not know when the ideal will be realized, or whether it will ever be on this earth; we are to aim at it, to work for it, to be wholly guided by it, all the same. It is not given us to look into the future; we have only a light to direct us on our way; yet if we and all men follow that light, it will conduct at last to perfect day.

What a difference it must make in a man's own life whether he cherishes this ideal or not! In any number of situations he will go one way with it and a very different way without it. Without it he will follow his selfish instinct to get as much out of other people and give as little as he can. This is only what the world does around him, and the laws of this method of procedure are formulated in much of what is called the science of political economy. Why should he be more virtuous than others? But, with the ideal, he will feel that to be more virtuous is just that to which he is called; he will never take advantage of another's necessities or fail to make the amplest possible returns for honest and faithful service. With

this ideal, he will never make a slave or a tool of another, whether it be man, woman, or child, whether it be workman in his shop, or wife or child or so-called servant in his house. For if that be the ideal for the future, he must not contradict it now; if it give the rule to the lives of others, no less strictly will he feel that it binds himself. With this ideal, a merchant will not lie about his goods, nor a lawyer in behalf of his client, nor a tax-payer about the amount of his property. With this ideal, one will feel that the wealth he may accumulate, no matter how honestly, does not belong to him to squander on his vices or to minister to his vanity or to spend on useless luxuries while others are in need; with his wealth he will serve, rather, as he never could without it, the cause of his ideal; he will with it try to lift up those less gifted in ability or less favored by circumstance, feeling that they are called to the ideal of complete living no less than he. Without the ideal aim,—well, one will live just as the vulgar rich are doing all about us, and have always done. So with public affairs. One on principle will participate in them, for the state is the means through which justice is done and wrong-doers brought to shame; it is an indispensable factor in the progress of mankind towards the ideal. So with all voluntary societies for the redressing of wrong in the world,—to the full extent of his ability he will support them. So with all reformatory movements attempting to check the degradation of man at its sources,—he will be predisposed to them, and only require that they be explained to him and the wisdom of the measures proposed be sure. So with a society like ours, or any church or temple, perchance, that sets before it as its prime, all-absorbing object the propagation of the moral ideal in the world,—by instinct, one who believes in the ideal will be drawn towards it, and will sustain it and aid in carrying on its work in every possible way. In short, for those who accept the ideal, it means a new life, a new attitude, new interests, new attachments, new purpose, and new joy in living. Wherever they may be, they will be swayed by it: in the law to make the law serve naught but justice; in the church to transform it; in medicine towards fresh discoveries for suffering man; in busi-

ness towards higher scruples; in daily labor towards greater faithfulness; in the home towards new love; in the school towards a deeper sense of the opportunities presented. People say ideals are impractical things, but there is naught in the world that has such power as an ideal clearly seen and fervently followed; it is a truly creative thing: it turns and overturns, and builds and rebuilds; it transforms men and communities. Oh, let the ideal I have indicated be burned in our minds and cast all others out! Let it become the animating spring of our lives, and we shall show that there is still salvation and infinite uplifting for man, though the doctrines of the churches be all left behind.

But the old faith had not only an ideal of life, it had a conviction as to the ordering of the world as an essential part of it. We, too, have a conviction as to this matter, and are as earnest to present our view as ever Christian believers were to present theirs. Essentially, the old conviction was that the world is ordered by a personal being or beings like ourselves, and that they may be influenced in essentially the same way that our fellow-men are. Nature seems, at first sight, a capricious being. The winds come and go; the heavens shine and now lower with angry clouds; the thunder rolls and now is still; the lightning flashes out of darkness; pestilence and disease steal on unawares; there are myriad phenomena that seem, to those who have not observed long and carefully, to come from beings as fitful, as changeable, and sometimes as passionate as ourselves. It is a shallow thought, the outcome of the narrowest anti-religious bigotry, that the gods of the past have been invented and imposed by priests on credulous minds. The people believed before their priests, and the priests were, as a rule, as honest as the people. The priests were but those who undertook to deal with the super-human powers and make them kindly disposed to men. Hence presents were offered to them,—the costlier the better,—and entreaties, as one man would supplicate another more powerful than he. This made the ritual of ancient religions, made the ritual of the Jewish and Christian faiths, too. Whatever desire was uppermost in a man's heart, and seemed difficult of

attainment, he made known to his God and begged for assistance. The pious Jew prayed for the glory and exaltation of Israel. Jesus, taking the hint from prophets before him, transformed the national hope into a hope for a reign of justice and righteousness, and prayed for the Kingdom of God. Whatever the ideal is, our conviction of how the world is ordered teaches us how we are to look for its accomplishment. What would otherwise be a mere matter of curiosity or speculation, becomes a matter of intense practical interest. Thus every religion takes up into itself the stage of philosophical culture which men had reached when it arose.

A religious faith that forms itself to-day can hardly agree with one formed under different conditions eighteen centuries ago. The notion of capricious powers is going from men who have observed nature and human life long and carefully,—*i.e.*, from men of science. In what seemed caprice aforetime they have discovered order; there is scarcely a phenomenon that excited old-time fear and wonder which could not be foretold, were all its conditions known,—the lightning, the thunder, the rain, pestilence, disease, all happen according to intelligible law; and no one soberly thinks now of changing or preventing any of these things by prayer or sacrifice. This does not mean that the idea of superhuman power vanishes from our minds, that the world we see is all there is, but simply that the old Gods vanish from our minds, and that we can use the word "God" only when we free it from much that men have connected with it, or deemed essential to it, in the past. The real change is simply in the conviction that the Supreme Powers of the world act in accordance with law; that they are steadfast instead of changeable; that they are not like human beings, who can be often moved to deviate, even from the best paths they mark out for themselves, by some inducement or urgent solicitation, but that they keep on their high way unmoved and unmovable. Piety, then, no longer shows itself in prayer to them; we cannot change their ways; we have but to bring our ways into harmony with theirs. For every desire of our hearts there are conditions set. Piety is not in indulging our desires and ignoring the conditions, going meanwhile

to God to help us out, but in observing the conditions. Of course, there may be desires for unattainable things,—fanciful desires, like that for unbroken clear weather, for the cessation of extreme cold or heat, of earthquakes, and the like,—desires for things which may likely not be for the best when the wide interests of the universe are taken into account, and the suppression of which would be the part of true piety. But for all attainable things—for health, for happiness, for the victory of justice in the world, for the establishment of a perfect society on the earth—the conditions are unalterably fixed, and piety consists in searching them out and in scrupulously observing them. If we believe in any ideal, we must earnestly and passionately assert this. It is not a matter of cold science, of criticism, but of religious conviction. You know how jealously in the past the defenders of religion have defended prayer, and how impious they have regarded any one who denied its efficacy; it was because prayer was vital to the old religion, because it seemed the only means for gaining the ends which religion had at heart; to disbelieve in it was equivalent to despair. So jealously, I believe, must we assert the reign of law in the world, so irreligious must it seem to us, and must we make it seem to the world, to hold that obedience to the fixed conditions of health, or happiness, or peace of mind, or of the victory of goodness in the world will not bring those results, or that, in lack of this obedience, anything else will, whether it be counting one's beads or saying one's prayers, and whether prayer be mere lip-service or the cry of the heart. O fellow-men, we must say, you must obey; there is no other hope for you, no other refuge; if in the past you have been disobedient, alas! but obey now; the fruits of the past cannot be avoided, but sow no fresh seed to bring you future sorrow and shame; sow the good, and you will reap the good. There is no other law in the wide universe.

Again, a sublime confidence arises that the ideal of life on which we set our hearts will somehow, somewhere be realized. We are not working for something that cannot be, for something that will not be; that perfect society and fellowship of rational beings of which we dream will come at last. We are

to work, as I have said, as if it might come on this earth ; but, if it does not, it will elsewhere. The old expectation and confidence were only mistaken in form, not in substance. The kingdom of justice will not likely come in our generation, it will never come by a miraculous interference from on high, and all our prayers will not hasten its advent ; we, and if there are beings like us on other planets, they, must work out the transformation, but worked out, completed, it one day will be. So great a faith cannot be scientifically established, and yet there are great reasons in its favor.

It is difficult to believe that this system of things to which we belong is not tending somewhither. That the world drifts aimlessly with no goal would probably never have been conceived of, save as a reaction against the view that capricious gods rule all things. We even know, as a matter of fact, on a limited scale, that there is progress in the world ; our solar system and our own earth have advanced from stage to stage, until here, at least, rational beings have come upon the scene. The progress has been from the material through ever finer and finer forms to the invisible and immaterial. Hence, though the visible order of things should pass away, this would not argue that the invisible should pass away with it. Scaffoldings arise and then are taken down, but the houses for whose sake they arose do not fall with them. The earth and other planets may be but so many scaffoldings by means of which spiritual beings like ourselves are reared ; it is difficult to see why they should arise, if something of the work they help to establish shall not stand. Houses, indeed, may be themselves ill constructed ; they may be carelessly put together or rest on insecure foundation. And so of human lives. Not every house stands, nor need every soul, after once its material scaffolding is taken away. Even here, in the course of human life, we see how immorality tends to produce disintegration. And when death comes, there may be nothing in the immoral man to hold his spiritual part together. Men are made for a purpose ; and if they do not fulfil it they are like dead or unfruitful trees, fit only to be cut down and to wither away. We can conceive higher beings than man ; but

we can conceive nothing higher than reason and virtue and justice and love, and man has in him the possibility of these things ; therefore he is transcendently sacred, and does not exist for something beyond him, like the earth and man's body and all that is material, but for what he may himself possibly become. And when he does become this, or is set on so becoming, there is no reason why he should pass away, since there is nothing more perfect to which he could give place. Now, there are, there have been, and will be in the course of human history, a great number of those whose hearts were set on virtue ; few, perhaps none, have reached the goal, and cast out every lingering trace of injustice and envy and selfishness from their hearts ; few, perhaps none, have had love returned for all their love, and found a perfect fellowship such as their hearts craved ; just men have been made the victims of injustice, and the pure have been hated by the vile, and the virtue of many has been doubly tried, because they have had to rest on their own strength and walk alone without companionship or example. The perfect ideal has never been reached in history, perhaps it never will be, but there have been and will be the elements of it, the hints of it, the foretokenings of it ; and surely the Spirit of the world were blind to its own ends did it not gather these select souls from all times, from all ages, perhaps from all worlds,—gather them somehow, somewhere into a great and holy fellowship, unite them in one sublime confederation,—the end, the issue, the everlasting outcome of the whole course of things.

Justice and love and brotherhood, let us remember, if we hesitate at so great a conclusion, are not our choice, so that we might choose anything else and do as well ; they are what a higher voice calls on us to choose,—the Spirit of the World it is, the Author of our being, who thereby asks us to do his will. No man follows a fancy of his own in obeying a good instinct ; so far as he does good acts, he does that for which he was made. No otherwise, too, can we be happy ; no otherwise can we find peace ; we know the divine authority of goodness directly, but were we left to find it out we should find it, because, struggling and striving to satisfy ourselves in

a thousand other ways, obedience to this alone will give us the sense of harmony for which we crave. With the sainted Augustine we may cry out, "Thou hast made us for thyself, and our hearts are unquiet till they find rest in thee." Those who are good have a significance in the world that naught else has. Not only do we admire them most, but they correspond best to the inmost requirements of things. Intelligence, wit, will, energy, ambition,—all pale before the light of goodness, and without it, and operating by themselves, may bring harm and disaster to men. Men of learning, men of might, men of influence may go to their graves unblessed, if not unheeded, by both men and gods; but the humblest soul that breathed good-will to men and lived in love and charity, even though its passing away is unnoticed by men, is both heeded and blessed by the Supreme Powers that are over all, and never can be blotted out. There is something coming out of this maze of human life. When the earth grows cold and the sun ceases to give its light, all will not be over. The things you dream of, if they are the best things, will come true. Our days are short, but by patience, by self-surrender to the highest in us, they may have an everlasting outcome. We are not waifs scattered on the shore of time; we are remembered by the Eternal Source whence we came; we have a bond of union with it; the Eternal voice speaks within us, calling us to itself, calling us to a life that has its own reason for being and can never end.

My friends, these are the bottom convictions that move me to be a teacher of ethics. To my mind, they take the place of the old faith. They give man an aim to live for, they tell him how it may be reached, and give him confidence that sooner or later it will be reached. To literally replace the old faith is out of the question. We cannot give a new Bible in place of the old, nor a new Christ in place of the old Christ; we do not want to. Progress is not by literally reproducing the past, but by catching its spirit and rising to a higher standpoint. Judaism blossomed into Christianity and satisfied humanity at one time. We want to satisfy humanity now. A religion is simply a satisfaction to the soul of man. Under

whatever form, in whatever details, that is its essential nature. It is not for us to present another infallible church or infallible book or infallible man, but to offer what shall be food and drink to the soul. Emerson said, twenty years ago, "The church is not large enough for the man." That is the trouble with it, and why so many earnest people are leaving it. Our thoughts play around it and above it. The fear of death, for example, the solicitude about what may come after,—this the good and the wise are outgrowing; a religion that appeals to such motives is beneath us rather than above us. We want something to take us out of ourselves, to inspire us with great aims, and to give us, in the midst of our efforts, a noble serenity and peace.

I know the ethical movement seems formless and bare. We have no literature, no rites, no songs, no holy days. We have nothing but our thoughts, nothing but a spirit that reaches out after something truer, better, and more satisfying than the world now knows. How could it be otherwise? How can a movement come, full-blown, into existence? An older authority has marked the course we, too, must follow,—first the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear. In time will come the light, the color, the warmth we have not now. The only present duty is to be sincere. We want poetry, but it must be our own, or at least in sympathy with our ideas; we want art, pictures and sculptures, but they must embody our own aspirations; we want songs, but they must burst from our own hearts. What art, what music, what poetry did the earliest Christian churches possess,—before Raphaels were painted, or Te Deums were sung, or Credos were even formulated?

The prime development of our movement, however, must be in our own lives. It is not a mere theory of morality, a mere view of life, we propose, but something to act on; and if we do not act the whole value of our movement ceases, and we but add one more to the pretences and shams of the religious world. Does the ideal move us, and are we by means of it given a deeper, a tenderer conscience about what we do and what we leave undone? Do we trust to the rightness of

our own lives, and to nothing else, to bring us through and to bring humanity nearer to its destined goal? And as we think of the end of life, are we becoming more assured that neither death, nor the fading of the earth, nor the fall of worlds can interfere with the triumph and eternal victory of the good? If we can give good answer to these questions, our faith can take the place of the old faith, and more than take the place of it. With it the world will take a fresh step onward in the path of progress.

ETHICS AND THE PULPIT.

AN ADDRESS GIVEN AT THE CLOSING MEETING OF THE SEASON OF THE PHILADELPHIA SOCIETY FOR ETHICAL CULTURE, MAY, 1888, BY JOHN H. CLIFFORD.

TAKING the pulpit as a typical name for the creeds and churches of Christendom, we find its relation to ethics complicated with various theological ideas.

Of ethics pure and simple the pulpit in general knows nothing, or teaches nothing. To some supposed older or higher ground of divine sanction it appeals than its ethical recognitions reach.

The same Church of Rome which gives the binding interpretation of Scripture likewise announces the unquestioned rule of conduct. Here the voice of ethics is hierarchical. The Protestant orthodoxies, resting on the Bible itself, derive all ethical sanctions from the "Sacred Word," subject to the divergent interpretations of the sects. Even the Liberal Christians, though making prior claims for Reason over scriptural authority, nevertheless, with individual exceptions, hold tacitly, at least, to the dependence of ethics on the presumptions of theology.

In all these provinces of religion ethics is subject to the qualifying name of Christian,—"*Christian Ethics*." Here and there, indeed, a larger note is sounded, as lately by Dr. James Martineau, who utters a brave call to the churches to put ethics first, and theology, religion itself, afterwards in the order of man's spiritual growth. This English Unitarian here comes nigh to a consent with Emerson's grand prophetic word, "*The Sovereignty of Ethics*." The Moral Law, that supreme rule within which, like the starry heavens above, fills us, as it did Kant, with awe: herein is the conscience of Christendom called by one and another strong voice from the pulpit itself,

or beyond it, to see the primal ground of all religious faith and life.

But, much as the pulpit has narrowed the range of ethics, and subjected the ethical content of religion to the authority of creed and church, thereby—even granting the truth of its theological beliefs and of its ecclesiastical claims—giving a false emphasis both in philosophy and in practical precepts, still the acknowledgment is due of high demands made upon men by the pulpit in moral life. By the best announcements and in the noblest realizations "*Christian Ethics*" rises virtually above its liminary creed to consonance with HUMAN Ethics, the universal rule of man's relations and conduct. Examples of holy living by children of the churches in every age attest this universality outrunning the lines of dogma and specific discipline. In a Saint Francis of Assisi, a Fénelon, a Channing, a Parker, a Stanley, the human is scarcely obstructed by the Christian consciousness, but the Christian is rather carried out into the human.

Certainly it is on the ethical side that the pulpit and its public have done, are still doing, their worthiest work. And that work, if it does not and cannot justify the assumptions of Christian dogma and the exclusions of the churches, is still a demonstration to the historic sense of the service of these partial modes to the universal spirit and progress of man. Nor need we fear but the saying will be fulfilled, "When that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away."

Even if you take ethics in its ancient and simple sense of custom, usage, the rule of action for men on grounds of associated life, still the term has its universal implications. But when those, especially, who have seen Emerson sweep out of decent society that cheap phrase of an arrogant dogmatism, "mere morality,"—when they return at this late day to that crude Philistinism, in the attempt to head off a movement for ethical culture, we are reminded, after all, how hopeless is the case of those dressed "in a creed outworn," but not yet given to the ragman of threadbare faiths. The "lightning-changes" of a certain Protean character—Radical-Conservative or Con-

servative-Radical?—are among the most diverting shows on earth, were there not in them too often a sad suspicion of spiritual insanity or insincerity. To-day, the old clothes retaken from the pawn of yesterday. To-morrow, a brand-new suit, for an outing in “fresh woods and pastures.” Next day, back again to the shabby garb. Are there no confirmed spiritual tramps to whom the cast-off wardrobe may be consigned for good?

Of all people in the world, surely, the Liberal Christians, with some of whom “motley’s the only wear,” should be the last to object to a plain, honest ethical dress. Has not Orthodoxy from the first hooted them for their morality-robos of “filthy rags”? In the eyes of Christendom at large are not they as much in need of washing and dressing as avowed non-Christians? If they would prescribe a better fashion and fit to the people of ethical culture, even so would the Orthodox mend them. On the whole, where that is the mood of Liberal Christianity, we will call it Sartor Resartus,—the tailor patched.

But when you come right down below all men’s vestments to Nature’s universal cut, you find one fashion, that never wears out,—the old, old fashion, the new, new fashion of the Moral Life. The righteousness which the ancient prophet denounced as filthy rags was a sham righteousness. The genuine righteousness is man’s robe of divinity. To the soul it is always orthodox, however formal orthodoxies may reject it.

And the proper meaning of ethics henceforth is not the mere custom, but the essential duty of man in his relations of moral being. How all hearts pay tribute for his noble call to higher cultures here to one who, being dead, yet speaketh, with voice inspired as any of old, for Eternal Righteousness. With all his seeming insistence on whatever mere forms or embellishments of life and expression, the unwearying plea of Matthew Arnold for culture of the Ethical Nature in man remains the core and vital energy of his gospel. That “Heaven kindly gave our blood a moral flow” he saw. And that flow he would teach men to deepen and quicken in its

proper courses till every soul should throb with the undefiled tides of Truth and Goodness, and mirror the Beauty of the world.

Once, after trying to describe to a friend, of Liberal Christian ties, the ethical movement, I was in a double manner pleased to hear him say, "Then I am an *Ethic*." And, accepting his adjective as a noun, I think we may say that at deepest every right-hearted man and woman is an "*Ethic*." And it remains for the pulpit and its patrons not to shut up ethics to the confines of a religious creed or definition; not to hug ethics as a foster-child of theology, Christology, or any of their dogmatic modes; then, as soon as they see ethics frankly made the basis of endeavor for men, turn round and taunt it again with "mere morality!"—but bravely and honestly themselves to own it, as one day they will, as integral duty and aspiration for humanity, one with gravitation and the Spiritual Laws.

The ethics and religion which need to be reconciled, or in any manner joined together, should both be got rid of, and a new recognition found of their essential identity in the moral and spiritual completeness of man.

The theological factors of religion have done work, and have still more to do for the human race. For one, I have no mind to be shut off from this side of speculation, sentiment, belief. I love the name of religion. And I love the true, the Universal Church, the Church of Man on this earth. To me a Society for Ethical Culture should be such a church, as such a church should be a Society for Ethical Culture,—and perhaps somewhat more.

But, in the redistribution of perceptions and of emphases, religion must not supplant with theology the ethical functions. These should reach to all the humanities of religion. Take care of the humanities, and the divinities, perhaps, will take care of themselves. And the humanities are crying as never before for the care, the solution which is, first of all, to be ethical in spirit and method, and which no religion assuming to ignore or subordinate ethics can even begin to provide.

And with all practical ethical endeavor in the world, we may still hear the

“—bards who sung
Divine Ideas below,
Which always find us young,
And always keep us so.”

All true gospel and prophecy of the ages gone remains, an ever-growing volume for the ages yet to come.

If instituted Christianity were the essential religion of Jesus, it would not be so wanting in the ethical emphasis. How sadly, in its quarrelling sects, has it missed his simple gospel of human virtues and blessings!

May I add as my last word, Let not the ethical culture movement, sprung out of a living sense of man's needs here and now, ever sink into a dead *ethicism*, and become the formal counterpart of a formal church. I hope, too, that it shall not drop to any revival of utilitarian modes, to the neglect of a rational idealism, which it may greatly help to keep alive.

Secured against such dangers, the ethical movement, I believe, is full of promise for man's redemption, not from Powers of Darkness of old figured to his terrified soul, but from his own evil and error; and his regeneration, not by any miraculous new birth from above, but out of his own instructed and ever-ennobled nature and life.

NEWS FROM THE SOCIETIES FOR ETHICAL CULTURE.

THE NEW YORK SOCIETY.

THE closing public meeting for the season was held on Sunday, May 13. As perhaps the most important occurrence of the past year—if it be considered in relation with the changes it implies and portends—is the departure of Dr. Coit from his field of labor in New York, it may be well to give here, in lieu of special report, the address he delivered before the Society at this closing meeting, as follows:

DR. COIT'S FAREWELL ADDRESS.

We celebrate this morning a double festival,—the birthday of our Society and the sending of our first missionary to a foreign land. The one occasion opens back upon the sure pathway we have trod together, and upon the grain-fields where we have worked. The other peers out with the eye of earnest apprehension upon what is not yet ours or any man's. Our peaceful sense of "something attempted, something done," must therefore blend to-day with thoughts of preparation for to-morrow's toil. The evening glow of our retrospection must give up some richness of its color before the gray light of duty approaching but not yet above the horizon.

Let me tell you the circumstances under which it happens that one of your Lecturers is to take charge of an Ethical Society in London.

South Place Chapel, a plain, old-fashioned building of brick, named for the street it is in, stands in the thick of the city's traffic, midway—as if partisan neither of the rich nor the poor, but mediator—between the East End and the West. It is in the very heart of London. This chapel bids fair to become identified with our movement. In it have gathered, Sunday after Sunday for sixty-three years, a religious society whose history previous to 1817 I have not had opportunity to trace, but whose mental growth from that time to this is clear, logical, and direct, away from theology towards an exaltation

of right living into an enthusiasm. It is a growth such as no physical organism ever undergoes,—a growth possible, however, to the human mind,—the return from old age back to the prime vigor of young manhood, casting off the crusty forms of ceremony and fixed habits and becoming free, agile, and alert again, spontaneous and generous.

South Place in sixty years has had but two regular ministers. The first, the Rev. W. J. Fox, led it for thirty-five years on from point to point of ever-widening emancipation. In about 1833 he abandoned the custom of taking a text for his discourses and declared his opposition to the Bible miracles. He devoted himself increasingly to social questions. He lectured on "Class Morality," on "The Moral View of the Corn Laws." His name is placed along with that of Cobden and Bright as an anti-corn-law agitator (Professor Seelye, of Cambridge, England, told me last summer that Fox often outshone either of the other two as a corn-law orator); and he specially devoted himself to the question of national education. In 1847 he entered Parliament, in 1850 he introduced a bill to promote the Secular Education of the People of England. He was everywhere free and ready to see the good even in things new and untried. He it was who in the literary world first recognized and welcomed the genius of Tennyson and Browning. Thus you can see he must have been a man after our heart.

From 1852 to 1863 the society was without a settled minister; but at the latter date Mr. Conway, who had gone to England with the purpose of influencing English opinion in favor of our North, began preaching at South Place, and during the twenty-one years of his leadership it evinced the same vitality and youth, the same marked capacity for growth. Soon forms of prayer were abandoned, and along with the Bible, selections from the higher literature of all nations were read as part of the morning exercises. It outgrew Christianity and with it the name. It called itself simply a religious society. Until ten years ago its position was that of theism and freethought. But in the last ten years Mr. Conway's own mind outgrew theism, and he brought his congregation to see

with him that belief in a personal God or immortality is not necessary to life and hope, but when regarded as such is a cause of discord among men.

In the last three years South Place has had no settled minister, but has continued its Sunday morning lectures, inviting men of various opinions to speak for them. And yet, even in these three years, they seem to have been growing in the same direction. In his last discourse there Mr. Conway pointed to America, believing that this, the home of all races, would be the cradle of a universal religion. Upon his return to America, as you may remember hearing him say, he recognized in our movement at least the germ of the future religion, and he wrote his people so. Through him two of our Lecturers, besides Professor Adler, were invited to speak at South Place. More than this, in Mr. Conway's lecture on "Unitarianism and its Grandchildren," he pointed to us as the heir of the future. That lecture was read at South Place by one of the members, and was then published by the society in pamphlet form. All these circumstances were preparing them to unite with us. They were therefore ready to receive most sympathetically the outline I tried to present to them last September of "Ethical Culture as a Religion for the People." And that they soon after gave me an invitation to become their Lecturer, chiefly shows how they had already grown in unity of mind among themselves and with us. I told them I would not come without the consent of the four other Ethical Lecturers; that on no account would I break away from the Ethical Union; if I came I should only come sent by the Ethical Societies. I felt the time for separate free-thinking societies was past. I had never belonged to any church in my life; the Ethical Society was the first religious body I had ever united with, and as it gave me room to work and think and satisfy my need of moral fellowship, I should never leave it. It was with this understanding they invited me to come. But still I feared I might be separating myself too much from our Union. I agreed with the other Lecturers that unless the name should be changed to South Place *Ethical Society* I ought not to go. But to this condition also

they yielded. Certainly they have given evidence that they are in good faith a sister Society of ours.

So much for the relation of South Place within itself to us. But the fact of their calling an Ethical Lecturer has a wider significance than the gain of one more society to our number: it means that we have got a foothold for our work and organization in England. Now there is no country in the world that has greater need of our movement, and in a certain sense is riper for it. Yet none where the outlook is less hopeful. The problem there is difficult and complicated; it is partly political, partly moral, and in great part sentimental. It is political because of the state Church, which through its recognition by the government gains a prestige and influence which permit it utterly to eclipse every effort at religious organization outside itself; it draws almost all the talent and culture of the nation, not to the pulpit perhaps, but into outward conformity in the lay membership. It is a question of morals, because almost the whole nation seem to think it justifiable to give assent to doctrines they have long ceased to believe, and to take part in ceremonies which have no inward meaning to them. It is a question of sentiment, so far as the beauty of the music and architecture and associations in memory charm and attract many. The Church of England dominating, the ethical movement, if it should make a little headway there, is almost sure to be simply one more sect. Sectarianism in its evil effects or character is a thing we do not know here; all denominations with us being on a level, it is as if we had no sects. But there it means a cramping of your life, a narrowing and hardening of your sentiments in the consciousness that you are off in a corner moping by yourself. The ethical movement in England must wrestle with this question of a national church, which, as soon as the Irish difficulties are at an end, will become the centre of political controversy. The Church now does not include half the nation, it does not embrace the religious life of the people, and yet assumes such pretensions. Our Ethical Society, I verily believe, offers the solution of the difficulty. We are not a sect, we are a universal church or we are nothing! According to the Constitution of

our Union of Societies for Ethical Culture, we welcome all who wish to elevate their own moral life and that of the community, "whatever may be their theological opinions." If so, men might still be church members, and, provided they did not count the old doctrines essential to a right life, they could at the same time unite with our Societies. Now I find on every side many who still hold to the old doctrines and forms, but never think of rating them as essential. Further, there is in England as well as in America a longing in all denominations to unite. Already they are co-operating in practical philanthropy; let them now all join hands on the fundamental principles of ethics, and, behold! while still in their separate church clinging to their old beliefs although no longer as essential, they have become one vast Society for Ethical Culture, a body well worthy, if any might be, of the state protection and support. I have not the slightest ground for believing that our movement would succeed in such an effort in England, I only mean it must assert its right to lay claim to such a mission, its fitness to become the national church, by including all others. And it is infinitely easier to convince Christians that their beliefs are not essential to a right life than to show them that their beliefs are not true. I found in England, under the wing of the broad church, one of the most perfect Ethical Societies conceivable, although not calling itself such. I was invited, during my stay in London, to be a resident at Toynbee Hall, of which I have spoken here before. Feeling that not being a Christian, if the fact were discovered, I might possibly seem to the others a wolf in the fold, I went to the young curate there, expecting to make a clean breast of my heresies. I began by asking him what religious tests were demanded of the young men who wished to live at Toynbee. His answer took the wind quite out of my ethical sails. He said, "Simply that a man shall be unselfish, and prove himself so in his conduct." What was that but a body of young men making unselfishness the one essential thing in the organization of their highest life? Each held his own views in theology, but none counted his doctrines necessary to anybody else's unselfishness. There

was an illustration of what the universal church must be, and of what our Societies are more and more to become,—a company of young people struggling to rid themselves of self and proving their sincerity by their conduct! I say, in England such would be our task. Ultimately it will be the same here, but it will be longer before the question of a national church comes to the foreground in America.

But there is another method by which the ethical culture movement must meet the church question. While it will leave all those who sincerely believe to remain, each in his own church, it must deal very differently with those who stay after they no longer believe. It must handle them severely. It must shame them as John Morley does in his essay on "Compromise." The only church member whom an Ethical Society never could admit to its membership would be the man whose church conformity is a lie. We should have by preaching straightforwardness and uprightness, and by practising it bravely, to drive him, goad him, sting him out of his cowardly hiding. A popular honesty-campaign similar to the temperance crusade would be needed, an anti-hypocrisy society. Non-conformity and ethical culture for non-believers; for believers, conformity and ethical culture!

Our ideas are very wide-spread in England already. The broad-church people are with us the whole way, minus intellectual honesty. "You are a broad-churchman," said a young Oxford graduate to me after hearing my four lectures. I told him I was only not broad enough to declare I believed what I did not believe.

But besides the broad-churchmen, the Positivists for the last thirty years have had a tremendous weight in crushing theological prejudices and pushing to the front humanitarian thought. The Positivists have failed to organize a growing church; they have been ridiculed for their worship of humanity, and for their pretended science, which turns out to be antiquated already.

The English workingmen, judging from the orators they cheer at their social clubs, are secularists.

Now, ethical culture being not coarse and mechanical in its

methods of reform as secularism is, nor so sentimental and set in its way as positivism, and braver in the truth than the liberal church, bids fair to challenge the respect and meet the needs of all. Our movement, if it receive the guidance of wise hands, might therefore become what other efforts have failed to be,—the rallying-point of a new moral life for the nation.

In going to England I would have you feel as I do, that I am carrying thither little of my own, but a sacred trust belonging to you more than to me, since I am one of the latest admitted into ownership. I take with me more than my own abilities and wit; I have gathered all I could of wisdom from your twelve years of experience as a society. I go to represent you at the court of the honest English mind. The fame of your character and your good works precede me and will assist me. I feel strong, not in myself, but in our united life. Besides, I am encouraged by your personal kindness to me during these two years of my apprenticeship as a Lecturer and worker, encouraged to believe that I shall be received with a similar kindness by the new society. Filled with a sense of the responsibility I assume, troubled by the fear that I may not guard my trust worthily of you, I ask, with gratitude for the past, that your kind thought still shield me. For I may fail entirely when I am away from you,—I shall not have that which has been my chief help. Since I have been with you I have never undertaken anything, even the slightest, without getting first the advice and consent of a man always ready to listen, a man as tender and considerate towards the trifling needs of his friend, as he is just and wise and devoted to the mighty cause of the whole world's progress. His hand has steadied me daily; his far-seeing thought has warned me; his character has enlarged me. Such has been my great fortune, such is my prime loss. It is no underrating of my own strength, but because I am aware of his, that the sense of my own feebleness comes over me at the thought of working no longer at his side. I shall bear with me all I can of his and your character and thought. I take my leave of you grateful for everything. Let this feeling be a pledge of lasting faithfulness!

THE CHICAGO SOCIETY.

EARLY in April a circular appeared and was widely distributed in Chicago, of which the following is a copy :

ECONOMIC CONFERENCES BETWEEN BUSINESS-MEN AND WORKINGMEN.

It is proposed to endeavor to make business-men and workingmen better acquainted with one another's views.

How many business-men have attended workingmen's meetings and know at first hand what their ideas and aims are ?

How many workingmen ever hear their employers or other leaders of business enterprise explain their views and the problems with which they have to deal ?

Business-men have their clubs and various associations, at which they state and defend their views,—but to people who are already convinced.

Workingmen have their union and assembly meetings,—and the same is true, in substance, of them.

What is needed is to bring these people together, and to help each to understand the other. Such is the *aim*, at least, of the proposed Economic Conferences. They have been arranged with a sincere desire to promote a better feeling in the community.

It needs but a glance at the programme appended to see that men fairly representing the great business interests of Chicago, and the different phases of thought and organization among workingmen, are to take part in turn. It would, of course, be most desirable that working-people should hear the addresses from the business-man's stand-point, and that business-men should largely make up the audience of the representatives of the workingmen. At least it is hoped that business-men will not allow it to be said that they are unwilling to take the trouble to hear the ideas of the workingmen, when an occasion offers and a special invitation is extended to them. An earnest appeal is hereby made to their patriotism and love of fair play. It is believed that workingmen will come out in good numbers.

On account of the dangers of miscellaneous discussion, it is proposed to exclude it from these meetings. But at the conclusion of the address of the evening, any one in the audience shall be at liberty to question the speaker as to any point he or she may not be satisfied about, provided the question is stated in a respectful manner. It is hoped that such questions and answers will prove an instructive and profitable feature of each meeting.

The choice of Sunday evening will, it is believed, give offence to no one who remembers that this is the time when workingmen have most leisure.

The meetings will be open to all. No admission-fee will be charged.

The Conferences will take place at the Hall, 45 East Randolph Street (up one flight), Sunday evenings, at eight o'clock.

PROGRAMME.

April 8, "The Aims of the Knights of Labor," George A. Schilling. April 15, "Banking and the Social System," Lyman J. Gage. April 22, "The Labor Question from the Stand-point of the Socialist," Thomas J. Morgan. April 29, "Is the Board of Trade Hostile to the Interests of the Community?" Charles L. Hutchinson. May 6, "A View from the Labor Sanctum," Joseph R. Buchanan. May 13, "Socialism as a Remedy," Franklin MacVeagh. May 20, "An American Trade-Unionist's View of the Social Question," A. C. Cameron.

The circular had been prepared and the arrangements for the Conferences made by Mr. Salter. It should be stated that he did so of his own motion, so that no one else was responsible for the scheme and its possible failure but himself. The first meeting, however, held at the rooms of the Ethical Society (which had been kindly offered by the Treasurer free of expense), proved that the plan was to work successfully. The little hall, seating two hundred, was fairly jammed, the aisles; entrance-way, and platform being occupied, and many being turned away. A larger room was needed, and the second and subsequent meetings were held in the Madison Street Theatre, capable of seating eight hundred or more people. The theatre was full almost every night, and often people were obliged to stand. The first meeting organized with Alderman W. R. Manierre in the chair, Mark L. Crawford, a leading trades-unionist, as Vice-Chairman, and Joseph W. Errant as Secretary. The expenses of meeting in the theatre were privately met. From the start the local papers gave extended notices of the Conferences, and ideas advanced at them not infrequently gave rise to editorial paragraphs or articles. The *Tribune*, in commenting on the close of the series, said,—

"But whether any conversions to correct social views have been made or not, it is a gratifying fact that an audience of several hundred people holding the most diverse opinions can discuss their theories in the freest manner without getting into unseemly quarrels. There were no restrictions as to the attendance at these meetings, and no steps were taken to preserve order; yet there were no unpleasant incidents. If the warring elements of society could be brought together in this manner more frequently there would be less bitterness between the rich and the poor, fewer labor troubles, and less windy talk about 'social revolution.'"

Space cannot be taken here to describe the Conferences in detail. Almost all the different points of view among work-

ingmen were represented in the course of the series. Mr. Schilling spoke for the Knights of Labor. He is, perhaps, the leading man in that order in Chicago. He explained the platform of the order, and yet expressed his own dissent in certain particulars from it. The platform, he conceded, was socialistic; as for himself, he was a believer in individualism and *laissez-faire*, and did not think that government could successfully run even a poor-house, not to say a railroad or a telegraph-system. Mr. Morgan, on the other hand, defended Socialism. He is the leader among the Socialists of Chicago, at least, the English-speaking ones. He said he regarded the formation of corporations and pools and trusts as inevitable; the true way was not to fight against them, but to let them have their course, and, as the monopoly became perfect, the government should step in and take control. Not immediately, or by any sweeping scheme, but as fast as business became monopoly, and in the order in which various branches of it assumed this character, should government step in,—not to confiscate, but to buy out. Mr. Buchanan has had unusual facilities as an editor (he is editor of the *Labor Enquirer*) for becoming acquainted with various phases of thought among workingmen, yet his own views were evidently Socialistic. Mr. Cameron, on the other hand, took the conservative Trades-Unionist view of the labor question, and advocated private corporation and profit-sharing. Mr. Cameron is a printer, Mr. Buchanan an editor, Mr. Morgan a brass-finisher, Mr. Schilling a cooper.

The business-men who addressed the Conferences are, as the *Herald* said, "three of the most progressive and prominent of Chicago's citizens." Mr. Gage is the Vice-President of the First National Bank. Mr. Hutchinson is President of the Board of Trade. Mr. MacVeagh is a leading wholesale merchant. Chicago workingmen are apt to have strong feeling against banks and still stronger against the Board of Trade. It is too much to expect that their opinions have been changed by Mr. Gage's and Mr. Hutchinson's able addresses, but some misconceptions must have been removed, some prejudices dissipated. Mr. Gage refused to allow that the

National Banks were monopolies, and pointed out the small value of their privilege of issuing notes, as shown by the fact that Chicago banks, with a right to issue over fourteen millions of dollars in such notes, have outstanding less than one million dollars. He pointed out the similarity between Trusts and Trades-Unions, yet held that both, if wisely conducted, may be productive of good. Mr. Hutchinson pointed out the commercial functions of the Board of Trade with great clearness. He held that its members were merchants, not speculators. The Board offers unusual attraction to the speculator, he admitted, but it does not exist for that purpose. Its business is to market the surplus grain and provision products of the country. It does not countenance corners, strives to prevent them, and generally succeeds. Eight out of ten corners, Mr. Hutchinson said, ruin those who try to run them. Mr. MacVeagh could not allow that the industrial system was making the poor poorer, but admitted that the poor were not made rich enough and that the rich were made richer than need be. It was greatly reducing, too, the number of small employers, and of self-employers. Free competition as an unmodified law, Mr. MacVeagh said, was a complete failure. The ease with which fortunes are made is abnormal. Mr. MacVeagh deprecated child-labor, and favored the reduction of the hours of labor. But Socialism, he urged in an elaborate argument, was impossible, undesirable, and unnecessary.

After each address questions were poured in upon the speaker from the audience. But as a rule they were given and answered in good temper. Perhaps the best result of the Conferences was the friendlier feeling produced between "classes," if that word must be used, that usually look on one another with suspicion. Many business-men were surprised at the intelligence displayed by the workingmen. Mr. Hutchinson made this rather startling statement: "Just here the average business-man may learn a good lesson from the workingmen. The latter have given more time, attention, and thought to these social problems than the former, and many among them can come out of the shop, take their place upon this platform, and express their thoughts, intelligent

thoughts, upon some of these vital questions of the day in such a manner as would put to shame the average business-man." It must be admitted that the workingmen were much more willing to hear the business-man's side of the question than the business-men were to listen to the workingmen's views. Two-thirds, if not three-fourths, of the audience, as a rule, was made up of workingmen.

At the last Conference a motion was made by a workingman to extend a vote of thanks to Mr. Salter, and to request him to arrange a similar plan for another year. This was carried by a unanimous rising vote.

Annual Meeting.—The annual meeting of the Society was held April 11. The Secretary's report showed that the Society had gained nineteen new members during the year, and lost six by resignation or death. The Treasurer reported that \$1235, in the form of extra subscriptions, to pay off debts and meet the increased expense of holding the Sunday lectures in the Grand Opera-House, had been raised, making a total of \$3780.75. There was a balance of \$23.52 in the Treasury, something unknown before in the history of the Society.

The May Monthly Conference of the Society was addressed by Dr. Paul Carus, editor of the *Open Court*, on "The Idea of God." The speaker discussed in a learned manner the etymology of the word "God," discarded the supernatural element in the idea as hitherto understood, and defined God as "the ethical life in nature." The paper was a notable one for its calmness and breadth of view.

The Closing Exercises.—The lecture season closed on the last Sunday in May. The exercises were of a patriotic character, in honor of Memorial Day. The platform had been handsomely decorated with flags and flowers by some ladies of the Society. The Ethical School was present and sang "The Country's Call" and "America" in a spirited manner, the audience joining with the children in the last one. Professor Lammers rendered a solo, between the two addresses of the day, with striking effect. The opening address was

given by General M. M. Trumbull, who had been brigadier-general in the late war, and whose eloquent words touched every heart. Mr. Salter followed on "Ethics and Public Life," pointing out the dangers to our country in time of peace.

THE PHILADELPHIA SOCIETY.

THE story of the past season's work, so far as public events go, is outlined in the following calendar of meetings held and lectures delivered during 1887 and 1888:

October 16, "The Place and Work of an Ethical Society," S. B. Weston.

October 23, "The Moral and Religious Education of Children in the Churches," S. B. Weston.

October 30, "The Moral Issue in our Municipal Politics," S. B. Weston.

November 6, Business Conference of the Society.

November 13, "The Moral and Religious Education of the Children in the Ethical Societies," S. B. Weston.

November 20, "Individual Responsibility in Social Development," S. F. Weston.

November 27, "Important Forward Steps in the Ethical Movement," S. B. Weston.

December 4, Business Conference. Paper by Miss Charlotte Porter on "Work of Home Section."

December 11, "The Ethics of Shakespeare," Stanton Coit.

December 18, "Ethical Culture as a Religion for the People," Stanton Coit.

December 25, "Our Debt to Christianity," S. B. Weston.

January 1, Home Section. Public meeting. Addresses by Dr. C. N. Peirce and Dr. Frances Emily White on "Dietetics."

January 8, "Law and Liberty *versus* Anarchism," S. B. Weston.

January 15, "The Right to the Products of One's Labor," S. B. Weston.

January 22, "The Leisure Hours of the Working-People and the Neighborhood Guild," S. B. Weston.

January 29, "Emerson and the Doctrine of Evolution," Edwin D. Mead.

February 5, Young People's Section. Public meeting. Addresses by S. F. Weston and Tatui Baba on "Prisons and Prison Reform."

February 12, "George Fox," S. B. Weston.

February 19, "The Principles and History of the Society of Friends," S. B. Weston.

February 26, "The Society of Friends and the Ethical Movement," S. B. Weston.

March 4, Home Section. Public meeting. Address by Dr. Frances Emily White on "The Influence of Physical Culture on Intellectual Development."

March 11, "Woman's Work in Social Reform," Stanton Coit.

- March 18, "The God Idea in Religion," S. B. Weston.
- March 25, "The Moral Idea *versus* the God Idea in Religion," S. B. Weston.
- April 1, Young People's Section. Public meeting. Address by Prof. Felix Adler on "The Idea of Culture applied to Business Life."
- April 8, "Mohammed, his Career and Work," Dr. Morris Jastrow, Jr.
- April 15, "The Final Aim of Life," S. B. Weston.
- April 17, Annual business meeting and election.
- April 22, Union meeting of Ethical Society with Independent Church at St. George's Hall. Addresses by M. M. Mangasarian and S. B. Weston on "The Religion for To-day."
- April 29, Second union meeting of Ethical Society and Independent Church in St. George's Hall. Addresses by J. H. Clifford and S. B. Weston on "Are we Christians?"
- May 6, Third union meeting of Ethical Society and Independent Church in St. George's Hall. Lecture by M. M. Mangasarian on "Gladstone's Reply to Ingersoll."
- May 13, Closing public meeting of the season and celebration of third anniversary of the Society, Sunday evening, in Natatorium Hall. Addresses by Dr. C. N. Peirce, Rev. J. H. Clifford, of Germantown Unitarian Church, W. M. Salter, and S. B. Weston.

The Third Anniversary and closing public meeting for the season, held Sunday evening, May 13, was of especial interest. The exercises began with music,—Miss Mawson giving an effective vocal solo. Mr. Weston then delivered a short address, in effect as follows, on

THE RELIGION OF ETHICS.

It is the religion of ethics which this Society has been upholding in Philadelphia for the past three years. The subject is world-wide, covering every one of our manifold human relationships and every phase of human thought and endeavor. In any single address, only one or another phase of this vast subject can be touched upon. The religion of ethics, as I understand it, means a religion founded on ethics, a religion which makes for the moral good of mankind,—the perfecting of individual character, and the shaping of a righteous social order. The ethical movement aims to forward and establish such a religion. This movement does not rest, as some seem to think, on a basis of scepticism and negation. It rests on a positive basis, and has positive, constructive aims. We believe far more than we disbelieve. If

we have lost our faith in the prevailing theological systems, it is because we believe in the universal rationality of things. These systems, in our eyes, do not exalt, but rather belittle, the moral worth and meaning of man and the universe. If we disbelieve in human-like divinities placed afar off, it is because we believe in a sacred, divine reality whose habitation is within us,—the indwelling divinity, uttering itself in conscience and growing in good deeds.

A duet having been rendered by the Misses Mawson, the President of the Society, Dr. C. N. Peirce, gave in a few earnest words, as follows, his

REASONS FOR BELIEF IN ETHICAL CULTURE.

I believe in the religion of ethics because it is easily understood and needs no theologian to interpret it.

I believe in it because it measures men by their good deeds rather than by their gold dollars, by greatness in good works rather than greatness in great wealth.

I believe in it because it is applicable to every industry or profession, and is equally appropriate and should be equally welcome in the counting-house as on the street, in the library as in the parlor, in the kitchen as in the dining-room.

I believe in it because its mission and aim is to make society and the country as rich morally as it is materially.

I believe in it because it gives us hope for a better, a nobler life,—one more worthy of living than the present.

And last, but not least, I believe in it because it makes it possible for our children and our children's children to realize our unfulfilled aspirations. I believe in it because, when we are forgotten, and the handful of dust—all that is left of us—shall be blown by the winds or mingled with the earth, those who shall occupy our places shall, through the influence of our religion of ethics, be made more worthy of the inheritance of life.

The Rev. J. H. Clifford, of the Unitarian Church of Germantown, then addressed the audience on "Ethics and the Pulpit,"—a lecture given in full in the present number of the

RECORD. The exercises of the day were closed by Mr. Salter, who gave the following words on

COURAGE IN RELIGION.

Man is called a thinking animal, but it is the adventurous spirits, as a rule, who think, and the rest follow in their wake. Thinking is not a logical machine that goes on of itself. We can often make it stop where we should like it to stop; we can bring up short of the conclusion we dimly see in the distance. It takes courage to face one's doubts, to let them have their full sweep. And yet I firmly believe it is because men do not think them out that they are so ill at ease. A new continent of faith is ahead of us, if we would only venture for it. Courage not merely to think, but to act is needed. It takes one sort of courage to see the truth, and another to brave public opinion and not keep silent about it. To put it roughly, it takes nerve to see the truth; it takes blood to speak it out. There are many people with fine nervous organizations, but bloodless. They keep their own counsel,—or, at best, have their intimate friends to whom they disclose their mind. Erasmus, if bidden to keep silent, would obey. To Luther such practices were a damnable imposture. No difference of ideas, but a difference of spirit. Honor to those who are not fractions of men, but whole,—who believe thoughts are not a substitute for action, but only a guide and impulse to action! Honor to those who have great hearts as well as great heads,—who cannot only point, but lead the way! Religion itself is to us a form of courage. It consists in fighting evil in the world. We do not *know* that we can conquer, but we believe it all the same. Be not discouraged at the evil in the world: it is there to be conquered, to make courage a virtue; it is there because the Spirit of the World leaves us the arbiters of our own destinies, and calls for brave men and women, and not idlers nor slaves, to do his work. This is a poor world for the coward; it is a good enough world for the brave.

THE ST. LOUIS SOCIETY.

Workingmen's Reading-Rooms.—The St. Louis Society has followed the lead of the Society in New York in turning the direction of its philanthropic work in the direction of education. But instead of giving the first attention to children it was decided to consider first the needs of the grown people, by opening up wider opportunities for reading among the working-classes. A circular was issued in one of the evening papers of the city, signed by three well-known men in St. Louis, stating the purpose and asking for the sum of one thousand dollars. Three ladies—Mrs. J. A. St. John, Mrs. James H. Green, and Mrs. L. D. Hildenbrandt—kindly consented to do the canvassing, and the total subscriptions amounted to \$1015.50. The reading-rooms were opened at 1532 Franklin Avenue in March. They were provided with daily and weekly papers and the monthly magazines. The religious as well as the anti-religious papers are excluded. The rooms have been open evenings and all day Sundays. The attendance has been good, and it has been interesting to notice how much the better class of literature has been read. A course of popular illustrated lectures and readings on science, art, and history were held on Friday evenings. A committee of workingmen was organized to take the matter in charge, and to dispose of course tickets at fifty cents a ticket, it being understood that the proceeds should go to develop a free library in connection with the rooms. This introduction of a workingmen's committee has proved a very satisfactory feature in the undertaking. The Washington University professors very cordially co-operated in the lecture course.

As the rooms are not used during the day, save on Sundays, the ladies have organized a sewing-school for children of the neighborhood, which meets on Friday afternoons.

Annual Meeting.—The Society held its annual meeting at Memorial Hall, Saturday evening, May 12. The annual report was read and several amendments to the by-laws were passed. The Secretary reported a membership of one hun-

dred and ninety-one, and the Treasurer reported that subscriptions towards the expenses of the Society had been received from twenty non-members and one hundred and seventy-six members of the Society.

Public Lectures.—The following is the list of subjects treated in the addresses on Sunday mornings at Memorial Hall :

- October 16, "The Future of Religion," W. L. Sheldon.
- October 23, "How shall we Deal with the God Idea in the Religious Education of the Young?" W. L. Sheldon.
- October 30, "How shall we Deal with the Old Testament in the Religious Education of the Young?" W. L. Sheldon.
- November 6, "Courage," W. M. Salter.
- November 13, "The Drift of Modern Culture," W. L. Sheldon.
- November 27, "Is Ethics without Religion?" W. L. Sheldon.
- December 4, "The Practical Side of Ethics," W. L. Sheldon.
- December 11, "The Spirit of the Coming Philanthropy," W. L. Sheldon.
- December 18, "How shall we Deal with the Story of Jesus in the Religious Education of the Young?" W. L. Sheldon.
- December 25, "Ethics for Children." A Responsive Exercise by the Children on the Platform, W. L. Sheldon.
- January 1, "What have we to Offer in Place of the Old Faith?" W. M. Salter.
- January 8, "Charles Darwin," W. L. Sheldon.
- January 15, "The Field-Ingersoll Controversy," W. L. Sheldon.
- January 22, Address by the President of the Society, Dr. Charles W. Stevens.
- February 5, "What is Ethics?" W. L. Sheldon.
- February 12, "Are we Agnostics?" Prof. Felix Adler.
- February 19, "The Old Testament from a Human Stand-point," Prof. Felix Adler.
- February 26, "Are we Atheists?" W. L. Sheldon.
- March 4, "Are we Materialists?" W. L. Sheldon.
- March 11, "The New Testament from a Human Stand-point," W. L. Sheldon.
- March 18, "Religion not Theology," J. C. Learned.
- March 25, "Success and Failure of the Sermon on the Mount," W. L. Sheldon.
- April 1, "Practical Religion for the Western World," W. L. Sheldon.
- April 8, Morning, "The Social Responsibilities of Young Men," Stanton Coit.
- April 8, Afternoon, "The Social Responsibilities of Young Women," Stanton Coit.
- April 15, "Why we cannot Pray," W. L. Sheldon.
- April 22, "The Substitute for Prayer," W. L. Sheldon.
- April 29, "Transitional Religion," W. M. Salter.
- May 6, "The Future of the Ethical Movement," W. L. Sheldon.
- May 13, "Count Tolstoi and his Religion," W. L. Sheldon.

GENERAL NOTES.

—A TRANSLATION of Mr. Salter's lectures in Dutch has just appeared in Amsterdam. The translator is the Rev. P. H. Hugenholtz, Jr., the minister of a large Free Congregation in Amsterdam. The volume has the title "*Zedelijke Religie*, door P. H. Hugenholtz, Jr., bewerkt naar W. M. Salter's *Religion der Moral*, Amsterdam, Tj. van Holkema, 1888." It contains two hundred and eighty-two pages, and has all the lectures of Prof. G. von Gizycki's German translation, "*Die Religion der Moral*," save "Wendell Phillips" and "Why Unitarianism does not Satisfy Us."

—A PAPER in the June *Unitarian Review*, by Mr. A. Emerson Palmer, on "Righteousness and Worship," speaks thus of the movement for ethical culture and its departure from past methods of moral development:

"The history of the Church (or rather of the churches) has been marred and disfigured by hostility, hatred, jealousy, and animosity. Churches have been striving to make men think alike. Here was one fundamental error. Their purpose should have been to achieve, not unity of belief, but unity of spirit. To make men and women think alike on speculative questions is an impossibility. To induce them to work together in a common purpose, to establish a kingdom of righteousness, truth, love, and justice,—this is no idle or visionary scheme. . . . Another cardinal error in the orthodox Christian churches, both past and present, has been that they made this glorious kingdom of heaven on earth merely a side issue, their chief object being to secure an eternity of bliss in another sphere of being. But religion is no longer a matter that concerns itself wholly or chiefly with the future. It is seen to take hold with real and vital energy upon every part and phase and circumstance of the life that now is."

Mr. Palmer quotes from the "Statement of Principles" of the New York Society, and from published addresses of the Lecturers, and adds, "We offer no special plea for ethical cul-

ture; but here surely is a religion capable of rousing men to noblest endeavor and loftiest attainment." Having granted so much, he still seems loath to yield full approval, and concludes, "The mistake of this school lies in minimizing the relation of humanity to the overshadowing and all-embosoming World-mystery. It seeks to put into the dim background the sense of awe, wonder, and worship, which will not down, which constitutes an essential and inseparable factor in any religious scheme or system that is to satisfy the deepest need and holiest aspirations of the soul. This is the radiant background against which are to be set our unceasing endeavors towards the attainment of moral perfection in ourselves and in our fellows."

We venture to ask, Is the defect, then, merely a difference in backgrounds,—the one "dim" the other "radiant"? And is not any attempt to put everybody's background in the same light a subtle recurrence of that old strife of the churches, a moment before deplored, to make men think alike instead of work together? Who shall decide whose background is "dim" and whose is "radiant"? It is the fulfilling of the principle on which the movement for ethical culture is founded to leave it to every man to characterize the luminosity of his background as he may, in the faith that this will tend not towards "minimizing the relation of humanity to the overshadowing and all-embosoming World-mystery," but rather towards enlarging and vitalizing that relation.


This quotation from the Constitution of *The Ethical Union* seems in point:

"The general aim of the Ethical Movement, as represented by this Union, is to elevate the moral life of its members and that of the community, and it cordially welcomes to its fellowship all persons who sympathize with this aim, *whatever may be their theological or philosophical opinions.*"

—AMONG the "Open Letters" of the June *Century* will be found a good account of the work and aim of the Free Workingman's School and Kindergarten, established by the New York Society for Ethical Culture.

GENTLY FALL THE DEWS OF EVE.

W. H. POMMER.




1. { Gent-ly fall the dew's of eve, Raising still the languid flow'rs;
Kind-ly flow the tears that grieve, O'er a mourner's stricken hours.
2. { Brightly gleams the morning light, Heart revives and courage comes;
Smiles dispel the gloom of night, When the mind in sadness roams.




cres. Bless - ed tears and dew's that sweet Heal - ing bring and
Smiles and sun - light, tears and dew's, Heal - ing bring and



dim. strength impart. Let us still their praise re - peat,
strength impart. So our voice their praise re - news,



cres. Let us still their praise re - peat, For they soothe the
So our voice their praise re-news, For they soothe the



dim. hu - man heart, For they soothe the hu - man heart.
hu - man heart, For they soothe the hu - man heart.

YE FRIENDS OF FREEDOM.

Words by FELIX ADLER.

M. LUTHER.
Arr. by HOLST HANSEN.

1. Ye friends of free-dom, rise, a-wake, Wa-ge-now your ho - ly
 2. Now fear not, tho' the war of hate A-round our path-way
 3. Lift up your souls, make broad the way, Spurn meaner paths al-

bat - - tle; The cru - el chains of false-hood break—The
 rag - - es, We march be-neath the flag of fate—We
 -lur - - ing—Oh con - se - crate your lives to - day To

yoke of e - vil shat - ter, Let not old forms of
 bear the hope of a - - ges. What tho' our band be
 what is great en - dur - - ing! The heart's hope can - not

wrong—Their hateful reign pro-long, Up, let the good u-nite, Up,
 few, If but our hearts be true, What tho' the goal be far, See
 lie—The heart's trust cannot die, True reign th'e - ter - nal laws, To

let us fight the fight, For truth, for light and glo - - ry.
 ev - 'ry sa - cred star—Sheds gold-en hope to cheer us.
 servethem is our cause—We will, we can-not fal - ter.

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VOL. I.

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OCTOBER, 1888.

CONTENTS:

- THE FINAL AIM OF LIFE. *S. Burns Weston*
- THE ETHICS OF INSOLVENCY. *Leo. G. Rosenblatt*
- A RESPONSIVE EXERCISE FOR ETHICAL CLASSES
- AN ABRIDGED FORM OF THE SAME EXERCISE
- A STARLIT NIGHT BY THE SEA-SHORE. Lines suggested by
Matthew Arnold's "Self-Dependence." *W. Walsham Bedford* .
- GENERAL NOTES
- MUSIC.—There are Lonely Hearts—One by One

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IT is the purpose of this RECORD to present NEWS OF THE ETHICAL MOVEMENT at large, but especially of the work in progress in the different Societies belonging to the Union of Societies for Ethical Culture. The general spirit and aim of the Movement will receive expression in regular contributions by Prof. Felix Adler, Mr. W. M. Salter, Mr. S. B. Weston, Mr. W. L. Sheldon, and Dr. Stanton Colt.

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THE ETHICAL RECORD.

OCTOBER, 1888.

THE FINAL AIM OF LIFE.

AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE SOCIETY FOR ETHICAL
CULTURE OF PHILADELPHIA, APRIL 15, 1888, BY S. BURNS
WESTON.

THE question raised by Aristotle, at the outset of his great work on ethics, What is the highest aim of human action? is one of the fundamental questions of moral philosophy. Every rational act, Aristotle observes, has a definite purpose. Every art, every profession, every kind of occupation is pursued for some purpose. "Of medicine," he says, "the end is health, of ship-building, a ship, of generalship, victory," etc.

Of the different ends of human activity, some are subordinate to others; some are pursued simply as a means to the attainment of certain other ends. But they all lead, or are supposed to lead, to some practical good,—good, at least, in making possible the realization of other things supposed to be good. Now, the last and highest good, according to Aristotle, the good which includes all others within itself, is the only absolute good. "If," he says, "there is some one end of all that we do, which we wish for on its own account, and if we wish for all other things on account of this . . . it is evident that this must be 'the good' and the greatest good. Has not then," he asks, "the knowledge of this end a great influence on the conduct of life? And, like archers, shall we

not be more likely to attain that which is right, if we have a mark?"

This question, which Aristotle raises at the beginning of his work on ethics, is one which comes directly home to all of us. What is the ultimate goal of our efforts? What is our leading purpose? What is the final aim of life?

The answer most people give to this question depends upon their general theory of the universe,—upon the special system of theology or philosophy they accept; in other words, they deduce the meaning and purpose of human life from their speculative theories of the universe. This is not the true method of procedure. Speculations concerning the infinite are not the true basis of a knowledge of the finite. Such speculations do not afford the proper key to the solution of the human problem. We must study, rather, human life itself, independently of speculative theories of the universe, if we would find out the laws and meaning and purpose of our existence. And, by faithful study, we can know ourselves. But who pretends to have any real knowledge of the infinite? The nature, character, and purpose—if it have a purpose—of the ultimate source of all life is a still unfathomed, if not an unfathomable, mystery. The speculations of philosophers in regard to a first cause have been going on for ages, but their speculations have given us no real knowledge of its being, nature, and attributes. Whether the power or powers which govern this universe are one or many; are personal or impersonal; are good or evil or morally indifferent, the highest faculties we possess, exercised to their utmost capacity, cannot or, at least, have not yet discovered. Only those who accept the theory of supernatural revelation claim to have any real knowledge of the mysteries of the infinite. Faith has boldly penetrated and cleared up for itself these mysteries, but human knowledge has not gone thus far. The knowledge grounded, not on reason and sound philosophy, but on faith in supernatural revelation, it is needless to say, is not knowledge. It gives the serious and earnest thinker no real light. It does not satisfy the rationalistic mind.

Now, the number of those who accept the stand-point of

rationalism in religion is every year rapidly increasing. There is a growing conviction among such that a knowledge of the true aim and duties of human life is in nowise furthered by theological speculations, or by endeavoring to fathom the mysteries of ultimate being. The questions of theology are purely speculative; but an inquiry, on the other hand, into the duties and significance and aim of our human life opens up a practical, moral, scientific question, to be settled by a careful, searching study of the facts, laws, and relationships of human nature itself,—moral, intellectual, and physical. Turning from theological research to human life, we pass at once out of the region of pure speculation and meet with facts which cannot be questioned, and which reveal to us, when properly understood, not only the meaning and worth of our own life, but the relation in which we should stand to the great cosmic whole.

By virtue of the moral and rational nature with which we are endowed we are able to know, to guide, and control ourselves; we find that we have duties and responsibilities,—that we can distinguish between high and low motives, and can set before ourselves and follow, if we will, a high purpose in living. Now, a knowledge of the laws of our development, of our chief duties, and of the higher purpose of our existence—that is to say, a knowledge of what our true part is in this infinite universe in which we live—is, it seems to me, of infinitely more value than to know, were it possible, by what genius or spirit or powers or divinities this universe is sustained and governed. Better far to know ourselves than to know all about the whole of the rest of the universe.

“ Know well thyself. Presume not God to scan.
The proper study of mankind is man.”

The ancient Greeks, therefore, who wrote upon one of their temples “ To the unknown God,” and upon another “ Know thyself,” were wiser than the great apostle of primitive Christianity, who endeavored to impart to the people of Athens a definite theology, the acceptance of which by *faith* he taught to be absolutely essential to salvation. But a greater than

Paul—one of the greatest moral teachers the world has ever known—had long before taught the supreme importance of self-knowledge. Socrates felt it to be a chief part of his mission as a moral teacher to turn people to a study of themselves. He believed fully that “the proper study of mankind is man.” The underlying principle of his teachings might be expressed in these two lines of a great living poet :

“Self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control,—
These three alone lead life to sovereign power.”

The world, when Socrates lived, was, however, not prepared for such high teaching. Instead of regarding it to be their chief duty to study themselves and learn and attend to their own needs and duties and responsibilities as rational and moral human beings, men deemed it their highest duty to devote a large part of their attention to the gods. The same mistake is made still, as a consequence of which progress in self-knowledge and in man's control over himself is greatly retarded.

Now, as regards self-knowledge, one of the most important things for us to know is, What is the ultimate purpose of our life? What is our final aim? And by this I do not mean, What is our final end?—a far different question. Our final end so far as this life is concerned is well known, and for all alike it is the same. The inevitable end of this life is death. Sometimes that end comes before life's labors are begun, sometimes when they are being actively pursued, and sometimes not until after they are finished; but sooner or later all human eyes are closed in eternal sleep, the lips are for the last time closed, the voice forever hushed, and the life, the thought, the soul-power depart, we know not how or whither. That great “sleep which rounds our little life” is a fact all must face. It comes once, and but once, to every human being, and after it, as has been truly said, all the rest is silence. The problem of our ultimate destiny is as yet unsolved. What lies beyond the grave is an entire mystery. There is no recrossing of the gulf that separates the here and the hereafter,—no message from our departed

ones to tell us of the future. Modern spiritualism, to be sure, takes a different view, but it has not made good its claim. The scientific investigation of spiritualism by the different Societies for Psychical Research has not as yet substantiated the theory of spirit communication.

But whichever way that question may be settled, it is not of our final destiny, but of the final aim of our present life-efforts that I wish to speak. The former is a question for science and philosophy to settle as best they can; the latter is a question of ethics,—one of the prime questions, which must be settled by the study of our moral and rational nature.

As to the final aim of human life there are three different views to which I would call attention,—the ancient Greek, the Christian, and the modern rationalistic view.

The position of Aristotle may, I think, be taken as best representing the ancient Greek attitude on this subject. According to Aristotle, ethics and all its problems rest on a purely natural basis. Man is a being with numerous natural desires or longings. What is the ultimate goal of those desires, and how is that to be reached? This, according to Aristotle, is the prime question of ethics. He claims that happiness is man's highest good, but admits, at the same time, that people differ as to the nature of the happiness they desire. Even the same person, he says, will find happiness in different things at different times; as, for instance, "when diseased, he believes it to be health; when poor, wealth," etc. But true happiness, says Aristotle, consists not in any material possessions, such as wealth affords, nor in the attainment of any given condition, such as health or honor. It consists, rather, in good actions,—in *well doing* and *well living*. Man's happiness or chief good, he argues, is "an energy of the soul according to reason;" or, to use another phrase of his, "an energy of the soul according to virtue." Marcus Aurelius, one of the noblest characters of antiquity, held substantially the same view. "If," he said, "thou *workest* at that which is before thee, following right reason, seriously, vigorously, calmly, without allowing anything else to distract thee, but keeping thy divine part pure; if thou *holdest to this*, expecting nothing, fearing nothing, but satis-

fied with thy present activity according to nature, and with heroic truth in every word and sound which thou utterest, thou wilt live happy." These definitions show plainly that the ancient Greek and Roman idea of happiness was not that of mere pleasure or enjoyment. It meant, rather, right living and right conduct, or the performance of noble and ideal actions.

The Grecian view of happiness is well illustrated in the story told by Herodotus of Cræsus and Solon. One day when Cræsus, the world-famous rich barbarian king, was showing Solon, the wisest of ancient law-givers, his treasures, Cræsus asked Solon whom of all men he knew he thought to be the happiest, supposing that he himself would be named on account of his riches. But Solon, after reflecting a moment, replied that the happiest man he had ever known was a simple Athenian citizen, who was in good health and had led a virtuous life. When asked who was the next happiest, Solon replied, one Tellus, an Athenian, who, after a long life of honorable citizenship, and after having reared a family of filial sons, had fallen in victorious battle for his fatherland. On being further asked by Cræsus whom he considered the next happiest, he answered, two brothers who passed out of life sweetly after having performed an act of filial devotion to their mother.

According to the view of happiness set forth by this story, nobility of character and action is what he must strive for who would be happy or who would possess the highest good.

The Greek and Roman moralists looked upon the perfection and happiness of the individual man as the *summum bonum*,—the highest aim of each man's life.

With the introduction of Christianity into the world a wholly new view of the aim of life came to be accepted. The very things the pagan moralists had extolled as of greatest importance were by Christianity given the least significance and esteemed as of the lowest worth. The natural man, Christianity taught, is evil. All true grace and virtue come from a supernatural source. The intellect, which the Greeks had made so much of in their systems of ethics, the Christian regarded as of no value whatever in itself. Paul calls the wise

man foolish. Nothing was good, according to the early Christians, that did not proceed from faith in the Christian revelation. "The virtues of the heathen," said St. Augustine, "are shining sins, because they are not grounded on the knowledge of God." "All that is not of faith is of sin." According to the Christian view not only were all pleasures and enjoyments wicked, but the natural man was a depraved being, and all his natural virtues were of no worth whatever. In fact, this life and all that proceeds from or is dictated by nature must be wholly renounced as an evil. "In the view of primitive Christians," says Sedgwick, "ordinary human society was a world temporarily surrendered to Satanic rule over which a swift and sudden destruction was impending; in such a world the little band who were gathered in the ark of the church could have no part or lot; the only attitude they could maintain towards it was that of passive alienation." The only true life, they held, is eternal life in the kingdom of heaven, living for evermore among the angels, glorifying God. This is the Christian aim. "To glorify God and to enjoy him forever is," says the church still, "the chief end of man."

But this view of the aim of life rationalists wholly discard. It is an aim which none would ever be led to adopt unless he first had full faith in the Christian revelation.

Eternal happiness in another life—the happiness consisting in glorifying God forever—is, to my mind, as an aim of life, infinitely inferior in moral worth to that taught by Aristotle. The final aim of life for all of us who do not profess to have any knowledge of the future, must, as with the ancient Greeks, refer wholly to our present existence.

What then, from the stand-point of modern rationalistic ethics, is the highest aim of our present life? Our lot having been cast here for a limited season, what is the one thing above all others that we should keep in view as the guiding star of all our conduct? We find mankind pursuing thousands of different callings, but is there not one common thing which we should all work for as the one aim of our life? Modern rationalistic ethics answers in the affirmative. And the aim it presents is far more like the ancient Greek than it is like

the Christian aim. Christian ethics is throughout based on supernaturalism. And by Christian ethics I mean that which is distinctively Christian. The doctrine of love to man, the inculcation of purity, honesty, unselfishness, and all such virtues, are not distinctively Christian; they are a part of the common ethical code of mankind, and are taught with more or less clearness and emphasis by all religions.

Ancient Grecian and modern ethics are, on the other hand, based on pure naturalism. Only natural sanctions are appealed to; only natural moral authorities are claimed; and only natural moral ends are sought. The whole sphere of the supernatural does not enter into modern ethics.

Modern rationalistic ethics deals with man as an end in himself. In the moral and rational nature of man it seeks to find the motives, principles, and goal of right living.

The utilitarian school of moralists maintain that happiness is the chief aim of human life; that anything is good in proportion as it tends to increase the sum of human happiness, and bad in proportion as it increases pain. The moral worth of an act, it is said, depends on its pleasure-giving or pain-avoiding tendency. "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters," says Bentham, "pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do as well as to determine what we shall do . . . they govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think." Bentham bases his whole system of morals and legislation on the principle of utility, by which is meant, the tendency of an act to increase pleasure or diminish pain. Mill, Bain, and Spencer follow him in regarding the worth of actions to be determined by their pleasure-giving or pain-avoiding tendency. It is general, not individual, happiness—"the greatest happiness of the greatest number"—that the utilitarian school of moralists have in mind in setting up the happiness-principle as the criterion of moral worth. Only when the consequences of one's acts are such as to promote general happiness, they say, are the acts to be approved; if they have the contrary effect they are to be condemned. The true object of even civil laws, it is stated, is the happiness of the community, and in order to

secure that end individuals who break the laws are punished. The greatest happiness of the greatest number is the principle upon which all just laws are based, and the one test of all moral action. No individual has a right to act against this principle. He must, on the contrary, if occasion calls for it, be ready to sacrifice his own happiness for that of the community.

According to the utilitarian school, then, the true object of life is to promote the happiness of mankind. But is happiness the highest object in life? Is it worthy to be set up as the final aim of our endeavors? The general happiness of mankind is certainly to be desired and as much as possible promoted. Every good person wants to make others happy. An evil person he certainly would be who liked to see others unhappy. Nevertheless, I believe there is a higher aim of life than happiness,—namely, *the development of life to its fullest perfection, physically, intellectually, morally.*

Happiness is a mere feeling, and feeling is variable; it differs in different individuals. The very things which would give happiness to one would make another miserable. There are some kinds of pleasure, indeed, that are not conducive to either intellectual or moral growth, and too much of any kind of pleasure is detrimental. It may be questioned whether it is for our best good to be always happy. A certain amount of suffering and pain may be necessary for our highest development, especially our moral development. The greatest moral natures are those who have passed through trials and sufferings. By the very nature of things a certain amount of pain and suffering in human life cannot be avoided. Death, for instance, that inevitable visitor of every home, brings sadness and sorrow. But the sorrow and affliction which death brings often act as a moral chastener, and cause life to be looked at more seriously and to be valued more highly, at least by the thoughtful. Moreover, there are some things for which every sound moral nature would readily sacrifice happiness—even the happiness of others—with the fullest approval of conscience. Now, that aim cannot be the final and highest aim which is from a sense of duty voluntarily sacrificed for the sake

of something else. A nation may be placed in such circumstances that it feels called upon to sacrifice the general happiness of its citizens in order to maintain its honor and rights. We applaud such a step. We applaud the individual who maintains his own honor at the expense of the general welfare. We approve of a person sacrificing his own happiness, but not his honor and character, for the happiness of the community. Than to sacrifice these, we say, he had better sacrifice life itself.

Nothing, in fact, can satisfy our moral and rational nature as an aim to be pursued under all circumstances except the *idea of the perfect*, which is a purely moral and rational idea. To put ourselves in harmony with the eternal principles of right; to do what we feel to be our highest duty, to live out all that is best and noblest in us, should be our constant aim. And we can feel assured that in pursuing that aim, our own happiness and the happiness of the world is being best promoted. Whereas, if feeling simply be the guide of our life and conduct,—if we strive simply to be and to make others *happy*,—we shall not only, it seems to me, not succeed in promoting the greatest amount of happiness, but shall not satisfy the dictates of our moral and rational nature.

This aim—the *idea of the perfect*—is not a purely abstract idea. It is an idea which can be applied to every act of life, and to any occupation in which we may be engaged.

In the first place, it requires us, in all our undertakings, to do as perfect work as possible. But no work can be considered perfect in every respect, however excellent the concrete results, and however much it may conduce to the general welfare, which has been done by morally imperfect means. The great public improvements, for instance, which Tweed inaugurated in New York are imperfect by the very fact that they are associated with the unscrupulous and unjustifiable means by which they were brought about. The late notorious Jacob Sharp had the boldness to say, that, because he was working for what would be a public good, therefore, the fact that he bribed the New York aldermen should be excused, and not be regarded as either a criminal or an immoral act. And one of the most influential of the New York journals

stated that if he had boldly confessed what he had done, when brought before the courts, and declared that he found bribery to be necessary in order to secure a needed public benefit, the public would at least have shown him great indulgence. The idea that immoral means to secure great public benefits are allowable is far too prevalent. It is far better that we do without such benefits than that they be bought at that price. And, in proportion as the idea of the perfect is recognized as the highest aim of life, no excuse will be accepted for adopting immoral means to secure special general benefits. As moral beings, we are called upon to lead a perfectly moral, a truly upright life, and to make all our dealings and relations with our fellow-men in accordance with the highest principles of right. Let the consequences be what they may, there is only one course for us,—namely, to do what we think is right under all circumstances. This should be our supreme rule. The ruin of character begins the moment right is in the least sacrificed to expediency, the very moment the end is allowed to justify the means. Our moral ideal can never be reached except by methods which are every whit as pure and elevated as the ideal itself; and taking our moral ideal as the one aim of our life, we shall never think of using impure and unrighteous methods to attain it. A rigid adherence to principles of morality in life and action may, indeed, oblige us to forego many pleasures and temporary benefits which we otherwise might enjoy. It may oblige us to perform painful and trying tasks which, if we consulted our pleasure merely, we would leave undone. Yet, there is something within us which declares that a strict obedience to the law of duty is the course we ought to pursue, and that such a course is the one which, in the end, will not only produce the most good for one's self and for mankind, but the highest happiness.

I would by no means say that happiness is not a proper object to work for. Indeed, to increase the happiness of the world as much as possible, and to diminish pain and suffering and human misery, in all its thousandfold forms, as much as lies within our power, is our bounden duty. Not to alleviate

suffering, when it is in our power to do so, would not be human. Works of love and duty for the good and happiness of others are among the most imperative dictates of our moral nature. And so, though happiness be not the chief end or aim of life, yet the moral aim—the idea of the perfect—would lead us to work for the happiness of our fellow-men, always remembering that that kind of happiness which is most worth having is that which comes from a consciousness of life in accordance with the law of right and the principle of duty. The aim of life, then, let me repeat, should be the fullest and completest development of ourselves, morally, intellectually, physically. This means the development in ourselves of the highest type of character,—a character as pure, as upright, and as free from evil and vice as an ideal character would be. It means working for the social ideal,—for justice between man and man; it means universal equality of rights and privileges; it means the spirit of fraternity and good will, and mutual helpfulness,—the destruction of greed and selfishness; it means the conquering of the too ready disposition to take unfair advantages of others for one's own benefit. Life of this type is an end in itself.

The true aim of life, then, is a true life. Whatever may be our future destiny, we are here to live out our lives—our possibilities—as fully and completely as possible. Endowed as we are with a rational and moral nature, we are true to ourselves only as our lives and actions are wholly reasonable and moral. For though we have other sides to our nature, still it is the rational and moral part which we all recognize to have a rightful authority over our whole nature. In view of this authority of reason and conscience, man is an end in himself; and so the highest or final aim of man should be to be a man, to be a whole, a perfect man, and the final aim of mankind should be a perfected humanity, a social ideal, a realization upon earth of the dream of a kingdom of righteousness.

Now, if this be the final aim of human life, can we, by following that aim as our one guiding star in life, be living out of harmony with the world-purpose? I, for one, do not pro-

fess to know what the world-purpose is. But this, at least, is certain: if there is a purpose in the universe, and if that purpose is moral, righteous, good, then moral living among men cannot be out of harmony with it. For we are not aliens in the world. We are a part of it. We are a part of that infinite world-life, of that vast natural order of things in which we, as it were, live and move and have our being. And therefore our life when rightly lived and the world-life cannot but be in essential harmony. We need, therefore, no divine-mediators, no supernatural messengers, and no speculations about the infinite, to teach us how to live and how to harmonize ourselves with the great cosmic order. All we need is to know ourselves, and to live true to our best knowledge. "To thine own self be true" says not divine revelation but common human reason, "and it will follow as the night the day" not only that "thou canst not then be false to any man," but that thou canst not be false to any power or powers outside of or higher than man.

Those who occupy this ground stand, I maintain, on the very safest ground. While those, on the other hand, whose religion and chief aim in life is to "glorify God and enjoy him forever" may be making a great mistake. They may be devoting their time and energies to creations of their own imaginations, to fancied realities. But he who bends his energies towards realizing, as far as may be, the idea of the perfect on earth, who endeavors, in other words, to lead an upright life, and who works for the moral good of his fellow-men, cannot be making a mistake. He is doing the very highest service he could possibly render. He is endeavoring to make life what it ought to be. He is fulfilling his highest duty. And if there is a future, he is certainly prepared to meet it; for he is not like the steward who took his lord's money and hid it in the ground, and had only that to return which he had received. He is like the one who took his talent and used it, and increased it tenfold before the time came when his lord asked for its return. The man who develops himself, who exercises his reason and his conscience, and grows to have wider and deeper and more rational views of life, and

who does not fear to follow on, step by step, as far and as high as his reason and conscience lead him, he is like the worthy steward, to whom a truly righteous, spiritual Lord would say, if, at the close of this life, he should knock for entrance at his abode: "Well done, thou good and faithful servant, enter thou into the joy of thy Lord." The chances of future rewards and benefits, then, are all in favor of him who attends to the duties of the present, making his constant, ultimate aim to be, to develop the life of man upon earth to its greatest possible perfection.

By virtue of the moral and rational nature we possess we are enabled, I have said, to acquire self-knowledge and to become more and more a law unto ourselves. Yet the more we study and know our true selves the more clearly do we see that there is in reality a higher power standing constantly over us, the very highest power, indeed, of which we have any real knowledge,—I mean *the power of the idea of the good*. That idea is not a mere fancy, it is a real fact, which every least stirring of our conscience makes us acquainted with. The idea of the good is the object of all rational, moral effort. The supreme authority over human life is the moral law, which bids us to strive for the perfect,—not for perfect happiness in a future world, but for perfect righteousness in this.

The chief aim of life, then, should be to follow the old simple gospel of practical righteousness, which all the great moral teachers have proclaimed. What Buddha or Zoroaster or Confucius or Moses or Socrates or Jesus believed about supernatural affairs does not concern us in the least, except in so far as we are interested in the history of theological beliefs. But those grand moral utterances of theirs, which were true then, are true now, and will be true for all time, and which are a source of moral strength and inspiration to all who read them, we would preserve as the most precious fruits of the thought and life of the past,—

"Out from the heart of nature rolled
The burdens of the Bible old."

The same nature which existed in Jesus and Moses and

Socrates and Buddha and the other great teachers of the past exists also in us. The fountain-source of moral inspiration is the moral nature of man, and the strength and possibilities of that source are not diminishing, but increasing as the years roll by. The world may lose its faith in theological creeds, but it cannot lose its faith in the moral certainties of our nature. The realities of conscience are a part of our very being. And so what man needs to-day is not faith in supernatural revelation, but to learn, as Emerson says, "the revelation of all nature and all thought,—this, namely, that the highest dwells with him, that the sources of nature are in his own mind, if the sentiment of duty is there." If we build on the law of righteousness in the human heart, we have a foundation that cannot be shaken, and the task set before us is plain. We must work for moral progress. We must build up the higher life of humanity. We must hold everything as sacred which helps towards man's higher development, everything as evil which tends against it. Our one aim should be to be pure and upright ourselves and to help elevate the moral life of the community in which we live. Living thus, we shall be living in right relations to the universe and to our fellow-men, and cannot but find that inner peace that passeth understanding,—the peace of conscience, which comes from paying heed to the inner voice of duty,—which, as Emerson says, is "one with science and beauty and joy."

"Man is his own star: and the soul that can
Render an honest and a perfect man,
Commands all light, all influence, all fate;
Nothing to him falls early or too late.
Our acts our angels are. Or good, or ill,
The fatal shadows that walk by us still."

THE ETHICS OF INSOLVENCY.

READ BEFORE THE YOUNG MEN'S UNION OF THE SOCIETY FOR
ETHICAL CULTURE OF NEW YORK, BY LEO G. ROSENBLATT.

INSOLVENCY is familiar as a mere *commercial* factor. But as a *moral* factor, the subject is enveloped in an atmosphere of semi-darkness. This moral obscurity seems to be matter for surprise until we discover how serious, profound, and difficult of solution are the problems involved. To me this discovery has come attended with a painful consciousness of my own insufficiency for the task of solution. If, nevertheless, I have summoned courage for the attempt, it is because to me the darkness is oppressive and because I feel the urgency and the need for more light upon a subject than which none can be more important in a community like ours.

For ours is a community of business men, men who belong to that large middle class which is neither too rich nor too poor to be beyond the reach and fear of financial shipwreck. And that the danger is always serious admits of no question. It is estimated (Atkinson) that ninety per cent. of all business men fail at least once a lifetime. Yet how few of those who boldly venture out upon the treacherous sea of commerce go morally equipped for the dangers and disasters to be feared!

What is insolvency? We naturally look to the courts of law for an authoritative definition. But we find, to our surprise, that the judges have long been engaged in wrestling with the problem of definition without having reached either complete or harmonious results. Thus, insolvency has been defined as inability to pay debts as they accrue.* And yet a man whose assets far exceed his liabilities may by mere accident be temporarily unable to pay an accruing debt. The

* *Ryer vs. Poppenhusen*, 43 N. Y., 75.

disability must be more than accidental and temporary. There must be, to constitute *insolvency*, not only an excess of liabilities over available assets, but such a *dependence upon the special indulgence of creditors* as renders further continuance in business without forbearance on their part impossible.*

Financial dependence is a necessary incident of the credit system on which all modern traffic is based. If the definitions of insolvency vary, it is because of the varying degrees of this element of dependence, with reference to which the courts have been called upon at different times to determine the corresponding rights and duties of debtor and creditor.

These varying degrees of financial dependence furnish the basis of what for our purposes may be taken as a convenient classification, for there are three distinct stages of progress towards absolute loss of the debtor's independence: I. Indebtedness; II. Embarrassment; III. Insolvency.

I find this classification convenient because the duties most commonly neglected (and it is only such duties that I intend to emphasize and discuss) may in each distinct stage of this progress be ranged under the head of a correspondingly distinct and special virtue. Thus:

Indebtedness—(which renders insolvency *possible*)—should appeal at once to the debtor's sense of *Prudence*.

Embarrassment—(that condition in which insolvency has become *probable*, and in which, therefore, the creditors have a direct interest in knowing the truth)—calls for *Candor*.

Insolvency—(the financial crisis in its *reality*,—because it involves an equitable distribution of inevitable losses)—invokes that highest of all virtues,—*Justice*.

I. *Indebtedness*.—Indebtedness begins the moment a trader obtains credit for business purposes.

I limit the proposition to traders, because in law—as well as in ethics—none but traders are justified in regularly dealing on credit. This principle is thus explained by Blackstone, the great exponent of the common law: "The bankruptcy laws," he says, "are laws calculated for the benefit of trade,

* 2 Bell Comment., 162; 4 Hill Rep., 654.

and founded on principles of humanity as well as justice; but they are cautious of encouraging prodigality and extravagance, and therefore allowed the benefit of the act only to traders *as the only persons subject to accidental losses or inability to pay debts without fault of their own.*" And he adds: "It is to the *misfortunes* of the debtors the law has given a compassionate remedy, but *not to their faults.*"*

This commentary on the law of bankruptcy is valuable as indicating not only what is the policy of the law, but what should be the principle on which the debtor, in justice to himself and to those dependent on him, is to shape his conduct. That principle is Prudence; its policy is insurance against the accidents of misfortune.

The rules of Prudence which (because most generally neglected) are deserving of special emphasis are:

1. *Self-assurance of fitness* for the business undertaken.
2. *Reduction to its minimum of the speculative element* in business.
3. *Avoidance of extravagance and luxury* in home-life.
4. *Creation and maintenance of a distinct insurance fund* as a safeguard against absolute penury.

The duties embraced in the 1st and 2d of these rules spring from the relation of the debtor to his creditor; the other duties refer more especially to his relation to his family.

A few words in detail as to each of these rules of conduct.

1. The first duty of a man of business is to assure himself that he has capacity and skill for the special branch of commerce in which he is about to engage. This statement will be readily admitted; its truth is universally accepted. And yet how many failures in business are traceable to personal incapacity! How many careers are blighted early in life, because of false pride on the part of indulgent parents, and a foolish vanity on the part of young men who have scarcely had time to serve their apprenticeship as clerks! A senseless ambition for premature independence lures many a youth into premature ventures and premature disaster. When too late,

* Blackstone's Commentaries, II., 474.

the lesson is learned that capital alone will not insure success; that brains and experience are its essential adjuncts.

It is enough for our purpose to state the rule. Its truth is commonplace; only its application is rare.

2. Less commonplace, and unfortunately less readily admitted, is the second rule of Prudence: That the debtor is bound to reduce to its minimum the speculative element in his business.

There are, perhaps, few business men who will admit the soundness of this rule even in the abstract. And yet the law gives it a place in the jurisprudence of insolvency, and business men often adopt it practically as a principle of copartnership, when they stipulate that neither of the copartners shall engage in stock speculations. The principle is well recognized in the law of bankruptcy. In the passage already quoted, Blackstone says, "to the *misfortunes* of the debtor the law is compassionate, but *not to his faults*." And among these faults he indicates recklessness and gambling. So, too, in our National Bankrupt Act, we find provisions that frown upon gambling as a commercial vice.* Under the terms of the act (while it was in force) a debtor who had lost any part of his property in gaming thereby forfeited his right to a discharge. And the law was severely ethical, for it would not permit the debtor to show, as an excuse, that he had won more than he had lost.† The wrong consisted in the reckless reliance on blind chance.

But business men will say that, while outside the limits of their own special business gambling may be wrong because it is unnecessary, yet inside those limits a certain degree of speculation is inevitable; for in every branch of business speculation must enter to a certain extent. But this very distinction contains an admission that the speculative element ought, in good morals, to be confined to the limits of actual necessity.

In the speculative element lies the chief risk of financial ruin. It is not enough that you are willing to pay the penalty of this risk. You are bound to avoid it. It is not enough

* U. S. Rev. St., § 5110, Subd. 5.

† *In re Marshall*; 4 Bank Reg., 106.

that you are willing to pay the insurance premium; as a prudent man you are bound to reduce the rate of insurance by adopting every safeguard which prudence suggests.

But the debtor has other relations than those of business. He is actually, or prospectively, a man of family. And this leads us to consider those other rules of prudence which are imposed upon him by this relation to his family.

3. The necessity for the avoidance of luxury and extravagance, and for the observance of simplicity in the home life, arises the moment a man, by contracting debts, forces upon himself a contemplation of insolvency as among the things possible. If indebtedness necessarily involves the possibility of financial shipwreck, however remote, is it not the navigator's duty to anticipate disaster and school himself, his wife, and children in the arts of self-help? Religion enjoins upon us so to live that we may be ever ready to face death. Prudence, from considerations of a similar character, commands the business man so to conduct himself that when adversity comes it may find him and those dear to him ready to relinquish costlier pleasures and to rest content with the higher satisfactions of an humbler life.

4. Last, but not because of least importance, I deem it needful to emphasize a duty almost universally neglected: that of *practical insurance* against absolute penury.

In this direction, the law shows some favor to the debtor class in its exemption from seizure of a small part of every man's property. But this exemption is practically nominal; and far more can be done, and ought to be done, either by the debtor alone or by the debtor class in mutual co-operation. Let me refer briefly, yet a little more in detail, to each of these methods of insolvency insurance.

(a) In most States the law comes to the relief of the insolvent by exempting from execution all the most necessary articles of household furniture, kitchen utensils, and tools of trade. In almost every State the debtor is permitted also to file a declaration that his homestead is held free and exempt from the claims of his creditors; provided, however, that such exemption shall not cover in value more than a certain amount.

(In New York the limit of value is \$1000.) The exemption is based on considerations of humanity, but it is also a wise public policy; for nothing presents to the insolvent debtor a greater temptation to fraud than the fear of destitution and penury in his home.

Whether the exemptions allowed by law are adequate is a question that demands legislative consideration. In this city the homestead exemption certainly seems to have been found inadequate; for since the law was passed (in 1850) scarcely a single declaration of homestead exemption has been filed. But this question of adequacy is a question of economics, not of ethics; its discussion, therefore, in this place would be improper.

(*b*) Individually, however, the debtor may do and ought to do far more than is at present customary, by setting aside, in his days of plenty, a special fund as and for a permanent and distinct insurance against abject poverty,—a fund to be held sacred against every temptation of business.

But to secure this provision against the suspicion and taint of fraud (whether it be made by way of marriage settlement or by conveyance after marriage), it should be made at a time when the debtor's solvency is unquestioned and unquestionable, and in such a manner as to give full and fair notice to the world—and especially to the creditor world—that it constitutes a separate and a sacred fund to which creditors must not look for repayment of their claims.

Secrecy should be scrupulously avoided in provisions made for wife and child; for the law justly regards secrecy as a badge of fraud.

But, with this element of secrecy and suspicion of fraud so easily eliminated, why is it that, as a matter of fact, debtors do not thus openly provide insurance funds for their families? Why, on the contrary, do we find that there prevails among business men a serious prejudice against the practice? Thus a merchant, when he buys a homestead, reluctantly, if ever, causes it to be conveyed to his wife; and yet such an act must be public and notorious, because it is necessarily a matter of public record.

There is but one explanation of this prejudice. It is be-

cause the practice of fraudulent provisions made at the wrong moment (because made after insolvency) is so common that business men fear to make just provision, even at the right moment, lest their acts be misconstrued. But the time and the manner of conveyance ought in themselves to constitute a sufficient safeguard against such misconstruction.

(c) *The principle of co-operative insurance* ought to be extended by the debtor class so as to cover the misfortunes of insolvency.

Why is it that practical business men have never thought of such an extension of the benefits of practical insurance? Men insure themselves against the loss of life or limb by accident; why not against the accidental loss of their daily bread? Is it because such an insurance might possibly set a premium upon fraudulent insolvency? Surely that danger may be averted by proper precautions, such as the limitation of the amount and due provision for payment of the insurance money, not in one gross sum, but in weekly or monthly instalments, just sufficient to cover the insolvent's actual necessities.

It seems to me that the main obstacle to the success of such insurance would lie, not in the practical operation of the scheme, but rather in the superstitious reluctance of business men to entertain the thought of insolvency even as a possibility,—a superstition very similar to that by which so many men are deterred from insuring their lives or executing their last wills and testaments. In the interests of enlightened morality such superstitions must be uprooted.

All these prudential measures should be adopted before the possibility of ruin has ripened into probability.

When the second stage in the progress towards absolute insolvency has been reached, new duties arise; and these may be summed up in the one virtue,—Candor. This leads us to the consideration of the second general class of duties which spring from the contemplation of insolvency.

II. Embarrassment.—With embarrassment come the most serious temptations of business life. The debtor hopes against

hope. He strains every nerve to escape disaster. He seeks to avert the pressure of maturing claims, and to satisfy existing creditors that they have no cause for fear. On the other hand, if he wants to continue in business he must gain the confidence of new creditors and obtain further credit.

It is almost impossible for the merchant of average calibre to resist the temptation to conceal his real condition by a *lie*,—by a deliberate misrepresentation, either active or passive, of material facts. Is he bound to resist this temptation?

The business morality of to-day answers this question unhesitatingly in the negative. And in justification of the lie which it excuses and commends, this false morality relies upon the following propositions:

1. That *it is no lie* for the debtor to represent himself as solvent as long as he can, by hook or crook, obtain an extension of old credits or acquire new. For while there is life, there is hope.

2. That *self-preservation* is the first law of nature and absolves a man from all ordinary obligations of morality.

Wherein are these apologies for falsehood fallacious and misleading? Let us see.

a. *The Apology of Equivocation*.—To me it appears a mere quibble to say that I have the right to tell Peter that I am solvent, when the very money I am seeking to borrow from Peter is needed to pay my debt to Paul.

It is true that the term "insolvency" is elastic and ambiguous; and perhaps, in the most liberal sense of the word, I am not insolvent if my lie succeeds. To appreciate, however, the absurdity of this position we need only recall the words of one of the most brilliant apostles of this convenient theory,—to wit, Mr. Wilkins Micawber, as reported by his friend Mr. David Copperfield.

"To leave this metropolis," said Mr. Micawber, bidding farewell to his creditor, Mr. Traddles, "to leave this metropolis and my friend, Mr. Thomas Traddles, *without acquitting myself of the pecuniary part of my obligation*, would weigh on my mind to an insupportable extent. I have therefore prepared for my friend, Mr. Thomas Traddles, and I now hold in my

hand, a document which accomplishes the desired object. I beg to hand my friend, Mr. Thomas Traddles, my I. O. U. for £14 19½s., and *I am happy to recover my moral dignity and know that I can once more walk erect before my fellow-men.*"

And Dickens adds, "I am persuaded not only that this was quite the same to Mr. Micawber as paying the money, but that Traddles himself hardly knew the difference until he had time to think of it."

Having thus, in his opinion, discharged his obligation, did Mr. Micawber really stand before the world a solvent man? And would he have been morally justified in representing himself as wholly solvent in order to obtain further credit?

I admit that if his own generous interpretation of the word "solvency" were universally accepted, there would be no wrong in Mr. Micawber's repudiation of insolvency; but in that event, the creditor to whom he applied for credit would either refuse outright to extend it, or else make more specific inquiries in order to define more particularly the degree of Mr. Micawber's "solvency."

The fact is, that the world does not understand the term "insolvency" as Micawber understood it. And the immorality of its use in that sense lies in the intent to deceive and the intentional use of a "double entendre," which means one thing to the speaker and another to the hearer,—“that keeps the word of promise to the ear, but breaks it to the hope.”

But (it may be asked) even if the embarrassed debtor owes this duty of candor to the creditor of whom he seeks to obtain further or new credit, what principle of morality compels him to expose his distress to existing creditors?

This problem is more difficult of solution; but only so long as we accept and admit the theory that the debtor's interest in his assets is that of an unqualified ownership,—an ownership so absolute that he may do with his property as he pleases and disregard wholly the rights of existing creditors as vendors to the payment of unpaid purchase-money.

This theory of absolute ownership is (I concede it) the theory of the law. Whether it is valid in ethics, however,

admits at least of very serious doubt. In a subsequent division of this paper I will endeavor to set forth more fully my reasons for believing that, as a proposition in ethics, the theory of unqualified ownership is unworthy of acceptance. For the present, let a mere statement of my position suffice.

I maintain that in morals—as a matter of simple justice—the debtor is a mere trustee, and not the absolute owner, of his assets upon which, and to the extent that, any part of the purchase-price remains unpaid. And if any position in this respect be true—if the property is a trust fund in which the creditors have a real and active interest—then they are entitled to know when the trust property is in danger of loss or destruction,—they are entitled to a voice in deciding how the assets shall be preserved, protected, and distributed for their benefit.

The obligation of candor is a logical result of the relation of trustee and beneficiary. It is so recognized by the law, and practically admitted—at least to a limited extent—in the common course of business.

Thus, as a principle of equity jurisprudence, it is well established that the beneficiary is always entitled to an inspection of his trustee's account.* And it is part of the theory of bankruptcy legislation that no merchant is entitled to a discharge unless he can show that he has kept honest books.†

And what do we find to be the practice of the business world? Has not the establishment of "commercial agencies" become almost universal? And do merchants ever resent as an impertinence the inquiries made through these agencies? I do not mean to say that the statements made to the agencies are always truthful and reliable. But the readiness with which inquiries are answered implies a significant admission of the principle, that candor is a duty which the debtor class owes to all who are interested, whether as actual or possible creditors.

And even if we concede that, as long as the debtor's availa-

* Story, *Equity Jur.*, § 1275.

† U. S. Rev. Stat., § 5110, Subd. 7.

ble assets exceed his liabilities, no one is injured by his silence; yet this is merely a limitation of the duty of candor. He is justified in remaining silent only so long, and only as to so much, as his assets do actually exceed his obligations. The moment they fall below the point of probable solvency, that moment his position is that of a mere trustee; and those who are entitled eventually to share in the distribution of the trust fund are entitled, by the very fact that the fund is threatened with destruction, to be consulted as to the manner in which that fund shall be protected, realized, and distributed.

As a matter of fact, and notwithstanding the establishment and growth of commercial agencies, secrecy is the rule, and candor the exception, in business life. And the student of practical ethics is inclined to ask, What legitimate purpose, after all, does this secrecy serve? Does it not indicate that there is something to be hidden,—something not just as it should be, that shuns the light of day?

b. The Doctrine of Self-Preservation.—But there remains to be considered the second branch of the apology with which the “practical” man seeks to justify the falsehoods of financial distress. He says: It may be all very well *in theory* to enjoin candor, but *practically* candor means hopeless ruin to the embarrassed debtor; for it would set in motion the machinery of the law for the collection of existing debts, and it would cut off all possible supply of further credit. In other words, the danger is so extreme as to invoke the *law of self-preservation*, that first law of nature, *which absolves men from all ordinary moral obligations*; and the debtor is therefore absolved from the duty of telling the truth.

This argument presents a problem more profound than most of those with which we have to deal, because the doctrine of “self-preservation” is one of the most abstruse theories of the law.

Fortunately, however, it will be found, on closer analysis, that the argument is in fact so superficial—the application of the principle invoked to the conditions of financial distress is so clearly inadmissible—that it will not be necessary to enter

very deeply into the philosophy of the doctrine of self-preservation.

The fallacy lies on the very surface. For the doctrine of self-preservation as a legal excuse is never properly invoked except in cases of extreme hazard of life. The hazard must be extreme,—a mere impending danger is not enough.* And life itself must be in jeopardy,—not merely a right of property.†

The condition of the embarrassed debtor is not one of extreme hazard of life. Even in the last hopeless stage of insolvency there still remains to the debtor the ability to earn at least a scant livelihood; there still remains the protection of the law which exempts from seizure his homestead, his most necessary articles of household furniture, and his tools of trade; there may be also, if the debtor has been prudent, an insurance fund to secure him against starvation; and there is almost always a fair chance of making a favorable settlement with creditors. Indeed, there is good reason to believe that if candor were the rule, and suspicious secrecy the exception, in cases of embarrassment, creditors would be far more compassionate, far more ready and willing to deal generously with their unfortunate debtors, than they are at present, when every business failure raises at least the presumption of hidden fraud.

If, then, there is neither an extreme peril nor a peril that threatens the extinction of life in the condition of impending insolvency, the debtor cannot fairly appeal to the doctrine of self-preservation to justify his disregard of ordinary moral obligations.

Besides, there are limitations of the doctrine which exclude its application to the relations of debit and credit, if it is true that the debtor's position is one of trust. The doctrine is generally invoked to excuse the act of a man who, to save himself from drowning, appropriates to his exclusive use a plank which another is seeking to secure for the same pur-

* U. S. *vs.* Holmes, 1 Wall, Jr., 1.

† Story, Equity Jur., § 395; § 414.

pose. But the doctrine has this limitation : that "*a man must not—to get a plank to save himself—be guilty of a breach of trust.*"*

Thus, it would be absurd for the soldier on the battle-field to plead as an excuse for desertion that his life was imperilled. His life is pledged to the performance of that very duty whence the peril springs. Or, to take an illustration from the law of navigation : In a leading case, which came before the highest tribunal in this country,† the question of the sailor's duty to passengers came under discussion upon the following facts. A vessel had suffered shipwreck on the high seas ; a number of passengers and sailors escaped from the sinking ship in a small boat ; the boat was overcrowded, and dangerously so, because it had sprung a leak. It was necessary for the safety of the majority that some should be sacrificed ; accordingly the sailors threw overboard three or four of the passengers, who perished in the waves. The survivors were subsequently rescued and reached home. Upon arrival at a port in the United States, one of the sailors was arrested, indicted, and convicted of murder. The prisoner pleaded the law of self-preservation as a defence. His counsel argued that, under the circumstances of the prisoner's peril, he must be assumed to have been reduced to a state of nature in which "terror has assumed the throne of reason," and moral responsibility was gone. The court nevertheless sustained the conviction on the ground that the doctrine of self-preservation cannot be invoked to justify a breach of trust. "It is the sailor's duty to protect persons intrusted to his care, . . . and the obligation rests upon him at all times, in every emergency of his calling. He must expose himself to every danger and protect the life of the passengers, *even at the risk of his own.*"

This decision well illustrates the true limitations of the doctrine of self-preservation and the impropriety of its application to the status of the insolvent debtor. For, as the sailor owes to the passenger a special duty of protection, so

* Story, Equity Jur., § 395 ; § 414.

† U. S. vs. Holmes, 1 Wall, Jr., 1.

the debtor is bound by a like trust to preserve and protect the property intrusted to him by his creditor. If the sailor is bound to sacrifice even life itself to save the life of his passenger, is it too much to expect of the debtor that he shall surrender mere rights of property in the fulfilment of his trust?

The law of self-preservation is not an active moral principle; it is a negative defence, which cannot be pleaded in justification, but only as an excuse; and only then as an excuse, when its exercise does not involve a breach of special trust.

Thus far I have simply indicated my conviction, and assumed as a premise, that the debtor's relation is one of trust. A consideration of the condition and duties of actual insolvency will afford a convenient opportunity for the analysis and verification of this assumption.

(To be concluded.)

A RESPONSIVE EXERCISE.

IN USE BY THE CHILDREN'S CLASSES OF THE ST. LOUIS
ETHICAL SOCIETY.

"What shall we think of thee, beautiful world?
Thou art so fair in thy vesture clad:
We would rejoice in thy glory unfurled,
Our lives are made in thy presence glad."

TEACHER.—Tell me, children, what do you like?

CHILDREN.—We like the blue sky and the still air; we like the grass that grows by the wayside or on the lawn, in the meadows or in the pastures; we like the leaves on the trees, and the flowers when they bloom; we like the stars, the moonlight, and the sunlight; we like the clouds and the rain, the frost and the snow, the wind and the storm; we like the summer and the winter, the fall and the spring. We like them all, for they are good, and we like all that is good.

"Whene'er a noble deed is wrought,
Whene'er is spoken a noble thought,
Our hearts in glad surprise
To higher levels rise."

TEACHER.—Tell me, children, whom do you revere?

CHILDREN.—We revere them who have gone before us and whose good work remains with us; we revere them who have made sacrifices for our sake that we who came after them might be made happier and better; we revere the great and good who were brave to resist when they were tempted, and who have had courage in the time of trial; we revere them who have done great and noble deeds by which something has been added to the progress of the world.

"All are needed by each one,
Nothing is fair and good alone."

TEACHER.—Tell me, children, whom do you love?

CHILDREN.—We love our fathers and mothers, our sisters and brothers; we love all them who have been kind to us and have cared for us; we love all the members of our home; we love the children with whom we play; we love them who teach us. And as we grow up we would wish to love them with whom we work, whether we work for them or they work for us; we would wish to love them whom we do not see and may never know; we would wish to love our fellow-men all over the world. For we would all wish to become loving and faithful men and women.

“The airs of heaven blow o’er me,
A glory shines before me,—
Of what mankind shall be,
Pure, generous, brave, and free.”

TEACHER.—Tell me, children, what would you be?

CHILDREN.—We would be true always and everywhere; we would be true to ourselves and to all men and women; we would be faithful in everything we undertake; to do it well, and to do it perfectly; we would be pure in what we say, in what we think, in what we do; we would be pure in heart; we would be strong to do and to bear, never flinching in the work that is before us or in the trial that is upon us; we would be just in what we say and in whatever we do, striving to believe and to teach only what is true, meaning to be upright and sincere in whatever we have to perform.

“He liveth long who liveth well,
All else is life but flung away;
He liveth longest who can tell
Of true things truly done each day.”

TEACHER.—Tell me, children, what would you do?

CHILDREN.—We would wish to work; and to feel that in whatever we do we are all working for one another; we would wish to do something to add to the happiness and well-being of our fellow-men; we would wish that in some way we might increase the extent of knowledge; we would wish that we might make men better and more perfect by our

presence in the world. We want that men should love one another.

"Sweet and low is that voice for me;
Within myself I hear it say,
'Strong and firm may you ever be,
Whene'er I speak, you must obey.'"

TEACHER.—Tell me, children, in what faith would you make these responses?

CHILDREN.—We would make these responses in the faith that it is in our own power to carry out what we have said, trusting that we too shall become worthy of being revered by them who come after us, even as we would revere the true and good who have gone before us. Our watchword is—
DUTY.

ABRIDGED FORM OF THE SAME RESPONSES.

I.

[To be spoken in concert:]

WE take delight in the blue sky and the still air, the grass, all the leaves, and every flower; the stars make us glad, the moonlight and sunlight, the clouds and the storm. We rejoice in them all, for they are full of beauty and power.

[To be sung:]

"What shall we think of thee, beautiful world?
Thou art so fair in thy vesture clad:
We would rejoice in thy glory unfurled,
Our lives are made in thy presence glad."

II.

[Spoken in concert:]

We revere all the great and noble men and women of the past and present. All who have been brave to resist temptation, and had courage in the time of trial. By their sacrifice

and devotion to others human life will always be happier and better.

[*Sung*.:]

"Whene'er a noble deed is wrought,
Whene'er is spoken a noble thought,
Our hearts in glad surprise
To higher levels rise."

III.

[*Spoken in concert*.:]

We love every one in our homes; we love our teachers and the children with whom we play. And as we grow up to be men and women we will love those with whom we work, whether we work for them or they for us; we must love our fellow-men all over the world, even those whom we do not see and may never know.

[*Sung*.:]

"All are needed by each one,
Nothing is fair and good alone."

IV.

[*Spoken in concert*.:]

We will be true in all we do, or say, or think. And let us be strong, never flinching in the work that is before us, or in the trial that is upon us. We must daily struggle to be just in judging ourselves and in dealing with all men.

[*Sung*.:]

"The airs of heaven blow o'er me,
A glory shines before me,—
Of what mankind shall be,
Pure, generous, brave, and free."

V.

[*Spoken in concert*.:]

Although it be ever so little, we may add something to the beauty and joy of living. We may help to check the world's

pain and vice, and in so doing we shall find inward strength and peace.

[*Sung :*]

"He liveth long who liveth well,
All else is life but flung away;
He liveth longest who can tell
Of true things truly done each day."

VI.

[*Spoken in concert :*]

We speak and sing, we live and act, believing that it is in our power to be perfect. Our watchword is—DUTY.

[*Sung :*]

"Sweet and low is that voice for me;
Within myself I hear it say,
'Strong and firm may you ever be,
Whene'er I speak, you must obey.'"

"For this is Love's nobility,—
Still to hold fast his simple sense,
And speak the speech of innocence,
And with hand and body and blood,
To make his bosom-counsel good.
He that feeds men serveth few;
He serves all who dares be true."

A STARLIT NIGHT BY THE SEA-SHORE.

SUGGESTED BY MATTHEW ARNOLD'S "SELF-DEPENDENCE."

O GREAT stars, aflame with awful beauty !
O great sea, with glittering, heaving breast !
Stars that march, all calm, in lines of Duty ;
Sea that swayest at stern Law's behest.

Mighty in your unimpassioned splendor,
Ye are filling all my puny soul
With the longing this vexed self to render
Wholly to calm Duty's sure control.

It were restful so to let the ruling
Of the mightier Law sway all the life,
Eager will and passionate spirit schooling
Till unfelt the pains of lesser strife.

Yet, O stars, your quivering shafts unheeding
On these tangled human sorrows smite ;
Merciless stars that on hearts crushed and bleeding
Bear the sharp stings of your bleak cold light :

Yet, O sea, that glittering breast is heaving,
All unconscious of the life it rears,
Shouting in the midst of its bereaving,
Laughing o'er a thousand widows' tears.

No ! I ask not for a life high lifted
O'er the changeful passions of mankind,
Undistracted, self-contained, and gifted
With a force to feebler issues blind.

Rather filling soul to overflowing
With the tide of this world's grief and wrong ;
Let me suffer, though it be in knowing
Suffering thus I am not wholly strong.

Let that grandeur crown the life of others ;
Let that light on calm endurance shine :
I will set myself beside my brothers,
And their toils and troubles shall be mine.

W. WALSHAM BEDFORD, in *The Spectator*.

GENERAL NOTES.

—THE SOUTH PLACE ETHICAL SOCIETY of London has made a preliminary step in the path of the opening season's work by sending out the following circular :

SOUTH PLACE CHAPEL AND INSTITUTE,
FINSBURY, LONDON, E.C.
August, 1888.

DEAR SIR OR MADAM,—The advance of Science, the play of historical criticism, and the development of a higher ethical feeling have, for many, made impossible the retention of the forms in which religious thought and life have hitherto found expression. The consequent closing of the accustomed channels in which religious energy had found healthy outlet, and the feeling of isolation accompanying the breach of sympathy with the action and aims of the old religious societies, add to the pain and regret unavoidably attendant on changes in the bases of faith and morals.

At such times active co-operation with a society advocating the newer views and the wider faith would by many be esteemed an advantage; and, presuming that the information may be of service either to yourself or your friends, we venture to bring to your knowledge that South Place Ethical Society (formerly known as the South Place Religious Society) has for many years afforded a rallying place for those who seek a rational basis for religious life and work.

The platform of the Society, which since Mr. Moncure D. Conway's retirement, in 1885, has remained an open one, is now to be permanently occupied by Dr. Stanton Coit, of the Ethical Culture movement in New York, who will enter on his duties the first Sunday in September. Enclosed is the list of discourses for the month.

I have the honor to be,
Dear Sir or Madam,
Your obedient Servant,
C. FLETCHER, *Hon. Sec.*

The first Sunday meeting began September 2, with a lecture by Dr. Coit, on "Matthew Arnold's 'Power that makes for Righteousness.'" On Sunday, September 23, Dr. Coit lectured on "'Robert Elsmere'" to a crowded house, many persons standing throughout the lecture. The membership of the society has increased considerably since Dr. Coit's work began.

—**MR. SALTER'S VACATION LECTURES.**—Mr. Salter lectured during the month of June in Kansas City, Minneapolis, Dubuque, and Indianapolis. His lectures were fully reported in the local papers and awakened much interest in the ethical movement.

—**THE ETHICAL UNION.**—The First Annual Convention of the Ethical Societies, since their regular formation into the "Union of Societies for Ethical Culture," will be held in Philadelphia in the last week in January, 1889. The lecturers and delegates from the several societies will be present. The programme promises to be of interest, and will be soon ready to be announced definitely. Membership in the Union can be attained by any persons interested in forwarding Ethical Culture, whether they live within reach of one of the already established societies or not, upon proper application; and applicants from different parts of this country and from Germany and England have, during the past year, availed themselves of this privilege. The constitution of the Union of Societies for Ethical Culture expresses its aims as follows: "The general aim of the Ethical Movement, as represented by this Union, is to elevate the moral life of its members and that of the community, and it cordially welcomes to its fellowship all persons who sympathize with this aim, whatever may be their theological or philosophical opinions."

If there is no authorized Local Membership Committee in the place where an applicant lives, application for membership should be sent to the secretary of the Union of Societies for Ethical Culture, Dr. C. N. Peirce, 1415 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, Pa., of whom, also, blank forms of application for membership may be obtained. Two-thirds of the money received from annual contributions to the funds of the Union by members at large will be devoted to the training of ethical teachers.

—**THE ETHICAL SCHOOL** in Philadelphia has sought new and more convenient quarters in which to carry on its promoting work. Its third yearly session opened on Wednesday,

September 26, with an increased number of pupils, at 1630 Arch Street, in a newly-fitted and centrally-located house in thorough sanitary condition, and with large, well-lighted, and well-ventilated rooms. Mr. Stephen F. Weston, a graduate of Antioch College, who has also taken a two years' special course in philosophy, economics, and pedagogy at Ann Arbor University, is the principal of the school. Besides the usual branches of common-school education, the course also includes lessons in Modelling, Free-Hand and Mechanical Drawing, Sewing, and Workshop Instruction. The methods of instruction pursued in all branches are those applied in the Manual Training Schools and the New York Workingman's School. The system of marks and rewards is not adopted, and there is no sectarian teaching. A regular course of instruction in Practical Duties will be pursued in the school during the coming year.

A branch school and kindergarten is established in West Philadelphia, at 3401 Spring Garden Street, under the supervision of Miss L. Gertrude Bardwell, who has studied the kindergarten method in Berlin, with Frau Henrietta Schrader, and in Dresden, with Baroness Marenholz-Bülów. And this school was also opened with enlarged attendance and interest on the 26th of September. The corps of instructors in both schools numbers twelve, six of whom are specialists in German, Physiology and Hygiene, Drawing, Wood-work, Vocal Music, Voice-culture and Dramatic Action.

—"MANUAL TRAINING," as discussed by Professor Felix Adler, was one of the most notable features in the programme of the Fifteenth Annual Session of "The National Conference of Charities and Correction," held in Buffalo last summer. According to the *Christian Register*, "A sense of propriety restrained the conference on Sunday from expressing approval by applause; but, when Dr. Adler finished his address on Thursday night, a storm of noisy approval greeted his ears, altogether the most deafening applause granted to anything during the week."

—MR. MANGASAR MANGASARIAN, widely known in Philadelphia as the eloquent minister of the Independent Christian Church, and who resigned his charge in June last, has removed to New York, where he will devote himself to special studies for a year.

—THE EDUCATION OF HINDU GIRLS, with all that this must imply in the development of Oriental Womanhood, is the aim of the unsectarian school which the ardent efforts of the Pundita Ramabai will be the means of founding in India. Those who have read her story of the intolerable hardships and repression these many centuries of the "High-Caste Hindu Woman," will perhaps not be surprised that this little book, which tells the story of India's sore need, has brought its message home to the heart of a young American,—Miss A. H. Demmon,—a teacher last year in the Philadelphia Ethical School, and that she will go this autumn to India to devote herself to the educational work to be undertaken in the Pundita's school.

—AN ADMIRABLE SHORT HISTORY of "The Ethical Movement in America" appeared in *Time* for August, an English periodical, published by Messrs. Swan, Sonnenschein & Co. Those who attended the Chicago Convention of the Ethical Societies last year will remember the presence and good words of an English visitor, Mrs. Mary McCallum, and be glad to read the interesting paper she has written.

—A SIGN OF PROGRESS.—*Unity* supposes "it may be necessary to say again, and still again, many more times before people will heed the saying, that *Unity* nor any member of the Western Unitarian Conference, so far as we know, ever say or think that 'every good man is an Unitarian.' But we do say and believe that every man who desires goodness and thinks his hold upon it might be enlarged by such a connection should be entitled to the fellowship of the Unitarian Church, because we hold that Unitarianism is committed by its history and philosophy to the thought that *goodness* is the


essential thing in religion, and that character is the end for which the church should labor, and he who believes this is of and with the Unitarian movement." If so, how does the Unitarian differ from the Ethical movement?

—"WHAT IS AN ETHICAL SOCIETY?"—Mr. Sheldon has just issued a timely little pamphlet of eleven pages, entitled "What is an Ethical Society?" Those who are curious to know what an Ethical Society means should send for a copy and learn Mr. Sheldon's idea of the aims and uses of such an association. Members will find this excellent little pamphlet well suited for distribution among their friends who have no idea of the mission of an Ethical Society.


—OBITUARY.—Since its formation, three years ago, the Ethical Society of Philadelphia has lost two members by death. The first was Dr. N. A. Randolph, a rising young physician of great promise, who was drowned while in bathing at Atlantic City a year ago last summer. At the time of his death he was editor of a prominent medical journal and filled the chair of a lecturer in the University of Pennsylvania. The second death is that of Frederick Pfaelzer, a young business man of intelligence and integrity, who died recently in Mannheim, Germany. He left a bequest of two hundred dollars to the Philadelphia Ethical Society.

THERE ARE LONELY HEARTS.


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
1. There are lone- ly hearts to cher- ish, While the days are go- ing by,



There are wear - y souls who per- ish, While the days are go - ing by ;



If a smile we can re- new as our jour- ney we pur- sue, Oh the good we



all may do, While the days are go- ing by, While the days are go- ing by.

ONE BY ONE.

Words by ADELAIDE A. PROCTER.

1. One by one the sands are flow - - ing, One by one the
 2. One by one thy du - ties wait thee, Let thy whole strength
 3. Ev - 'ry hour that fleets so slow - - ly Hath it's task to

mo - ments fall; Some are com - ing, some are go - ing; Do not
 go to each; Let no fut - ure dreams elate thee; Learn thou
 do or bear; Lu - mi - nous the crown and ho - ly If thou

Some are coming,

strive to grasp them all. Some are com - ing, some are
 first what these can teach, Let no fut - ure dreams e -
 set each gem with care, Lu - mi - nous the crown and

do not strive to grasp them all, Some are coming, some are

go - ing, Do not strive to grasp them all.
 - late thee, Learn thou first what these can teach.
 ho - ly, If thou set each gem with care.

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ORGANIZED 1887.

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THE ETHICAL RECORD.

ISSUED QUARTERLY.

JANUARY, 1889.

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Felix Adler, Ph.D.

THE ETHICS OF INSOLVENCY. *Leo G. Rosenblatt*

"ROBERT ELSMERE" FROM AN ETHICAL POINT OF VIEW.

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JANUARY, 1889.

THE INFLUENCE OF MANUAL TRAINING ON CHARACTER.

BY FELIX ADLER, PH.D.

MANUAL TRAINING has recently been suggested as one of the means of combating the criminal tendency in the young, and this suggestion is being received with increasing favor. But until now the theory of manual training has hardly begun to be worked out. The confidence which is expressed in it is based, for the most part, on unclassified experience. Now experience without theory is blind. Theory, it is true, without experience is without feet to stand on. But experience without the guiding and directing help of theory is without eyes to see. I shall this evening offer, in a somewhat tentative way, a few remarks intended to be a contribution to the philosophy of manual training as applied to the reformation of delinquent children. I do not, of course, attempt to cover the entire ground. I shall confine myself to one type of criminality in children, a not uncommon type, that, namely, of moral deterioration arising from weakness of the will.

To begin with, let us distinguish between feeling, desiring, and willing. A person who is without food feels hunger. A person who, being hungry, calls up in his mind images of food, will experience a desire. A person who adopts means to obtain food performs an act of the will. A Russian prisoner in Siberia who suffers from the restraints of confinement is in

a state of feeling. The same person, when he recalls images of home and friends, is in a state of desire ; but when he sets about adopting the means to effect his escape, concerts signals with his fellow-prisoners, mines beneath the walls of his dungeon, etc., he is performing acts of the will. Permit me to call your particular attention to the fact that the will is characterized at its birth by the intellectual factor which enters into it. For the calculation of means to ends is an intellectual process, and every conscious act of volition involves such a process. If the will is characterized at its birth by the intellectual factor which enters into it, we can already here anticipate the conclusion that any will is strong in proportion as the intellectual factor in it predominates. It was said this morning that "an ounce of affection is better than a ton of intellect." Give me a proper mixture of the two. Give me at least an ounce of intellect with an ounce of affection. There is great danger lest we exaggerate the importance for morality of the emotions. The erroneous opinion is widely entertained that good feeling, kind feeling, loving feeling, is the whole of morality, or, at least, the essential factor in it. But the influence of feeling is confined to using a mechanism already at play, to directing a force already in motion. Feeling may be compared to the rudder of a ship. The will is the power which propels it through the waves. Without power, the rudder is useless.

Let me give illustrations to bring into view the characteristics of a strong and of a weak will. Great inventors, great statesmen, great reformers, illustrate strength of will. We especially note in them tenacity of purpose and a marvellous faculty of adjusting and readjusting means to ends. Persons who are swayed by the sensual appetites illustrate weakness of will. We note in them vacillation of purpose, and the power of adjusting means to ends only in its rudimentary form. The ideas of virtue are complex ideas. A person to be in the highest sense virtuous must be capable of holding in mind long trains and complex groups of ideas. The most detestable vices, on the other hand, are distinguished by the circumstance that the ends to which they look are simple, and

the means employed often of the crudest kind. Thus, a person of weak will is hungry. He knows that gold will buy food. He adopts the readiest way to get gold. Incapable of that long and complex method of attaining his end, which is exhibited, for instance, by the farmer who breaks the soil, plants the corn, watches his crops, and systematizes his labors from the year's beginning to its end, he takes the shortest road towards the possession of gold,—he stretches forth his hand and takes it where he finds it. The man of weak will, who has a grudge against his rival, is not capable of putting forth a sustained and complex series of efforts towards obtaining satisfaction, for instance, by laboring arduously to outstrip his rival. He is, furthermore, incapable of those larger considerations, those complex groups of ideas relating to society and its permanent interests, which check the angry passions of the educated. He gives free and immediate rein to the passion as it rises. He takes the readiest means of getting satisfaction: he draws the knife and kills. The man of weak will, who burns with sensual desire, assaults the object of his desire. The virtues depend in no small degree on the power of serial and complex thinking. Those vices which are due to weakness of will are characterized by crudeness of the aim and crudeness of the means.

To strengthen the will, therefore, it is necessary to give to the person of weak will the power to think connectedly, and especially to reach an end by long trains and complex groups of means.

Let us pause here for a moment, and elucidate this point by briefly considering a type of criminality which is familiar to all the guardians of delinquent children. This type is marked off by a group of salient traits, which may be roughly described as follows: Mental incoherency is the first. The thoughts of the child are, as it were, smooth and slippery, tending to glide past one another without mutual attachments. A second trait is indolence; a third, deficiency in the sense of shame, to which may be added that the severest punishments fail to act as deterrents.

Mental incoherency is the leading trait, and supplies the

key for the understanding of the others. Lack of connectedness between ideas is the radical defect. Each idea, as it rises, becomes an impulse, and takes effect to the full limit of its suggestions. A kind thought rises in the mind of such a child, and issues in a demonstrative impulse of affection. Shortly after, a cruel thought may rise in the mind of the same child; and the cruel thought will, in like manner, take effect in a cruel act. Children answering to this type are alternately kind, affectionate, and cruel. The child's indolence is due to the same cause,—lack of connectedness between ideas. It is capable of sustained effort, because every task implies the ability to pass from one idea to related ideas. The child is deficient in shame, because the sense of shame depends on a vivid realization of the idea of self. The idea of self, however, is a complex idea, which is not distinctly and clearly present in the mind of such a child. Lastly, the most severe punishments fail to act as deterrents for the same reason. The two impressions left in the mind, "I did a wrong," "I suffered a pain," lie apart from one another. The memory of one does not excite the recollection of the other. The thought of the wrong does not lift permanently into consciousness the thought of the pain which followed. The punishment, as we say, is quickly forgotten. If, therefore, we wish to remedy a deep-seated disease of this kind, if we wish to cure a weak will, in such and all similar cases we must establish connections between the child's ideas.

The question may now be asked, Why shall we not utilize to this end the ordinary studies of the school curriculum,—history, geography, arithmetic, etc.? All of these branches exercise and develop the child's faculty of serial and complex thinking. Any sum in multiplication gives a training of this kind. Let the task be to multiply a multiplicand of four figures by a multiplier of three. First, the child must multiply every figure in the multiplicand by the units of the multiplier and write down the result, then by the tens, and then by the hundreds, and combine these results. Here is a lesson in combination, in serial, and, for a young child, somewhat complex thinking. Let the task be to bound the State of New

York. The child must see the mental picture of the State in its relation to other States and parts of States, to lakes and rivers and mountains,—a complex group of ideas. Or, let it be required to give a brief account of the American Revolution. Here is a whole series of events, each depending on the preceding ones. Why, then, may we not content ourselves with using the ordinary studies of the school curriculum? There are two reasons.

First, that history, geography, and arithmetic are not interesting, as a rule, to young children, especially not to young children of the class with which we are now dealing. These listless minds are not easily roused to an interest in abstractions. Secondly, it is a notorious fact that intellectual culture, pure and simple, is quite consistent with weakness of the will. A person may have very high intellectual attainments, and yet be morally deficient. I need hardly warn my reflective hearers that, when emphasizing the importance of intellectual culture for the will, I have in mind the intellectual process as applied to acts. To cultivate the intellect in its own sphere of contemplation and abstraction, apart from action, may leave the will precisely as feeble as it was before.

And now, all that has been said thus far converges upon the point that has been kept in view from the beginning,—the importance of manual training as an element in disciplining the will. Manual training fulfils the conditions I have just alluded to. It is interesting to the young, as history, geography, and arithmetic often are not. Precisely those pupils who take the least interest or show the least aptitude for literary study are often the most proficient in the workshop and the modelling-room. Nature has not left these neglected children without beautiful compensations. If they are deficient in intellectual power, they are all the more capable of being developed on their active side. Thus, manual training fulfils the one essential condition,—it is interesting. It also fulfils the second. By manual training we cultivate the intellect in close and inseparable connection with action. Manual training consists of a series of actions, which are controlled by the mind, and which always react on it. Let the task assigned be,

for instance, the making of a wooden box. The first point to be gained is to attract the attention of the pupil to the object. A wooden box is interesting to a child, hence this first point will be gained. Lethargy is overcome, and attention is aroused. Next, it is important to keep the attention fixed on the object. Thus only can tenacity of purpose be cultivated. Manual training enables us to keep the attention of the child fixed upon the object, because the latter is concrete. Furthermore, the variety of occupations which enter into the making of the box constantly refreshes this interest after it has once been started. The wood must be sawed to line. The boards must be carefully planed and smoothed. The joints must be accurately worked out and fitted. The lid must be attached with hinges. The edges must be smoothed or bevelled. The box must be painted or varnished. Here is a sequence of means leading to an end, a series of operations all pointing to the final object to be gained, to be produced, to be created. Again, each of these means becomes in turn and for the time being a secondary end; and the pupil thus learns, in an elementary way, the lesson of subordinating minor ends to a major end. And, when finally the task is done, when the box stands before the boy's eyes a complete whole, a serviceable thing, sightly to the eyes, well adapted to its uses, with what a glow of triumph does he contemplate his work! The pleasure of achievement now comes in to crown his experience; and this sense of achievement, in connection with the work done, leaves in his mind a pleasant after-taste, which will stimulate him to similar work in the future. The child that has once acquired, in connection with the making of a box, the habits just described, has mastered the secret of a strong will, and will be able to apply the same habits in other directions and on other occasions.

Or let the task be an artistic one. And let me here say that manual training is incomplete unless it covers art training. Many otherwise excellent and interesting experiments in manual training fail to give satisfaction because they do not include this element. The useful must flower into the beautiful, to be in the highest sense useful. Nor is it neces-

sary to remind those who have given attention to the subject of education how important the influence of the beautiful is in refining the sentiments and elevating the nature of the young. Let the task then be to model a leaf, a vase, a hand, a head. Here again we have the same advantage as in the making of the box. The object is concrete, and therefore suitable for minds incapable of grasping abstractions. The object can be constantly kept before the pupil's eyes. There will be constant approximation, and at last that glow of triumph. What child is not happy if he has produced something tangible, something that is an outgrowth of his own activity, especially if it be something which is charming to every beholder?

But now let me briefly summarize the conclusions to which reflection has led me in regard to the subject of manual training in reformatory institutions. Manual training should be introduced into every reformatory. In New York we have tested a system of work-shop lessons for children between six and fourteen. There is, I am persuaded, no reason why manual training should not be applied to the youngest children in reformatories. Manual training should always include art training. The labor of the children of reformatories should never be let to contractors. I heartily agree with what was said on that subject this morning. The pupils of reformatories should never make heads of pins or the ninetieth fraction of a shoe. Let there be no machine work. Let the pupils turn out complete articles, for only thus can the full intellectual and moral benefits of manual training be reaped. Agriculture, wherever the opportunities are favorable, presents, on the whole, the same advantages as manual training, and should be employed as far as possible in connection with reformatory institutions in the country.

I have thus far attempted to show how the will can be made strong. But a strong will is not necessarily a good will. It is true, there are influences in manual training, as it has been described, which are favorable to a virtuous disposition. Squareness in things is not without relation to squareness in action and in thinking. A child that has learned to be exact—that is, truthful in his work—will be inclined to be

scrupulous and truthful in his speech, in his thought, and in his acts. The refining and elevating influence of artistic work I have already mentioned. But, along with and over and above all these influences, I need hardly say to you that, in the remarks which I have offered this evening, I have all along taken for granted the continued application of those tried and excellent methods which prevail in our best reformatories. I have taken for granted the isolation from society, which shuts out temptation; the routine of the institution, which induces regularity of habit; the strict surveillance of the whole and of every individual, which prevents excesses of the passions, and therefore starves them into disuse. I have taken for granted the cultivation of the emotions, whose importance I am the last to undervalue. I have taken for granted the influence of good example, good literature, good music, poetry, and religion. All I have intended to urge this evening is that between good feeling and the realization of that good feeling there exists, in persons whose will-power is weak, a hiatus, and that manual training is admirably adapted to fill that hiatus.

There is another advantage to be noted in connection with manual training,—namely, that it develops the property sense. What, after all, apart from artificial social convention, is the foundation of the right of property? On what basis does it rest? I have a proprietary right in my own thoughts. I have a right to follow the dictates of my own conscience. I have a right to follow my tastes in the adornment of my person and my house. I have a right to the whole sphere of my individuality, my selfhood; and I have a right in *things* so far as I have put a part of myself into them. The child that has made a wooden box has put a part of himself into the making of that box,—his thought, his patience, his skill, his toil,—and therefore the child feels that he has a right of property in that box. And as only those who own property themselves are likely to respect the rights of property in others, we have by manual training cultivated the property sense of the child; and this, in the case of the delinquent child, it will be admitted, is no small advantage.

I have confined myself till now to speaking of the importance of manual training in its influence on the character of delinquent children. I wish to add a few words touching the influence of manual training on character in general, and its importance for children of all classes of society. I need not here speak of the value of manual training to the artisan class. That has been amply demonstrated of late by the numerous technical and art schools which the leading manufacturing nations of Europe have established and are establishing. I need not speak of the value of manual training to the future surgeon, dentist, scientist, experimenter, and to all those who require deftness of hand in the pursuit of their avocations, but I do wish to speak of the value of manual training to the future lawyer and clergyman and to all those who will not be called upon to labor with their hands. Precisely because they will not labor with their hands is manual training so important for them,—in the interest of an all-round culture,—in order that they may not be entirely crippled on one side of their nature. The Greek legend says that the giant with whom Hercules grappled was invincible so long as his feet were planted on the solid earth. We need to have a care that our civilization shall remain planted on the solid earth. There is danger lest it may be developed too much into the air,—that we may become too much separated from those primal sources of strength from which mankind has always drawn its vitality. The English nobility recognize this danger, and have deliberately adopted hunting as their favorite pastime. They follow as a matter of physical exercise, in order to keep up their physical strength, a pursuit which the savage man followed from necessity. The introduction of athletics in colleges is a move in the same direction. But, friends, it is not sufficient to maintain our physical strength, our brute strength, the strength of limb and muscle. We must also preserve that spiritualized strength which we call skill,—the tool-using faculty, the power of impressing on matter the shapes of mind. And the more machinery takes the place of human labor, the more necessary will it be to resort to manual training as a deliberate exercise in skill, pre-

cisely as we have resorted to athletics and hunting as exercises in strength. A father, therefore, who belongs to the intellectual class, has every reason to take an even greater interest in the manual training of his children than a father who belongs to the artisan class.

There is one word more I have to say in closing. Twenty-five years ago, as the recent memories of Gettysburg recall to us, we fought to keep this people a united nation. Then was State arrayed against State. To-day class is beginning to be arrayed against class. The danger is not yet imminent, but it is sufficiently great to give us thought. The source of the danger does not lie, we may be sure, in the malice of the poor against the rich or the envy of the rich by the poor; but rather, I think, it lies in this, that the two classes of society have become so widely separated by difference of interests and pursuits that they no longer fully understand one another, and misunderstanding, as is well known, is the fruitful source of hatred and dissension. This must not be. The manual laborer must have time and opportunity for intellectual improvement. The intellectual classes, on the other hand, must learn manual labor; and this they can best do in early youth, in the school, before the differentiation of pursuits has yet begun. Our common schools are rightly so named. The justification of their support by the State is not, I think, as is sometimes argued, because the State should give a sufficient education to each of its voters to enable him at least to read the ballot which he deposits. This would be but a poor equipment for citizenship at best. The justification for the existence of our common schools lies rather in the common feeling which they create between the different classes of society. And it is this bond of common feeling woven in childhood that has kept and must keep us a united people. Let manual training, therefore, be introduced into the common schools: let the son of the rich man learn, side by side with the son of the poor man, to labor with his hands; let him thus learn practically to respect labor; let him learn to understand what the dignity of manual labor really means, and the two classes of society, united at the root, will never thereafter entirely grow asunder.

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A short time ago I spent an afternoon with a poet whose fame is familiar to all my hearers. There was present in the company a gentleman of large means, who, in the course of conversation, descanted upon the merits of the protective system, and spoke in glowing terms of the growth of our industries and of the immense wealth which is being accumulated in our large cities. The aged poet turned to him and said, "That is all very well. I like your industries and your factories and your wealth; but, tell me, do they turn out men down your way?" That is the question which we are bound to consider. *Is this civilization of ours turning out men, manly men and womanly women?* Now, that this very technical labor, which is the prolific source of our material aggrandizement, also can become, when employed in the education of the young, the means of enlarging their manhood, quickening their intellect, and establishing their character, is the point which I have ventured to submit to your attention this evening.

THE ETHICS OF INSOLVENCY.

READ BEFORE THE YOUNG MEN'S UNION OF THE NEW YORK
SOCIETY FOR ETHICAL CULTURE, BY LEO G. ROSENBLATT.

(Concluded from the October number.)

LET us then take for granted that the debtor is hopelessly insolvent. He abandons his ship to the winds and the waves, and makes for the shore with what he has been able to save from the wreck. And now the question arises, How ought the salvage and the loss be distributed?

III. *Insolvency.*—Shall the debtor be the sole arbiter of the distribution, and divide the remnants of his fortune as suits his pleasure? Or must he be controlled by the principle of equality and impartial justice?

If we turn to the law of shipping for our answer, we discover what is known as the law of general average, which divides the loss incurred among the various interests exposed to the common danger and ultimately saved, and divides such loss among them evenly *in the proportion of their respective values.*

The same even-handed justice controls, in our courts of equity, the distribution of an insolvent's assets, when he has not exercised the common law right of preference. And the principle of this equitable distribution is embodied in the maxim, "equality is equity."* To do justice to each, equity respects the rights of all creditors. For every creditor has the same title to be paid in full, if the assets are sufficient; and if insufficient, then each creditor has the right to be paid as nearly in full as possible. It necessarily follows that the general loss shall be distributed among the creditors in proportion to their respective claims.

* Story, Equity Jur., § 556a.

But, unfortunately, law and equity are not always equivalent terms. And in direct conflict with the principle of equity—for “equity delighteth in equality”—stands the principle of the common law that the debtor, even after hopeless insolvency, has the right of absolute dominion over his assets, and can dispose of them as he pleases, showing such partiality and preference in the payment of his debts as he arbitrarily chooses.

Is this doctrine of absolute dominion, as a justification of preferences, consistent with the law of ethics?

If the fact that this doctrine has been very generally modified by statute were sufficient in itself to condemn it, then all further argument might be spared. For, theoretically, preferences were prohibited by our National Bankrupt Acts* as being in fraud of general creditors, and are to-day forbidden by statute in every New England State except Rhode Island, in many of the Southern, Western, and Pacific States, and in every one of the Middle States except our own State of New York.† And even in this State the entering-wedge has been driven, for in the year 1887 the legislature passed a law avoiding in general assignments all preferences (other than for wages or salaries of employés) except to the amount of one-third in value of the assigned estate left after deducting such wages or salaries.‡

But these statutory enactments are not sufficient to prevent secret and collusive preferences.

Even under the strict construction of our National Bankrupt Act secret preferences were very generally supposed to be common; and the mutual jealousies which thus sprang up among the creditor class undoubtedly tended to render the law odious and inadequate to prevent fraud. No law can be other than a dead letter, unless supported by an enlightened public opinion. And public opinion to-day still inclines to an approval of the common-law theory of the insolvent's absolute right of dominion. Every creditor seems ready to

* U. S. Rev. Stat., § 5128.

† Burrill on Assignments, § 165.

‡ Laws 1877, ch. 503.

concede the debtor's right to prefer whom he pleases,—especially the creditor whom the debtor has pleased to prefer. And thus the question remains a proper and serious problem for discussion in the domain of practical ethics. In considering the doctrine of preferences as a doctrine of the common law, it is but fair to say that the law-courts were not indifferent to the ethical aspects of the question. They sought to justify the debtor's right to prefer as a moral right. "It is neither illegal nor immoral,"* said one of the ablest English jurists. And in the courts of this State it has been laid down "as a settled and unshaken principle, both in law and in equity, that a failing debtor has a just, legal, and moral right" to give preferences.†

The insolvent's right to prefer special creditors or sets of creditors is ordinarily justified upon one or more of the following grounds, which it may be worth our while to analyze:

1. *The principle of absolute dominion*, which asserts the debtor's right to do with his property as he pleases.
2. *The principle of gratitude*, which emphasizes the superior claims of those creditors who, in extending credit, were influenced by motives of friendship rather than motives of gain.
3. *The principle of public policy*, which commends and rewards the diligence of those creditors who outstrip others in the race for collection.

Let us consider these propositions in the order named:

1. *The Principle of Absolute Dominion*.—A concise statement of the argument, based on this principle as applied to the case of insolvency, is contained in the following words of a common-law court: "It is," says the learned judge, "only when a man loses dominion over his property and transfers that dominion to another that the right of a creditor to a *pro rata* dividend attaches. While a man retains dominion of his property, he may encumber and convey it as he pleases, if not directly forbidden by law, and prefer such creditors, by payment or transfer, as he pleases."‡

* Lord Kenyon in *Estrick vs. Cailland*, 5 Term Rep.

† Murray vs. Riggs, 15 Johns. Rep., 571; Thompson, C. J.

‡ Blakely's Appeal, 7 Ban. Pa., 449.

There is no question of the soundness of this decision as a statement of the law, founded on legal precedent; but I submit that it is neither good ethics, nor consistent as a matter of logic with other well-established principles of jurisprudence.

Thus, it is a principle of equity jurisprudence that "*a person who has gotten the estate of another ought not, in conscience, as between them, to be allowed to keep it and not to pay the full consideration money.*"*

And, accordingly, if I buy real estate on credit, I am held in equity to be the absolute owner of the land only to the extent of my partial payment; as to the unpaid balance of the purchase price, I am regarded as a trustee of the seller.

The law creates an equitable lien upon the land in favor of the vendor, which is valid and enforceable against all but innocent third parties.

But why (the layman will ask in surprise) is not this doctrine extended to personal property? As a matter of logic, there is no reason at all why it should be confined to real estate. The reason of the rule applies as fitly to the one class of property as to the other. But considerations of expediency prevent its application to specific merchandise. For it is generally impossible or impracticable to fasten a lien upon property unless the specific property can be readily distinguished from the mass with which it has been mingled.

But while this consideration of expediency is good ground for refusing to establish a special lien or trust on specific property in favor of a special creditor, it is not a valid objection to the creation of a general lien or trust imposed on all the assets in favor of all the creditors.

And this logical development of the theory of vendor's lien is what we find, as an historical fact, in the law of Louisiana, where it is a fundamental principle that "the property of a debtor is the common pledge of all his creditors."†

The doctrine of the vendor's or creditor's lien, as applied

* Story, Equity Jur., § 1219.

† Burrill on Assignments, § 165, Louisiana Civ. Code, Art. 3150.

to real estate, is borrowed by our jurisprudence from the Roman law; but we have not been consistent in confining the application of the principle to landed property, and excluding from its benefits that class of property which is most generally purchased on credit.

At all events, whatever may be the inconsistencies of the law, it is instructive and important, from the stand-point of ethics, to find (even though limited to the law of real estate) a recognition of the trust relation of debtor to creditor. It is at least a partial condemnation of the doctrine of absolute dominion. It is an admission that, in theory at least, property purchased on credit ought to be a trust fund, burdened with a peculiar lien to the extent of unpaid purchase-money, in favor of unpaid creditors.

But while the law assists us in illustrating, and helps us to understand, the principles of ethics, its doctrines are not final and conclusive as arguments. And it is fair to retort upon him who quotes the law with one breath, and with the next seeks to expose its inconsistencies, that he must rely for the support of his propositions upon other premises than those which the law alone has established.

Upon what ground, then, must we condemn the doctrine of absolute dominion, and its corollary, the debtor's right to prefer whom he pleases, considering the question from the stand-point of pure ethics? Clearly upon the basic principle of all moral law, that man is a moral being only by reason of his relation to the world of which he forms part; only because he forms a link in the chain of human life. And because he has no moral life except as a link in the chain, he holds his existence and all that forms part of it in trust for the common good.

This moral trust is recognized and well illustrated by the law of eminent domain,—the rule that all private interests are subordinate and must give way to considerations of the national welfare. And the law of absolute, unqualified dominion—the right of the insolvent debtor to prefer whom he pleases—is inconsistent with and must yield to the principle of justice, which is the very highest consideration of the public good.

If "equality is equity"—if equity demands that a debtor shall be just before he is generous; if public policy calls for the removal of temptation from the pathway of the insolvent; if justice commands respect for the equal rights of all who, in common reliance on the honesty and fidelity of the debtor, have trusted him; and if all these considerations condemn the debtor's exercise of partiality in the distribution of his assets—how can it be claimed that he can morally disregard these considerations? how can his right of ownership be declared morally free from the limitations of his own conscience and the common welfare?

We must, then, dismiss as unworthy of further consideration the apology for injustice which is based on the principle of an assumed "absolute dominion." And I turn therefore to the second supposed justification of the insolvent's right to prefer.

2. *The Principle of Gratitude.*—As the principle of dominion forms the basis of the lawyer's favorite argument in justification of preferences, so the argument founded on the principle of gratitude finds special favor with men of business. But the theory has also received judicial recognition.

"There may be good reason," said an English judge, "for a sinking trader to give a preference to one creditor before another: to one that has been a faithful friend, and for a just debt lent in extremity, when the rest of his debts might be due from him as a dealer in trade, wherein his creditors may have been gainers; in this case, I say, and so circumstanced, the trader honestly may—nay, ought to—give a preference."* This argument is open to the objection that it is founded on sentiment rather than upon considerations of equity. It is the debtor's duty to be just before he is generous.† He is certainly entitled to no credit for paying his debts of gratitude with the proceeds of other people's property. Such generosity is as worthy of praise as the liberality of the late Mr. Tweed, who found it easy to give thousands to charity out of the millions which he had stolen.

* *Small vs. Oudley*, 2 P. William, 427.
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† *Story, Equity Jur.*, § 556.

But there is another more practical objection to the allowance of such preferences,—namely, that a debtor cannot be safely trusted to choose wisely and fairly. His motives are not likely to be proper and disinterested. Experience shows that the choice has almost invariably been exercised for fraudulent purposes. “There is no limit to the fraud and injustice perpetrated by such means.”* And “to leave the choice to the debtor is practically constituting him an agent to obtain money from one and bestow it upon another at his will and pleasure.”† The testimony of one of the ablest judges of this State upon the subject may prove interesting. “The experience and observation of mankind,” he says, “must witness against this principle, which is perverted and made subservient to the gratification of vindictive feelings and the foulest ingratitude, as well as injustice towards honest and confiding creditors.”‡

But, assuming that the debtor might be trusted to choose conscientiously, is there not a justification for the preference of the “friend in need” on grounds of equity? Taxes due to the State are justly preferred by law, and no one will deny the propriety of the preference which is generally given by statute to the wages of labor. Why may not the preference given as a reward for disinterested generosity be justifiable on similar grounds?

In the first place, there is no analogy between State taxes and laborers’ wages on the one hand, and the financial claims of friendship on the other. The debts due to the State are charged upon the assets, irrespective of ownership. For reasons of public policy—in fact, for the purpose of maintaining its own existence as a body politic—the State must collect its taxes without regard to individual interest.

And for like considerations of public policy the law permits and sometimes enforces the preferential payment of laborers’ wages, because otherwise the unpaid wage-earner might become a burden to the community. And in the case

* Report of the District Attorney of Ohio, 1843, quoted 10 *Pai.*, 229.
Walworth, Chancellor, *Boardman vs. Halliday*, 10 *Pai.*, 229.

‡ *Nelson, J., Cunningham vs. Freeborn*, 11 *Wend.*, 256.

of the wage-earner there are also special considerations of humanity, since to deprive the laborer of his wages is to deprive him of his daily bread.

But no public policy entitles to distinction from ordinary merchandise creditors the friend whose cash loan is made, in times of distress, from motives of friendship alone. If the loan is made with the understanding that its return will be secured by preferential payment, then there is little merit in it; for the risk falls not on the lender, but on the general creditors, whose losses are thus increased and whose distributive shares are thus diminished by the continuance of a losing business. But if, on the contrary, the loan is made with open eyes,—with a knowledge of the risk and a willingness to bear his share of the probable loss,—then why should not the lender divide the risk and the loss with the merchandise creditors?

The disinterested conduct of the debtor's friend certainly entitles him to the debtor's gratitude. But what right has the debtor to pay this debt of gratitude with property that does not belong to him,—property that has simply been intrusted to him in reliance upon his honesty and fidelity to the purposes of the trust? The debtor has good cause to be grateful; but what cause have the general creditors for gratitude?

True, the advance of a few hundred or a few thousand dollars, in the nick of time, may perchance avert the crisis of disaster; and thus the creditors may be benefited by the preservation of the estate. But, in order to entitle the lender to gratitude for this timely loan, the creditors should have consented to it; they should have a voice in deciding whether its acceptance and employment are expedient. For often their interests are in fact jeopardized by what may be a very foolish attempt to save a hopeless wreck.

The loan of money to an embarrassed debtor has been compared to the advances made to a vessel in distress, to enable the vessel to reach its home port. Such advances are ordinarily secured by what is called a bottomry bond, which is in the nature of a mortgage, taking precedence of all

other claims against the vessel. But the comparison is an unfortunate one, if it is intended to sustain the claim of the lender to a preference, in case of insolvency. For it is a peculiar feature of the bottomry bond that the debt is discharged if the vessel is lost. "It is absolutely essential to a bottomry bond that the lender should assume this risk."*

It is indeed questionable whether the practice of advancing money to a failing debtor without the knowledge of creditors should be encouraged. For, as to existing creditors, such advances tend to hinder and delay the collection of their claims. And as to future creditors, the pretence of solvency creates a false, misleading, and often fraudulent impression.

3. *The Principle of Public Policy.*—It is, however, claimed that the embarrassed debtor must be permitted to promise or give preferences, in order to stave off the crisis of hopeless insolvency. If he can throw a sop to Cerberus, he may perchance tide over his troubles. And "the necessities of mercantile business"† are set up as a justification of the preferential security of the most urgent claims. From this stand-point, the preference given to the urgent creditor is characterized as a just reward for his superior vigilance and diligence in prosecuting his remedies. In other words, the preference is justified because it is given under compulsion; and the compulsion is justified because it evinces superior diligence. But is that diligence of a character to be commended and encouraged? Does not the debtor's distress appeal to qualities more generous than those of vigilance and diligence?

If, looked at from the stand-point of ethics, the debtor's assets are to be regarded as a common pledge for the common security of all creditors,—if each creditor is thus interested in preserving the trust character of the fund,—ought not each be required to respect the rights of all? How can any one creditor justly disregard the privileges of his class, if he claims the benefits of belonging to that class? And why should he be commended for seeking, by oppression of the debtor, to obtain a special advantage over others of his class?

* 2 Parson's on Contracts, 282.

† Burrill on Assignments, § 162.

The judicial praise of what is called the creditor's superior vigilance and diligence is inconsistent with the theory that the creditors are interested and should act jointly, and as a class, upon the principle that equality is equity. He who seeks equity must be ready to do equity.

The justification of a practice that violates this principle of equity cannot be sound "public policy."

It follows, then, that there is no ground upon which the right of preference can be justified in ethics. And the time must come when business morality will rise to the level of, and yield effective support to, the statute law which so generally condemns the insolvent's arbitrary and often fraudulent distribution of his assets.

In what I have heretofore set forth, I have endeavored to arrange categorically and discuss in detail those duties which, because of the possibility or the probability or the actual existence of insolvency, devolve upon the debtor class. I have sought to emphasize especially those rules of conduct which the debtors, as a class, either fail to recognize or consciously neglect.

But the relations of debit and credit impose duties also upon the creditor class, and to these I deem it proper, in conclusion, to call your attention, without dwelling upon this branch of the subject at length.

The Duties of the Creditor Class.—It is my purpose to emphasize only those duties which appear to be most commonly neglected. And I think it will be found, upon examination, that the faults of the creditor class correspond very nearly to those of their debtors. In both cases the root of the evil probably lies in the same false philosophy of business life.

The policy of the bankrupt law, as I have already pointed out, is to show compassion to the debtor's misfortunes, but deny it to his faults.* The policy of the mercantile world seems to be the very reverse.

* Blackstone, ii. 474.

Thus, instead of discouraging, the creditor class do all they can to stimulate imprudence on the part of debtors. Prudence enjoins upon the debtor self-assurance of his fitness and capacity for business. But how does the creditor class stand with reference to this rule of common sense? The financial standing of every man who asks for credit is carefully probed, but how many creditors care to examine into his mental and moral fitness to be trusted? What difference, for instance, does it make to the merchant, who is seeking to unload his wares, how often and how fraudulently his debtor has failed? Let the insolvent start afresh in the name of his wife or his son, and he will find but little difficulty in getting new credit. Indeed, so cynical is this disregard of moral character that it is a standing joke among merchants that a man is a better business risk after he has failed than before, because he is sure to have made a profit out of the transaction.

Then, again, prudence calls for a reduction of the speculative element in business to its minimum. But does the creditor class help and encourage the observance of this practical rule of conduct? Decidedly not. The practice of what is called "dating ahead" will illustrate my point. The debtor is approached by the seller's agent and urged to purchase. He replies that his needs for the current season have been already supplied; to buy in excess of his present requirements would be discounting the future; and the proceeds which he expects to realize from current sales do not warrant speculation. To overcome this objection the seller then offers a tempting bait. "If you will give me your order now," he says, "I will not require you to take the goods, nor will I charge them against your account, until long after you have had an opportunity to dispose of your present stock." I will "date the bill ahead." (And thus it has come to pass that in one branch of business, at least, a credit of as long as *eleven months* is not uncommon.) The debtor falls into the trap set for him. He discounts the future. He buys prematurely and without knowing what his needs are going to be. He becomes loaded down with speculative stock. He is un-

able to dispose of his surplus wares except at a sacrifice. And then comes the inevitable result. Embarrassment is followed by insolvency. And both debtor and creditor suffer the disastrous consequences of a policy as immoral as it is shortsighted.

And what is the cause of this cynical indifference to the rules of prudence? It is the bitterness of competition. It is the utter absence of an *esprit de corps* among the creditors themselves,—the lack of fidelity to class interests. And it is to be hailed as a sign of moral progress when trade guilds are formed, such as the jewellers of this country have organized. In the interests of sound business policy, no less than for the sake of a healthier business morality, such guilds should be encouraged in every branch of commercial activity, to regulate credits, to secure fair dealing, to insure just claims against the consequences of incapacity, imprudence, and dishonesty, and to raise the standard of mercantile character.

Then, again, consider the evils for which the creditor class becomes responsible by its indifference to or discouragement of business candor. The lack of frankness, the love of secrecy, engenders suspicion; the misfortunes of the embarrassed debtor, instead of exciting compassion, induce oppression. This oppression or the fear of it constitutes the strongest incentive to the commission of those frauds, of which the debtor is sure to be suspected, whether guilty or innocent. For in every case of insolvency there is a presumption of fraud,—sometimes unfair, but only too often well founded.

But if candor were the rule of business, instead of the exception, there would be less room for suspicion, and more for compassion; there would be less of oppression on the part of creditors and less fear thereof on the part of debtors. Confidence begets confidence. And mutual confidence would inevitably inspire the creditor with compassion and the debtor with a sense of justice.

The creditor class is at fault in its attitude towards the debtor class; the two classes meet apparently as friends, but they do not trust each other out of sight. Let the creditors

encourage candor by a consistent exercise thereof; let them by example teach the doctrine that the relations of debit and credit are interdependent, not independent; let them emancipate themselves from the moral superstition that business and ethics have nothing in common; and frankness will become the rule, in the early stages of embarrassment, and equality and justice the principles upon which the losses of insolvency will be distributed.

But the principle of justice is one which the creditors are almost estopped from invoking, because they do not recognize its binding force among themselves. Business is treated as a sort of civil war, in which every man's hand is raised against his neighbor. And the conflict is not confined to the struggle between debtor and creditor; it is perhaps more fierce and bitter still among the creditors themselves. In the race for first place, the rule of business men is: Each for himself, and the devil take the hindmost. And it is pitiable to see how they stumble and humiliate themselves in the final rush for preference.

One of the most common forms of commercial vice is the practice of seeking and giving secret preferences for fraudulent services to be rendered. The creditor offers or consents, in consideration of full payment of his individual claim, to obtain a favorable settlement from his fellow-creditors. He signs the composition deed, and thus ostensibly agrees to join in the compromise which, upon the strength of his subscription, he induces others—less “diligent” and less “vigilant” than himself—to accept.

Happily the law does *not* approve of this species of vigilance and diligence; it does not commend this exercise of the right of absolute dominion; it calls such conduct by its right name, and stamps it as deliberate, downright fraud. And a composition thus obtained is void in law and in equity.* This recognition of moral principle by the law renders a discussion of the principle, as a rule of ethics, superfluous. For the law often lags behind, but seldom goes in advance of public morality.

* Story, *Equity Jur.*, § 370.

To every rule there appears to be an exception. And the National Bankrupt Act of 1867, which was in advance of the business morality of its time, is such an apparent exception to the rule that the law seldom, if ever, pioneers the way of moral progress. It is an exception, however, which proves the rule. For in 1878 it was repealed, because it was a practical failure. In the shadow of its beneficent provisions, fraud and dishonesty seemed to flourish. The very practices against which it was directed—the payment of fictitious claims, the creation of secret preferences—were carried on under the cover of its apparent sanction.

Why did it fail? Not because its theory was unsound; not because its principles were inconsistent with good morals: on the contrary, it seems to be a perfect compendium of business ethics. It failed because it was premature as a code of accepted ethics; because it did not fit the conscience of its generation; because it was in advance of the times.

In illustration let me refer to a fact mentioned by one well qualified by experience to speak with authority. Speaking of the criminal remedies provided for the prevention and punishment of the most flagrant abuses and frauds, Blumenstiel says,—

“The conviction of a bankrupt under the statute is as much a matter of surprise and wonder as the performance of a miracle would have been. *This is not because the laws applicable to commercial offences are defective, but is due rather to the carelessness and negligence of the creditor class in pursuing a fraudulent creditor, as well as the ease with which bankrupts at the present day are able to compound their misdeeds with the parties whom they cheat.*”*

This illustrates why the National Bankrupt Act proved a failure; this explains why it was repealed.

Like Moses, the nation brought down from the sublime heights of morality a code of ethics. Like Moses, it found the people worshipping the golden calf. Like Moses, it shattered the tables of the law.

* Blumenstiel on Bankruptcy, 607.

Ethical culture in the market-place must necessarily precede the institution of an effective and enlightened system of bankruptcy legislation. The high priests of the nation may build the sanctuary. But if the people enter with unclean hands, with unclean hearts, and thoughts impure, then is the sanctuary violated and defiled.

"ROBERT ELSMERE."

DELIVERED BEFORE SOUTH PLACE ETHICAL SOCIETY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1888, BY STANTON COIT, PH.D.

I WISH that, from the first, Christians might spare themselves any fears, and earnest men outside the Church might not deceive themselves with any hope from *Robert Elsmere*. It is a book which will strengthen orthodoxy, and make it more difficult to lift the Church out of its conventional grooves,—as Mr. Gladstone must have seen, or he would not have set the whole nation reading it. No churchman need regret the popularity of *Robert Elsmere*; it is we who have reason to lament.

The only prominent characters in the book who are not theists, believers in a personal God, and do not acknowledge Jesus as Lord and Master, the only characters who give up all dogma and will follow reason to its logical issue, are two men of the most detestable type,—men in whom the casting aside of Christianity is made to be a part of their cold-blooded selfishness. Edward Langham, Robert's tutor and intimate friend at Oxford, had had a moment of intellectual enthusiasm once, had written poems and art criticisms, but suddenly and soon his active energies became paralyzed with a sense of "the uselessness of utterance, the futility of enthusiasm, the absurdity of trying to realize any of the mind's inward dreams." He became a whining, carping, pessimist, "tormented with self-consciousness." He gave up composing and took to translating, but simply "as a kind of mental stone-breaking." The only delight that remained to him was to haunt the theatres of Paris for a fortnight, and to hear Wagner. "He had weeks of timidity and depression." He trifles with a young girl's affection, excites her sympathies by telling her what a miserable creature he is. But having led her on, he suddenly neglects her. Later, he allows himself to ask her to become

his wife, and the next day writes her to the effect that he has changed his mind, that it would interfere with his studies to have a wife about. And when Robert comes to plead his sister's cause, Langham replies, "My habits are my masters. I should grow to hate what comes between me and them." A man with a diseased will, loving nothing, sickened with contempt for himself, dodging every responsibility, sneering at what is high,—this is one of the two representatives of the rationalist who influence Elsmere to the undermining of his faith in the incarnation and resurrection of Christ. It is a portrait well calculated to make an honest Christian, who had never met unbelievers, turn in horror from their company. The other is a man tainted with hereditary insanity. His father had committed suicide. His sister, whom he treats with a contempt cruel enough to drive her mad, also loses her wits. And he himself, finally, becomes a raving maniac. But besides his taint of insanity, he is as selfish as Langham and more immoral. Until they are already dying of diphtheria he will do nothing for his wretched tenants. The only woman he admires is of the dangerous French type. He urges this woman's friendship upon Robert, and she afterwards attempts, by her wiles, to entrap Robert into unfaithfulness towards his wife. But the Squire had never pretended that she was moral! This is the other representative of the class of men who carry criticism to the extreme, even to the renouncing of the idea of a personal God. This portrait, like the other, implies that men of that class have no heart, no soul, but are driven by an abnormal and irregular intellect. For all their defects of character seem to be introduced as the cause of their abandoning theism in addition to abandoning miracles.

Besides Langham and the Squire there are some minor characters who do not believe in a personal God. But they too are such as to disgrace any ideas they could hold. James Wardlaw and his wife are Comtists; but he is coarse and vulgar in manners and believes in the subordination of women, while his wife is a stupid nonentity. The only other unbelievers into whose society the reader is permitted to enter

are the group of workingmen at the North R—— Club, who are about to publish a comic life of Christ, and whose organ, *Faith and Fools*, contained a caricature of the crucifixion,—the scroll emanating from Mary Magdalen's mouth containing obscenities.

I have no doubt there are among unbelievers in real life just such degraded and monstrous specimens of human beings as those in *Robert Elsmere*. But, surely, the earnest unbelievers whom I have known personally—and I have been with such all through my life—are as far removed from such abominations of character and such impiety as the saintliest Christians are. To hear Christ ridiculed pains them in the same way as it would to hear their own mother scoffed at; and contempt for the idea of an infinite Father, although they do not believe in it themselves, strikes them as implying contempt for the human mind itself. Among many friends who have given up theism and personal allegiance to Jesus as Master, I have not one who has any taint of insanity or any heartless intellectuality like the Squire's, or any morbid, emasculated impotency of will like Langham's. And of the great men and women of fame in modern times, who have discarded their old beliefs entirely, I cannot recall a single one of that kind. The same moral qualities which make one man a steadfast Christian will lead another to drop his Christian faith and quit the Church of his childhood. In *Robert Elsmere*, however, the characters are allowed to grow nobler and better up to a certain line of heterodoxy; they may throw aside miracles and the divinity of Jesus, so long as they still do everything in remembrance of him and keep their trust in the Eternal; but that marks the division-line between the sheep and the goats; on the other side we see grazing Langham, the Squire, the Wardlaws, and the obscene scoffers of the North R—— Club. This book is so earnest and sincere that, doubtless, in this point it will strengthen public sentiment, and I cannot therefore forget the injustice done. For my part, the ideas I believe in are the very life of my better life, yet they are not the idea of a personal God nor the memory of Jesus; and no more subtle attack can be made upon them and upon those holding

them than to intimate that somehow a deterioration of character goes along with them.

But in quite another way the book will confirm the conventional Christian in his thinking, and stiffen the prejudices against every one who is not interested in the divinity of Christ. For the book gives only the most paltry and meagre—merely intellectual—grounds for setting aside miracles and the supernatural. The reason Langham and the Squire and Robert abandon the divinity of Christ is simply because historic research proves that the miracles did not happen. Scientific criticism shows, they think, that the disciples of Jesus were incapable of testifying as to whether five thousand men, besides women and children, were fed with five loaves and two fishes and twelve baskets full remained or not, or as to whether a man three days dead was brought back to life or not. With these miracles the whole superstructure of theology falls. The doctrine that Christ is God and that God does special acts becomes untenable to them. Therefore, for these reasons, they give up the incarnation, the divinity, the resurrection of Christ, the trinity of the Godhead, and the knowledge of personal immortality. These dogmas do not satisfy the intellect,—that is the only reason Robert gives for discarding them, and thereby implies that provided they did satisfy the intellect he would go on preaching them as earnestly and persistently as ever. In short, his dissent is wholly on intellectual grounds, not once on practical grounds; his question, his doubt, is always as to their truth, never once as to their moral worth.

Now, a truth may be scientifically unimpeachable and yet practically unrelated to our lives. Therefore, before we question its truth we may examine into its bearing upon conduct, upon the joys and sorrows of conscious beings, and if we find it unrelated or remotely connected, or a fact which should not be obtruded, we may discard it, knowing that it is not worth while or that we ought not to give our attention to it. If any one should come to me with classified facts as to the number of leaves on every tree in Regent's Park, and show me photographs of all the various shapes of leaf on any tree,

or should give me statistics as to the number and size of the clouds that sailed through yesterday's sky,—how many were shaped like elephants and how many looked like mountains,—while I would admit the fulness and richness of nature's life and beauty, at the same time I should look with pity on the man so empty of wisdom and judgment; I should think the man demented, to have so little feeling for the relative value of facts in the great system of truth which has its centre in the moral life of men. A sane man considers not only truth, but the ethical worth of it.

Now, I am aware that the majority of thinking men who dissent from the dogmas of the Church do so because they cannot believe in their truth, implying that if they could only believe they would have no other objection to make. On the other hand, I am aware that most persons in the Church cling to the doctrine chiefly because of its supposed moral worth, and many feel not at all sure that the doctrine can be defended scientifically, but are absolutely certain of its value in relation to character and suffering and joy. And many who do for conscience' sake withdraw from the Church and turn away from its teachings do so with sadness and in tears, as if bereft of life's beauty and meaning. It is right that the worth of the doctrines should constitute our chief concern. But what I wish to insist on is that there is a large minority of earnest men—and this minority is growing every day—who reject Christian dogma wholly on practical grounds; who, before they apply the test of truth, and without ever denying on that score, apply the test of moral worth.

First, they ask of any supposed truth, like the fall of man or the resurrection of Christ, Does it feed the heart and stimulate the will to heroic action, and expand and elevate the mind? If not, let it drop. If it does, they then ask, Does it do so relating to other truths? Is it to be emphasized and dwelt upon week after week, for century after century? For we must give our attention to those truths which are relatively of most importance to character and society. We must ask, Is it, in the long run, a healing truth, or is it only a temporary palliative that perhaps soothes for a season or for centuries,

but if taken constantly paralyzes human energy and cramps men's thoughts? But, besides asking, "Is it valuable, and is it important relatively to other valuable truths?" there is still a third question for us to ask, "Is it a truth that should be made a principle of membership in a society aiming at righteousness on earth? Ought men be compelled to subscribe to it in order to be recognized as moral teachers or honest citizens? Is it such that it should form part of the bond of union among good men? Is it such that any man should be condemned and ostracized for not believing it?" I take it, many a truth may be comforting and stimulating and relatively valuable, and yet should be left wholly to each individual man to entertain or neglect. Accordingly, from an ethical point of view, the Church has done very little to vindicate herself when she has simply proved that her dogmas are true; and, on the other hand, any one who abandons these dogmas merely because they do not satisfy the demands of intellect will never discover any other truths to put in their place. He must apply the test of worth as well as of truth; and if on the ground of worth he discards Christian dogma and theism, it will be because he sees other truths of greater value, better fitted to bind men in righteousness. But if in this way we discard their dogmas, every Christian should respect us. Orthodox Christians, however, who read *Robert Elsmere*, will surely think that we are mere skeletons of intellect, without heart, without any warmth of human blood in our veins,—perhaps who, if capable of delight, would enjoy chiefly vivisection, tearing to shreds the living, palpitating faith of other men, as the Squire did, and as Langham would have done except even this pleasure palled on him. But even good Robert's motive for giving up the old faith was not that the ethic passion in him demanded something better, but simply that his critical faculty took offence at belief in miracles.

We have now considered the forces which moulded Robert's religious career while he was in the Church, and which culminated in his leaving the Church, and in the tragic scene between himself and his wife. He has abandoned miracles and the divinity of Christ, but he is still a believer in a personal God,

and acknowledges Jesus as Master. Why his critical faculty finds nothing to object to in theism is never explained. The only thing he has to say in scientific defence of it is that it cannot ever be disproved. Robert's process of destructive criticism, however, stops here; and we may turn now to follow him in his constructive social mission among the workmen of East London.

Immediately we find that his narrow, intellectual view of Christianity, and his lack of the ethical standing-point, make him utterly misunderstand why the people of the working classes are alienated from Christ and the Bible. He imagines that, like himself, they have taken offence at miracles, and that in casting off miracles have, through lack of perception, thrown away Jesus too. So, in his first religious address to them, which is on the claims of Jesus to modern life, his chief point, while showing that miracles do not happen, is at the same time to prove that that is no reason for being indifferent to Jesus,—as if that was why the working people are indifferent. Elsmere shows, and it certainly is true, that the character of Jesus only stands out the more sublime by being stripped of supernatural powers. But the working people have, not at all because of rational views against miracles, fallen away from God and the Bible. They have not thought about miracles one way or the other; they are interested in other concerns, and these of a very material and narrow kind,—keeping alive, finding work, feeding their children, drinking beer, and probably discussing politics. It is true the people do not care for Jesus, it seems to them sentimental and foolish to make so much of him. But it is idle to hope to rally them about his name by showing that he did not raise the dead and restore the blind and lame, and that he did not himself rise from the grave, and that he was simply a man with all the limitations of his times, although nobler, and having some good ideas about a kingdom of God. To imagine that the people have fallen away from him because the Church has declared him to be not a man but God would be as if some great lover of Shakespeare, descending out of his library and finding that the masses of people did not read and love Shakespeare,

should think it was because Mr. Donnelly had been spreading abroad damaging reports about Shakespeare. And if he should go to the workmen of East London, and try to prove that Mr. Donnelly's theory was false in order to get them to read Shakespeare, it would be like Elsmere's attempt to bring the people to Christ by showing that the Church had misrepresented him.

No, if you would bring the people to do everything in remembrance of Jesus, you would have to show them how that would deliver them from their hard lot, diminish their hours of labor, give them the friendship of the best, educate their children, and afford them happiness and health. But that you cannot show. The people would therefore count it sentimental. The people see that there is no magic in that name. They do not feel, and cannot be made to feel, that the historic Jesus has delivered or will deliver them from their earthly woes, and of any other they have no fear.

I wondered whether any such experiment as Elsmere's had really been made, whether the story related in this novel had any counterpart or any foundation in real life. Accordingly, I went to a man who has been for fourteen or fifteen years a constant lecturer at workingmen's clubs; he probably, I was told on good authority, would know more than any one else about the thoughts and sentiments of the workingmen of London, and what they had done. I asked him (he had read the novel) if he had ever heard of such a movement among them as this of Elsmere's men forming a brotherhood in the name of Christ and in trust on the Eternal. He said that to his knowledge nothing of the kind had ever been thought of and could not be. He said, "One never would see pictures of Socrates and Jesus on the walls of a workingmen's club, as Mrs. Ward describes; they have never heard of Socrates and Jesus." Then he corrected himself and added, "I will not say they have never heard of Jesus, but all they know of him is his name." He agreed with me that every attempt like Elsmere's would probably only quicken whatever dormant germs of theology had been sown in their minds in early childhood. Then I went to a clergyman of the Church of

England, who knows the people well, and has studied their habits and thoughts for years, and his words were, "Such a scheme as Elsmere's could not live a day! The people would not have it, and the thought of God is not at all what is going to arouse the people."

No! And the people are right. The reorganization of their life is not to be on trust and memory. Trust in the Eternal? Not that, but *hope based on human effort!* Stimulate that; let the people see and feel how, by their concerted action and effort, the whole mass of them may lift themselves out of ignorance and poverty into power and plenty, into a society of just and equal laws and opportunities. Stir up hope for themselves and their children. Preach the necessity of human social effort. Not trust in the Eternal! Then will the workingmen come to you. Whether trust in the Eternal is justifiable rationally I do not care to argue: all I say is, the people will not listen to it, and, what is more, if they did, it would not stimulate and guide their characters as hope in combined human effort would.

And is memory even of the noble life of Jesus going to raise the people into moral and social excellence? No, not memory,—but insight into the meaning of right living, into the causes of wretchedness and depravity; insight—the vision of the perfect society, the picture, the pattern, of how each man ought to live each day now and here, held before his eyes, bound about his brow, nailed upon the door-posts of his heart—that will save, that will deliver! That will draw men into brotherhood. Memory, in turning our gaze backward, makes us forget the task before us. Insight is what we want, foresight, the haunting dream of what may come through human effort, not satisfaction in what has been. Let the dead past bury their dead. If there be any life still in them, Jesus and all the past heroes will live in us and stir our pulses without our making them the centre of our conscious thought and the bond of human fellowship.

"To reconceive the Christ," says Elsmere, "is the task of our age." And by the Christ he does not mean, as some do, the ideal of manhood for each, the pattern of character which

each man's heart creates out of its own aspiration, but the local, historical Jesus. In order that the members of the North R—— Club should reconceive the Christ aright, he hung up "four or five drawings of Nazareth, of the Lake of Gennesareth, of Jerusalem, and the temple of Herod." He describes with painful vividness the last scenes of that life, and how "they laid him in a tomb which had been hewn of rock, and rolled a stone against the door of the tomb;" now certainly it was grossly amiss for these men to ridicule Christ, but that and their obscenities concerning him were only a minor part of their general depravity and vulgar taste. If to ridicule Christ were the only wrong these men were in the habit of committing, then to reconceive him would have been their chief need; otherwise it would have been only one of a hundred points for reform which were equally important. It is strange how sometimes men who have been reared under such influences as Elsmere had been reared under are scarcely moved when other forms of vice and sin are committed: men may debauch themselves with drink, and may murder and ruin innocent lives, and nothing will be done, but let a word be breathed against Jesus and they are on their feet in an instant. I once watched a clergyman as he listened to a rough man addressing a crowd. The speaker was running over with coarse and low jests and suggestions, and the clergyman smiled with kindly pity; but when the man quoted in some flippant sense a beautiful saying of Jesus, the clergyman's face grew ashen white, and from that moment he sat like one dead. But is Jesus the only person to be held inviolable in our thought? Are wives and daughters and sons to be counted cheap and not sacred? May they be besmattered with foul talk and we sit by with never a protest? Is Christ the only person whom we need to reconceive? Is he the first we need attend to? No! Every man and woman of us to-day needs, first and foremost, to reconceive,—to get a correct idea of himself and herself and of those we daily meet. There is no one of us who has not already a better notion of what Jesus was than what we ourselves are. I find everywhere that boys and girls and men and women have such

low estimates of themselves, of what will satisfy them, and of what they long to be. I find young men of beautiful nature and sensitive feeling imagining that they are cut out to be hard and tough, and so go about it; and women who have no dignity because they do not respect themselves and their gifts aright, and so let themselves down. To reconceive, to appreciate anew, yourself,—that is the task of each of you, that is what it is the preacher's task to make you feel. And that must be especially the work of any one going to the people of the humblest ranks. Not only they themselves estimate themselves low, but every class above them looks down upon them, and they acquiesce. Yes, Jesus was good; the best who has lived; perhaps perfect in spirit. But it is not in remembrance of any man who has lived—it is in the right of what we ought to be and in prophecy of the better life that shall be through our combined effort—that we are to eat our daily bread and do our daily work. And this right and this prophecy will inspire men.

But while the author of *Robert Elsmere* lets her hero blunder, she seems to see clearly herself. She does not for a moment think that it is trust in the Eternal, in the remembrance of Jesus that brings men into Elsmere's "New Brotherhood." When Elsmere first proposes his new scheme, she makes a young fellow in a shabby velvet coat stand up and say,—

"I do not know whether I speak for anybody but myself, but what I do know is this, what Mr. Elsmere starts I'll join. Where he goes I'll go. He's put a new heart and a new stomach into me, and what I've got he shall have whenever it pleases him to call for it. If he wants to run a new thing against or alongside the old one, and he wants me to help him,—I don't know as I'm very clear what he's driving at, nor what good I can do him,—but when Tom Wheeler's asked for he'll be there.' A deep murmur rising almost into a shout of assent ran through the little assembly."

Behold, now it is not trust in the Eternal nor remembrance of Jesus,—that is only an outward form which they do not understand,—but trust in Robert Elsmere, and personal gratitude to him. And, again, we note that the little girl who

responded to her father's blessing at dinner was "the one whose mother died last June, visited and comforted to the end by Robert and his wife." We see in whose remembrance the bread was blessed! And women united with the brotherhood because "Mr. Elsmere had been that good to them that anything they could do to oblige him they would, and welcome."

Thus the author lets us into the real secret of Elsmere's success,—the personal influence of a devoted friend, who led the people even when they did not know what he was driving at. But what a pity to have done this last! Instead of preaching trust in the Eternal and the remembrance of Jesus, why did he not, seeing these were not at all the living forces at work, say so, and point out to the people that in every case it is the devoted friendship that constitutes the power, and that the brotherhood together were simply a company of friends working to advance human character and welfare, and that each of them could be like him, a power in proportion to their devotion to others? Why did he not stop them the moment they were willing to be led blindly? How dared he to put upon the badge of the brotherhood the face of Christ if it was his own image they carried in their hearts? Why did he not say, "We will not have any one's portrait, because it is the task of each to impress the image of his own highest personality upon everybody he meets?" Had Elsmere had such insight, this splendid book would not have come to naught. We cannot help but lament that the mountain should have labored and only a little mouse of a Christian sect be brought forth.

When I read a book like *Robert Elsmere* it touches me in what I have most at heart. For if the new brotherhood of mankind is to be based on trust in the Eternal and remembrance of Jesus, instead of on hope in human effort and insight into character and the personal friendship of equals, then an ethical society like ours is a mistake. But *Robert Elsmere* has deepened my conviction that we, as a society, have a place to fulfil and a work greatly needed to perform.

NEWS FROM THE SOCIETIES FOR ETHICAL CULTURE.

THE CHICAGO SOCIETY.

THE Chicago Society resumed its Sunday meetings on October 7. The lectures up to December 2 have been on the following subjects: "The True Basis of Religious Union," "The Aims and Needs of the Ethical Movement," "Social Peace and how we may have it," "The Highest Rule of Life," "The Attack on *Robert Elsmere*," "A Man's Duty to Himself," "Ethics and Worship." On November 11, Mr. Sheldon spoke on "Modern Scepticism,—Is it Dangerous?" and on December 2, Professor Thomas Davidson lectured on "Intellectual Piety." "The Ethics of Belief" was the subject of Mr. Salter's address on Sunday, December 9. The increased attendance since the meetings have been held in the Grand Opera-House is gradually bearing fruit in additions to the membership of the Society. During October and November twenty applications were handed in to the Secretary.

The Ethical School started in promptly on the opening Sunday of the year with an attendance of fifty-six pupils. Mr. Benjamin Hyde, after two years of faithful service as superintendent, has given up his place to Mr. Joseph W. Errant. Mr. Edw. C. Wentworth has become librarian. The Young People's Union has recently voted a gift of twenty-five dollars to the library fund. The teachers form a class, which Mr. Salter meets once a fortnight, and to which he is giving a course of written lectures on Systematic Ethics.

The Reading-Circles on the north, south, and west sides of the city have a total regular attendance of about fifty. Mignet's *History of the French Revolution* is used on the west and north sides (Taine's three volumes being too detailed for

such use); the South Side Circle has not yet completed Taine's *Ancient Régime*. Each member is expected to provide himself or herself with the book and read the chapter for the evening; a *résumé* is read at the meeting by some one appointed beforehand, and two or three short papers on topics suggested by the chapter are contributed. The meetings are fortnightly.

The Ladies' Charitable Union has held its annual meeting. Its twenty-seven members contributed last year \$108.91; the Ethical School \$27.82; and there was \$100 in the treasury to start with. \$166.39 has been expended, and a balance remains of \$70.34. It contributes to the Immediate Relief Society and to the Protective Agency for Women and Children, and has a delegate on the board of the latter organization. It has also appointed recently a committee to act with the Women's Federal League in securing the enforcement of the State compulsory education law and the municipal factory ordinances in Chicago.

THE PHILADELPHIA SOCIETY.

THE first Sunday in each month until the present year has been devoted to the meetings of the ethical sections. Since the beginning of the present year lectures have been held regularly every Sunday and in the evening instead of in the morning. This has been an experiment, and though it is found that the attendance is somewhat larger in the evening, a recent vote showed that the majority of the members favor returning to Sunday morning lectures.

Mr. M. M. Mangasarian, who is now living in New York, where he is pursuing a special course of study in philosophy, economics, and ethics, has lectured twice before the Society to very large audiences. Professor Adler has spoken once, and also Mr. Frederic A. Hinckley, speaker of the Free Congregational Society of Florence, Mass. Mr. Weston's lecture on "*Robert Elsmere*" called out a crowded house.

The children's ethical classes meet Sunday mornings at ten o'clock, and the young people's class in ethics at eleven o'clock. The section meetings are now held on Tuesday and Friday evenings.

The Meetings of the Business Section alternate with those of the Young People's Section on Tuesday evening. Professor Simon N. Patton, who fills the chair of Political Economy in the University of Pennsylvania, gave, after the election, an interesting talk before the Business Section on "The Relation of Tariff to Wages," which was followed by discussion. Mr. George Ashton Black, of New York, led the discussion of the following meeting, on "The Ethics of a Protective Tariff."

The Young People's Section of the Philadelphia Ethical Society has started an interesting series of meetings, comprehending in subjects so far a discussion of some of the phases of Evolution, by Professor Cope; a presentation of the Land Question, by Arthur Stevenson, President of the Henry George Club; and a tactic interpretation of Rhythm in Music, by Professor Bachelor.

It is expected that some time in February, Joseph May, of the First Unitarian Church, will make some statement of reasons why he conceives ethics alone (not the *ethical movement* necessarily) cannot satisfy the highest religious consciousness of the age. The Executive Committee invited Mr. Ames and Mr. Krauskopf to make a similar presentation. Had it not been for Mr. Ames's departure from the city there is no doubt but that he would have appeared and spoken. Up to this writing Mr. Krauskopf had not replied.

Perhaps the most important work undertaken by the section, however, is the organization of a class of from twelve to fifteen members, coming together Sunday forenoon, to read Spencer's *Data of Ethics* and discuss the points involved.

The Neighborhood Guild Association, which was a direct outgrowth of the work in behalf of street boys begun by the Ethical Society, held its first annual meeting early in December.

The progress of the first year has been very encouraging. Family Guild, No. 1, which is located in the midst of working-people's homes, is open every day and evening of the week, including Sunday, to young and old of both sexes. The house is provided with a free library and reading-room, an art loan collection, and opportunities for social intercourse and amusement. There are evening classes in cooking, dress-making, carpentry, wood-carving, clay-modelling, mechanical drawing and designing, singing, dancing, etc. The Treasurer's report showed that the expenses of the year had been a little over two thousand dollars. There was a balance of nearly five hundred dollars in the treasury.

THE ST. LOUIS SOCIETY.

How the St. Louis Society has been shaping its course this winter appears in an account abridged, as follows, from the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* of October 27, 1888, of Mr. Sheldon's

PLANS FOR THE WINTER.

"The Society for Ethical Culture will this year enlarge the scope of its undertakings. Mr. Sheldon, the Lecturer of the Society, feels that the religious ideas advanced are now clearly understood by the light given in the various discourses which have been delivered at Memorial Hall the last two winters, both by the Lecturers of other Societies and by himself. He has sought to make it plain that, while the Society was not a church in the ordinary sense of the term, its work was not anti-religious, but that its aim was rather to throw the stress of religious teaching in the direction of moral culture. The Lecturers in the ethical movement have endeavored above everything else to emphasize the necessity, in the present day, of moral culture, in view of the apparent decline throughout the country in moral earnestness as well as in religious enthusiasm. They feel that the Ethical Societies are needed as supplementary to work that is done by the church, and that church-members, as well as people who are outside of the church, should share in the undertaking.

"Various practical questions and social issues, with which everybody, whatever his religious beliefs may be, is personally concerned, are subjects that require ethical treatment, and that will receive earnest attention on the platforms of the Ethical Societies. Accordingly, in this aim, Mr. Sheldon will speak on 'Henry George, and his *Progress and Poverty*,' and follow that later with addresses on 'Ethical Considerations in the Present Political Situation,' on 'Points of Ethics in Commercial Life,' and on 'Offered Solutions of Pressing Social Prob-

lems.' He does not propose to advocate any particular theories, but, so far as possible, to show in how far ethical considerations should share in the practical solution of all social problems.

"The Society has instituted a Sunday-school. Heretofore there have been only one or two class-meetings Sunday afternoon, in charge of Mr. Sheldon. He is now, however, elaborating a plan, with the aid of several teachers, for the organization of a school for several classes to meet Sunday mornings at the Society's rooms at 2646 Pine Street. The younger children are to go on as before, studying the Bible-tales, which have been rewritten somewhat in the form in which Charles Kingsley and Church have rewritten Homer. The older class of girls and the older class of boys are to take up a course of study on personal duties. They are to begin with a study on the subject of dress. They will examine it historically, with plates and illustrations, and then enter into the morals of dress, and the high purposes it really has to serve. This historic method of treating of the duties of life is to be the especial feature of the work, and serve the purpose of giving life and color to what would seem at first to be a bare study of abstract morals. Later will come a course of study on the family relations and home ideals, and then, on the social relations and ideals of citizenship and human fellowship.

"There will also be a club formed of from twenty to thirty young men and women, to take up a historical study of the Bible from a strictly rational method and on the bases of the latest historical criticism in order to discover the real literary and moral worth of the book. Last winter the young men studied the works of Count Tolstoi the fore part of the season, and the latter part they took up Plato's *Republic*.

"The Ladies' Philanthropical Society, numbering thirty members, contemplate the establishment of an institution in the lower part of the city, somewhat after the style of the institutions elsewhere known as 'neighborhood guilds.'

"The Workingmen's Self-Culture Club, which was organized last week at the reading-rooms on Franklin Avenue, has grown out of the experiment made last winter in starting some free reading-rooms for workingmen on the north side of the city and inviting the Washington University professors to give a course of illustrated lectures Friday evenings at these rooms. The lectures were so well received that it was decided to take a further step, and the 'Workingmen's Self-Culture Club' was organized. The plan has proved successful, and an executive committee of capable young men has been organized to promote the new movement. A second series of illustrated lectures, kindly given by the professors of the Washington University has been arranged. There are already about sixty members in the club."

THE SOUTH PLACE (LONDON) SOCIETY.

Important accessions to membership mark the acceptability of Dr. Stanton Coit's manner of carrying on the work of the time-honored South Place Religious Society, now be-

come the South Place Ethical Society. At the present rate of increase the membership would double itself in twelve months. A writer in the London *Echo*, remarking on this increase, says,—

“And it is significant that this new access of vitality is contemporaneous with the substitution of ‘Ethical’ for ‘Religious’ as the Society’s designation. It is well to bear in mind that the change received the full and warm approval of Dr. Coit’s predecessor. Said Mr. Conway, writing from New York, in enthusiastic recommendation of Dr. Stanton Coit to the succession at South Place, ‘Those who have read my pamphlet on “Unitarianism and its Grandchildren” will know that I regard this ethical movement as substantially one with the South Place idea. It is the most living movement now; and as South Place has for many years been informed by the spirit, I trust it will now gladly adopt the appropriate name.’”

The same writer, continuing, gives a pleasant glimpse of one of the special features of this Society’s social gatherings, a Monday night “*Conversazione*,” and incidentally mentions other meetings that distinguish the life of this liberal association, as follows :

“The Institute was well filled. Nineteen-twentieths of those present were members of the Society. In South Place they certainly understand the art of making a pleasant evening. They know how to warm both hands at the fire of the inner life. Besides the graver discourses of the Frederic Harrisons, the Andrew Wilsons, the Leslie Stephens, the Dr. Marshes, the Stuart Glennies, and a host of other eminent people, there are the popular concerts on Sunday nights, the natural history rambles during the summer months, and gatherings such as those of Monday night,—with recitations, musical performances, and singing.”

Recent lectures by Dr. Coit have been on “Schopenhauer the Pessimist,” “Intellectual Honesty in the Pulpit,” “The Evils of Scepticism,” “The Tribal Self.”

GENERAL NOTES.

—THE CONVENTION of the Union of Societies for Ethical Culture will be held this month in Philadelphia. The order of proceedings is prospectively outlined as follows:

PROGRAMME OF THE FIRST ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE UNION OF SOCIETIES FOR ETHICAL CULTURE, PHILADELPHIA, JANUARY 25, 26, AND 27, 1889.

Friday, January 25, 10 A.M.—Meeting of delegates. Organization of the Convention. Address by Speaker of the Fraternity of Lecturers, Professor Adler. Special business.

3 P.M.—Meeting of delegates. Reports of practical work being done in the Ethical Societies. Special business.

8 P.M., at St. George's Hall, Thirteenth and Arch Streets.—Public meeting, which will be addressed by several prominent liberal speakers on the subject, "What Steps are necessary to place the Liberal Cause on a more Solid Foundation?"

Saturday, January 26, 10 A.M.—Meeting of delegates. Special business. Short papers on "Ethical Instruction for Children;" "Work of Young People in the Ethical Societies;" "Conditions of Membership in the Ethical Societies;" "Should there be an Inner Circle, corresponding to Church Membership?" "The Ideal Type of Organization."

3 P.M.—Unfinished business.

8-10 P.M.—Reception given by the Philadelphia Society to delegates and invited guests.

Sunday, January 27, 11 A.M.—Public meeting at St. George's Hall. Address by Prof. Felix Adler, to be followed by other short addresses.

8 P.M., at St. George's Hall.—Leading address by W. M. Salter, to be followed by short addresses.

Meetings of the delegates to be held in the parlors of the Ethical Society School, 1630 Arch Street.

—THE DUTCH TRANSLATION of Mr. Salter's lectures has received a critical though appreciative review from the celebrated theologian and Biblical critic, Professor A. Kuenen, of Leiden. Liberal extracts from Professor Kuenen's two articles in *De Herforming* were given in the *Christian Register* (Boston) of November 1. On the suggestion from the editor that he might wish to answer Dr. Kuenen's criticism, Mr. Salter

made a brief reply, or rather explanation, in the same paper of November 15, from which we make the following extract:

... "My book is nowise an exposition of the ethical movement: it contains simply my personal views.

"The change in the name of Mr. Conway's old society has not the significance which Dr. Kuenen attributes to it. It means simply that that society has put itself in line with the ethical movement in America. If by chance the South Place Religious Society had changed to a Unitarian society and had taken that name, would Unitarianism therefore have been placed in antagonism to religion?

"Such a formula as 'ethics without religion,' in connection with our Societies, has never been heard of by me before. As for myself, ethics is inevitably religious; and none of our Lecturers eschew the word 'religion,' though I am sorry to observe that we are continually represented as doing so. Still, the use of the word is not essential to us. The essential thing is dedication to the cause of the good in the world; and whether one calls that religion or not, or interprets it in a 'religious' manner (technically speaking), is a comparatively unimportant matter.

"Why do we leave the old fellowships? Because what is essential to us does not content them. They, Unitarianism included, make essential also belief in a personal God and the habit of prayer; and they have Dr. Kuenen with them. There are Unitarians in the West who believe in a purely ethical basis of fellowship. In my judgment, they ought to join with us, or we with them,—somehow they and we should become one body. All of our Lecturers are, I think, members of the Free Religious Association; but Unitarianism calling itself Christian and confessing 'the Lord Jesus Christ' rests on too narrow a basis for us. We aspire to a fellowship making goodness so supreme that any one who cherishes a good purpose in his heart, or wishes to do so, shall be at home in it, whether he regard himself a Christian or not. But a Unitarian might belong to our Union; for all who sympathize with our fundamental moral aim are welcomed by us, '*whatever their theological or philosophical opinions.*' A theist is as much in place with us as an agnostic, a believer in prayer as one who does not believe in it; but, if the theist makes his faith essential to fellowship, he of course would not come to us, though we should not exclude him,—he would simply exclude himself. Unhappily, theists and Christians, as a rule, make their beliefs so essential that they cannot unite in fellowship with those who do not hold them. I trust and hope, however, that a larger temper may grow in the future.

"As to my own thought being superficial, I am afraid Dr. Kuenen's charge has much to justify it. I have never ceased to wonder at the temerity of Professor von Gizycki in proposing to translate my lectures into German. Much else that had appeared in connection with our movement was surely more worthy of that distinction. My lectures were for the most part given to mere handfuls of people in Chicago, ... and they were almost always written in haste, and sometimes under painful stress. ... I am myself keenly conscious of my limitations, and hope, if health and strength are continued to me, to think more deeply on many matters, to correct and amend whatever conclusions I may too hastily have reached, and to unlearn anything false. I hope particularly to arrive at a larger

and more satisfactory philosophy of life and the world than I have yet attained. But, while I say this, I cannot expect that I shall ever be able to hold again distinctively Christian beliefs; and, on the other hand, I am positively sure that, even if I should hold them, I should never want to be in a fellowship that excluded good men who did not hold them. One lasting thought the ethical movement has given me, that the love of goodness is the supreme thing in life. One noble impatience, as it seems to me, it has awakened in me,—impatience, namely, with all attempts to make anything less than this essential to the closest, the most sacred ties of man with man. The editor of the *Register* thinks we make ethics a fetich. We might make of the word a fetich, though, as soon as we begin to, I fear I should hate it. But the thing? I believe there is nothing else in the world that so deserves our reverence.”

In commenting upon this in the same number, the editor of the *Register* called attention to the “rigid conditions of membership” in the Chicago Society,—referring in part to the fact that members were obliged, unless specially excused, to pay not less than ten dollars a year towards defraying the expenses. “Our ethical brethren,” he continued, “seem to have adopted the exclusive forms of a club organization, instead of the freer, more open, and fraternal methods prevalent in the liberal branch of the Christian Church.” The fact is, however, that the old provisions in the By-Laws were changed a year ago, and that the corresponding section now reads: “This Society shall rely wholly upon voluntary contributions for its support.” It should be added that the actual subscriptions for the new year seem not to have been affected by the change.

The Philadelphia Society works under like free conditions. The rule relating to the contributions of members is given in its By-Laws as follows:

“It shall be the duty of the Finance Committee to see that each member is visited personally every year for the purpose of soliciting such subscription as he may be able to make for the support of the Society.

—DR. H. DRUSKOWITZ, in an interesting little volume, *Moderne Versuche eines Religionsersatzes* (Heidelberg, Georg Weiss, 1886, pp. 90) devoted a chapter to *Die Religion der Moral*. In conclusion the author remarked that her investigations had led her to the conclusion that Feuerbach, Dühring,

Duboc, and Salter had come nearest to solving the problem, though none had done so completely. She had also considered Comte, J. S. Mill, and Lange. As a matter of literary ethics, it may be worth while to note that the *Nation* (New York, January 20, 1887) substituted the name of Comte for Salter, in commenting on this volume and mentioning the authors to whom prominence was given. "Worst of all, neither Feuerbach, Dühring, Duboc, nor Comte has given us an adequate substitute," was the *Nation's* language. Dr. Druskowitz has since published a new edition of her *Zur neuen Lehre*, under the title *Zur Begründung einer überreligiösen Weltanschauung*, and a study of *Eugen Dühring* (Heidelberg, Georg Weiss), dedicated to Mr. Salter.

—AMONG the admissions to membership in the Union for Ethical Culture we are glad to note the following distinguished foreign names: Georg von Gizycki, Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Berlin, Berlin, Prussia; Augustus Vernon Harcourt and Rachel Vernon Harcourt, Oxford, England; P. H. Hugenholtz, Jr., Amsterdam, Netherlands; Alice Graham Loring, Weimar, Germany.

—A NEW volume of Mr. Salter's discourses, under the title *Ethical Religion*, is in the press of Roberts Brothers (Boston).

—ONE of the chapters in a recently published work, *Moral Philosophie*, by Professor Georg von Gizycki, of the University of Berlin, is entitled "Ethical Societies and the Church." This chapter was translated by Mr. Sheldon for the ETHICAL RECORD, but came too late to appear in this number.

—THE DISCUSSION of the difference between Unitarianism and Ethical Culture receives a lucid and able contribution from Mr. W. L. Sheldon in the *Christian Register* of December 6. Unitarianism, it seems to him, puts the elements of theism and worship in the foreground. "Now, we, on the contrary, so far as my own observation goes [do not exclude, but], leave these elements in the background simply for the sake of putting the other phase, that of ethics, in the foreground."

INNOCENCY.

G. A. MACFARREN.

Allegro soave.

Treble.

Alto.

Tenor.
(Sra. lower.)

Bass.

Organ.

Man. 1.

p

Pod. p

Keep in - no - cen - cy,

Keep in - no - cen - cy,

keep in - no - cen - cy,

keep in - no - cen - cy,

and take heed un-to the thing that is right,

and take heed ' un-to the thing that is right, . . .

The first system consists of six staves. The top three staves are vocal parts (Soprano, Alto, and Tenor) in B-flat major, with lyrics "and take heed un-to the thing that is right," and "and take heed ' un-to the thing that is right, . . .". The bottom three staves are piano accompaniment, including a treble and bass staff with chords and a single-line bass staff.

take heed un-to the thing that is right: for

take heed un-to the thing that is right: for

Man. 2.
pp

The second system continues the vocal and piano parts. It consists of six staves. The top three staves are vocal parts (Soprano, Alto, and Tenor) in B-flat major, with lyrics "take heed un-to the thing that is right: for" and "take heed un-to the thing that is right: for". The bottom three staves are piano accompaniment, including a treble and bass staff with chords and a single-line bass staff. The system concludes with a piano (*pp*) marking and a *Man. 2.* instruction.

that shall bring a man peace at the last,

that shall bring a man peace at the last,

peace, peace at the last . . .

peace, peace at the last . . .

mf Man. 1.

Man. 2.

p

First system of the musical score. It consists of four staves. The top two staves are vocal parts with lyrics "Keep in - no-cen-cy,". The bottom two staves are piano accompaniment. The key signature has three flats (B-flat, E-flat, A-flat). The first staff has a mezzo-forte (*mf*) dynamic marking and a crescendo hairpin. The piano part features a steady eighth-note accompaniment.

Second system of the musical score. It consists of four staves. The top two staves are vocal parts with lyrics "keep in - no-cen-cy, in - no-cen-cy." and "keep in - no-cen-cy, in - no-cen-cy." respectively. The bottom two staves are piano accompaniment. The key signature remains three flats. The first staff has dynamic markings of *p* (piano) and *pp* (pianissimo) with corresponding hairpins. The piano part continues with the eighth-note accompaniment, ending with a double bar line.

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ORGANIZED 1887.

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VOL. II.

No.

THE ETHICAL RECORD.

ISSUED QUARTERLY.

APRIL, 1889.

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1889—1890.

THE ETHICAL RECORD begins its second year somewhat enlarged in size and scope. In addition to the publication of addresses delivered before the Ethical Societies, short articles on ethical theories and on the practical moral questions of the day will be solicited from able writers. We hope to begin during the year the publication of a series of outlines of lessons for the moral instruction of the young, by Professor Adler.

The RECORD will continue to give reports of the philanthropic and other work engaged in by the Ethical Societies, and also news of the progress of the Ethical Movement at large.

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THE ETHICAL RECORD.

APRIL, 1889.

A SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY AND APPLIED
ETHICS.

BY FELIX ADLER, PH.D.

It is proposed to found in one of the large cities of the United States a school for the scientific teaching of Philosophy, Ethics, and the History of Religion. The need for such an institution and its objects are briefly set forth in the following statement, to which attention is earnestly invited.

The school is intended to afford to the moral teachers of the community the opportunity of fitting themselves adequately for their future vocation. The training afforded by the theological seminaries, as at present constituted, has long ceased to satisfy the requirements of the age. The seminaries are deficient in two important particulars: they are unfriendly to intellectual liberty, and they exclude from their curriculum many branches of knowledge essential to the proper equipment of the moral and religious teacher.

1. The student who enters a theological seminary is in a manner pledged beforehand to arrive at certain conclusions. The whole tendency of the teaching and the subtler influence of the student's environment are calculated to direct his thoughts into certain channels, to seduce him to the acceptance of those peculiar doctrines in whose interest the seminary is maintained. Theology rests on a basis of philosophy, and a discussion of the fundamental philosophical problems

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is therefore unavoidable in any theological school; but in institutions with a distinct dogmatic bias such discussions can neither be sufficiently comprehensive nor impartial. In some schools the great modern systems of philosophical thought are almost entirely ignored; in others the exposition of these systems is indeed permitted, but is apt to be strangely discolored by prejudice and misconception. Now, it is evidently unfair to the student that the principles of Spencer and Schopenhauer, for instance, should be expounded by men who are confessedly the bitter enemies of these thinkers. The statements of such opponents cannot be fair. The opportunities of the student to sift the evidence, to test the weight of the opposing arguments, cannot be complete, and intellectual liberty cannot thrive under such conditions. The school of philosophy is intended to make a new departure by removing all such unnatural restrictions. The school will be pledged to no particular philosophy and committed to no particular views of religion. Its cardinal principle will be that all the great systems, especially of modern thought, shall be represented, not by their enemies, but, as far as possible, by their adherents. Thus the philosophy of Spencer will be taught by a Spencerian, the utilitarian philosophy of Mill by a Utilitarian, etc. And as regards the students, no questions touching their religious belief are to be asked, and no pledge of any sort is to be exacted. The school will not propagate any set of convictions, but will seek to give so broad and careful presentation of philosophic opinions that the students may freely arrive at clear and well-matured convictions of their own. The assumption that any board of college trustees is competent to decide that certain opinions are true and that others are false must be given up. The method of artificially protecting the truth, or what is supposed to be the truth, against contact with error should give place to the nobler plan of inviting the different systems of thought to enter into free competition with one another, in the expectation that that which is intrinsically the strongest will prevail, and that a higher and larger form of truth will be the outcome of this conflict of ideas.

2. The theological seminaries exclude many branches of knowledge which are essential to the proper equipment of moral and religious teachers. The gravity of this defect will be apparent to any person who takes the trouble to examine the curriculum of our seminaries, even the most advanced. We now proceed to give an outline sketch of the scheme of studies as projected for the new institution :

The school will be divided into three departments,—the Department of Philosophy, the Department of the Science of Religion, and the Department of Applied Ethics. The Department of Philosophy will include lectures upon such subjects as History of Philosophy, Logic,* Psychology, and Theories of Ethics. Classes will be formed for the critical interpretation of the chief works of the great masters of philosophy.

In the Department of the Science of Religion lectures will be delivered on the history of the great religions, understanding thereby the religions of the Chinese, Egyptians, Hindoos, Persians, Greeks, Romans, and Mohammedans, as well as Christianity and Judaism. The comparative method will be applied to the study of the evolution of religious doctrines, of religious institutions (such as the monastic orders), of religious ceremonies, and the like. The manifestations of the religious principle in man present problems of the highest interest to the historian and the philosopher; but unfortunately when considered at all they have too often been treated in a partisan spirit, with a view of exalting some one religion at the expense of others. They should be investigated in the purely objective spirit of science. Classes will also be formed for the reading of the sacred books of the ancients—the Bible, Koran, Vedas, etc.—in the original. Even the modern teacher of religion will undoubtedly gain in depth and insight by penetrating to the original sources of some of the principal religious systems that have ruled the world.

* There is at present a growing interest in what may be called the New Logic among men of science. Professor Helmholtz has delivered lectures on the logical principles underlying the sciences in the University of Berlin; Professor Wundt, in a work recently published, discusses the logical foundations of mathematics, physics, chemistry, etc.

The Department of Applied Ethics will embrace (a) Education, (b) Economics, (c) Practical Reforms.

(a) *Education*.—The moral teacher is to be pre-eminently an educator,—an educator of the people as well as of young children. But it may be confidently asserted that hardly one out of a hundred of our moral teachers has made a special study of methods of education. The wretched methods which usually prevail in our Sunday-schools are a striking commentary on this singular defect in the training of the clergy. The history of education, the results of pedagogic experience, as laid down in the works of the best modern writers on the subject,—Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Fröbel, Diesterweg, G. F. Herbart, and others,—should receive the earnest attention of the future teacher of morality and religion. In the fulfilment of his vocation he will have to deal with one of the most difficult of educational problems, that of the right moral and religious education of the young, and he will not be able to solve this problem at all satisfactorily unless he be well versed in the general principles on which the growing science of pedagogy is based.

(b) *Economics*.—The importance of a more complete mastery of Political Economy on the part of those to whom the community looks up as its moral guides need hardly be explained at length. The economic questions which so greatly agitate mankind to-day are at bottom moral questions. The right of property, for instance, has been rudely assailed. It is important that the public teacher should examine whether there is such a thing as a moral basis of property, and, if so, what that basis is. The laborers everywhere demand a greater share in the products of their labor. It is important to examine whether there is such a thing as a just proportion between labor and the fruits of labor. The State is loudly called upon to interfere in behalf of the working-classes. The vastly-significant question arises whether the State has moral functions to perform or not, and, if it has, how far it may be justified in attempting to modify the economic conflict. Public opinion is rapidly undergoing a great change in regard to all these questions. It is of the utmost importance that pub-

lic opinion be rightly shaped, that its crude and often hasty judgments be rectified, and that while a larger share of justice be secured for those who are suffering, the higher interests of society, considered as a whole, be not forgotten. From our moral teachers we have a right to expect that they will enter the struggle between laborers and capitalists as mediators. But to address themselves with success to so great a mission they must possess adequate knowledge of the subjects they attempt to handle, or they will fall into deserved contempt. A previous course of economic study should be required of students as a condition for entering the school. In the school itself the relations of Ethics to Economics should form the subject of a series of special lectures and exhaustive discussions.

(c) *Practical Reforms.*—Under this head may be classed such subjects as Penology, Pauperism, the Temperance question, Civil-Service Reform, and the like. These matters should be early brought to the notice of those who are fitting themselves to discharge the functions of moral teachers. Later in life they will be called upon to face these practical problems, to take sides *pro* or *con*, and to influence others by their arguments and example. That they may do so intelligently, that they may not gather their opinions hastily from the surface of the ephemeral literature of the day, that they may not speak except after due deliberation, is plainly and eminently desirable. But this desirable result cannot be attained except by providing a more comprehensive, a more practical, a more thorough system of training.

Two other features of the school remain to be mentioned: that women shall be admitted to its privileges on a level of perfect equality with men, and that there shall be liberty of teaching in the largest sense; that no professor or instructor shall be appointed or excluded because of any opinions which he may or may not hold. Intellectual and moral fitness are to be the only tests applied.

The whole aim and intent of the new institution may be compressed into the single sentence, that those whose vocation it is to be the moral helpers of their fellow-men should

be educated in such a way as to become efficient moral helpers. It is an open secret that at present the best men, the most capable, the most intellectual, the most ardent, are more and more turning away from the pulpit and entering into other careers. On the other hand it is equally certain that the function of the moral and religious teacher in the community has not become obsolete, that there is a great work for him to do, that, in the specialization of social functions, his particular function has grown to be not less but more important than ever, that men are everywhere thirsting after just such help; just such inspiration, just such guidance, as only those can give who make the study of moral and religious questions their exclusive occupation for a lifetime.

It is to be hoped that where so great a demand exists the effort to create an adequate supply will meet with ready encouragement; that the public, and especially men of large means, will give their support to such an institution as it is here proposed to establish. As to students, it may be predicted that they will not be found wanting. There is hardly a doubt that many of the young men who are now studying in theological seminaries are dissatisfied with what they receive there and would gladly avail themselves of larger advantages if they were offered. And, furthermore, there can be little doubt that many who at present do not enter theological seminaries because they are unwilling to submit to the narrowing influences of such institutions would devote themselves with enthusiasm to the large public life of the moral teacher, if they could do so without bartering their intellectual liberty.

A project of such magnitude will eventually require large means, but there is no reason why a beginning should not be made on a smaller scale. The school should be founded in some city in which a large university already exists. It should remain independent of the control of the trustees of that university, while at the same time the students may have access to the lectures, library, and other advantages of the existing institution. An endowment fund of about three hundred thousand dollars should be raised to begin with, in order to insure a moderate permanent income. In addition, a society

should be formed for the support of the school, whose membership may be drawn from all the States of the Union; for there are scattered friends of the liberal cause throughout the United States on whose willing co-operation reliance can be placed. The Union of the Societies for Ethical Culture has already agreed to devote a part of its annual income towards the support of such a school, and several large amounts (one of twenty thousand dollars) have been pledged towards the endowment fund in case the movement for creating such a fund can be carried through successfully.

Assuming that these expectations are to be realized, the trustees of the school would then be in a position to create four or five professorships, and this number would be sufficient at the outset. Two or three European scholars of reputation should be appointed, in order to raise the style of teaching at once to an elevated plane and to give character to the institution. Associate professors should be added from time to time, and the system of Docenten should be introduced, which has proved so successful in the German universities. The great advantage of this system is that any person himself a graduate of a university who can pass the required examination is permitted to teach or to lecture to the students. The examination has nothing to do with the candidate's opinions, but is conducted solely with the idea of testing his mental calibre, his scientific maturity. In none of our American colleges or universities is such free teaching allowed. In the new school the broader plan of perfect freedom is to be tried without reservation. The sole standard to be applied will be the scientific standard. The authority of the governing board shall be excluded from any influence in the lecture-rooms.

Such, in main outline, is the plan of the new school of Philosophy. Philosophy has ever been revered as the mother of the sciences. It is also the fountain of practical idealism. When we consider how widely the religious beliefs of the past, with all the moral checks and safeguards which they implied, have been abandoned at the present day, we cannot but feel that a great danger threatens our democratic communities

in the absence of any effective substitutes for those teachings. When we consider, on the other hand, how the forces of conservatism are everywhere banding together to maintain reactionary ideas, to keep the education of children and students, the schools and universities, in their hands, we cannot but wonder that those who desire progress should thus far have failed to make any strong counter-efforts, to build institutions which should be dedicated to freedom as those others are to authority. The school which has here been described is planned to be an institution of this sort; it is intended to serve the highest interests of science and at the same time to send new currents of practical idealism into the life of the common people.

THE PRACTICAL VALUE OF PHILOSOPHY.*

BY PROFESSOR JOSIAH ROYCE, HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

I COME here this evening with a strong desire to express very cordially to the Ethical Society my interest in the plan for the formation of a school of philosophy. I have been asked to give a statement of the need of such a school from the point of view of one actually engaged in teaching, and I shall endeavor as best I can to express in untechnical language what seems to me to be the real public use of philosophic study. I am anxious to lay stress upon the fact that philosophy is no *merely* technical pursuit; that it is not a research into abstract truth for the bare sake of abstraction; that it is not something totally diverse from any other pursuit, and having no connection with life; but that, if a philosophical student does his duty, there is no branch of work so intimately dependent upon the genuine interests of life. For the real business of philosophy, if I may allow myself at once a definition, is THE ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM OF THE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF HUMAN LIFE, BOTH PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL. To show what this definition means, I must first appeal to you directly as persons representing a movement for the ethical culture of our people, and must try to show how, in connection with your work, you must needs be led somewhere to desire, if not for yourselves a technical pursuit of philosophy, still, at least, the actual pursuit of the study on the part of some one.

I address you, therefore, for the first, not merely as a conference of persons who meet to consider a project that may have meaning far beyond the boundaries of your own special line of ethical work, but simply as representatives of the Societies for Ethical Culture, and ask you what is the significance of

* An extemporaneous address before the Convention of Ethical Societies, St. George's Hall, Philadelphia, Friday evening, January 25, 1889.

the cause in which you are engaged? You are endeavoring to make people enthusiastic in the cultivation of upright life, to interest certain of your fellow-creatures in ideals that you have of conduct, and to make men earnest and energetic, faithful and loyal, as men and as citizens. Whenever, in the course of this teaching of yours, you have to express your ideals as to what men ought to be and do, you try, in your teaching, to make these ideals effective by clearly presenting the issues implied, and by insisting upon the way of life that you consider best. You are, in all this, serving your own ideals; and yet, surely nothing is clearer than that this world of ours is full of conflicting ideals. Your fellow-beings do not altogether share your purposes, else why should you teach them? They are influenced by many opposing ideals, and your purposes, your notions of what a man should do, are at variance with theirs. How then, after all, when you consider the matter closely, shall you impress upon others the real reason,—the real meaning of the ideals which you maintain? How shall you show that your notion of the right is, in every case, the true one, and that the other opposing notions are really false? Surely, if you undertake, not merely to show the energy of your personal interests, not merely to depend upon the persuasiveness of your own presentation of your ideals, but to give reasons for the faith that is in you, you must feel the need of reflecting as to the significance of these ideals themselves; you must feel the need of criticising them. It is not, indeed, for the sake of playing the sceptic and of standing outside of all your activity that you will critically consider these ideals. Criticism is, to be sure, always more or less sceptical. But when *you* criticise, it is for the sake of understanding why you should be loyal to your faith, and why you should persuade others to be loyal thereto; it is for the sake of returning, with renewed energy, to your work of giving advice.

Now, whenever you begin to inquire into the reason why one ideal is better than another, you begin the examination of what I call the presuppositions of conduct; and in so far you philosophize. Whenever this inquiry is made full and

thorough-going, whenever, instead of accepting some moral code, of insisting upon some way of life dogmatically, you pretend to discover wherefore that way of life is better than any other, then just in so far as your inquiry goes to the bottom of the matter, criticises deeply, analyzes profoundly, you philosophize, and the branch of philosophy that you then pursue is precisely what we call ethical philosophy.

Now extend for a moment such an inquiry. Suppose the thinker asks himself of the sum total of human ideals, in so far as they are accessible to him, what they mean, what they appear to be upon analysis, how they bear examination, how they conflict with one another, what the significance of such conflict is, then the thinker *philosophizes* upon human life as a whole, and his ethical philosophy is not merely in the service of one system of doctrine, it is an effort towards the impartial comprehension of life, an effort as vast in its scope as it is important.

In the same way as that which I have just been describing one may also inquire into the meaning and into the real reasons of the fundamental theoretical doctrines that we hold about the world; for human life is not only expressive of certain fundamental practical passions of humanity, but it is also full of beliefs regarding the constitution of the world without. These beliefs, in fact, enter into and influence our conduct, or, in other cases, they combine themselves into those systematic wholes that we call the sciences; for scientific research, too, when it is concerned with natural history, with social affairs, or, again, even with physical phenomena pure and simple, is still a kind of living. It depends upon, it expresses, fundamental beliefs, which the scientific thinker himself does not analyze, does not criticise, accepts because it is his nature to accept them, applies because it is of the scientific spirit that he should thus apply them. But if one not merely accepts such fundamental beliefs as are actually at the basis of all our notions about the world and about science; if, I say, he begins not merely to accept but to criticise these fundamental notions, understanding the variance and knowing the many errors of human opinion, then such a man begins

to philosophize about the theoretical doctrines of men, precisely as before our thinker philosophized about the conduct of men. And now we have what constitutes the theoretical division of philosophy; namely, an analysis and criticism of the fundamental presuppositions of theoretical belief and of science. And surely, just as the ideals of conduct provoke inquiry by their multitude, by their daily conflicts, by their earnestness, by their importance, just so the theoretical beliefs of men must equally provoke our analysis and our criticism, by the sincerity with which they are held, by the magnificence of their pretensions, and by their vast moment to the human race. Surely then, also, in the course of your effort to teach men what line of conduct you think is best, and to maintain such beliefs about the world as you think will serve the highest ends of conduct, you must feel at times the need of such a fundamental analysis of the ground on which you stand. This then, I say, is philosophy,—AN ANALYSIS, if you will, OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PASSIONS OF HUMANITY. For the passions of humanity are both practical and theoretical. Men long to attain good things for themselves and to gain knowledge; they long to lead their fellows in the way that they think right; and they long to teach their neighbors the truth; and these two fundamental passions of humanity, to do and to know, as surely need analysis as they claim our loyal enthusiasm.

If it is worth while to live, surely it is worth while to know the significance of life. If it is worth while to have passions, surely it is worth while, if not for us ourselves to be devoted to their analysis, then, at all events, for us to support others who may be called upon to engage in such a devoted study of the meaning of life. The more you regard life as a significant thing the more you must feel the value of a rational understanding of this significance.

For you, then, the study of philosophy must indeed come in sight, as it often does come in sight; and what I want you to bear in mind in every consideration of the subject is precisely this intimate dependence of the philosophical student upon the concrete facts of human life.

The work of the philosopher is very often misunderstood. He is conceived as one who possibly attempts to complete the work of the sciences (as if that work ever could be completed!) by a fantastic construction of his own. He is conceived as undertaking to give a compendious account of all that science has not yet clearly made out; or, again, he is conceived as endeavoring to pass behind every veil with which the mysteries of the world are hidden, and to lay claim to a transcendent insight into all mysteries. Or, once more, with no less contempt for his pretensions, but with even more impatience, perhaps, at his pedantry, he is conceived as a man deeply interested in stating everything in abstract terms, in arranging a system of purely technical words. Of all these things he is accused; and I will not deny that the history of thought has many forms of delusion and of pedantry to show us, which indeed are unworthy of the attention of the serious thinker; but the great philosophers of the world, however fantastic their dreams may occasionally have been, however dry and pedantic the details of their systems may sometimes seem, have been real philosophers just in so far as they were men who deeply and truly and passionately knew life, and comprehended its passions; men who were not remote from humanity, but close, watchful critics of human affairs; men who were not mere dreamers about the fantastic world behind the scenes, but men who were anxious to comprehend the real sense of *this* world. The object of their attention was always the *human being* in his attitude towards the world. They were trying to understand him, to know the value of his ideals and the limitations of his insight. Philosophy has been essentially critical wherever it has been valuable; even its constructions are always critical constructions. That is, having examined the ideals of man, having criticised the work of his life, the philosophical thinker has endeavored impartially to set before us what was the outcome of the criticism, what of value remained when the insignificant had been thrown away. And even if on occasion the outcome of the philosophical thinker has been sceptical or out and out pessimistic, its value, where it then still has value, lies in the exposure of vanity which the

thinker presents to us ; since the discovery of what is vain is a part of the discovery of what is real and genuine, and since the genuine is only hidden by the vain.

But I pass from this general account of the work of philosophy to another way of exemplifying the real importance of this work. I grant you that many enthusiastic men find such critical study of the meaning of life not consistent with their own interests. There are men, and noble men, too, who find in themselves no calling to criticise life, but rather a calling to set forth some view of it uncritically but earnestly. Yet, I insist, these are not all men, nor all the earnest men, nor all the leading men, and I want to point out to you what effect the study of philosophy has, in many cases, upon those students who actually engage for a while in this critical contemplation of life, in this passionless analysis of passion. Many students there are in the higher institutions of learning who, for some time engaged in the study of philosophy, are, after a while, called to some other sphere of life where the technicalities of the study are impossibilities, and where their philosophical reflection must cease. Under such circumstances, what do they carry away from a real, earnest, and careful study of the meaning of human life ? I can say, from observation of such students, that this, at least, results, even if their philosophical study goes no further. For them, at all events for awhile, there has been a study of human life as human, and thenceforth, when their own experience forces them into the actual conflicts of their particular careers, these conflicts have a chance at least to seem in their eyes far more significant than they would have been originally. For now the man who is in the conflict of life, who is bearing the bitter burden of his own cares, feels that the passions that move him, the ideals that he worships, are the passions and the ideals of mankind ; he feels that it is the spirit of humanity that is expressing itself in him ; his life is enlarged by having once taken this broad view of human activity. The private fate of a man is for him simply not a private matter, but is an example, an expression of the universal life. The effect, in short, upon such a student is very much like the effect of art upon the appreciative observer. You

know, perhaps, the ancient definition of tragedy, and of its purpose. Tragic art, as Aristotle said, was intended, by arousing pity and fear for some great object, for some great misfortune of a noble hero, to *purge* the spectator of such emotions as would commonly move him in ordinary life. Such grand suffering, such deep sorrow *humanized* the spectator, so that thenceforth his own private and petty passion, looked at from a more universal point of view, seemed, in its private and petty character, so small that he could forget it, and learn to see in his own fate only the great struggles of humanity, to know in his own sorrows only the expression of the sorrows of the world. He was purged of his pettiness by seeing how public and how universal a thing is the sorrow, the misfortune, that he witnessed on the stage.

Now, what Aristotle felt to be the worth to the spectator of the universal emotions aroused by tragedy, this is to many students the main worth of philosophical study. I naturally fancy that my ideals are my own, that my problems are my own; and so long as that is the case they are selfish ideals and problems; but when I regard my problems as those of humanity, then all my struggles, my ideals, my passions, and my beliefs are the expression in me of the great interests of the human spirit, which is the same in all ages. When I am full of this insight my own interests are significant (no longer in a private and personal sense, as if my pride had been enlarged by the getting of this knowledge); but rather, just because my pride is humbled by seeing the magnitude of the issues of life, the issues of my own life become sacred from a higher point of view. This enlargement of interests one might define as the *humanizing of a man's temperament*. And if you say, "but all experiences, all social activity of a higher sort, and, as was just observed, all art, will accomplish in a way these same great purposes," there still remains an office for philosophy. For we may humanize our temperament by *reflection*, as well as by observation, and when we do so we engage in the business of philosophy. Say as much as you will then that the philosopher can invent no *new* life, can produce no *new* ideals, his criticism is still, in the

case of the true and earnest student of philosophy, productive of an enlargement and an increase of the genuine interest in all ideals.

This is the use of philosophy for one class of students, and such may pursue it no further than in the lecture-rooms for a few years; but they remain stronger men, for whom the earth and the heavens are larger, and fuller, by reason of such reflection upon themselves. On the other hand, however, there is another effect of the study of philosophy which is especially important in the education of the teachers and leaders of men. As we were saying in the beginning, the leader of men must have his ideals, must be loyal to them himself, and must try to attract others to his high standard. How shall he be able to insist upon this loyalty if he cannot maintain the value of it against the sceptic, the scoffer, or the opponent? Ah, but you may say, "Not merely by reason can a man maintain the significance of his own ideals. He may insist upon them, none the less warmly, when his insistence is a matter of faith, not of reason; and the prophets of humanity—have they been men who could always give a reason for the faith that was within them? Have they not hurled at an unbelieving world their 'Thus saith the Lord,' and converted the masses that were first their enemies by the force of their very enthusiasm itself?" Ah, I reply, but not all men, and above all not all leaders of men, not all teachers of youth, are born to be prophets. If they were, the world might be led astray, but would always be led, and we should not have times of doubt, of unrest, and of general public indecision such as at present. But if the religious teacher be no born prophet, if he be capable of losing his inspiration, and doubting the significance of his faith, if he be capable of fickleness in his love, so that he may transfer his services from one ideal to another, then is it not indeed dangerous for him to undertake the work of teaching his fellow-men without previously learning, in the course of his education, on what grounds his own views are to be maintained against those of others?

How often does it not happen that a teacher is found who actually undertakes, in the ardor and enthusiasm of youth, to

guide his fellow-men, and who then suddenly wakes up, too late in life to ward off the mischief, to the fact that his beliefs have never had a foundation which could hold against the skilful word of the doubter. Perhaps his abandonment of his faith is as irrational as his maintenance of this faith had previously been. Perhaps he is a Robert Elsmere, who has accepted his doctrine as he has accepted his native air, but who has no root and withers away at the first heat of criticism. Some one says to him, perhaps, when he is a clergyman of an established church,—some one says to him one day, “But, you know, miracles do not happen;” and our poor Robert Elsmere suddenly finds that his fair edifice has crumbled into dust, not because a genuine reason *why* miracles do not happen was given him, but because he never had a rational conviction that they did; and in the absence of such foundation there comes the desolation of the broken life and the sense of the vanity of the aspirations that once made the world bright and fair. Worse than the private ruin of the career of one teacher in such a case there is the public offence to the poor in spirit who had trusted in the word of a man who must now say that, as he discovers, he had never really meant his word at all.

What evil must follow from such a change of opinion, where the change has to occur in public, where the leaders of the battle have to alter front in the presence of the enemy, and make anew their plans of campaign at the moment of the greatest danger, it is hard to say. This we know: that we have a right to demand and expect of those who are to be our guides that they should be intelligent guides, that they should have taken some fair precautions against error, and that, if they must change, they should, during the course of preparation, have taken some precautions against the need of baffling, incomprehensible changes in the midst of their careers. Freedom on the part of a teacher to teach only what his conviction demands, freedom on the part of every thinker to alter his views when the evidence forces him so to alter them, freedom of every man to follow at every moment the truth, and the truth only, ought indeed to be a common-

place of all practical, as it already is a commonplace of all scholarly, undertakings; but such freedom must not be abused to the extent of permitting every man who happens to have opinions, if they have never been thoroughly reflected upon, to throw them upon a trusting public.

In short, if your leader is to be a worthy leader he ought, in these days, to have been in youth a reflective thinker. If he is not technically a philosopher he must indeed have known enough of technical philosophy to be capable of judging of the sincerity, of the earnestness, and of the fixity of his own faith. If he is to enter the world where the ideals fight their battles, he ought, at least in the quiet of the philosophical study, to have fought those battles ideally, to be acquainted, at any rate, with the weapons that are in the armory of human thought, to know his foes and his friends; and such preparation requires serious study, close reflection, on the great questions of humanity.

The result, then, of such philosophical study as this ought to be the production of teachers who are, I will not say merely more learned, but more worthy of the trust of their followers; and I cannot see how, in this age of complex life, of serious problems, of great issues, and of grave doubts, a man can undertake to guide his fellows and at the same time to neglect the meaning of the passions upon which all these serious things depend.

But, I must turn to the other aspects of the subject, and consider not merely the immediate effect of philosophical study upon those who follow it, but the more extended interests of such a movement as the one that you are here to-night considering, for the cause of civilization in our nation at large.

No careful student of American life can fail to feel at the present time that our nation, which, as the chairman so well remarked in his opening address, may be and probably will be called upon to lead in the future the Anglo-Saxon race, is approaching a serious crisis in its history. This Anglo-Saxon race which we represent on this continent has had, in the past, a most singular and marvellous history. It has been among all the races of men the one that was most distinctly,

in modern times, the great servant of the ideals of humanity. No race has carried so far abroad on the earth the institutions and the culture that modern life has developed; and yet this race, so constructive, and so ideal in its constructions, has, in the past, stubbornly neglected to reflect upon its ideals. The greatest, I say, of the servants of the ideal in modern times, it has declined to know what its ideals were, and has even scornfully denied that it had any ideals. The British constitution, that marvellous instrument of human ingenuity, which has been the mother of constitutional governments throughout the world, was the product, year after year, of efforts at compromise, which always denied that they conformed to any principle whatsoever; and yet they did conform to very deep and very significant principles. Logical, or otherwise ideal interests have almost always been firmly abjured by the English statesman, whether in his own home or in the colonies. Yet, despite his denial, he followed very lofty ideals. But now the crisis approaches when we can no longer hope to serve the interests of the ideal without knowing something about the significance of our purposes. Our race has met at last, here in this continent, greater problems than ever were set before it in the past. The problem of the formation of a permanent and great people out of the heterogeneous elements of our population, presses upon us in many forms. Our institutions have a perplexity and our dangers have a seriousness never before known; and yet at this very time our nation at large is disposed not to think seriously about its social position, but to wait, and to put off, and to avoid political changes, and to feel sure that all will be well. This policy of waiting and hoping has been, ever since the war closed, the common device of the nation at large; and no one need be an alarmist in order to feel how serious the condition of things must grow in time if this indifference to methods, if this unwillingness to reflect on our position, remains as permanent a characteristic of our nation as it has been. The Anglo-Saxon was safe in his ideal tasks in the past, safe in his cheerful manly unconsciousness of the meaning of the work in which he was engaged, safe as the instrument of the divine

order, although he did not comprehend in what sense he was its instrument. But at last this manly, but still too youthful indifference, must give place to a conscious self-comprehension; or the Anglo-Saxon, who no longer has to deal with his brethren alone, but with all mankind, will find that his sword will drop from his hands, and that his work will be unfinished, and that perhaps in time even ruin may overtake him, at the very moment when his activity, if properly guided by conscious reflection, might have become most glorious.

Nevertheless, notwithstanding the indifference that I have just lamented, there are indeed signs that our nation is, at heart, quite capable of very serious reflection. There are here and there indications of a growing spirit of reflectiveness. There are here and there symptoms of a tendency that aims to make our social life not merely progressive, but consciously progressive; not merely rational, but consciously rational; and these symptoms seem to me to come from a growing sense of the importance of knowing our life and of understanding what we are about. An exhaustive examination of the details and the issues of our social life is before us, and must be undertaken; and if my definition of philosophy is a right one, such an exhaustive examination is precisely the task of the philosopher. At such a moment the duty of all reflective people towards their nation is plain. They must organize for reflection, and they must, as genuine servants and as loyal citizens of the nation, offer to it the gift, not of mere opinion, but of a common, thorough-going, free, cautious, earnest, devoted self-criticism,—a criticism of our life.

I will not, therefore, now dwell upon those darker and still more difficult problems concerning the world, and the destiny of the human race, and the moral order of the universe, which perplex so many at this time. I speak for the moment only of the more obviously practical social problems that oppress us, and I say that *these* of themselves demand philosophical reflection. The problems of practical life,—look at them as you will, you must come to some conclusion in regard to them; and (of this I am sure) begin where you will, you must philosophize thoroughly. Undertake it as you will, the task

must be prosecuted to the end. The philosophy which you undertake must be, not fragmentary, but thorough-going. It is for this reason that I say, a plan of the kind which is here under consideration to-night has a significance that goes far beyond the boundaries of the work of your Ethical Societies. It is a plan of national significance. Its work must be done somewhere and by some one. The question is merely, Can you contribute to the accomplishment of this task?

Such, then, are the reasons why the study of philosophy has a significance for men in general, and for us in particular, both now and for all time.

Philosophy, I repeat, is not an effort to go any further in the consideration of the theory of the universe than the very limited means, which are confessedly at the disposition of human thought, will properly permit us to go. Philosophy is therefore not to be judged by our incapacity to know certain of the mysteries of the universe. Its business is, in a genuine sense, with men and with their world. The philosopher is concerned with the universe only in so far as it is man's universe and only in so far as the deepest passions of life, the strongest ideals of men, must take the form of beliefs about the universe. Therefore, as philosophy is thoroughly human, this study of the presuppositions of life and of passion must needs be prosecuted. It must needs be prosecuted in order to enlarge the individual beyond the confines of his own private life, in order to prepare the teacher for the work of intelligently guiding his adherents, and, above all, it must be prosecuted for the sake of offering to the nation, at a time when our trials are certain, for more than a generation, to increase rather than to decrease, the service of advice from reflective thinkers. Such advice will not be presumptuous. Such advice will really be given by the thinking nation to itself. Our interests as citizens are the interests of the one social order, of the one great human person that expresses its life in each one of us. But therefore philosophy, in endeavoring to bring this person to a comprehension of himself, is serving not the interests of a few people, but of the nation at large.

I have set before you this undertaking and its importance. There is no more obvious remark about the world than this,—that for an enthusiastic moral agent that is after all the best possible world which needs his help to make it better; and in this sense the need which I have been trying to describe to-night, ought to make this world, in your eyes, indeed, one of the best of worlds. For your service is very profoundly required in this crisis. If you succeed, you will perform a service which will be not of to-day or of to-morrow, but will be a treasure for all time.

THE SCIENTIFIC TREATMENT OF RELIGION.*

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THERE are things which we ardently wish for, yet scarcely expect. They seem so improbable that when they appear to be actually coming to pass, we find it difficult to credit the evidence of our senses. This meeting this evening is to me an event of this sort.

Three years ago this month, "our mutual friend" Mr. Sheldon (now of St. Louis) and I held a long and earnest talk in his room in Berlin on exactly the question which we are now called together to more seriously and formally discuss. Our programme was almost identical with that which has been printed and sent to us for consideration. When I began to read those pages, my first thought was, "surely here is another case of mind-reading;" then on further reflection I formed a better theory and said, "the fever is becoming epidemic and arises out of certain ill conditions of intellectual, moral, and religious health which Christendom is now experiencing; in other words, we are considering a question which grows out of the ripeness of the times."

A part of this proposal, as you know, is already being carried out by our enterprising French brothers through the magnanimity and munificence of M. Émile Guimet. The great Museum of Comparative Religion, which he founded first at Lyons (where I had the privilege of some weeks of study in it), is now in Paris; a school for the scientific study of religion and religions has been formed; some fifteen courses of lectures by the best men obtainable are in progress; a large select library of fifteen thousand volumes is on the ground; a special journal is published bi-monthly (*Revue de l'Histoire*

* Address before the Convention of Ethical Societies, St. George's Hall, Philadelphia, Friday evening, January 25, 1889.

des Religions), and the enterprise now rests on no less a foundation than the Department of Instruction for the Republic of France.*

To others have been assigned the addresses on the utility of philosophy, the method of dealing with philosophical and ethical problems, the question as to the need of a new school for the treatment of these serious themes, the character of the project, and the means to be adopted in bringing it about. I shall undertake to limit my remarks to the question as to how religion is and should be treated.

Method and thoroughness make the result of any investigation. It is the unanimous opinion of those who have caught the spirit of insight and outlook, arrived at in these later times, that the views and methods of mankind have started on the process of a complete change of character. The results that have already been achieved in many fields by the new method of inquiry are past recounting, and their effect on the theory and practice of the Western world is immeasurable. If one would realize this, let him call to mind the views prevalent but a short time ago concerning the nature and structure of the earth's crust; the plant and animal life upon it; the cultivation of its soil, the culture of plants, and the breeding of animals; the building of works of art and utility; the relations of men in society and in trade; and beside these crudities let him set the yet also imperfect results of our elaborate sciences of geology, biology, agriculture, horticulture, breeding, architecture, engineering, economics, etc. Why all this difference within such an extremely short time? No doubt there are several reasons, but there is one of eclipsing importance, and that one is the application of a new method.

1. *The Theological Method.*—Men have been earnest before our day, but mere earnestness does not attain to truth. Unfettered inquiry is a rare, if not impossible, attainment in any field. Total independence of judgment is a desideratum perhaps unreachable. Judgment we have, and plenty; but judg-

* See an article in the *Christian Register* for February 9, 1888, where I have given a fuller account of this movement, and from which I take some of the thoughts which are to follow.

ment based on breadth of facts, fairness in recognizing their merit, and reverence for and trust in the resulting truth, has few admirers and fewer representatives in those fields where personal interest is liable to be affected. In some branches the desirable attitude is coming to be realized. Respecting the facts of mathematical and physical sciences, *e.g.*, the occidental part of the world is reaching a state of serious and sincere earnestness. To a greater or less extent this is also true of some other branches of knowledge and practice. But concerning those realities which lie nearest to the centre of our being, which take the deepest hold upon life, which require in us change of circumstances, of outward conduct and inner regard and attitude, and which relate to the views of the world that have held sway for ages ; in fine, of all those things which pertain to the social order, to morals, and to religion, there is as yet only here and there an application of the spirit elsewhere prevailing. Assumptions are often made in support of the views men hold regarding these things which they would be far from applying to any other subject. It is the very nature of popular conservatism always to tenaciously resist innovation, to have undisturbed confidence in its present theories, to decry inquiry, and to insist by appeals to this or that authority that outside of these there is no truth. This unruffled assurance that "our age and our people" are in the enjoyment of the best is very difficult to stir. It has been the custom of this method to assume that the facts could only be properly seen from its stand-point. What men of other religions and races saw were only imaginings of weak and depraved minds. This conceit is illustrated by the case of the boy who, on learning there was to be an eclipse of the moon on a certain evening, went about among his playfellows and sold tickets of admission to his mother's back-yard. The boys came, saw the eclipse, and went home in gleeful satisfaction. But the two things of note are, the first boy's assumption that the eclipse could only be properly seen from his stand-point, and the stupid acknowledgment of this by the other boys, who did not perceive that such truths are not limited to any one person's or nation's stand-point. Yet, in

reality, it is no more ridiculous to claim a monopoly in eclipses than to assume that we have possession of all helpful ideas and attitudes regarding moral and religious thought.

Yet here, too, progress towards the broader spirit is little by little taking place, as one easily sees when he compares historically the views of to-day with those of a few generations ago. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the conservative views have not broadened, but that the ranks of those who are on the side of progress have been very notably increased. The religious teaching of Christendom has for centuries been of such a defined type and on such an unquestioned authoritative basis that there has been no room for the idea of progress. In a system of already attained truth the notion of advance is absurd. The only advance possible within such a view is the bringing of the individual lives more thoroughly under its regulations. This sort of progress was to become the ideal of each. But it is transparent that the more this aim is accomplished the more impossible is any enlargement of view and any actual progression. Here is one very manifest reason for the tardiness with which religion comes under the spirit of our age. Then again, ecclesiastical interests and party and sectional prejudices continually place and replace inquiry on a partial field. Men become lost in the petty differences which divide them as sects and forget that there is a broader moral and religious world. They are so busied with these minor matters that they are all oblivious to the learning and research which are shedding treasures around them, and they thus fail to see that these facts and thoughts would throw a world of needed light on the questions about which they are disputing.

It should not be omitted to mention that the respect which our modern science has created for itself has brought about a sort of fashion to be "scientific," and notwithstanding these open violations in theologizing circles of the first and most fundamental principles of science, we hear much in certain quarters about a "science of religion," a "science of ethics." But what for a science of botany, *e.g.*, would that be which confined its observations, analyses, and discussions to one

species of the vegetable kingdom, though that one were even the cedar of Lebanon or the great African baobab! Yet how does the most of the world's study of these questions differ from the case here cited? Only here and there a real investigator is to be found in this field. Nearly all the universities remain unawakened to the importance of such a candid and universal examination of these problems as they would approve of in history or physics, and consequently there are offered in the whole world (outside of Paris) less than half a dozen brief courses of scientific lectures on the subject of religion, a few more perhaps on ethics. Surely one keeps within the truth in saying that the *world's* understanding of the religion question is yet in its infancy, or has only reached a stage of advancement similar to that of astronomy in the days of Copernicus and Tycho Brahe. The philosophy of the most prevalent theology has remained for centuries quite unchanged in its essential character and aim. It credulously trusts and rests in a view of the world developed by men who lived ages ago; and, in doing so, it discredits and denies the views of its own age, which are proclaimed under vastly greater light by men who have a hundred times better understanding of the universe; while in almost everything aside from religion and morals it understands and accepts these latter views. Everywhere but here, it may be said, this class of minds are trying to make their outlook harmonize with the light of their times. They know that the universe is no longer regarded from the geocentric but from the heliocentric point of view, not from the Ptolemaic but from the Copernican. In biology, geology, and astronomy, man is recognized and admitted to be one incident in one stage of one incidental world in one incidental solar system; and only in theology is it persistently assumed and asserted that the *universe* was specially created for man, for a theatre in which he might sin, and in which he might be redeemed or lost. This is the old anthropocentric and largely anthropomorphic view yet holding sway. Nearly every other line of study under new method and greater light has received a fresh grounding, and in all cases it will be granted humanity has immensely gained.

Man seems to have a natural fear of the untried. The child who has not yet walked fears to try. The boy who would learn to swim dares not go beyond his depth. And so in a hundred other instances. We are safe, or we think so, where we are; the new method or way is untried; and we hesitate or refuse to venture. The man who has never reasoned on his faith dares not. He trembles at the thought of it. To do so he thinks would be sacrilege. It is a "holy of holies" into which he may not enter. He marvels at the grace of God in sparing those who reason and discuss these themes familiarly. In his attitude he does not know, and while he remains so disposed, never can realize the joy and naturalness of mental growth. His reverence, awe, superstition, or whatever it be, shuts him off from learning the laws of the very Being he so earnestly, yet unintelligently, adores. Just as the man who has never seen nor climbed a mountain has no conception of the exhilaration experienced among mountain scenery and of the sublimity with which nature becomes clothed; so here, the man who has limited his religious associations to his own or a few Christian denominations can have but a meagre idea of the profound sentiment with which he is dealing, and of the richness and inspiration lost to him through the poverty of his outlook.

2. *The Reactionary or Negating Method.*—There is yet another extreme. Some, it seems, are so afraid of light that they live in the dark; but there are others who use the light so as to put their eyes out. Many become dissatisfied with the methods and tendencies of theology, learn some of its errors and limitations, and come speedily to the conclusion that the whole matter "cometh of evil." They set vigorously at work to bring about its destruction. The case is closed and the verdict rendered before the evidence has half been heard. To cite one of many instances, Feuerbach revolted against the dogmatic and narrow assumptions of the Church of the times, analyzed the notion of religion which he found prevalent, and came to the conclusion that the substance and essence of *all* religion is covetousness, exhibiting itself in prayer, sacrifice, and faith. The human spirit never gets as

far as unselfish devotion. "That self-love," says he, "is always a necessary, indestructible, universal law and principle, inseparable from every kind of love, religion must itself confirm. Indeed, she does actually confirm it on every page of her history. Everywhere, when man has resisted that human egoism which has been here explained, be it in religion, philosophy, or politics, he sinks into pure nonsense and insanity; for the sense which lies at the basis of all human instincts, impulses, and actions, is the satisfaction of the human nature, the satisfaction of the human egoism." (*Wesen der Religion*, p. 100.) But this covetousness, of which religion consists, as he would have it, is always an unmixed evil, and therefore the less there is of religion in the world the better it will be for the world.

But who has a right to deal thus exclusively with this great historic fact? Where has it been shown that such are the only manifestations of religion? How has it been learned that those who do not manifest these signs are irreligious? What is the evidence that the signs of religion are always and everywhere limited to prayers and fastings, to bowing and kneeling, to masses and sacrifices? If I do not greatly mistake, we shall find in a study of the subject, such as that suggested in an outline which will be handed to those of you desiring it as you pass out,* that the case is by no means so simple, that many other elements much more legitimate than some of these are large factors in what history has decided to designate as religion. Indeed, this kind of treatment of the question gets no further than the most narrow and conservative. A reactionist is not seeking the truth, though he may deceive himself into thinking so. His wrath is to him only righteous indignation, but it blinds him all the same to the worth of what he hates. Not reaction, but growth out of and above, accompanied by a coolness that is able to recognize both the merits and faults of that from which it came, is the sign of mental health.

3. *Dogmatism among Scientists.*—It is one of the ground

* See the "Outline of Inquiries," etc., appended to this address.

maxims of that scientific method of research to which we owe so much, that a definition is not to be made nor a law formulated while there are yet known cases, instances, or species unexamined; and that even though a law has been formulated or a definition thought to be complete, if new instances are brought to light the whole subject is at once not only open to revision, but is bound to be re-examined before it can be taken as the basis of any further results. Can there be any doubt as to whether this canon has found application in the study of these great themes? Indeed, from the side of those who have taken upon themselves this great name Science, the problem of religion has often received the narrowest and most dogmatic treatment. Many so-called "scientists," without even giving faithful study to a single religious development, have formulated their decision: that "religion is superstition, and superstition must be rooted out of the world." The bigots and dogmatists are not all christened by the term "theologian," nor does one become a "scientist" merely by calling himself such. These people have taken it for granted that science meant physical or material investigation, and that all people of common sense agreed in the conclusion that the physical implies nothing but matter; in other words, they have settled the greatest question of thought in all the ages. A monstrous presumption which the reading of one respectable history of philosophy should have made impossible!

4. *The Scientific Method Applied to Religion.*—In an effort to treat religions in a scientific manner, it is not this or that form, or this or that manifestation, that makes the chief interest; rather it is the truth (from whatever source) in the idea of religion itself. Only by an examination of its many manifestations and a discerning analysis of its various impelling characteristics will one attain to an intelligent result. It is not different from nor less easy of understanding than any of the other complex phenomena of earth. Moreover, the problem is not whether Buddhism, or Judaism, or Mohammedanism, or Christianity, or any other form, is the most perfect religion, nor whether one of these is true and the rest false. What is here said is not meant as an apology for the doctrines

of any faith or sect. Nor is it intended as an apologetic defence of religion itself. It is rather a search for the facts regarding the subject and for the principles underlying it, and to accomplish these ends in the most impartial and universal manner possible. It is believed that to make any theme a subject of science in actuality is to remove it from the realm of partisan strife. Where the object is truth, divested of all individualities, there can be but one party; and within this there can be no dogmatizing on the part of people who realize the difficulties of their own convictions and the consequent discount or allowance with which all evidence must be received, and the tentative yet practical manner in which all conclusions must be held. Our effort, therefore, should be to learn what religion is at its root; to find out how it has and does manifest itself; how it comes about that there are such phenomena as religions; what are their fundamental antecedents; what is the cause of their growth and decay; in what ways has it applied itself to life; is it a thing which admits of being further broadened and perfected; and under a greater fulness may life by its exercise be more expanded and developed? There are theologians, rabbis, Brahmins, Sramans, and Mollahs who are interested in those questions of superiority, who have so little realization of the great religious expanse as to suppose that the total realm of its truth and actuality is included within the little spot over which they are bickering with their next-door sects. To them is ungrudgingly left the settlement of these so often purely imaginary and bootless discussions. The real question is one as much greater and more important than these as the world is greater and more important than a single country, province, or county; or as an international cause is greater than a local or neighborhood interest.

It is because the world is awakening to this feeling that such a convention as this is possible; and it is because this highest and noblest human impulse—now grown so strong—is striving to organize itself that it will succeed.

OUTLINE OF INQUIRIES FOR A HISTORICO-ETHNICAL STUDY OF RELIGIONS.*

To be treated scientifically, religion, like every other human expression, should be investigated historically, ethnologically, and philosophically; in other words, in terms of time, of space, and of inmost nature or essence, the two former being the indispensable preparation for the latter. Inasmuch as there is virtually no history obtainable, in the continuous chronological sense, for most of the peoples of the world, the historical and the ethnological study must go hand in hand.

The first requisite, then, is to obtain through ethnology a general notion of the races of men and of their various leading branches, past and present. Each special people developed in comparative independence have produced among other products a religion peculiar to themselves and their circumstances. They therefore form so many leading subjects of historico-ethnical inquiry, under each of which many questions are to be asked; and from the multitude of answers returned may be undertaken the building up of the body or superstructure of a genuine science of religion. The following outline of topics contains some of the many inquiries to be made in the study of each special religion:—

I. PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS:

1. The Racial Relations of the Special People.
2. Their Relative Position in History and the Principal Great Events in their Career.
3. Their Residence and Physical Surroundings:
 - Climate,—cold, hot, moderate, and stimulating.
 - Land-surface,—mountainous, level, plateau, desert.
 - Water,—rivers, lakes, seas, archipelago.
 - Flora, fauna, minerals.
 - Striking natural phenomena,—storms, hurricanes, volcanoes, earthquakes.
4. Their Stage of Development in General:
 - Material,—How do they live? (1) By hunting and fishing; (2) by herding and pasturing; (3) by agriculture; (4) by agriculture, manufacture, and trade. Tools, weapons, shelter.
 - Intellectual,—language, literature, art.
 - Social,—family, government.
 - Moral,—virtues and vices in their own regard, relations to surrounding nations.

II. SOURCE OF THEIR RELIGION:

1. Founder or Founders; Chief Circumstances of their Lives.
2. Relative Originality and Chief Sources of Influence.
3. Sacred Literature,—divisions, general character, theoretic origin, actual origin.

* Reprinted from *How Religion Arises: A Psychological Study*, by Duren J. H. Ward (George H. Ellis, Boston, 1888.)

III. THEIR CONCEPTION OF THE UNIVERSE:

1. Its Form or Shape.
2. Its Nature or Substance.
3. Its Origin or Creation.
4. Their Theory of the Source of Evil.

IV. THEIR CONCEPTIONS OF SUPERNATURAL BEINGS; *i.e.*, THEIR THEISM:

1. Names, Nature, and Functions of the Gods. Are they
Simple, tangible, or visible objects,—stones, bones, shells, herbs,
bits of wood, feathers, weapons, rocks, water, skins, ani-
mals, particular places;—*i.e.*, to what extent is *fetichism*
prevalent?
Semi-tangible or semi-visible objects,—mountains, rivers, earth,
fire, wind, rain, lightning;—*i.e.*, to what extent does a lower
nature worship prevail?
Intangible or invisible objects,—sky, sun, moon, stars, dawn,
spirits of ancestors and of great men, spirits in and inde-
pendent of objects, personified abstract conceptions of vir-
tues, fates, etc.? (These three characteristics are developed
from a suggestion made by Max Müller, Hib. Lect., 1878.)
Or, from another point of view, are they (1) living or departed
human spirits, (2) transformed human spirits, or (3) natural
forces and phenomena or imagined powers modelled on
human spirits?
Whether the *polytheism* is of a miscellaneous, democratic, mon-
archical, or henotheistic conception?
Whether a *monotheistic* conception is attained by individuals or
by the people at any time in their career?
Whether they developed a *philosophy*, and, if so, what it attained
to,—dualism, spiritual monism, or materialistic monism?
2. Character of the Gods,—power, wisdom, beneficence, malevolence.
(Only dualistic religions divide their deities into divine and de-
moniacal, and their future state into heaven and hell.)

V. THEIR CONCEPTION OF MAN'S NATURE:

1. His Origin.
2. His Relation to Supernatural Beings.
3. The Character of Their Idea of Salvation, if any; *i.e.*, from what
to what? Is it only sensuously thought, or does it refer to some
condition or state of mind to be avoided and some spiritual ac-
complishment to be aimed at, and, if the latter, what is the chief
feature of the resulting mental development,—intellectual, moral,
sympathetic, æsthetic, etc.
4. Their notion of a future life,—death, resurrection, region of the
dead (immediately after death and their permanent abode, whether
(a) in solitary gorges and valleys or on hill-tops where the living
rarely go; (b) on distant islands towards the setting sun; (c) in

an under and shadowy realm below our world; (d) among the stars or beyond them, in a heavenly kingdom for the good and a lower place of punishment or torment for the wicked; (e) a spiritual state out of spacial relations).

VI. WHAT SUGGESTION DOES THEIR ENVIRONMENT OFFER TOWARDS EXPLAINING THEIR THEISM AND ESCHATOLOGY?

VII. CULTUS:

1. Creeds,—character and relation to the authority on which they assume to be based; how regarded?
2. Ceremonies,—prayers, offerings, sacrifices, assemblies, songs, dances, incantations, feasts, fasts.
3. Ordinances having regard specially to individual life,—birth, circumcision, confirmation, baptism, marriage, anointing of the sick, burial, commemoration, canonization, excommunication.
4. Organizations :
 Institutions, sects.
 Priesthood,—its orders, ordination, duties, standing, vestments.
 Shamans,—sorcerers, magicians, medicine-men, miracle-workers, prophets.
5. Places of worship,—temples, altars, sacred groves, hills, valleys; sacred utensils.
6. Symbolism,—geometric forms, monograms, paintings, figures.

VIII. MORAL TEACHINGS (or Relation of the Religion to Practical Life,—virtues, vices).

IX. PROGRESSIVE OR DOGMATIC IN TENDENCY:

1. Direction and Strength of this.
2. Heresies; their nature (*i.e.*, whether Party reactions or growths of thought), their treatment by the dominant faith.

X. THE CENTRAL IDEA OF THE RELIGION:

1. In Theory.
2. Its Greatest Emphasis in Its Practical Carrying-out.
3. Other Essential Ideas.

XI. ITS PECULIAR CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS SHOWING THE SCOPE OR FULL CONTENT OF RELIGIOUS LIFE.

NEED OF THE PROPOSED SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY AND APPLIED ETHICS.

WILLIAM J. POTTER, MRS. ANNA GARLIN SPENCER, THOMAS DAVIDSON, O. B. FROTHINGHAM, WILLIAM JAMES, R. HEBER NEWTON, T. W. HIGGINSON, FRANCIS E. ABBOT, AND OTHERS.

THE need of such a school as is outlined by Professor Adler in this number of the *Ethical Record* was strongly expressed by the various speakers at the Friday evening meeting of the late Philadelphia Convention, and in the letters that were read from many prominent persons who were unable to be present. We can give but short abstracts of the earnest speeches which followed the addresses of Professor Royce and Dr. Ward, published in the foregoing pages, and only extracts from the more important letters.

THE ADDRESS OF MR. POTTER.

Rev. William J. Potter, of New Bedford, Mass., was introduced as the President of the Free Religious Association of America.

He began his remarks with the statement that he was present because of his deep interest in the subject under discussion. He represented a somewhat different Liberal circle from that of the Ethical Culture Societies, yet he had long believed that such a school as that proposed was greatly needed, and the project had his entire sympathy. Though President of the Free Religious Association, he had no right to speak for that association, nor was he an official delegate from any society. Yet from his position and his association with liberal thinkers of various classes, he might claim to have touched pretty closely the pulse of liberal thought, and to be capable, therefore, of bearing testimony that might be of some worth beyond his individual opinion. He directed

the attention of the audience chiefly to the point, that a School of Philosophy and Applied Ethics, where the instruction should all be given in strict accordance with the scientific method,—as well concerning the philosophy and history of religion as in other departments,—was a great need in this country, because there is nowhere any school for the training of public teachers or preachers that now supplies the want. You would not expect to find such training at Princeton, where the very name suggests an antiquated creed; nor at Yale, where the President of the University, by its charter, must be an Orthodox Congregationalist minister; nor at Andover, even if the New Orthodoxy shall prevail there, for it is one of the fundamental principles of the New Orthodoxy that all theology and the whole history of mankind, for time and eternity, is Christocentric. Not even will you find it in the Divinity School of Unitarian Harvard, though it has been claimed that the teaching in that school has been put on a strictly free, unsectarian, scientific basis. That school *has* been opened toward Orthodoxy, but not yet has it been opened on the other side toward a liberty beyond Unitarianism. It is a school professedly for the training of *Christian* ministers, and as such it retains certain theological presuppositions which forbid a perfectly scientific method of inquiry; as instanced by the fact that at its daily religious service, conducted by the students, no scripture is allowed to be read except from the Hebrew and Christian Bible. Mr. Potter thought that a school on a perfectly free basis, manned by the most competent scholars of the time, would not lack for students, and closed with a few words on the additional importance of such a school for the training of practical helpers in philanthropy and charity.

THE ADDRESS OF MRS. SPENCER UPON THE PRACTICAL SIDE
OF THE PROPOSED SCHOOL.

Mrs. Anna Garlin Spencer, of Providence, R. I., spoke substantially as follows:

At this late hour, after the expression of so much profound thought respecting the need for a broad, free, and compre-

hensive teaching of philosophy, I should not venture to ask the attention of the audience but for the fact that there is one practical aspect of the question which has not yet been fully discussed. I mean that aspect indicated by the words "and applied ethics" in the circular which has been read. The anti-slavery conflict marked an era in the moral development of America. Much of the ethical devotion and activity formerly clustered about the church life was then concentrated upon that great moral revolution; and was separated, if not alienated, from the old theological association. And since that time, there has been a growing tendency toward specialized moral effort in philanthropy and reform. So that to-day, if we would define "the church universal," the vast "body of believers" in truth, righteousness, and love, who are working to establish nobler and more humane institutions, and to help men and women to themselves grow better, we must outline not only the so-called church with its differing names and creeds, but we must also note a multitude of societies each at work upon some *detail* of human conduct or of human association. This is simply the ethical translation of the universal law of growth: increasing differentiation of function accompanying increasing complexity of organization. The problems of personal conduct to-day press upon us so many new and mooted questions; the problems of social organization to-day suggest so many puzzling and conflicting theories, that men and women are forced to study one problem at a time, to take one aspect of human duty at a time to establish and enforce.

And in this great work of reform and philanthropy in America there are far more women than men engaged to-day. The material demands of this commercial age are so absorbing upon both the time and talent of men, that women *must* do the greater portion of character-building in every direction, if it is to be done at all. And this is one reason why I am profoundly interested in the proposed school; its scope includes women on equal terms with men. And my interest because of this feature in the plan is not simply because I am a woman, and want women to have "chances." It lies much

deeper than that. It springs from the fact that to my apprehension the burden of care for the defective classes, of protection and special training for the erring and unfortunate, of dealing at first hand in personal, helpful ways with the great social problems of the time, is for the most part already laid upon the women of this country. I believe, so hard is it growing to hold the highest talents and lifelong devotion of the ablest men to the work of the preacher, that the public teachers of ethics, and accredited ministers of religion, in the future, must be to a great extent *women*. And if the church, as well as the school, must thus be officered largely by women, the absolute necessity for equal opportunities of training for both sexes is apparent. But whether any of you hold with me in this matter or not, no student of the social conditions of the time but knows that in this outer, *lay* ministry of reform and philanthropy, of which I have spoken, women are already serving in great numbers. And for this work, as truly as for any more formal leadership, they need training. And they need the broadest and wisest training. The woman who with baptism of holy consecration works for the extinction of the drink-habit, and the cure of the drink-mania, wants something more than enthusiasm and devotion in that work. She wants knowledge. She wants to know the great laws of heredity so far as these are ascertained; she wants to know what habits breed and stimulate the vice she abhors; and what relation the State justly has to personal habits. The woman who with a shuddering pity at her heart plunges into hell to rescue a falling or fallen sister needs something more than that shuddering pity to teach her how to deal with lust and its victims. She wants to know more than the one-sided experience of the sheltered and pure-hearted woman can prove; the power and use of the basic passions of the race, and the rational methods of restraining their abnormal action. The woman who, hearing always "the sad music of humanity," seeks with a world-wide love and sympathy to succor the poor and wretched, and befriend the forsaken, must have something beside love and sympathy, or she will blunder where she most would help. She must learn the true laws of human growth

and association : the best methods of teaching people to help themselves.

When I, a young woman, first felt that some service for suffering humanity was laid upon me and could never be ignored, I cast about for such training as would fitly prepare me for the work. And the fact that because I was woman I was excluded from most schools of theology was not the only reason why these schools could not supply my need. The deeper reason was that in many directions they were deficient in the studies and teachers which are needed to give definite preparation for such world-service. And what I, and many another earnest woman has tried to get in hard and wasteful ways of private masters and solitary study, all men and women who are dedicating their lives to charitable and reformatory work should be able to secure in the best direction of experts and masters. I hope this proposed school will be established. I hope so because I share with the wise men who have spoken here to-night a profound interest in the exposition and wider understanding of a rational philosophy of life and conduct. But I hope also that this school will be established because it promises to teach the workers in the drudgery of reform, and the practical helper of his kind, how to work wisest and best. What is the reason that the average reformer is a one-sided hobby-rider? What is the reason that the average philanthropist thinks his little scheme almost all there is of moment in charity? Because these have no sense of relation. They know nothing of the grand proportions of divine law and human activity of which they are a tiny part. They want to *know*.

We all want a larger view and a clearer insight. As we sit in our love-sheltered homes, and hear the tramp of the homeless and wandering without, we want indeed above all else the impulse of love and sympathy to reach out the hand of help; but we want also the knowledge of how best to lead the wandering in, and what to do with the homeless when once we have sheltered him.

THE ADDRESS OF PROFESSOR DAVIDSON.

Professor Thomas Davidson, of New York, whose remarks were very brief, said he was interested in the project because it bade fair to do two things: first, to make moral teaching an essential part of education, and, second, to introduce unity and wholeness into instruction. He believed that only in this way could an education be found that would answer the needs of the American republic. Our present education, he said, was utterly unsuited to our condition, being half mediæval and half sentimental, with no unifying principle. The great defects in our educational system upon which so much care, labor, and money were expended were being felt upon all hands and demanding remedies. He believed our school system had to be reformed from bottom up, and that essential elements in this reformation would be unity and the training of heart and hand as well as of head.

EXTRACTS FROM VARIOUS LETTERS.

We publish below extracts from the letters of a number of prominent persons, to whom Professor Adler's article in this number, outlining a School of Philosophy and Applied Ethics, was sent as a private circular.

From O. B. Frothingham:

"I wish that my physical condition was more satisfactory, or that Philadelphia was nearer, then I would definitely promise to be present on the 25th of January. As it is, I am afraid to commit myself to anything but the heartiest approval of your scheme. I know of but one divinity school (that of Cambridge) where full intellectual liberty is allowed, and none where a system of applied ethics is adopted."

The following from a later letter:

"I am truly interested in the establishment of such a college as you propose. It seems to me very important,—of *first-rate* importance,—in fact, as essential to true Liberalism, and I only wish I were rich enough to found such a school. The man who does it will confer a lasting benefit on mankind and will deserve perpetual honor. It is a great step forward, and plants Liberalism on a broad and scientific foundation. I am persuaded that the warfare with evil must go on; that the period of indifferentism, of drift, of optimism, of negative liberty, is

past; that the day of simply 'free religion' wearing the substantial likeness of all faiths and no faiths is over; and that battle, not acquiescence, is our call. I believe that the modern weapons are *ethical*, not *theological*; that not *creed* but *conscience* should be our watchword; that no *speculative evil*, but certain *actual evils*—ignorance, imbecility, blindness, moral inertia, intellectual and spiritual poverty, weakness of will—stand opposed to us as foes, and demand all the energy of our resistance. In other words, the conflict is no longer with shades in the air, but with persons on the earth; and this conflict is moral.

"Again, it is my conviction that ethics must have that force of enthusiasm, of fervor, of high, concentrated, consecrated purpose that is associated with religion in order to be effective. This your Societies have, and this gives them power. For power they have. They are growing in strength every year. Their root strikes deep. What is needed now is an institution that shall make that power permanent."

From Professor William James :

"I feel that, unless all signs and portents are false, the next fifty years are going to be distinguished from any past period in the history of our English race by the great part which scientific and philosophic speculation will take in determining the ideals of individual as well as of social life. The beginning of the eighteenth century was a philosophic age, but the beginning of the twentieth century bids fair to be one still more active in that direction, still more influenced from that quarter. Theorists will be helmsmen as they have not been before. Every institution which helps the higher theoretic life will consequently be of momentous value to the state. Your programme is so generous that I applaud it with both hands, and earnestly hope that ways and means may soon be forthcoming to make the School an accomplished fact."

From Rev. R. Heber Newton :

"If such a school can be rightly organized, and securely founded, it will be of inestimable benefit. All that the circular affirms concerning the great bulk of our divinity schools, within the different churches, is thoroughly true. From the nature of the case, it is impossible for any denominational school, at present, to realize, even approximately, the ideal of a school for the scientific study of religion. Such schools cannot offer, at present, and for a long time to come, that entire freedom of mind on the part of instructor and instructed which is a primary condition for the thoroughly scientific study of religion—of theology and of ethics. The proposed school may form what, in reality, would be a post-graduate course, to which men of sufficiently large minds and free spirits would come, from the various denominational schools, to complete and correct their studies. Its influences would, therefore, not at all be limited to the comparatively small number who might seek the benefit of its curriculum, but would extend to the denominational schools themselves, and through them to all their students, by stimulating these schools to higher and better and broader work. Its best power would probably lie in this latter direction. On this account, therefore, it seems to me that it may—if judiciously managed in the beginning—appeal to

large numbers of men who are thorough believers in the main dogmas of their own churches, but who are, at the same time, large-minded and open-hearted, and desirous of progress. The only criticism that I would offer, at the present stage of proceedings, lies in this direction. A mere free-thought school, however beneficial it may be to many individuals, would fail of realizing the highest good that is possible for the institution now proposed. If a little of the wisdom of the serpent is mingled with the harmlessness of the dove, the benefits of the new School may be vastly multiplied. It will of course be understood that I do not suggest any equivocal position,—but, on the contrary, the most frank and outspoken attitude; only, that attitude can be so shaped as not to conflict needlessly with any denominational position.”

• From Thomas Wentworth Higginson :

“I am in favor of the proposed school, and think that it would find many pupils, especially on the side of social reform and practical ethics. There is a growing demand for just such instruction, and there is now no place which gives just what is desired.”

From Francis E. Abbot, Ph.D. :

“I want to express my great appreciation of your circular, which strikes me as exceedingly well thought out. You outline a magnificent scheme, which, if practicable, will do more for the world than any other that could be devised. Only those who believe, with me, that philosophy is the only possible foundation for ethics, and that a thoroughly philosophical ethics is to be grounded only in a thoroughly philosophical theory of the universe, will discern the world-wide importance of the movement you seek to inaugurate. I have no adverse criticism whatever upon the plan you so admirably sketch. . . . On one point alone do I have a suggestion to offer,—that in the ‘Department of Philosophy’ some distinct recognition should be made at the outset, not only of historical, expository, and critical work, but also of positive construction. The vast expansion of modern science demands, and will inevitably involve, a total reconstitution of philosophy and ethics on the basis of the philosophized scientific method; the next century will certainly behold it made. In Germany, I know, the era of mere criticism is supposed to have supplanted permanently the era of construction; but this only shows the exhaustion of the creative spirit in that country, or, more correctly speaking, the exhaustion of the *methods* hitherto recognized there. Nevertheless, just as certainly as it is the essence of all mind to *create*, a creative epoch will succeed once more the present critical epoch; and, in founding such a school as you contemplate, it is wise to recognize this necessity in explicit terms of some kind. I may be right or wrong in my own attempts to construct; but, if I fail, somebody will succeed. And it ought to be the chief aim of your school to foster, encourage, and help all genuine *philosophical construction*. This is precisely where our universities chiefly fail.”

From Rev. Edward Everett Hale :

“I have read your letter with great interest. I am afraid I shall not be able to be present. . . . I certainly hope for your success.

"I cannot but wish that the institution might be placed at Cambridge, where we have already a good deal working in the right direction; but every other university city would say the same."

From Rev. J. C. Learned:

"I have received your circular and prospectus of a School of Philosophy and Applied Ethics. An institution whose spirit and method are such as these outlines suggest is undoubtedly needed. Once established, it would *make* friends,—may it find enough *ready made* to transform this ideal into a reality. I look with hopeful interest on the varied activities of the Ethical Societies. I believe they are to make a substantial and permanent contribution to the religious thought and to the social needs of our age. I hope your Convention, therefore, may serve in all ways to strengthen your hands and hearts, and to advance the cause—the humane cause—to which you have pledged your individual and collective powers."

From Judge George C. Barrett:

"The general idea of instruction upon important subjects, without bias of any kind and solely for the purpose of reaching the truth,—without fear,—cannot fail to meet the approval of all just and liberal minds. And it was that thought, so clearly expressed in the circular, which interested me. I should rejoice to see it put into practical and thorough execution."

From Moncure D. Conway:

"The printed pamphlet with which the invitation is accompanied presents an ideal worthy of the centenary of the first President, who declared that this government does not 'in any sense' rest on the Christian religion. But such an ideal is still hard to attain in a country where sectarian religion is in various ways legally established. I need hardly say to one of your knowledge and experience that the large and national success of such a school as that proposed will depend very much on the men who shall be prominent in it as teachers. I should strongly urge that there should be no president. Thomas Jefferson's reasons for making it the fundamental law of the University of Virginia that there should be no president of the faculty or of the college have even greater force in application to an institution for which the public will be eager to find a creed-label, and would certainly find it in the views of any man eminent enough to be college president or principal. For a colorless man would be insignificant. This is the point I feel most strongly. . . . I assure you of my hearty sympathy with the new and much-needed educational scheme."

From Rev. W. C. Gannett:

"I hope for all success to the plan, or to something like it. The circular shows that it has been carefully thought out; and if the *spirit* of the thing can be kept as broad as the plan, such a school must do great good,—perhaps even more as an 'object-lesson' to existing schools than by direct influence on students of its own."

From Rabbi Emil G. Hirsch :

"I need scarcely assure you that I most heartily approve of the project, and have no doubt as to the urgent necessity which exists among the liberals of all classes for such an institution. Your appeal characterizes well the work done by our theological seminaries and the narrow prejudices which rule most of our universities; but even where what the Germans call *Lehrfreiheit* obtains, the opportunities offered for the liberal ministry are not very extensive. The leader of modern thought needs more than philological training. As long as truth absolute was believed to be contained within the lids of a book or books revealed in an old tongue, philological preparation was essential for him who would preach the word; for upon correct interpretation of that ancient record depended the salvation of the community. To-day, however, not books, but life, need interpretation, and that book of life can only be read by him who is well equipped with a full acquaintance of the methods and the results of modern philosophy, whose eye can detect midst the conflict and contest of warring opinions the steady onward current of progress. Thought to-day must lead to action. In the field of practical ethics the speakers from the pulpit and from the platform must become the leaders and organizers. The established schools, both in this country and in Europe, pay too little attention to these practical issues in their theological curricula, and the consequences are patent in the lost hold on life and the blindness to living issues which characterize the utterances of most pulpits to-day.

"I hope you will succeed speedily in your endeavor. Whatever I may do in my restricted circle to further your plans, rest assured, will be willingly done."

From Rev. M. J. Savage :

"Being just on the point of leaving town, I have only time to say that I think your proposed scheme for a School of Philosophy and Applied Ethics is every way admirable, and that I hope it may succeed."

From Rev. H. M. Simmons :

"I am heartily in sympathy with such a school as you propose. Hardly anything is more needed, either in the moral or religious field, than to learn the true philosophy and application of ethics. I feel sure that such a school would not only advance practical morality, but would help to bridge the supposed division between ethics and religion, and to unite good people of all churches and of none in that larger thought and more charitable feeling which is both moral and religious. You are therefore at liberty to consider me a warm friend of your proposed movement."

From Rev. Jenkin Lloyd Jones :

"Permit me through you to convey my cordial greetings to the friends who assemble at the Ethical Culture Convention. It would give great pleasure to accept your invitation to stand with them on the platform, and nothing but the *material* barrier of distance prevents. In the desire to make character-building

the pre-eminent object of religious organization, ethics the foundation of the religious life, the alleviating of suffering, the ameliorating of ignorance, and supplanting of superstition with an enthusiasm for excellence the prime call for co-operation, I find myself in complete sympathy with the brethren to whom I send greeting. That there are points of cordial disagreement in our methods and perchance many of our intellectual conclusions makes our fellowship more real, for it is a fellowship of the *spirit* and not of the *letter*, a fellowship of diversity rather than of conformity. I can contribute no wisdom to your deliberations at this distance. I wish you all success and pledge you what little co-operation I can give in your proposed School of Philosophy and Applied Ethics. I wish you could get the phrase 'comparative study of religions' somehow into your title, as you doubtless will into the curriculum of study."

From Rev. J. H. Clifford:

"I send you my hearty approval of 'the Scheme as outlined in the Circular' before me, with high hope in the prosperity and results of this grand undertaking.

"I desire, in some humble way, to be numbered with those who shall engage in its furtherance. To be united for such an object should seem to all workers, in whatever directions of progressive liberal thought and advancing life, as a new enlistment, under inspiring promise, in the holy war of humanity, where every generous struggle makes for coming peace."

From Edwin D. Mead:

"We need such a school in America. We are all certainly very glad to recognize the great advance in the methods and the spirit of the study of philosophy, and the teaching of philosophy in many of our colleges and universities, in these later years. I should like to speak in detail and in warm words of the solid and admirable work which is being done at Harvard, at Johns Hopkins, at Ann Arbor, and in other places. But the atmosphere and the animus of the vast majority of our colleges are still such as make impartial, scientific, and thorough philosophic study difficult and almost impossible; while in the theological schools, which ought to be the great nurseries and homes of philosophy and of freedom, the student is almost invariably handicapped and mortgaged, the end and aim of his philosophic studies prescribed for him almost as imperatively as they were to the mediæval schoolman. This is not the way to rear scholars; this is not the way to train scientific men; it is not the way to make competent and strong men; it is not the way to foster philosophy and fortify truth; it is not the way to make religion strong and great and inspiring and commanding. It is precisely because I want to see religion throned in the minds of men; because I believe that, though a little philosophy may be a dangerous thing, a deep and true philosophic culture is a safe thing, and the only safe thing, for the teacher to-day; . . . because I believe that a serious, free, and deep study of philosophy leads irresistibly to those great beliefs which noble and religious minds most desire,—it is because I believe these things that I welcome such a scheme as this of yours to advance the scientific study of philosophy in America. I wish your enterprise the hearty support and the high success which it deserves."

From B. F. Underwood :

"I regret that I cannot be present, but am greatly interested in the project and hope it will be successfully carried out. My own views are so fully expressed in the circular received that I will only say that it gives my idea exactly of what a school of philosophy should be and how it should be conducted. I wish to be a member of the Society for the establishing and support of the school, and will do whatever I can to aid it."

From Dr. Daniel G. Brinton :

"Your letter reaches me in the midst of preparation for Europe. . . . I am in deep sympathy with the project, and you have my best wishes for its success."

From James H. West, editor *New Ideal* :

"With the entire work of the Ethical Societies I am in cordial sympathy, and the movement in behalf of the proposed 'School of Philosophy and Applied Ethics' has my cordial and unqualified approbation. . . . The ordinary college and university, even the best we have in America, fail to-day to meet the requirements we feel most pressing. . . . You will not fail of students and helpers, I believe, if once your movement is inaugurated."

From W. T. Harris, LL.D. :

"Many thanks for the prospectus of the new School of Philosophy and Applied Ethics, which I have read with great interest.

"One suggestion occurs to me, from my point of view. I think that the Philosophy of History—or *Comparative History*, which amounts nearly to what the Germans call *Cultur-Geschichte*—should be a centre to the course of study in a new school that shall really bring us any light. The principle of evolution in history is the only guide I know of; it furnishes the only standard that I have by which to decide on the things that are already established and by which to judge new schemes proposed. I am interested in knowing, for instance, the historic principle (or active working power) which has made Judaism conquer all European minds; made Roman ideas (property and civil law) prevail over the same civilization; made Greek ideas in philosophy and literature and art prevail also. Comparative History and Philosophy alone can discover to us the cause of these potencies and make us enlightened.

"Only when thus enlightened can we rightly choose and rightly judge."

ETHICAL SOCIETIES AND THE CHURCH.*

BY PROFESSOR GEORG VON GIZYCKI, OF THE UNIVERSITY
OF BERLIN, GERMANY.

ACCORDING to Immanuel Kant, there is an invisible church, made up of earnest thinking people who regard the true service of God to consist, not in creeds and religious ceremonies, but rather in a disposition towards an upright life. If these persons unite with the exclusive purpose of working against evil in the world and of strengthening the cause of the good, if they thus hold up "a standard of virtue as the basis of union for all who love the good" ("eine Fahne der Tugend als Vereinigungspunkt für alle die das Gute lieben"), then they constitute an "Ethical Society." Under the leadership of Felix Adler, who appears to have been chiefly influenced by the philosophy of Kant, organizations of this kind have arisen at the present day in America under the name of "Societies for Ethical culture." It was an expression of considerable import which fell from the lips of Moncure D. Conway, the former minister of the "South Place Religious Society," London, in considering the present condition of the churches in North America, when he remarked: "Among all the out-burnt craters, I see but one peak from whence the sacred fire is now ascending. The movement, which in strength, freedom, and influence may now be regarded as succeeding to that of Channing, Parker, and Emerson, is the one in New York which undertakes to found a religion purely upon a basis of morality." This remark had reference to the "ethical movement" led by Felix Adler and his friends. Mr. Conway adds, "that the question whether a church is adequate to the needs of the time, is simply the question whether that church is able

* Freely translated by W. L. Sheldon from chapter iii. book ix. of a recent volume on "*Moralphilosophie*," by Georg von Gizycki, Wilhelm Friedrich, Leipzig, 1888.

to draw to itself the moral genius of the age." He appears to be of the opinion that this condition cannot be asserted of any of the existing churches.

Emerson, in his well-known article on the "Sovereignty of Ethics," has referred to the charge "that pure ethics is not now formulated and concreted into a *cultus*; a fraternity with assemblings and holy days, with song and book, with brick and stone." We can now assert that the grounds for this charge have been removed through the efforts of this group of wise and earnest Americans of whom Mr. Conway speaks. These men have undertaken to develop a religion of morality whose basis shall be, not in hidden mysteries about the supernatural such as no man can understand, but rather in what all believe and as to which no sane mind can doubt. They have expressly recognized the "self-sufficiency of the moral consciousness," of which Emerson speaks; and they have made this the sole basis of their conduct and their creed. They simply give to ethics the place or position of supremacy which has heretofore been given by the churches to theology.

They are not in antagonism to the Christian or the Hebrew religion. On the contrary, they are at present probably the truest friends of these religions, for the reason that they are desirous of rescuing all the moral truth that humanity has experienced and discovered in these historical movements; while those who are determined, at any cost, to cling to outward forms and outworn doctrines are doing their part to make this moral truth lost to men. The ethical religion of these men and women—their moral faith—works also among the poor. The faith of man in himself and the sense of human brotherhood; the belief that the human race through its own inner strength can develop a glorified earth; the assertion that the responsibility for what takes place in the moral world rests exclusively on human beings; the appeal to the feeling of duty and to the sense of ethical joy that must necessarily accompany the upright in heart,—all this is showing itself more powerful than speculative doctrines of a theological or metaphysical kind. It is manifest that the

"problems of life" awaken greater interest than the "problems of theology."

What is it that the Ethical Societies aim to accomplish? The Society for Ethical Culture of Chicago aims "to serve the cause of the good apart from the religious doctrines of the past. While standing outside of the churches, whether Christian or Jewish, it does not spend its time in attacking them, but seeks to take up the work which they, to such an extent, leave undone—the work of moral reform."

There is a similar expression of view in the statement of principles of the Ethical Society of Philadelphia, which says: "We affirm the need of a new statement of the ethical code of mankind. The formulations of duty which were given by the great religious teachers of the past are not sufficient for the changed conditions of modern society. We believe that moral problems have arisen in this industrial, democratic, scientific age, which require new and larger formulations of duty." And Stanton Coit remarks: "Ethics is the science of good character and right conduct, and it is based on our moral experience and our moral judgment, and should be kept independent of all theology, just as the science of correct thinking is, and political economy, and all other sciences of the mind and society, and as all practical arts are. We are pledged to no philosophical theory as to the nature of God and the universe, or as to the limits of human knowledge. And so long as the atheist, or agnostic, or positivist does not derive his sanctions to right actions from his speculative theories, we gladly welcome him. We would leave the speculative thought of each individual as untrammelled as you do here at South Place, and assert that character and conduct are independent of philosophical speculations. We would then unite on the basis of character and conduct, and try to build up these as best we can in ourselves and others." And Salter says: "Humanity is to awake to sublime tasks; the god that is in us is to arise out of his sleep and match the miracle of legend with a miracle of fact, bring a new order out of the chaos in which humanity still lives, and lift the earth and the struggling millions of men into the light and joy of heaven."

Shall we be deluding ourselves if we cherish the hope that some time in the distant future, when swords shall be beaten into ploughshares, and the spears into pruning-hooks, the Christian churches will all be transformed into Societies for Ethical Culture? The human race is still so young! Churches we hope there will always be. The organ and the hymn will ever have their place there,—only we hope that the music and the song will be of a kind that is human and ethical, and that the aim will not be to influence God by sacrifice and prayer, but to appeal to, and elevate mankind. God—if he exists—stands in no need of us; but the entire energy of our hearts is needed to make this earth, so full of evil, diviner. Alas! how much that is best and highest in the soul of man, especially in the soul of woman, is lost to the world because it is directed towards the supernatural,—towards that which either may not exist or, if it does exist, is in no need of this sacrifice on our part! Is this right? If there be a God, surely he must will and love the good; and “this is the love of God, that we keep his commandments.” His commandments are: that we love one another and make one another happier; that we pour out our love where it can accomplish the most,—that is, on our fellow-men; that we love our fellow-men with all our hearts, with all our souls, and with all our strength,—that is, with all the love we have. If, however, God is not good and does not love the good, still we ought to do the good.

Georg Christopher Lichtenberg exclaims, truly: “What wars and strife and disputes there have been about the service of God! We could almost fancy that at one time the belief prevailed that the human being existed exclusively to pray and to worship God. I am satisfied that most of this worship is superfluous; there is but just one way to worship God,—namely, to fulfil our duty and to act according to the laws given us by human reason. The words ‘there is a God’ mean simply, in my opinion, that I feel myself, notwithstanding my freedom to do as I like, obliged to do that which is right. What further need have we of a God? This is God.” “What does it mean to have a God, or what is God?”

Martin Luther replies: "God means that to which one looks for all good, to which one flies in all trouble; therefore, to have a God means nothing else than to trust and believe in him with the heart; as I have often said, it is simply the trust and faith of the heart that makes both God and idol. If your faith and trust are true, you have the true God; if, on the contrary, they are false and unworthy, then you have not the true God; the two belong together, faith and God. Whatever it is that your heart leans upon and commits itself to, that is really your God." Then, would it not be right to believe in the good in itself and to trust it with all one's heart, to take refuge in it in all trouble, to lean the heart upon it, and commit oneself to it? Of this God is not the commandment true: "Thou shalt have no other gods before me,—that is, me alone thou shalt take for thy God?"

THE ETHICAL BASIS OF FELLOWSHIP.*

BY WILLIAM M. SALTER.

MR. SALTER sketched the ideal of a religious fellowship, in which the recognition of duty as a binding law, and a purpose to live an upright life, should be the only conditions of membership. While such a body would be committed to no theological or philosophical belief, it would not exclude various beliefs or the free expression of them. Minor groups might be formed of those drawn together by intellectual affinity, or by practical agreement in some solution of the problem of society. But theism or agnosticism, socialism or individualism, should form only the atmosphere of any group, not a creed or binding statement. If any group made more of any philo-

* An address delivered before the Philadelphia Convention of Ethical Societies, Sunday evening, January 27, 1889. We regret that the limits of the *Record* will not permit the publication in full of this noteworthy address of Mr. Salter and also the addresses that followed it by Mr. Clifford, Mr. Potter, Mrs. Spencer, and Mr. Mangasarian. The first part of Mr. Salter's address, of which we can give but a brief abstract, will appear in full in his forthcoming book, "Ethical Religion" (Roberts Brothers, Boston), which is noticed elsewhere in this number of the *Record*.

sophical view or economic plan than of the central moral aim, which ought to be supreme over all else, it would be in danger of becoming sectarian. The heretics in relation to this ideal body would be the theists or agnostics, the socialists or individualists, who refused to have fellowship with others of different ways of thinking, separated themselves and formed bodies of their own. Heresy would then lose its old associations, and instead of standing for freedom, would stand for intolerance. Personal and social morality would be the main themes for the attention of such a body and of all its branches.

Mr. Salter, in concluding, spoke as follows :

"My understanding of the ethical movement is that it aims to establish such a fellowship as I have described. The common impression of us is that we are a company of agnostics. How far we may be responsible for this I shall not undertake to say. It is possible that we have sometimes confused our own personal views with the aims of the movement to which we belong. If ours were an agnostic movement it would of course nowise differ in principle from the Unitarian, Presbyterian, or any religious sect. The truth is, I think, simply that we open our doors to agnostics (or, for that matter, to materialists and atheists), while the churches generally exclude all who do not agree with the creeds which form their basis. But we are no more an agnostic movement because agnostics are among our number than we are a Jewish movement because some of our most active and devoted members are Jews. In the constitution of our union we distinctly declare that our aim lies in the elevation of the moral life of our members and of the community, and that we welcome all to our fellowship who sympathize with this aim, whatever may be their theological or philosophical opinions.

"It is sometimes said that it is not what we do but what we omit that makes a barrier between ourselves and the churches. But omitting a thing does not exclude it; because we omit theism or worship or prayer from among the things required of our members, we do not forbid them such thoughts or practices; we do not prevent the formation of subordinate groups to whom some form of theistic devotion would be helpful and inspiring. A distinguished Rabbi of Philadelphia said a while ago that the omission of worship constitutes 'a barrier between the Ethical Culture Society and pure Judaism, and a barrier it is of no small proportions.' Unitarians say the same as to our movement and Unitarianism. But to us—to me at least—it does not seem that this should be a barrier; for myself I should never set it up, nor do I set it up. I should like to have no barriers exist save between those who love what is good and those who love what is evil. It is the churches who make barriers, not we; our aim is to transcend all those which conscience does not set up.*

* The interior motive of our movement with relation to the whole question of prayer and theological belief was never more finely expressed than in the following words (which I have come upon since the above has gone into print) of Professor Adler, in the very inception of our movement and before the parent Society in New York had "a local habitation and a name:" "We

"It may be said that our aim is impracticable. A Unitarian journal recently said that a religious body must, as a matter of course, have religious doctrines; that our own movement has its intellectual limits; that, in effect, intellectual differences must be more potent to divide than moral aims can be to unite. And we must at least admit that there probably never has been such a fellowship as we crave. There is indeed an observation of Epiphanius, one of the Christian fathers, that in the primitive period of the Church wickedness was the only heresy; that impious and pious living divided the whole world into erroneous and orthodox. I should like to believe that this was so, but I fear it was only an ideal of the bishop's mind transferred to a period of which he had imperfect knowledge; for not much later, at a church council, when a bishop was charged with unchastity, the cry went up, 'What do we care about his chastity? Is he orthodox? That is the question,' and again, 'Worse than a Sodomite is he who will not call Mary the mother of God.' No; history does not give us much encouragement. And we may be sure that it will be easier for us to become sectarian than to be loyal to our ideals. Like the Puritans, like Unitarians more recently, we may demand liberty for certain views but not be willing to extend it to other views. There is no use in denying it, our movement has, as matter of fact, attracted more agnostics and materialists than theists, and naturally enough, since hitherto there has been no religious home for the former class, while for theists church doors have been wide open. Should we nevertheless give a warm welcome to theists if they choose to come to us? Should we to our platforms as well as to membership in our societies? Do not say that the question may never have to be faced. If it should not, it might be (I do not say it would be) only because of the practical oneness and weakness of our movement. A movement like ours which welcomes to its fellowship persons of all theological or philosophical opinions ought to attract persons of all theological or philosophical opinions, *i.e.*, of all that are not held in a sectarian spirit. For who will say that a man may not believe in God and yet desire fellowship with all good men? Who will say that a man may not believe in prayer and yet not wish to be sundered from any other person who simply aspires to be a better man? Believe me, liberals in spirit are not confined to those who are liberals in name. The test of our sincerity may come: how shall we meet it?

"Even now there are those whose ideals of fellowship are as broad as our own. Not only are there individual men and churches here and there, but in the West, where I am particularly acquainted, there is a company of religious societies

propose to exclude entirely prayer and every form of ritual. Thus we shall avoid even the appearance of interfering with those to whom prayer and ritual, as a mode of expressing religious sentiment, are dear; and, on the other hand, we shall be just to those who have ceased to regard them as satisfactory and dispensed with them in their own persons. Freely do I own to this purpose of reconciliation, and candidly do I confess that it is my dearest object to exalt the present movement above the strife of contending sects and parties, and at once to occupy that *common ground* where we may all meet, believers and unbelievers, for purposes in themselves lofty and unquestioned by any. . . . *Diversity in the creed, unanimity in the deed!* This is that practical religion from which none dissents. This is that platform broad enough and solid enough to receive the worshipper and the infidel. This is that common ground where we may all grasp hands as brothers, united in mankind's common cause." (Address at Standard Hall, New York, May 1876.)

which refuses to limit its fellowship by any dogmatic tests. I refer to the Western Unitarian Conference. Practically that body stands on the same basis with our own. The platforms are indistinguishable. Theirs contains not a word about God or Christ or immortality or worship or prayer,—or any other matter about which earnest and sensible men could disagree. What, then, distinguishes the two bodies of men? In principle, nothing. As matter of fact, however, in their local churches the Western Unitarians retain some of the forms of worship; many of them, no doubt most, are theists and believers in prayer. We, on the other hand, as it happens thus far, are, perhaps, as a rule, not theists; at least, in no branch of our general body has there been any prayer. But we welcome those who are theists to our fellowship, and they do not exclude agnostics or materialists from theirs. What valid reason is there then for our remaining apart from one another? I, of course, speak absolutely for myself in this matter; but for my own part I can see no reason. If we cannot fraternize with men who with the same dominant aims as ourselves cherish a faith in God and the habit of prayer, we are not as broad as our principles; and if they cannot fellowship with others who are as eager to advance the cause of 'truth and righteousness and love in the world' as they can be and yet differ from them in philosophical view, they are not true to their principles. There is no greater call for magnanimity on the one side than on the other, and this I say without implying that there are no theists in our company or no agnostics in theirs. I believe there is a sincere desire on both sides to put religious fellowship on a moral basis, to break down old walls of division, to bring into closer union all good men. If there are hesitations on either side, they are hesitations of the flesh, arising from old habits and memories and associations, not of the nobler spirit. May the day come when we shall be brought together, when we shall be outwardly and to all the world what we are now in spirit,—one body, one fellowship wherein a common spirit, a supreme aim, a crowning aspiration, shall be more potent to unite than intellectual differences can be to drive asunder! And when this wall of separation goes down, may others perchance begin to disappear! May an ethical Judaism arise as broad and free as the ethical Unitarianism, and great numbers from the ancient and proud people of Israel come into the larger fellowship! May the love of goodness as the supreme concern of religion steal into the various Christian communions, soften asperities, make peace where are now contention and strife, and bring hearts together that are now apart! Yes, may the daring dream of the heart more and more come true, and good men the world over come to love one another and to live and labor in one world-wide communion for the holy ends of justice and right!"

THE LATE CONVENTION OF ETHICAL SOCIETIES.

THE Third Convention of Ethical Societies, held at Philadelphia on the 25th, 26th, and 27th of January, 1889, was an interesting occasion. The business meetings took place in the rooms of the Philadelphia Society, 1630 Arch Street; the public meetings were held in St. George's Hall. The Convention was called to order Friday morning, January 25th. Dr. C. N. Peirce, president of the Philadelphia Society, was elected chairman and Mr. Joseph W. Errant, of Chicago, was made secretary.

There were present twenty-seven delegates, representing the Ethical Societies of St. Louis, Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia, and a number of friends of the ethical movement from other cities.

After the organization of the Convention the reports of the secretary and treasurer of the Union and of the Publication Committee of the *Ethical Record* were read. The secretary, Dr. C. N. Peirce, reported that the labors of Mr. William M. Salter and Mr. S. Burns Weston in the West and East had been fruitful in enlarging the membership of the Union and in interesting many in the Ethical Societies and their work. The treasurer reported a balance of one hundred and twenty-nine dollars and fifty-eight cents in the treasury. The receipts for the *Ethical Record*, it was reported, had about covered the cost of publication, without paying anything for editorial services. The subscription-list was reported to be steadily increasing.

Professor Adler, as Speaker of the Fraternity of Lecturers, then made an address, outlining the work before the Convention. The most important matter to be considered was the school project, which was to be the subject of the evening public meeting at St. George's Hall. He proposed that the Union

should consider the advisability of offering a prize of one thousand dollars for the best essay on some subject of practical ethics, the offer to be open to students and scholars abroad as well as in this country. The appointment of a salaried secretary of the Union was also recommended.

At the beginning of the Friday afternoon session committees were appointed to report on the following subjects: the Budget; *Ethical Record*; Conditions of Membership in an Ethical Society; The Proposed School of Philosophy and Ethics; Prize for Essay on some Subject of Practical Ethics; and Social Life in the Ethical Societies. The remainder of the afternoon was occupied with an earnest discussion as to the qualifications for membership in an Ethical Society, and was participated in by Messrs. Salter, Adler, Nettle, De Roode, Sheldon, Black, Errant, Traubel, Rosenblatt, Weston, and Mrs. Williams. The question was warmly discussed whether the annual payment of a stipulated sum should constitute one of the qualifications of membership, as in the New York Society, or whether the amount of yearly contributions of each member should be wholly optional, as in the St. Louis, Chicago, and Philadelphia Societies. There was considerable difference of opinion. Other points that arose were, whether there should be a formal admission of members into an Ethical Society, whether there should be formed an inner circle corresponding to church membership, and to what extent the Committee on Membership should examine into the character of applicants for membership.

Friday evening, the 25th, was set apart for a special public meeting in St. George's Hall to discuss the school project. Professor Adler presided and made the opening address, and was followed by Professor Royce and Dr. Ward, of Harvard University, Rev. William J. Potter, of New Bedford, Mrs. Anna Garlin Spencer, of Providence, R. I., and Professor Thomas Davidson, of New York. Letters were also read from prominent persons in sympathy with the object of the meeting who were unable to be present. The addresses and extracts from the letters are published in the foregoing pages. Saturday morning a special conference was held to discuss

still further the proposed School, Professors Royce, Davidson, Cope, Adler, Rev. Mr. Potter, Dr. Ward, and others, taking part.

At the close of the discussion the following resolution was unanimously adopted:

"WHEREAS, It is proposed to found, when adequate financial support shall be assured, a school of Philosophy and Applied Ethics,—for giving advanced instruction, on the basis of the broadest intellectual liberty and the highest scholarship, in the several departments of Philosophy, of the Science of Religion, and of Applied Ethics, with the special view of training educators and practical workers in these important provinces of learning and life; therefore be it

Resolved, That a Committee be appointed thereupon by this Conference, with power to add to their number any other persons whom they may deem wise counsellors in the matter; said committee to organize by the election of their own officers and of such sub-committees as may be necessary, and so far as this Conference is concerned, to have full powers further to elaborate the plan of the school in detail, and to secure funds for its endowment and maintenance.

Resolved, That the following persons be appointed for said committee by this Conference: Professor Felix Adler, New York; Octavius B. Frothingham, Boston; Hon. George C. Barrett, New York; Professor William James, Professor Josiah Royce, Cambridge; B. A. Ballou, Providence; William M. Salter, Chicago; Professor Thomas Davidson, Orange, N. J.; Mrs. Josephine Shaw Lowell, L. D. Brockway, New York; H. N. Hailman, La Porte, Ind.; Edwin D. Mead, Boston; Henry M. Simmons, Minneapolis; Minot J. Savage, Boston; Rabbi E. Hirsch, Chicago; Arthur Hill, Florence, Mass.; Jenkin L. Jones, Chicago; Hon. J. B. Stallo, Cincinnati; Mrs. Elizabeth B. Chace, Providence; John C. Learned, St. Louis; Mrs. Anna Garlin Spencer, Providence; Dr. Duren J. H. Ward, Cambridge; William J. Potter, New Bedford."

The Saturday afternoon session was mainly occupied with the unfinished business of the Convention. Mr. Leo G. Rosenblatt, president of the Young Men's Union of the Society for Ethical Culture of New York, read a paper on "Work of the Young People in the Ethical Societies." After the discussion of this paper the reports of the committees appointed on the previous day were presented.

The Committee on Budget presented the following resolution, which was unanimously adopted:

Resolved, That it is the sense of this Convention that the income of the Union of Societies for Ethical Culture be derived wholly from voluntary contributions from the several Societies."

The Committee on Social Life in the Ethical Societies presented the following report :

"Your Committee respectfully reports that in its opinion the main obstacles heretofore existing for the formation of closer and more intimate relations between our members are temporary and can be removed, first, by bringing the children together in the ethical classes, and the young men and the young women in the Young People's Unions ; "secondly, by encouraging the adult members of the Societies to join in classes for ethical study and associations for charitable and other works of helpfulness.

"We wish to emphasize the value of working together for common interests, as the sure way of cultivating kindly acquaintances and the growth of friendship between members."

The Committee on *The Ethical Record* recommended :

"First. That in each Society a committee be appointed to canvass for subscriptions both inside and outside of the Society.

"Secondly. That persons interested in the ethical movement in cities in which no Society exists should be appointed local agents for the purpose of extending the personal canvass for subscriptions.

"Thirdly. That each Society should appoint one competent person as special correspondent of the *Record*, whose duty it shall be not only to report to the editor all items of general interest pertaining to the Societies, but also to recommend the publication of such lectures and papers as are specially adapted for general distribution.

"Fourthly. That we heartily approve of the form in which, under Miss Porter's competent editorial management, the *Record* has been published, and that a special vote of thanks is due to Miss Porter.

"Fifthly. That the editorial management of the *Record* should hereafter be one of the functions of a general secretary of the Union of Societies, if such secretary be engaged as a salaried officer, otherwise we recommend the appointment of a special editor at a stipulated salary."

The Committee on Conditions of Membership in the Ethical Societies having no report to offer, the Secretary was instructed

to send an abstract of the discussion of the previous day upon the subject to the Secretary of each of the Ethical Societies.

The Committee on offering a prize for an essay on a subject of practical ethics presented the following resolution, which was unanimously adopted:

"Resolved, That, in case contributions to the amount of one thousand dollars be received by the Treasurer of the Union before July 1, the Executive Committee is authorized to advertise this sum for the best essay on some subject of applied ethics, the conditions to be fulfilled by the essayist to be determined and the prize judges selected by the Fraternity of Ethical Lecturers."

The Committee on School of Philosophy and Applied Ethics offered as its report the resolution of the morning conference, given above.

The Executive Committee was instructed to appoint a paid Secretary whenever the funds in the treasury of the Union warranted such appointment, and was given power to fix said Secretary's salary.

The Executive Committee of the Union named for the following year are: Professor Adler, Mr. Henry Friedman, of New York, Dr. C. N. Peirce, of Philadelphia, Mr. William R. Maniere, of Chicago, and Dr. Charles W. Stevens, of St. Louis.

Saturday evening the Philadelphia Society gave a reception to the delegates and invited guests at their rooms, 1630 Arch Street, which were well filled.

Public meetings were held in St. George's Hall on Sunday, the 29th, at 11 A.M. and 8 P.M. In the morning addresses were made by Mr. W. L. Sheldon and Professor Adler on "The Moral Instruction of the Young." In the evening Mr. William M. Salter gave a lecture on "The Ethical Basis of Fellowship," which was followed by short addresses from Mr. William J. Potter, of New Bedford, Mr. John H. Clifford, of Germantown, Mrs. Anna Garlin Spencer, of Providence, and Mr. M. M. Mangasarian, of New York. Mr. S. Burns Weston, Lecturer of the Philadelphia Society, presided at both meetings.

The next Convention of Ethical Societies will take place either in St. Louis or New York.

GENERAL NOTES.

—MISS CHARLOTTE PORTER, the former editor of *Shakespeareiana*, who gave able and faithful service to the editorial management of *The Ethical Record* during the past year, began in January, in company with Miss Helen A. Clarke, the publication of a new periodical, *Poet-lore*, a monthly magazine devoted to Shakespeare, Browning, and the comparative study of literature. Miss Clarke contributes an able article to the March number on "'Paracelsus' and 'The Data of Ethics.'" This attractive-looking magazine is issued from the same press as *The Ethical Record* (J. B. Lippincott Co.).

—THE WORKINGMEN'S SELF-CULTURE CLUB, inaugurated by the Ethical Society of St. Louis, has begun a series of Sunday afternoon lectures, as a means of bringing the Club before the workingmen of the city. An admission-fee of ten cents is charged. The first lecture, held at the Grand Opera House, Sunday afternoon, February 24, was attended by about one thousand people. The boxes were occupied by some of the most prominent citizens of St. Louis. The lecturer was Mr. W. L. Sheldon, and his subject, "Travels in Europe."

—PROFESSOR H. H. BOYESEN says, in an article on "The School Question in New York," in the *Christian Union* of February 7: "Where, for instance, is a school to be found in New York City so roomy, so bright and attractive, so complete in its sanitary appointments, as Professor Felix Adler's School for the Children of Workingmen, in West Fifty-fourth Street? For three years I have looked in vain for a school uniting so many advantages, where I might send my own children; and a number of my friends who have engaged in the same search have been equally unsuccessful."

—THE NEW IDEAL, a monthly journal of constructive liberal thought and applied ethics, promises well, judging by

the three numbers already issued, to fill the place once occupied by the *Index*. "The object of *The New Ideal* is the discovery and propagation of constructive liberal thought and the application of modern ethical ideals to the increasing problems of human need." Among the list of contributors are the names of Francis E. Abbot, Ph.D., William J. Potter, and O. B. Frothingham. These names ought to secure for *The New Ideal* a large subscription-list. The subscription price is but one dollar a year. It is published at 620 Atlantic Ave., Boston.

—THE CHRISTIAN REGISTER of January 31 contained an interesting symposium on the important question, "Can Morality be taught without Sectarianism in our Public Schools?" Thirty-four letters from eminent educators and clergymen were printed in reply. Most of the writers thought it possible to teach morality in the public schools without trenching on sectarian grounds; but it is noticeable that some of them included in such teaching doctrines which many in our time would regard as sectarian. The discussion was ably reviewed by Dr. William T. Harris in the *Register* of February 7. His statement that "the separation of Church and State involved the separation of Church and the public school," is endorsed by the *Christian Register*.

—UNITY, whose motto is "Freedom, Fellowship, and Character in Religion," has just entered (the 1st of March) upon its eleventh year in an enlarged form. "Unity does not exist for the *Unitarian cause*, but for the cause of human freedom, truth, and righteousness." It is "suspicious of sectarian tendencies and dogmatic exclusiveness. . . . It is in search of the unities of universal religion that reaches from the Catholic Church to the Ethical Culture Society, that includes the perennial elements in Christendom, Judaism, and all other forms and names that have purified, sweetened, and ennobled life." The above is to be counted among the good signs of the times.

—WE had hoped to publish in this number of the *Record* Professor Adler's admirable address before the Philadelphia

Convention on "The Moral Instruction of the Young," but owing to the large amount of space we give to matter pertaining to the school project, its publication has to be deferred until our next number. During Professor Adler's recent Western trip he gave this address to large audiences in Congregational churches in Milwaukee and Indianapolis. We also have for publication in our next issue an important paper by Arthur W. Hutton, member of the South Place Ethical Society of London, on "Hymns and Music at Ethical Meetings."

MR. SALTER'S NEW BOOK, "ETHICAL RELIGION."

THE extended notice that Mr. Salter's lectures have received abroad, through their German and Dutch translations, under the titles *Die Religion der Moral* and *Zedelijke Religie*, has created a demand in this country, without as well as within the lines of the Ethical Movement, for the publication of a volume of them. The many friends and admirers of Mr. Salter will be glad to know that such a volume is now in the press of Roberts Brothers, Boston, and is promised soon to appear, under the title *Ethical Religion*. The book will consist of most of the lectures that have appeared in the foreign translations, with some additional ones. We predict that the Ethical Movement will win many warm friends through the publication of this volume.

In a letter on "Literary Topics in Boston" in the February number of *The Book-Buyer*, Arlo Bates writes as follows:

"An important volume—of which I should have liked to read Mr. Wasson's review—is to appear in February. It is the *Ethical Religion* of William Mackintire Salter, and it seems to me to be one of the most striking and persuasive presentations of the gospel of pure ethics which our time is likely to see. Its key-note is sounded in its opening sentences: 'The moral nature is that by which we transcend ourselves and enter into an ideal region. . . . Ethics is essentially the thought of what ought to be.' If the world can be persuaded to concern itself with the discussion of moral problems in any other form than in the guise of fiction, this work ought to attract wide attention."

We reprint below some of the many appreciative notices that the foreign translations of Mr. Salter's book have called forth.

The Dial (Chicago), March, 1886:

"The familiar saying about the prophet and his own country is freshly illustrated by Mr. William M. Salter, of the Chicago Society for Ethical Culture, whose works might be called for in vain at most American bookstores, and which are yet translated into German, and in Germany everywhere, as Mr. Edwin D. Mead writes, exposed for sale. . . . We, for our part, will say that the compliment done Mr. Salter in the recognition of his earnest and thoughtful work is richly deserved."

The American (Philadelphia), February 27, 1886:

"He [Mr. Salter] is a man of eloquence and earnestness, as these discourses show, and their translation into German evinces their power to commend themselves to a much wider constituency than that to which they were first addressed."

Rev. Dr. F. L. Patton, in the *Presbyterian Review*, April, 1886:

"There is not a little to commend in this volume. It inculcates a lofty morality, and is far above the level of the utilitarian and evolutionary moralists."

Vossische Zeitung (Berlin), October 14, 1885:

"The book furnishes new and beautiful proof that not only dollars but ideas are powerful in America."

Litterarischer Merkur (July 31, 1885):

"Here we see the spirit of radicalism in its noblest and most complete form, —a pressing forward, a striving for reform, but in the sense of an inner renewal and regeneration, and under the guidance of comprehensive moral ideas, which become practically articles of faith and religion."

Doctor Paul Barth, in *Deutsche Worte* (April, 1886):

"Despite certain failings it is for popular uses the best book on morality that exists."

Ein Veteraner, in appendix to *Fünf Gelegenheitsreden* (Königsberg, 1886):

"It is a truly edifying book, not in the ordinary sense of edification, which it must be confessed is often worse in liberalism than in orthodoxy, but a steel-bath for manly souls (*ein Stahlbad für Männerseelen*)."

Professor Harold Höffding, of the University of Copenhagen, in letter to Professor von Gizycki :

"I am particularly obliged to you for Salter's book. Please say to him that I feel that I have gained theoretically as well as practically from reading it. What a noble and pure spirit breathes through the whole! I have derived a fresh confidence in the power of a philosophy of life based on free investigation."

Professor Fr. Jodl, of the University of Prague, in *Deutsche Literaturzeitung* (November 7, 1885):

"It should put us to shame that this book is written by a foreigner,—an American, and comes to German readers only as a translation. The thoughts of the writer are not new to German science, but no one has hitherto succeeded in speaking them out so perfectly, so clearly, and so eloquently."

In the *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Philosophische Kritik* (*Beigabeheft des 89 sten Bandes*, 1886) Professor Jodl says, at the conclusion of an extended review:

"To a book like Strauss's *Old and New Faith* is *Die Religion der Moral* for these reasons infinitely superior, as well with respect to its scientific foundation as to its practical influence; and I cannot omit to recommend Salter's book to the most earnest attention of all those who feel the need of replacing the unhappy dualism between the religious and the scientific stand-points with a comprehensive ideal view."

Notices of Mr. Salter's book have appeared in *Mind* (London), October, 1885; *Romanula* (Roumania), June 18, 1886; *Europa*, No. 33, 1885.

More extended reviews have appeared in *Evangelisch-Kirchlicher Anzeiger* (Berlin), September 18 and October 2, 1885; *Wissenschaftliche Beilage der Leipziger Zeitung*, No. 60, 1885; *Breslauer Zeitung*, November 14, 1885; *La Filosofia delle Scuole Italiane* diretta dal Prof. L. Ferri, Roma, Vol. 32, No. 2; Professor C. Schaarschmidt, in *Philosophische Monatshefte*, XXIII. Band, Hefte 9, 10, 1887; *Revue Philosophique*, dirigée par Th. Ribot, December, 1888; *Moderne Versuche eines Religionsersatzes*, von Dr. H. Druskowitz, Heidelberg, 1885 (chap. ix.); Professor A. Kuenen, in *De Herforming* (Amsterdam), 29 September and 6 October, 1888.

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Art. II. Sec. 1 of the Constitution of the Ethical Union reads:

"The general aim of the Ethical Movement, as represented by this Union, is to elevate the moral life of its members and that of the community, and it cordially welcomes to its fellowship all persons who sympathize with this aim, whatever may be their theological or philosophical opinions."

All persons in sympathy with the general aim of the Ethical Movement as expressed above are cordially invited to become members of the Union of Societies for Ethical Culture. Application blanks may be obtained by writing to the Secretary.

To each person received into the Union will be sent a blank for contribution to its funds. Those who contribute annually will receive **THE ETHICAL RECORD**, if they are not subscribers, and, hereafter, all the lectures published during the year by the different Ethical Societies.

By a provision of the Constitution of the Union, two-thirds of the money received from annual contributions will be set aside as a fund to be devoted to the training of Ethical teachers.

Application for membership should be made to the Secretary of the Union.

Address

S. BURNS WESTON, Secretary,

405 North Thirty-third Street, Philadelphia, Pa.

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THE ETHICAL RECORD.

JULY, 1889.

COUNT TOLSTOI FROM AN ETHICAL STAND- POINT.*

BY W. L. SHELDON.

COUNT Tolstoi's name is becoming a household word in our country. Almost everybody has heard something about him. Quite a number, indeed, have not only been led to read his writings, but, what is rare in such cases, they have been very much influenced by them in the direction of their thoughts. Nowadays we do our reading often merely with the purpose of acquainting ourselves with the ideas of a writer; we think it essential that we should know what the world is talking about; but we scarcely ever pause to reflect on the teachings or to ask ourselves whether we have learned anything from them. But it sometimes happens, in spite of ourselves, that, after perusing a book, we lay it down with a sense that somehow we have experienced a change of feeling from reading it; we are never quite the same person afterwards that we were before we had taken up the book. This has been especially the case with those who have begun to read the works of this writer.

My interest in him is not so much in the artist or man of letters, as it is in the social and religious reformer. His work in this direction, even because of its influence, if for

* Address before the Society for Ethical Culture of St. Louis.

no other reason, calls for our most careful consideration. It is not the men who repeat history, but those who alter it, whose career we need to most carefully observe. Whether his teachings will be accepted or rejected, it is quite certain that the degree of their influence will place his name on the list of the most conspicuous reformers of our century. This influence is all the more remarkable from the circumstance that his writings are not at all of the kind that we would regard as sensational. Nevertheless he is being read by almost every one; and it is now regarded as a want of culture or an indication of provincialism if a person is unacquainted with some of his writings. He has even become so popular that you will find his books along with the odd miscellaneous collection of literature that men pick from at the railway stations. There you will find on the same shelf, perhaps, "Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde," "Huxley's Half Century of Science," the sensational novel "Mr. Barnes of New York," and probably, in a conspicuous corner, Tolstoi's "My Religion." In fact at the present day we even begin to hear allusions to a "Tolstoi-ism."

He is still at present a great living writer. He is now only sixty years of age, and there is therefore still another decade in which his genius can develop. He is a nobleman of Russia, and was born in 1828. His life has been for the most part a literary one. He has mingled with all classes of Russian society; he knows the court, the life of St. Petersburg, the army; and he knows equally well the details of the vast peasant life of Russia. He is now living in strict consonance with his own teachings,—an exceptional circumstance in the lives of social reformers. In the last century there was an instance of the popularity of a writer who advocated in many respects quite similar views; but, unhappily, that man's own career was a painful and grotesque contradiction to his own high teachings; and there is always mingled in our respect for him a certain degree of contempt. We refer, of course, to Jean Jacques Rousseau.

As a reformer within the great organization of the Church of Christendom, Tolstoi represents a tendency now rapidly

gaining ground everywhere,—of seeking to revert to pristine and primitive Christianity.

When his volume entitled "My Religion" first fell into my hands it was like a revelation to me. We have all had that vague sense of incongruity in our minds between what we learn in Sunday-school or the Bible and what we have commonly known and met elsewhere in the world as Christianity. We have grown up as children with a kind of awe for the clergy, and yet never for the life of us could understand or make it satisfactory, why those men did not do as we learned in the Sunday-school a true Christian would do,—that is to say, when one cheek was smitten, why did they not offer the other? We observed that these men in their practical life seemed to carry on their affairs like the rest of the world. And still we had to call them "Christian." This volume called "My Religion" laid bare to me in all its plainness the glaring inconsistency. I arose from the perusal with the feeling,—now for the first time I know the meaning of historic Christianity.

Tolstoi more than any other writer has truly exhumed primitive Christianity; but in doing so he has undoubtedly begun to dig the grave of the great religious organization of Christendom. This work would have been scarcely possible in the West, in England or America. Unlike the Russians, we would have had standing between the historic fact and ourselves, an immense body of documents, great systems of theology. We should have had to grope our way in dismay and perplexity through volumes of intricate metaphysics. It is practically impossible for us in the West to take up a single line of the Christian Scripture and read it, without having a multitude of associations cluster around it and make it impossible for us to read the words at first sight in their original meaning. Tolstoi in Russia, burdened less with all that multitude of sects and sectarian theology, was better able to go back and read the words of the early manuscripts precisely as they stood. He did nothing but exhume in its original condition the "Sermon on the Mount;" but it is a very different kind of document from those we ordinarily have in mind

through the interpolations and interpretations, the adjustments and circumlocutions by which it has been made to fit into our modern views of life, and still continue to be the "Sermon on the Mount."

A single instance of what he did in this direction will suffice. He took up the familiar text, "Thou shalt not be angry with thy brother without cause." The words, *without cause*, troubled him; they seemed to be inconsistent with the spirit of the whole sermon. He went back to the earliest manuscripts, and found that these words were not there, but had been a probable interpolation. And as a matter of fact, in our Revised Version those words have been taken out of the text and transferred to the margin. For my own part, therefore, I can say, after reading Tolstoi, that for the first time I felt with pleasure and delight that I was actually reading the veritable Bible. With the single exception of his view that Jesus did not teach personal immortality, I am satisfied that in his book "My Religion" he has truly rediscovered pristine and primitive Christianity.

This rediscovery, from a historic stand-point, is simply of consequence with reference to the existence of the Church. And it does seem as if he had brought consistent believers to the horns of the dilemma, in a necessary choice between the Church on the one hand, and on the other, historic Christianity. His charge of inconsistency is the most severe, perhaps, to be found from any living writer.

"The Church confesses the doctrine of Jesus in theory, but denies it in practice. Instead of guiding the life of the world, the Church, through affection for the world, expounds the metaphysical doctrine of Jesus in such a way as not to derive from it any obligations as to the conduct of life, and any necessity for men to live differently from the way in which they have been living. The Church has surrendered to the world, and simply follows in the train of its victor. The world does as it pleases, and leaves to the Church the task of justifying its actions with explanations as to the meaning of life. The world organizes an existence in absolute opposition to the doctrine of Jesus, and the Church endeavors to demonstrate that men who live contrary to the doctrine of Jesus really live in accordance with that doctrine. The final result is that the world lives a worse than pagan existence, and the Church not only approves, but maintains that that existence is in exact conformity to the doctrine of Jesus."

Tolstoi, however, stands for a much more practical and

vital question to every living person. The issue for us is, not whether the Church is or is not consistent: that is a matter of history, and concerns those only who are committed to its membership. The vital question is just this: Has this great writer rediscovered the fundamental moral principle of life? He claims that he has done so, and that with this rediscovery he has the panacea for all the social ills and for all the woe and sorrow and mistakes of the world. All his teaching is crystallized in the revival of the one doctrine of *non-resistance of force*, which he claims to be, and which probably is, the root and principle of the Sermon on the Mount. It is the doctrine of universal self-sacrifice, complete self-abnegation, the total surrender of the individual with all his comforts and luxuries, in the cause of the welfare of society. "Do this and thou shalt live," would be his saying. It is not mere self-sacrifice, but rather the *completeness* of it, which makes the conspicuous feature of his ethical thought.

We come back to the original query, What is it that gives this man so peculiar an influence and so powerful a hold on so many living people? Surely no person at first sight is going to be drawn to this teaching. This anomaly is all the more manifest when we stop to think of the class of persons who have been most influenced by Tolstoi and his religion. We are, as a rule, disposed to think of the illiterate, the uneducated, as constituting the restless and unsatisfied class. It is to them, indeed, that all reformers are mostly inclined to turn, because all reform begins with dissatisfaction. But now, on the contrary, this writer's influence has been mainly upon the more intelligent, upon the leisure class, upon the people who read, upon the men and women who can afford the luxuries of life. "My Religion" and "My Confession" will be, perhaps, less often found in the hands of the poor than in the boudoir, the private parlors, and on the elegant library-tables of the rich. The reason for this circumstance is certainly not on the surface.

This much, however, is certain. People of refined sensibilities, who desire to preserve their internal complacency and composure, would do well to let this writer alone. Conscien-

tious persons, individuals of extreme moral sensibility, men with high-strung feelings of human sympathy, are made uneasy and restless in reading the words of Tolstoi. Few of these persons would be able to account for the fact, or to say just what was the cause of this feeling of inner disturbance; but, after reading his words, they find they cannot go back again and take up the thread of life just where they left it before. There is a troublesome jar of which they are ever conscious, although the cause of this jar may be so subtle as to be for them indefinable.

No doubt many a woman, after she has been perusing a volume of this writer, when she takes up her jewels or holds in her hands the delicate lace with its exquisite workmanship, every inch of which stands for hours if not days of human labor,—many a woman then, for the first time, takes these articles in her hands with a sense of reluctance and discomfort; she does not find that satisfaction in them that she once did; it is as though, while the eyes are resting on these objects of beauty, a new undercurrent of pain has arisen, a pain which she is not able to define nor to stifle. Many a man, too, after having read one of these books, when he seats himself at the family table, supplied with the costly viands of meat and drink that may have come from all quarters of the world, will have a like sense of uneasiness. A restless something stirs within him, and takes away a little of the pleasure that he once could feel at the family table. The pain in the world has, to a certain extent, set him, too, a little ajar, though for him likewise the cause of it is still largely indefinable. The most that we can say is, that these writings somehow set us a little at discord with ourselves, and tend to lessen our former pleasure in the luxuries of life. No doubt this sense of discomfort may vanish away in the majority of those persons who do not have sensitive consciences nor strong human sympathies; but, on the other hand, it clings tenaciously in the minds of others, and will not let them go. And it is among these others that we shall have to look for the disciples of Count Tolstoi.

The practical question brought home to us by this writer

is just this. At no time in history has there been such a glaring contrast between extreme poverty, on the one hand, and, on the other, such lavish display of superfluous wealth. At no time in earlier ages has there been such a universally-recognized code of selfishness, so widely-adopted a system of pure individualism. The result of it is to make our age illustrious for its moral monstrosities. It therefore becomes a plain, practical, home question to individuals of delicate feelings and fine moral sentiment, who may happen to be provided with the comforts and luxuries of life, whether they should not give them up altogether, whether they should not surrender them completely to those who have nothing, and thereby at least be true to their sense of human fellowship. It is a natural question : What right have we to joy when the great majority of the world is in pain? Blunt, callous minds will not be troubled with this query ; refined moral natures, however, will never escape it. In the face of the evils that have come from the prevalence of individualism and selfishness, would not the true system be to revert in reaction to complete self-surrender, total self-abnegation, to have no self at all? Under those circumstances we should not have the sense of jar from having for ourselves the means of enjoyment, while others are in pain for the want of such possession. We should be in no peril from the selfishness of individual life, because that life would be completely merged in the life of human society.

This question is pressing home to multitudes of individuals at the present day. Tolstoi naturally pushes in the probing-knife still deeper for such persons as are committed to Christianity when he points out to them that this would alone be honestly *Christian*. But for all men alike it is a practical issue, whether the present system of the world will not harden us into unfeeling selfishness, dry up the well-springs of the finer sentiments, and destroy the very capacity for the higher pleasures. If that be the result, then manifestly the lesson of this great writer has a meaning, and there is a practical suggestion to be found from the teachings of Count Tolstoi.

It is generally looked upon as suspicious and showing a

proper want of intellectual sagacity, to lean towards the views of this writer, to be afflicted with what is known as "Tolstoisism." For my own part, I cannot but think that men should be ashamed of any sense of shame for their own moral feelings. It is frequently said, as a kind of stigma, that men have been "influenced" by this or that moral or religious teacher. It is frequently assumed that a strong mind will not be under the control of any man's ideas, and so it is naturally asserted that if a man leans towards these particular views he has been, to a certain degree, intellectually unbalanced, inasmuch as he has allowed himself to be influenced by this particular man.

But there is one distinction never to be forgotten. In the sphere of morals and religion the word influence means something else than within the sphere of natural science. We are able in matters of scientific opinion to take facts or statements on the authority of another, provided we have a firm reliance on the judgment of that individual. Millions of money, for example, are expended in mining engineering; and the final returns may depend wholly on the mathematical calculations of one or, at most, two engineers. But when it comes to the matter of ethics or religion, all this is changed. Men will not stake life issues on the views of another. We may appoint as many committees as we please to make the investigation and find for us the normal rule of life; but when it comes to the actual acceptance of what these persons have to offer, it is then quite another matter. We insist on testing that rule by our own experience. We may seem to be making a very sweeping assertion in what we say, yet we say it with the most cautious circumspection,—the world does not accept or reject its life-rules, its moral systems, on external authority. The thunders of Mount Sinai might have gone on pealing from the first hour they were heard by the Hebrew people, thirty centuries ago, down to the moment of the last speculation on the Stock Exchange in Wall Street, yet that Decalogue would have been forgotten ages ago, if it had not been found to have had something practical for human experience in the social relations.

Religious systems and ethical codes are born and not made. If men at one time accepted Judaism or Buddhism as their life gospel, it was because at that age that gospel most perfectly fitted their needs and was best adapted to the personal requirements or experiences. It was precisely the same when the world accepted Christianity; and it will be the same with whatever teaching the future of human history will adopt. You cannot force moral ideas on the feelings of another. For that reason, if men at the present day sympathize with this great writer that we are studying, it is because they have found something that fits into their natures in the words of Count Tolstoi.

At the same time there is also this other anomaly, that while a multitude approve of what this writer says, and are stirred by him to the depths; while they feel that the life gospel is actually there; nevertheless these persons do not undertake to live up to it; at the most they make of it only a partial experiment. In spite of the multitude of his avowed disciples, so far as I know, Tolstoi himself is the only man who is carrying out his own life teachings. It is said that this is not a just argument against their practicability. Men say: "We are creatures of habit; we think this would be the true doctrine of life, and yet our habits are so fixed upon us that we do not apply it; we offer this not as an excuse, but as an explanation." Nevertheless it strikes me that this is not a fair statement. The essential feature of the right system of ethics would be, that it should be able to alter our habits and change us from creatures of habit into creatures of principle. For this reason, unless these ideas of Tolstoi not only find believers but followers, it will point out an inherent defect in the man's theories, and so, perhaps, an inherent defect in the antique moral code of universal self-abnegation. Perhaps the Church at the present day is right in its efforts to adjust itself to modern circumstances, but it is defeated in its purpose mainly by trying to call itself historic Christianity. As a result of this effort we have neither the ethics of Jesus on the one hand, nor, on the other, a practical system of ethics for the world as it is to-day. As a result, therefore, there is the

paradox of some of the best moral and religious spirit of the present day working entirely apart from the Church.

Through Tolstoi we see the full significance of pure self-sacrifice when taken all by itself as the supreme lesson of human life. It is strictly the outcome of the ethics of Jesus, and is merely an adherence to his command, "when a man strikes you on the one cheek to offer the other also." Men may threaten him, he will not resist; men may rob him, he will not seek for legal retribution; men may offer to slay his friends or to slay himself, he will not raise the axe in self-defence to slay the would-be murderer. He will not go to war; he will not sit on juries; he will not take an oath; but with the life that is left him he will labor for the happiness and welfare of others. This may seem very strange and erratic; but let us not cheat ourselves in our complacent satisfaction with the world as it is, by calling him insane, or finding some other idle adjective that may hide our own selfishness. He may be wrong in his conclusions; there may be error in the way he has made his inferences, in the manner he has used the dissecting-knife; but the error is the error of a colossal intellect, of a true heart, of a mighty genius.

That is the true pathway towards perfect character for an individual, which shall put him the most at peace with himself, and stimulate him to do the greatest amount of work for the world. Now, what I would say is this, although it may seem contrary to the prevailing opinion: there is but one goal of moral character, but there are various pathways by which to get there. Do not under any circumstances understand me to mean by this, that what may be wrong for one individual would be right for another. There can be but one right and one wrong; but, nevertheless, one virtue may need to prevail in one and another virtue to predominate in another, according to the nature of the individual and according to his circumstances, if they are to keep in mind the final goal of perfect character. For some persons we might need to emphasize supremely the need of constant and perpetual self-sacrifice; for others, on the contrary, who may have that virtue to a high degree, it might even be necessary to en-

courage a certain amount of self-assertion. Of some it is required, from the circumstances of their situation, that life should be a constant giving up. Of others, from another set of circumstances, it may be required that their life should be a constant display of action and determination to effect changes in the world. All that we mean by this, therefore, is that a particular stress is to be laid on certain virtues, according to the nature of the person and the circumstances of his life. For example, the gospel of self-sacrifice as taught in its supreme form by Count Tolstoi, might be, from the circumstances by which he is surrounded, the best method by which he might achieve that peace with himself, and have that stimulus and guidance by which to do the greatest amount of good for society. Yet this same gospel in its extreme form might be ruinous for western civilization.

We must remember where he is and how he is placed. He resides under the despotism of the Czar of Russia. He cannot alter the social system by teaching, by preaching, by advocating a change of laws, by working for new institutions, by urging better enactments of the legislature. He cannot do this, for the simple reason that it is the Czar alone who can make this change. He stands there in his solitude chained like a Titan Prometheus. What can he do? The gospel which he has evolved is precisely the one which fits his requirements, which, as we have said, has at last brought him to be at peace with himself and given him the best methods by which to influence his fellow-men. There could be for him no other gospel than that of self-resignation, because resignation is a necessity for him. There could be no means with him for altering society and its institutions; nothing was left for him but individual effort, as nothing would be left for all Russian society. He has undoubtedly taken the very best method to purify and elevate the hearts and lives of the Russian people. There is no use in that country in trying to rise above the level of the crowd; for there swings there always the sword of Damocles, to cut off the head of the ambitious one.

What we are saying could perhaps best be given in the

form of an illustration. You have perhaps often, like myself, stood with interest and wonder before the cage of an African lion. We see him go pacing up and down, down and up, up and down; as soon as he reaches one end of the cage he wheels around and moves on to the other end; he seems everlastingly trying to get out. I have stood at times with a kind of fascination watching the beast, and have found myself muttering to him under my breath: "Fool! why don't you be quiet? What do you go up and down pacing before these bars for, chafing under the fancy that if you only walk up and down often enough, you can perhaps, after all, get out? Why not pacify yourself, and lie down and rest?" And still the tawny beast, in spite of all my mutterings, keeps up his endless endeavor to find an opening where he can break through. Now, if the African lion could only reason and had moral will, the gospel of Tolstoi would be just the thing he would require; his defiance and restlessness would be subdued, a calm peace would settle down over those fiery passions, he would simply adjust himself to the inevitable lesson, "Thou shalt submit." A vast number of human beings, millions on millions indeed, are in the condition of these caged lions; strong natures under all conditions feel themselves precisely in this situation, in so far as they are under this law of the inevitable; for them all this gospel would come like the balm of peace to weary souls. The great Orient has been to a large degree for ages in this situation. The iron hand of despotism has been to them like the bars before the cage of the African lion.

But for us in the Western World it is another and a different question. Perhaps this gospel, instead of bringing us into peace with ourselves, would merely wrap us in a moral slumber; perhaps it would remove the stepping-stones by which human society is to advance towards its own amelioration.

Men and women have been accustomed to enjoy the luxuries of life as an end and purpose in themselves. It is this fact which accounts for the restless feeling of dissatisfaction on the part of refined natures. It is and must be a wrong to sit with complacent ease in the enjoyment of the comforts and

luxuries of life as though the world were now at its millennium. But, on the other hand, if these luxuries and comforts are regarded as the means rather than the end, then the whole matter assumes a very different aspect. *The refinements without serve as a stepping-stone for the refinements within.* Civilization, though it scoff at silks and velvets, laces and broad-cloth, jewels and bric-a-brac, must nevertheless acknowledge that they bring about a refinement in the world which is not to be found in the backwoods of a section of India, where it is said the moral code is quite strictly adhered to, but where, nevertheless, in all other respects the people are at an inferior stage of development. We want a refined human nature, a progressive human nature, fully as much as we need a human nature that shall obey the Ten Commandments. The colossal selfishness and the colossal individualism has come, it seems to me, simply from not having learned the actual value and purpose of the refinements of material prosperity. We have invented or discovered or manufactured the articles of comfort and luxury in our great cities too fast and on too great a scale, for us to be able to know how to make the best use of them. The modern world has not learned how to live up to its new furniture. The result is inevitable,—we forget that all this can only be the means for the elevation of the world, and we settle down to the mere physical satisfaction of our luxurious surroundings and possessions. It is not that we need less of the works of art, of beauty, and of luxury in the world; but that with heart, energy, and enthusiasm we will find the proper use for them, and put them to that use at once and forever.

This error on the part of modern society accounts for the secret of the influence of the teachings of Tolstoi, and the fact that this influence should be especially noticeable among people who lead the conventional life of the world. What he has been able to do is to bring forward for general acceptance the disclosures as to the meaninglessness of conventional life. He makes it plain how much we are losing by this delight in the mere externals of civilization. When will you ever penetrate beneath the crust, the thin stratum of conventionalism?—that

is his perpetual query. When will you find the undercurrent of human existence, the deeper feelings which alone give worth to human life? No wonder in reaction men will be disposed to say, We will have done with this altogether; we will give up our great cities, our beautiful homes, our large establishments; we will revert to the simplicity where at least we will be living a genuine, even though it be a restricted, life.

By our conventional life, by losing ourselves in the mere delight of external forms and luxuries, we rob ourselves of the joys and privileges of social intercourse; we destroy the pleasure of a larger fellow-feeling, we deprive ourselves of the benefits and enjoyments that would come as the fruits of our own efforts. In a word, we do not get what we are striving for; we toil for happiness, and then perish with a sense of *ennui*. His picture of the failure of our civilization to get what it is after is something never to be forgotten. The desperate efforts on the part of people to be happy, and the ludicrous or melancholy failure, is what he brings out so distinctly. The supreme pleasure of life, according to him, comes from the social relations, from the delight of human fellowship; yet, as he points out, the higher we advance in our civilization, the more and more strained become these relations, the less and less do we have of this human feeling, the greater and greater becomes the *ennui* of human existence. As he says:

"Education consists of those forms and acquirements which are calculated to separate a man from his fellows. . . .

"To-day cleanliness consists in changing your shirt once a day; to-morrow, in changing it twice a day. To-day it means washing the face and neck and hands daily; to-morrow, the feet; and day after to-morrow, washing the whole body every day, and, in addition and in particular, a rubbing down. To-day the table-cloth is to serve for two days, to-morrow there must be one each day, and then two a day. To-day the footman's hands must be clean; to-morrow he must wear gloves, and in his clean gloves he must present a letter on a clean salver. And there are no limits to this cleanliness, which is useless to everybody and objectless, except for the purpose of separating one's self from others, and of rendering impossible all intercourse with them, when this cleanliness is attained by the labors of others."

Remember, it is no erratic man that teaches this; it is a man who knows the whole diapason of human feeling, who

is familiar with all the conditions of human society, from the peasant in the hut to the Czar on his throne. Now, what is the root of all this? According to Tolstoi, the answer is precisely the answer that was given by Saint Paul: Money is the root of all evil,—that is to say, the supreme source of human pleasure that comes from the instinct of human fellowship is defeated by the accumulative instinct. In his opinion, our great cities are our failures. There is not a doubt that in his appeal his words have struck home. He has made apparent the defects to be observed in our age from the abnormal development of individualism. He shows with perfect clearness that the soul of a man possessing millions may be as empty of pleasure, and often more empty, than the soul of a peasant who does not know where he is going to get the bread for his mouth on the morrow. What he has said is true; fellow-feeling between class and class, between man and man, is on the wane and in danger of becoming extinct. More than that, it is equally apparent that the higher we advance from grade to grade, from stratum to stratum of society, the less this fellow-feeling exists. The loneliest man on the face of the earth is the man possessing the greatest wealth or the greatest power on the face of the earth. Tolstoi could well smile at the ambition of the peasant to occupy the position of the Czar, for he knows the condition of the mind in both of them.

What, then, are we to do? Tolstoi has the one distinct and clear-cut answer: Level the distinctions at once, completely and forever; have done with all superfluous wealth; put away the superfluous social forms that make the soul of man as arid as an Arabian desert and as empty of life as an extinct volcanic crater. He says plainly he knows what he is going to do: he is going to abandon the city and give up his wealth; he is going to leave the social stratum to which he belongs by birth and education; he proposes to return to the country and go back to the life of the peasant, to live with that class, to do their kind of work, and he is satisfied that it is what all the rest of the world should do. In one terse sentence he sums it all up: "Only when I possess nothing

will I be in a position to do the least particle of good." Wealth has defeated its own end, according to him. The inference from that is, in his opinion, that wealth is superfluous. The thing to be done at once for himself and the world is to be rid of the superfluous, to have no more wealth and no more cities.

We may for a moment in our reaction become enamoured of complete self-abnegation and sacrifice. We may at first feel called upon to make a total surrender of ourselves and all our possessions. We may think that a wise method to adopt would be to carry out the suggestions of Tolstoi,—to give up our cities, our homes, our comforts, and refinements; in a word, to revert to the life of the people in the country. We might by that means once more have a reign of simplicity; but we might at the same time lose that inner refinement that has been developing in the course of ages through the influence of exterior civilization.

There has always been a disposition on the part of many to glory in the principle of self-sacrifice. The instinct is high and good; nevertheless, when followed to an extreme as an exclusive principle of life, it proves a failure. This virtue is not the end of high character, but the means towards high character. We might be in as grave error as before, by transposing and confusing the pathway with the goal. Self-sacrifice for its own sake is blind fanaticism; self-sacrifice, when it consists of a surrender of our lower personal ambitions to a larger moral or race purpose, is the sublimity of heroism. The great moral problem is not how to do away with the passions, how to rid men of the care for luxuries, how to abandon or destroy all class distinctions; but, on the contrary, to find the principles which ought to govern and regulate all these concerns. When is war legitimate? When is it proper for a man to display anger? Under what conditions may we resist injustice? When and where is the place for silks, broadcloths, and jewels? What should be the basis of class distinctions?

Class distinctions? Yes, we want them, and we know that they will always exist. Tolstoi is wrong in expecting to do

away with them; but he is essentially right when he shows the error of society in the criterion by which they make these class distinctions. The refinements of external life? Yes, we need them, but we want that they should be so utilized as to develop the refinements of internal life. We have to keep in mind that all these external objects of luxury are the means to a larger end; namely, the subjective, inner development of the world. If jewels were to be worn, not for the sake of display, but because they were objects of beauty and because we love the beautiful, they would then serve a high purpose. We would not be made selfish by possessing them, because we would have the same or even greater pleasure, from our love of the beautiful, in seeing them on others. What is true of jewels is equally true of other wealth. As soon as we fix the goal or end which all these exterior elements of civilization are to serve, as soon as we direct human attention to this goal of inward refinement, so soon we shall be able to rectify the mistakes of selfishness and individualism, so soon we shall be able to remove these moral monstrosities, so soon we shall be able to break down the glaring contrast between extreme poverty, on the one hand, and, on the other, the lavish display of superfluous wealth.

Now, in conclusion, let me revert to my figure of the African lion. Suppose for a moment that, after he had ceased his constant chafing and lain down, the gates were thrown open and the doors of his cage were to fall away, what then would we say if we could speak in the language of the tawny beast? Would we still urge him to calm himself, to be quiet, to lie still and cease chafing, to hold in the tempest of passions and ambitions? Would we go on in an endless monotone, "You must submit?" Every man and woman of us would, on the contrary, cry out: "Up and go! the gates are down, the doors have fallen; make, with all the energy you have, to the forests where you belong; live out the life that is within you!"

This, it seems to me, is the case of the world to-day. Our Western civilization has found the doors of European despotism fallen. The gates are open, the world that seemed

shut out is there before us ; the spirit that appeared dormant has only been slumbering. I think we will say with one voice, as we said to the lion in the cage : "Up, ye race of men, and go, the world is before you, the life to which you were born is now at your command ; live, work, and build a new and larger civilization. Let the passions and the ambitions, let the comforts and the luxuries of the world, be the means by which the great end will be accomplished, and a new and mighty edifice of social order rise in vast and ideal proportions."

In conclusion, now that we have dissected Tolstoi, and endeavored to show where he was strictly a student and therefore a discoverer for the world, and then where, on the contrary, he was influenced by the conditions under which he lived ; let me mention to you another writer equally great, equally eminent, and sure to go down as one of the most conspicuous reformers of our century. This writer has been able just as truly as Tolstoi to indicate the defects in the internal structure of society ; to show the wastes of conventionalism. He has done just as much to develop the buried life and to call it back into existence ; but, unlike Tolstoi, he is the product of our own free life and free civilization. When he teaches the gospel of submission, it is a submission with a meaning and a purpose in it. He is strong in the sense of a larger life in America. Instead of the lesson of despair or self-sacrifice as a virtue for its own sake, we have the tone and spirit of buoyant hope, of aspiration for the coming future. You may study Tolstoi for the sake of scrutinizing the social and moral conditions of Russia ; but in so far as he can teach you anything as to the rules by which you are to develop the pathway of life, this other writer can teach you just as much and a great deal more, because he has lived and worked and developed under the same conditions with you. Turning away from Count Tolstoi and his religion, therefore, we would look rather to our own greatest moral and religious reformer, Ralph Waldo Emerson.

THE MORAL INSTRUCTION OF THE YOUNG.*

BY FELIX ADLER, PH.D.

MORAL instruction is an attempt to reach the will through the intellect. It is of course only one of the means of developing character. Among the latter may be mentioned: the silent force of example; the secret influence of heredity; the effect of social environment, of the laws, manners, customs, the drift of sentiment and opinion in a community. All these factors of character are here ignored for the purpose of concentrating attention on a single question,—the influence and importance of moral instruction.

My first proposition is that such instruction should only be given by teachers specially qualified by study and experience to deal with this particular branch of education. And here, at the threshold of the discussion, I must pause for a moment to consider a prejudice which, if not dislodged, will effectually bar further progress. Parents are, as a rule, jealous of the interference of outsiders in the training of their children. They are extravagantly sensitive on this point. They regard themselves as the true guardians of the moral welfare of their children, and resent the efforts of the moral teacher as an impertinence. They stoutly assert that they are competent to impart all the moral instruction which their children require. To this there is a twofold answer: First, that parents, whether competent or not, as a rule do not give any adequate moral instruction to their children. Even the best educated fathers and mothers generally fail to do this. They intend to do it, they plan to do it, but they have not the time; they put the matter off a month, a year, and in the end, the obligation which they assumed with so much confidence is neglected.

* Abstract of an address before the Convention of Ethical Societies, St. George's Hall, Philadelphia, Sunday morning, January 27, 1889.

Their situation reminds me of an experience described by Mr. Trumbull in his Yale lectures on the Sunday-school. The Sunday-school is about a hundred years old. When it was first introduced in this country, it met with wide-spread opposition, on the ground that religious teaching should be given in the home, that it is the proper duty of the parents to nourish the spiritual life of the young, and that special schools for this purpose would rob the family of one of its highest functions. To test the sincerity of these professions, Mr. Trumbull, a man of great energy and enthusiasm, visited three thousand families of those who refused to send their children to the Sunday-schools, and he found that among all these families religious instruction was actually imparted in—six. I imagine that, if we were to canvass the homes of that class of parents who claim that they are competent to give all the moral instruction which their children require, we should find the proportion of those who actually give it not much larger.

But, apart from this, I venture to say that parents, even educated parents, are not, as a rule, *competent* to give adequate moral instruction to their children. I am aware that a statement of this kind is likely to provoke a storm of indignant protest. What, people will say, are we not ourselves moral persons, and are we not therefore competent to teach morality to our children? But surely it is one thing to know, and a very different thing to teach. Some of the greatest artists have not been successful as teachers of art; some of the greatest mathematicians, when appointed to college professorships, have not been nearly as helpful to their students as younger men, in point of attainments immeasurably their inferiors. Precisely because the chiefs of science and art move on so elevated a plane they find it difficult to descend to the lower level of the beginner, and to realize the difficulties by which he is embarrassed. In like manner, it is possible to be a highly moral person, and yet to be quite incapable of teaching the elements of morality to the young. It is strange that so obvious a fact should need to be repeated so often. Teaching is both a science and an art, and the science and art of it are acquired, like every other science and art, by a course of

special study and training. To achieve even moderate success as a teacher, it is necessary not only to possess knowledge, but to be able to prepare the mental pabulum in a manner suitable to the child's powers of assimilation; to know what are the capabilities of a child of eight, of ten, of twelve, of fourteen, etc.; and, if this is true in all departments of education, it is not likely to be less true in the most difficult branch of all,—the department of moral education.

But let me now proceed to outline the matter and method of moral instruction as it has been tried in the Ethical Classes connected with the Society for Ethical Culture in New York.

For children between ten and twelve years of age, selected stories from the Old Testament are used.

For children between twelve and sixteen, there is systematic teaching of the principal duties. At the same time, proverbs or golden sayings are analyzed and committed to memory, and speeches embodying lofty moral sentiments are recited by the pupils.

For boys and girls from sixteen upward, chief stress is laid upon a careful study of selected biographies.

1. It is unnecessary to expatiate on the value of many of the Old-Testamentary legends, considered as an introduction to moral teaching. The Hebrews have always been noted for the depth and purity of their domestic affections, and the simple virtues to be cultivated, the obvious faults to be avoided, in domestic life, are reflected in their sacred literature as nowhere else. Such stories as those of Joseph and his brethren, of Cain and Abel, of Jacob and Esau, of the first temptation in the Garden, of Ruth and Naomi, stand out with the freshness and clearness of immortal types. They were invented when the world was young, and will always awaken the interest and speak with unfailing directness to the hearts of young children.

2. A knowledge of some of the principal duties of life can be imparted to children at the age of twelve to sixteen. It may be urged, indeed, and this is considered a fundamental objection by some, that it is impossible to interest young persons in abstract moralizing. But why should the method of moral

teaching necessarily be abstract? The same objection would hold good against the abstract mode of teaching any other branch. What, for instance, could be more dry and repellent to a child's mind than the old abstract way of teaching the names of things without presenting the things themselves to the child's senses? Or the old method, which still lingers in some of our backward schools, of teaching the laws of nature from a text-book, without experiment and illustration? If, on the other hand, the pupil is led to reach the generalizations of science by his own efforts, if he is so guided as to discover the simpler laws of nature by observation and experiment of his own, he will welcome and value the abstract formulation of the law as a concise statement embodying and fixing the results of his own experience. And the same inductive or Socratic method can be applied, and we have sought to apply it, to the teaching of duty. We do not present abstract rules of conduct to our classes, but begin with concrete cases, and lead the pupils, by an analysis of these cases, to discover the laws of conduct for themselves. But let me illustrate the inductive method by applying it to the matter in hand. Suppose, for instance, in the course of instruction, we have reached the duty of veracity. We do not weary the pupils with any solemn declamation on the virtue of truth-telling. We do not indulge in any such barren exhortations as: Children, it is wrong to tell a lie. It is wicked to tell a lie. Be sure never to tell a lie. The subject is introduced by presenting certain concrete cases for the pupil's analysis, as, for instance: "Some time ago, I read in the newspapers an account of a certain reckless person who dropped a burning match on a heap of dry straw in a stable; the stable caught fire, and a destructive conflagration ensued, which consumed several blocks of houses. When this person was called to account, he denied that he had dropped the match. What do you call such a statement as his?" "A falsehood." "Why do you call it a falsehood?" "Because his statement was contrary to the facts." "Am I then to understand from what you say that every statement which is contrary to the facts is a lie? Are you satisfied with this definition?" The pupils, as

a rule, will at first profess themselves satisfied. "Give me other instances of falsehood." A multitude of such instances will be brought forward. I find that children's minds are remarkably suggestive, that they display a truly wonderful command of illustrative material, and that their moral perceptions are exceedingly acute. I am constantly amazed at the fine distinctions which they are capable of drawing, and in this respect they seem far to excel their elders, whose moral sensibilities have been blunted and whose moral judgment has been warped by the degrading influence of the struggle for existence. From among the instances they suggest, I select some one which is suitable to the purpose in hand, or I interject one of my own to help on the discussion,—the following, for example: "I have read in history that the ancients asserted that the sun revolves around the earth, and that the earth itself is a flat body. Should we be justified in saying that the ancient astronomers lied?" After a little hesitation, the class will answer, "No, they did not lie." "But their statements were contrary to the facts." "Ah, but they did not know the real facts. They did not intentionally misrepresent." "It follows then that, in order to brand a statement as a falsehood, it is not sufficient that it be contrary to the facts, but there must be an intention on the part of the speaker to misrepresent." We are seeking by the analysis of concrete cases to get at a definition. A clear definition is the first point to be aimed at. The moral vocabulary is vague in most men's minds. The moral terms are loosely used, and as a consequence the ideas for which these terms stand remain confused. In order to clear up these ideas, it is necessary, in the first place, to define the terms. "We have seen that a statement intentionally so put as to be at variance with the facts is a falsehood. But, my children, have you never heard of statements which are not exactly contrary to the facts, which indeed are entirely true to the facts up to a certain point, and which we yet reprobate as outrageous lies,—statements literally true which yet are false in spirit? Give me an instance of such literal truth which is false in spirit." The instance which has been repeatedly given by the classes is taken from the pupil's own experience, and

therefore doubly interesting. It is that of a boy who has played truant all day long, and who, just before school closes, enters the school-house, and remains in the lower hall, say for five minutes; he then goes home, and when his mother asks him, "Have you been at school to-day?" he answers boldly and deliberately, "Yes, I have been at school." And so he has. He has been at school,—for about five minutes. "Now, why would you call such a statement as this a falsehood? It is true to the facts, is it not, as far as it goes?" "Ah, but it leaves out the essential fact,—that he has been away from school during the greater part of the day." "So, it is necessary, in order that a statement may be regarded as true, that it shall cover not some infinitesimal fraction of the facts, or some minor facts, but the essential facts." Again, there are other ways of telling a lie,—as, for instance, by the use of ambiguous words. The assertion made may be entirely true in one sense of the word, and entirely false in the other sense, the sense in which the hearer understands it. Instances of this kind are mentioned. Or again, a lie may be told in the manner related of a certain Jesuit who took an oath in court that a person whom he knew to be guilty was innocent, saying: "I believe the accused to be innocent, as truly as I stand upon this stone," pointing to the stone pavement of the court; but he had taken care, before he left home that morning, to cover the inner soles of his shoes with earth, so that he was not standing upon stone at all,—and thus he justified to himself the veracity of his statement. From the discussion of these and similar cases, we arrive at last at some such definition of truthfulness as this. A truthful statement is one which is intended to convey to the hearer an impression in accord with the essential facts.

We have thus, in attempting to gain a definition, incidentally come upon some of the various forms in which falsehood expresses itself. And it is one of the leading objects of moral instruction, to enable the pupil to detect vice in disguise, to tear from its hideous features the mask of innocence which it assumes, to follow it into its hiding-places and drag it to the light. But we have so far considered only spoken falsehoods.

Is language the only vehicle by which a false impression may be conveyed? No, it is possible to act a lie. For instance, on this Sunday morning there are probably thousands of persons among those assembled in churches who endorse by their presence, or actually perform, the ceremonies of a religion whose cardinal doctrines they no longer believe; and these persons act a lie. And it is possible, again, to convey a false impression by the mere expression of the face, as happens so often in society when a person alludes in conversation to some historical event or date which every one is expected to know, and the hearer whom he addresses nods assent, or assumes a wise expression of the countenance, as much as to say, I know all about it, while the fact is that he knows nothing at all about it.

The definition of a particular virtue or vice, the various forms which this virtue or a vice assumes are the first two points to which attention is to be paid. Next, we are to consider the causes. What are the causes that lead to falsehood? For unless we know the causes, we shall hardly be able to apply the remedies. Among the causes of falsehood are to be mentioned, first, desire for gain; next, fear of punishment, as in the case of a child that has done some wrong act and is afraid to confess because of the severe penalty which it knows the parent will exact. And in this case, the too-severe parent is to be blamed more than the child. In other cases, vanity, the desire to exaggerate one's achievements, leads to falsehood. Or again, and this occurs especially among very young children, the nimble fancy, the wantonness of a vivid imagination, betrays into falsehood. The child hardly realizes the boundary line between fact and fiction. Not all lies are equally black. The greatest mistakes are often made by parents in treating every falsehood as if it were the sign of a wicked heart. Some falsehoods are almost innocent,—hardly deserve to be called by that name. Others, again, are the symptoms of deep perversity, veritable danger-signals that should arouse the parent to adopt the most radical means of cure. A lie may be compared to an eruption on the surface of the body, and we must discover the

seat of the disease of which it is the symptom, and vary our treatment according to the diagnosis. Again, there are cases of which I do not speak to my young pupils, but to which I will here allude in passing, in which falsehood is due to idealism. It is a disheartening fact that that which is best in us should so often be turned to the worst abuse. There are persons whose aims in life are so high, whose aspirations towards what is excellent are so intense, that when they lapse into transgression they cannot bear to admit the fact to themselves; they cannot bear to see themselves as they are; they live in habitual self-deception as to their own condition, and their whole inner life is profoundly falsified in consequence. Of course, this sort of self-delusion cannot go on forever; the time comes when their eyes are opened, and they are then likely to be plunged into the darkest depths of despair. Falsehoods of the worst type are those inspired by sheer malevolence,—by the desire to injure another, without any corresponding benefit to one's self. These are diabolical falsehoods, and of these, fortunately, there are but few examples.

We have discussed the definition of falsehood, the various guises and disguises which it assumes, and the causes that lead to it. Lastly, we consider the reasons against falsehood, and in favor of truth-telling. Among these, we mention the injury done to others; the shaking of confidence in ourselves; the loosening of the bonds of mutual trust in society generally, so far as our example tells; the fatal necessity of inventing ever new falsehoods to cover up the first; finally and chiefly, the loss of self-respect. Only facts are real: in so far as we report facts, we are real; in so far as we report what is not fact, we become ourselves shams and counterfeits.

By such discussion and analysis the conscience is illuminated; what was before vague is defined; what was chaotic and obscure is brought into orderly arrangement. And who will say that in this manner the antipathy to a lie is not strengthened, that the spirit of scrupulousness in truth-telling is not intensified, and that the power of distinguishing between right and wrong is not refined? Who will say that this *thorough leavening of the moral consciousness* of the child in

regard to falsehood is not of greater practical utility than merely to say to a child, in a general way,—Thou shalt not lie, or I warn thee against lying, or I will punish thee if thou art guilty of lying,—as most parents are content to do?

And in the same manner, the whole field of duty, so far as it lies within the bounds of children's experience, is cultivated. We take up the self-regarding duties, and the other-regarding duties. The duty of self-preservation and the corresponding prohibition of suicide. The duty of temperance and of cleanness, physical and moral. The duties of the intellect. The duties that relate to the feelings (and here we have an opportunity to define and carefully distinguish from one another anger, indignation, envy, jealousy, hate, malice, vanity, pride, dignity, and to speak of certain rules which should be observed in order to gain control of one's passions). The duties which we owe to all human beings as such,—respect for the life of others (Thou shalt not kill),—respect for the property of others (Thou shalt not steal),—justice, benevolence, etc. The special duties which arise in the family: the duties of parents to their children, and children to their parents; the duties of brothers towards brothers, and sisters towards sisters; of brothers towards sisters, and *vice versa*; the duties of older brothers and sisters towards younger brothers and sisters, and *vice versa*. There are here fine shades of distinction in duty due to differences of age and sex, which require attention, though they are too often overlooked. The elements of political duty. The duties of friendship. And lastly, crowning the edifice of ethics, the duties that relate to the ideal humanity that is to be.

It ought to be the aim of the moral teacher to help his pupils know their duties, and to inculcate in them the habit of reflecting on the rules which should govern conduct. That this can be done at a much earlier age than is commonly supposed, is my earnest conviction, which the experience of twelve years in teaching ethical classes has steadily strengthened. Of most persons, it may perhaps be said without exaggeration that they have a feeling of duty rather than a knowledge of duty. When a certain situation presents itself,

they tend to act in a certain way, but they cannot clearly state the principle or rule which determines their action. They act under the impulse of a certain moral instinct,—at best, under the guidance of moral tact. But while tact is an extremely precious quality, it deserts us precisely when we are most at fault: I mean in novel situations upon which the analogies of past experience throw no light. (For tact is the happy faculty of appreciating a given situation and instantaneously applying the analogies of a past to a present experience.) And with such situations a time of transition like ours is apt to be replete. Society in the nineteenth century is undergoing a process of rapid and continuous transformation. In economics, in politics and religion, new conditions have arisen, and new problems are constantly being started which sorely perplex the conscience. And precisely in regard to these problems moral tact cannot avail. Only a deliberate recurrence to the principles upon which conduct should be based can help. When, however, I speak of principles in connection with the moral instruction of children, I do not mean metaphysical principles. I should deem it as great a wrong to steal a march upon the growing intelligence of my pupils by infecting them with some philosophical bias of my own, as it would be to impress upon their minds a religious doctrine at a time when they are still too young and inexperienced to test its truth or worth. I have in mind those practical principles of morality upon which all good men are agreed,—those secondary principles which theologians and philosophers alike accept, and for which they seek to find an ultimate explanation in some first principles of metaphysics or some mystic fact of revelation. But I hold that it is not once necessary to enter into that dreary region of metaphysical subtleties or theological controversies, in order to teach morals to young children. It is possible to confine one's self to those points upon which all are agreed. The business of the moral teacher is *to enrich, to clarify, and classify the content of the child's conscience*, and this is the sole end which he should keep steadily in view.

The next subject of which I shall speak is the use of prov-

erbs. The thoughts expressed in proverbs may be likened to pearls brought up from the depths of human experience and set in golden sayings. Proverbs may be compared to those delicate fabrics of the East which can be folded up within the smallest compass, and which nevertheless when unfolded excite our surprise by the large space over which they spread. So, when we unfold the meaning of a proverb, we are often surprised at the wide range of human experience which it covers. And yet the truth it conveys is stated so briefly and pithily, and in such condensed form, that we can easily carry it about with us in memory. Proverbs of this kind have been selected from the Hebrew Scriptures, the Dhammapada of Buddha, and from other sources. Such, for instance, as the following: "He who has a good eye shall be blessed." What is a good eye? An eye that sees the good in others,—that penetrates through the husks of an often unpromising exterior to the potential virtue underneath, and calls it forth by seeing it. There is such a thing as an awakening eye, a creative eye. Thus may I be permitted to point, in passing, to the inexpressible value of the possession of a good eye in the life of husbands and wives. The charms of youth are certain to fade, the graces of form and feature inevitably decay, the force of those intoxicating emotions which first drew the hearts of the lovers together subside; and then it often happens that marriage becomes a mere formal bond,—nay, a heavy yoke fastened by habit upon the necks of these unwilling companions. But if they possess the quality of a good eye, they will be able to see in one another the hidden germs of spiritual graces and call them forth because they see them. And they will clothe one another in spiritual beauty which age cannot impair nor time diminish. Ah, blessed is he who has the good eye! "A falsehood is like pebbles in the mouth." A falsehood is like many pebbles. Every falsehood tends to multiply itself, and each separate falsehood is like a stone. Not bread which we can assimilate, but a foreign body, alien to our nature; and these stony falsehoods will fill our mouths and choke us,—choke the better life in us,—unless we eject them all. "The discipline of a father

is a wreath of victory about the head, but the teachings of a mother, a chain of honor about the neck," indicating the different nature of the services which father and mother render us. The father helps us to victory in the struggle of life; the mother's counsel leads to honor. Concerning the filial relations: "The crown of parents are their children's children, and the glory of children are their parents." Concerning energy of character: "He who is prompt in his affairs shall stand in the presence of kings." Concerning fortitude: "If thou faint in the day of adversity, thy strength is small." Concerning the bridling of the tongue: "Death and life are in the power of the tongue, and they that love it shall taste the fruit thereof. An imprudent tongue is like a piercing sword. The words of the good are healing." Concerning self-control: "As rain breaks through an ill-thatched house, passion will break through an unreflecting mind." "Let each man make himself as he teaches others to be. He who is well subdued may subdue others. One's own self it is difficult to subdue." "Self is the lord of self. Who else could be the lord?" Concerning hatred: "He who holds back rising anger like a rolling chariot, him I call a real driver; other people are but holding the reins." "Let a man overcome anger by love; let him overcome evil by good; let him overcome the greedy by liberality,—the liar by truth." "Let us then live free from hatred among men who hate." Concerning the indestructible nature of goodness: "The virtues of the good are imperishable: thus do the good say to the good." One must be good one's self to realize the eternity of the good. Concerning the increase and the splendor of virtue: "A righteous man is like the rising sun, which shineth more and more unto the perfect day." "The good gleam from afar like the snowy mountains." And there are innumerable other sayings, such, for instance, as are to be found in the *Encheiridion* of Epictetus, which convey lessons equally important, and can be used to the same effect. A careful analysis of the meaning, however, is in all cases indispensable to a proper handling of this instrument of moral education.

Speeches embodying noble thoughts and feelings. In most

of our schools it is customary for the pupils to commit to memory and recite the patriotic speeches of a Patrick Henry, a Webster, a Lincoln, and others, and this is found to be an excellent means of developing the sentiment of patriotism in the young. There is no reason why other sentiments should not be cultivated in the same way. Our pupils should be taught to repeat a few of the grand orations of Isaiah, in which the awful thunders of the moral law reverberate and the feeling of moral indignation is expressed with a vividness and force never since surpassed or even equalled. They should read and recite the Sermon on the Mount, with its sweeter and tenderer messages; the last speech of Socrates before his judges, as reported by Plato, than which no finer or nobler composition exists in any language, and other speeches of a similar kind. For when we repeat the speeches of another, we put on, for the time being, the nature of the other. The feelings which are uttered by the lips live for the moment in the heart, and leave their mark there for good forever.

And lastly, we should make the most extensive use of biographies. And here, again, the searching analysis of motives should be a principal aim of the teacher. Thus, for instance, in discussing the life of Sister Dora, with my pupils, we reached the point where that remarkable woman is called upon to decide whether she will serve as sick-nurse in a small-pox hospital, thereby exposing herself to the danger of contagion, or whether she will live in the family of her brother, who had just lost his wife, taking upon herself the responsibility of bringing up his little children. To an ordinary person the latter duty would have seemed the less difficult. But to a mind like Sister Dora's, intent on brilliant and dramatic achievements, with a craving for the extremes of self-sacrifice, the tedious round of routine duties involved in the care of a household seemed positively repulsive. Was Sister Dora justified in going to the hospital, or should she have remained with her brother's children? For weeks and weeks this problem was discussed in its various bearings by the young ladies of the class. They were too much charmed with the generosity of the would-be martyr to condemn; on

the other hand, they could not fail to perceive that the interests of a certain group of little children had been too little considered, too arbitrarily set aside. At last, I think they all became convinced that the nearest duty, however dull and uninviting, has the largest claim; that the ambition to excel others in generous actions, like every other form of ambition, may have a selfish ingredient, and should be distrusted. And such a conviction, thus deeply impressed, must assuredly be regarded as a valuable acquisition for life. But not only does biographical study afford an admirable opportunity for practising and refining the moral judgment, but it offers to the young splendid patterns and inspiring examples. Our children should be acquainted with the great men and women whose names illuminate the history of the human race,—with the great thinkers, the great philanthropists, the great reformers, the saints. We all desire to move in good society, and this desire is a perfectly laudable one if we attach the right meaning to the words “good society.” How strange then that we should ignore the best society! The best society, the society of the immortals, is always open to us. They who belong to that *élite* company are always willing to receive us and exact no degrading sacrifices of honor or personal independence as the price of our admission to their circle. Our boys and girls should be familiar with the lives of such women as Mary Somerville, the astronomer; Margaret Fuller, whom Emerson honored with his friendship; Florence Nightingale, “the Lady of the Lamp;” Vittoria Colonna; they should know in its details the life of a Socrates; of a Howard, who first let light into the darkness of the prison-house; of Sir Thomas More, England’s Lord High Chancellor, who perished on the scaffold,—one of the richest, rarest souls that ever lived, one of the strongest, bravest, truest men that ever walked this earth! Ah, we make too little of our great men; we pay too little heed to the treasures which human history places at our disposal. In the light of one great name, every other name has been dimmed,—in the exaggerated admiration which we have cherished for the heroes of the Old Testament and the New, we have too much forgotten those other great

ones who might also be our helpers. Let us refresh in the minds of the young the fading record of human achievement and human endeavor. Let us surround our children, as they go forth on the road of life, with an ideal company of friends whose exalted example will fill their lives with worth and meaning. Let us make much—far more than we are now doing—of the systematic study of biography.

I have set out to describe a scheme of moral instruction for the young. I am very far from believing that I have exhausted the subject. My intention was merely to break ground, to give a few hints. The Biblical legend serves as the introduction. The systematic teaching of duty is the centre of the scheme. Proverbs, speeches, and biographies are useful auxiliaries.*

* I have confined myself in the above to speaking of moral instruction. Religious instruction is also given in our classes. It consists chiefly of the study of the best spiritual literature, ancient and modern, including of course the choicest passages from the Old and New Testaments. But it should be remembered that Plato at one end of the line, and Emerson at the other, are as important in their way as Isaiah and St. Paul. I believe that a first-hand acquaintance with the best spiritual literature of the world is indispensable to a genuine spiritual culture. A series of lectures to the oldest pupils on the practical philosophy of life is designed to conclude the system of religious teaching.

Another point which should be added to the above is that our classes are organized for purposes of practical charity. The pupils collect among themselves each month a certain sum, and this is used partly to assist in defraying the expenses of an evening school for poor children,—partly to purchase comforts and delicacies for the sick poor. In the teaching of morals, if anywhere, practice should not be divorced from theory.

HYMNS AND MUSIC AT ETHICAL MEETINGS.*

BY ARTHUR W. HUTTON.

I HAVE been invited to open the discussion this evening on "Hymns and Music at Ethical Meetings," chiefly, no doubt, because not so long ago I was a member of a committee of five which met here a considerable number of times to discuss the question of a proposed revision of the hymn-book used at South Place. Our suggestions were favorably received by many members of the Society; but there were sufficient reasons, then, it appeared, for postponing any settlement of the question. And I am given to understand that the time has not even yet arrived for any practical steps to be taken, though it is a matter that must be faced sooner or later; so that, in introducing the subject this evening, I wish it to be understood that I am dealing with the question in its general aspect, rather than with reference to our own particular case, though it will be impossible to leave out of sight, at any rate by way of illustration, what we do or might do here.

I trust I shall recall no painful reminiscences to any one's mind when I say that *the subject naturally divides itself into three heads*. It does so, and I cannot help it.

There is first the question of hymns, or of congregational singing; next that of other church music performed by a professional choir, to which the congregation attends without joining in; and, lastly, I do not want to leave out of sight the case of instrumental music pure and simple, which, in my judgment, ought to have an honorable place at ethical meetings.

* This paper is substantially what was read at a Conference of the South Place Ethical Society on Monday evening, February 18, 1889; but sundry corrections and additions have been made, suggested by the discussion which ensued.

The question of hymns, however, comes first, and is on various grounds the most important ; and I imagine that it is mainly around this point that our discussion to-night will hinge. I couple hymns with congregational singing because practically, though not necessarily, the two are indissolubly united.

A preliminary point may be noted. An objector may not unreasonably be imagined who decides against hymn-singing altogether at ethical meetings. He protests that the practice savors too much of the Methodist chapel or even of the "Salvation Army ;" that it is vulgar and out of date ; that as a matter of art congregational singing is always very poor stuff ; that at its best it is a wild, uncultured, gushing mode of expressing religious feeling ; and that in the more refined atmosphere of an ethical meeting it is out of place. I have some sympathy with this objector. Let us admit that congregational hymn-singing is an outcome of Celtic or Teutonic fervor rather than of Greek or Latin classical culture ; that its associations are Puritan rather than Catholic, and are, in any case, exclusively theological. Let us further admit that as we grow older we are disposed to "join in" less boisterously than we did of old, and that after a time it becomes desirable that we shall not "join in" at all. Still, when all has been said, the facts remain that it is far and away the most popular method of expressing religious emotion, and that to many people, and especially to young people, a service or a meeting which excluded all congregational singing would seem a very unattractive dead-alive affair.

Assuming then, without further apology, that the singing of hymns is a legitimate feature at ethical meetings, the next question is, "What hymns ?" And here I take it to be of the utmost importance that a clear principle should be laid down. I answer to the question unhesitatingly, Only such hymns that can be sung by the members of an Ethical Society in their plain and obvious meaning, without necessitating recourse to mental reservation, or to strained allegorical interpretations, or to any other evasion whatsoever. And since it is a first principle with the Ethical Society—and indeed the very reason

for its existence—that morality is not rightly based on theology or on any kind of supernatural doctrine, it follows that any hymn which bids us appeal to a personal God to aid us in the practice of virtue, or which finds a motive for such practice in the hopes or fears of a life beyond the grave, is not one that the members of the Ethical Society can rightly be invited to sing. To depart from this principle is not merely to give a character of unreality to the proceedings, it is to give a false impression of our position to inquirers who have a wish to learn more about us. I am not unwilling to allow this liberty of allegorical interpretation to free-thinkers who may have occasion from time to time, from whatever cause,—and there are various legitimate ones,—to attend the religious services of bodies more or less orthodox. I see no reason why it should not also be allowed to those—and they are many—who still remain nominal members of those religious bodies, though they may have lapsed from orthodoxy as completely as we have ourselves. But it is surely quite another thing for the members of a society, which has publicly dissociated itself from the theological position, to join, at meetings of that society, in the singing of hymns which reaffirm the position repudiated. When the president at any ethical meeting announces the singing of a hymn, he puts into the mouths of those present phrases which they ought to be able to utter with the most perfect sincerity; but if he thus puts into their mouths phrases inconsistent with the society's first principles, he makes it impossible for any thoughtful member to throw any heart or enthusiasm into the singing.

I must admit that I had been disposed to extend this principle even to the exclusion of all theistic references, however refined and philosophical, as likely to mislead inquirers interested in our position; but, on reflection, I am disposed to modify that judgment and to insist only on the exclusion of what is inconsistent with the idea of an Ethical Society.

To the objection, if raised, that any exclusion implies a certain exclusiveness and narrowness in our position, I would briefly reply that it is the presence of theological teaching in a hymn, not its absence, which makes it exclusive. All

men, orthodox or unorthodox, could join in hymns selected on the principles I have been advocating. It is just because those principles have not been followed by the compilers of the hymn-book with which we are familiar that many of us find ourselves precluded from joining in a good number of the hymns which it contains.

To the further objection that, hymns being mostly what they are, this exclusiveness will leave us nothing or next to nothing to sing, I have two answers to make: First, no great number of hymns is required. A select few, each thoroughly in accord with the ethical movement (for a genuine movement I believe it is becoming with us quite as much as in America), each emphasizing some phase of ethical thought or aspiration, would be far more to the purpose than an *omnium gatherum*, dragged in from all quarters indiscriminately, merely on the ground that the verses, apart from any question of their poetic merit, had a religious tone, or something like it, without theistic references. I may mention that at the committee meetings here to which I have referred we found in our present book about two hundred hymns answering fairly well to the description I have given, and we got together about a hundred more similar in character. But even so, I doubt whether we might not have cut out one-half and still have left enough for the use of Ethical Societies in their present elementary stage. A few really good hymns that use would make familiar, even no more than a hundred, would satisfy me, so that they illustrated and enforced our position. And my second reply is that even if so few as a hundred do not exist thoroughly suited to our purpose, why then we must write them ourselves. If our movement is a real one a poet will soon arise capable of throwing our thoughts into graceful verse that would be welcomed at our meetings. I will even say that if no such singer arises it will go far to show that our movement has not the life within it that it needs to become a successful one. There is no need, I imagine, to keep strictly to the hymn form as we now know it. Possibly something lighter, more of the carol type, might prove better. But yet I cannot deny that there is an earnestness in the old-fashioned hymns—and espe-

cially in the German hymns—that we could not dispense with without losing an element necessary to secure permanent growth in a movement like this.

Let me say a few words on “adaptation,”—the alteration of phrases here and there to make the whole hymn fit in with our views. From the literary point of view it has always appeared to me objectionable, both as a matter of taste, and also as a mere question of justice to the author. It has seemed to me that the best adaptations can never be more than ingenious, and that the art of adapting, if art it be, must be reckoned an ignoble one. Certainly, if one happens to be familiar with the lines as they originally stood, and to know how exquisitely and precisely they represented the author’s mind, the effect of the alterations is either to amuse or to exasperate; and that does not conduce to a fit frame of mind for hymn-singing. But I owe it to Dr. Coit that I have somewhat modified my views on this subject, and see there is another side to the matter. He has pointed out, and has quoted very aptly from Dr. James Martineau in illustration of the position he maintains, that adaptation holds no mean place in the history of literature, while in regard to hymns it is really the method in which a continuity of religious tradition can be secured without prejudice to the continuous reception of new light. Accepting this view, if only we can make sure that adaptations do not impair the poetical value of the original, if even, as I am assured, they may enhance its value, the literary objections become comparatively unimportant. Religious traditions must not lightly be set aside; and the traditions of South Place, though brief and meagre compared with the traditions of Catholic Christendom, are at least as honorable as those of any other religious community; they should therefore be treated with the utmost consideration when its hymns are under revision; and perhaps in adaptation may be found the means of reconciling new and broader views with modes of expression which old associations have made dear.

Turning next to the choral music other than hymn-singing, best described perhaps as the singing of anthems by a professional choir, in which the congregation does not join, I

give it as my opinion that here we do not need the restrictions which seem to me imperative in the case of hymns. Singing to which we attend, and in which we do not otherwise participate, has a somewhat dramatic character; it inspires by representation. Thus, while our religious emotions may be quickened and strengthened by contact with what has expressed the religious beliefs of others, we do not imply that their objects of belief are ours also; at any rate, our attention in this case is not open to misconstruction; nor does it put us into a consciously false position. And we strengthen the case by making our selection from as wide a field as possible. I mean that if in this case we agree to admit music set to words involving the teaching of Unitarianism, but refuse to allow words that involve orthodox Christianity or Catholicism, we go far to lay ourselves open to the misunderstanding that the Ethical Society takes its stand on Unitarian doctrine; whereas not only is that not the case, but if our movement grows, as I assume it will, in a very short time the majority of its members will have been drawn from elsewhere, and will have known nothing of the special Unitarian position.

I will add but a few remarks on the third department to which I referred,—that of instrumental music pure and simple. Here, even more than in the case of elaborate choral music, much depends on the individual, whether the performance prove itself an admirable vehicle for sustaining fruitful meditation on subjects which I will call spiritual or ethical, as you please; or whether it be no more than a pleasant relaxation during which the mind takes rest and devotes itself to no thoughts in particular. Even in the latter case I think a not too prolonged instrumental performance would not be without its advantages; for after our emotions have been aroused and our aspirations after the ideal stimulated by attention to some eloquent discourse, it is distinctly bad for us, without some such break as a musical interlude would give us, to come down at once to the trivialities of ordinary conversation. I know there are some persons to whom all music not joined with words is mere unmeaning noise—there is the case of an ex-Cabinet minister [Sir George Trevelyan], no mean judge

in other branches of art, such as painting, engraving, and architecture, who confesses that he would never know "God save the Queen" from any other tune, but for the effect it has in making people stand up; but such persons are the exceptions, and provision should be made in this matter for the majority and not for the exceptions. And though I must confess myself to be inferior to many whom I know in the power of giving interpretation to the language of instrumental music; and though I must further admit that the diverse interpretations given by different persons to the same piece tells somewhat against the reality of such interpretations; yet I am among the majority who find themselves stirred they hardly know how by the mysterious tide of sound, who catch glimpses as it were of "thoughts too deep for tears" while the sonata weaves its complicated web, and who would therefore value highly the power of sound in energizing the too dimly appreciated realities of their spiritual life.

I should perhaps explain that by instrumental music I do not mean organ-playing, or at least organ-playing only, under special circumstances. Let me give the organ its due. For the accompaniment of hymn-singing it is virtually a necessity; and its convenience in concentrating the whole instrumental performance in the hands of one person, who is able to give considerable variety with comparative ease,—this is undeniable. But for an organ to be really inspiring it must first of all be really a fine one, and must further be placed in some grand cathedral, whose echoing aisles give it that expressiveness which in itself, in consequence of the purely mechanical method in which it produces sound, it necessarily lacks. I believe that every musician will bear me out in the assertion that for expression the organ must always be inferior even to the piano; while compared with an orchestra, large or small, of stringed instruments or of wind and stringed instruments combined, it holds no place at all. When therefore I advocate the use of purely instrumental music at ethical meetings I wish it to be understood that I have not so much the organ in my mind as a string quartet, or a slightly increased orchestra in which the strings would still hold the most important

place. I will refer to a thought on this subject communicated to me some years since by Cardinal Newman, for the expansion of which, however, I must hold myself responsible. He said that stringed instruments give us the music of humanity while wind instruments suggest the music of the gods. The first idea is clear enough. In what I may term the inexpressible expressiveness of the violin and violoncello we can recognize the laments and longings as well as the airy cheerfulness that make up so much of human life. And, on reflection, the second half of the sentence soon explains itself. The relentless blare of the trumpet, the stolid humor of the serpent and trombone,—these followed by the dreamy softness of the French horn, the pastoral sweetness of the flute, or by the heartless laughter of the reedy bassoon and clarionet,—all these represent very aptly the careless life of the Olympian gods as they sit in the clouds at their ease, sipping their nectar, and laughing consumedly at the struggles of us poor mortals, when they learn of our desperate efforts to walk in the path of virtue, or at least to keep up appearances.

On the ground then of some such associations as these, I should advocate that the instrumental music at ethical meetings should depend mainly on stringed instruments for its effect. I believe that in this department there is a great opening for us to make our meetings not merely attractive but refined and elevating. I think that if, in introducing it, care were taken that everything that is done should be done as well as possible, that the pieces should be carefully selected, and the performance intrusted only to professionals capable of illustrating the ideas that were in the composer's mind,—we should materially improve the position of our movement in the eyes of those whom it is most important that we should win over to our side, and that we should find ourselves at the same time securing moral advantage as well as intellectual enjoyment.

It is right that I should add that, except in regard to instrumental music, what is actually done here on Sunday mornings comes very near to my idea of what ought to be done; and that I consider we owe great thanks to Mr. Shedlock and

to those who co-operate with him for the selection and arrangement of the anthems that are sung. Of course the whole ground that I have indicated is not covered; but the general lines followed are precisely those that I have laid down; and they are followed, too, as I think, in a manner altogether praiseworthy.

ETHICAL SOCIETY NOTES.

THE NEW YORK SOCIETY.

The Fortnightly Club.—This club was started a year ago, and consists at present of about forty members, ladies and gentlemen, connected with the Ethical Society of New York. It meets fortnightly on Sunday evenings in the parlors of Professor Adler. The object of the club is to stimulate the reading and discussion of standard books on ethical subjects. The club has read during the year John Morley's "Compromise," Tolstoi's "What to Do?" Carlyle's "Hero-Worship," Strauss's "The Old Faith and the New," and the "Gospel of Mark." These books or treatises are read by the members at home, and they are expected to be prepared to discuss what they have read in the meetings. A certain amount of preparation is thus secured.

This plan has been adopted as a compromise between free debates and the reading of papers, written by the members. The former plan is open to the objection that it usually leads to windy and aimless discussion, the latter, that strong papers on special topics cannot be secured with sufficient regularity, and that in consequence the interest of the meetings is likely after a while to subside. Such papers are however not excluded when members are found willing and competent to elaborate them. Thus the last meeting of the year was devoted to the reading and the discussion of an able paper, by Mr. George Iles, on the question of Prohibition.

The Fortnightly Club during the first year of its existence has reasonably met the expectations of its members, and it is hoped that it will continue to bear good and better fruit in the future.

The Workingman's School.—Dr. Duren J. H. Ward, a graduate of Hillsdale, Harvard Divinity School, and University of Leipsic, and at present lecturer of philosophy in Harvard University, has received and accepted the appointment of Principal of the Workingman's School.

THE CHICAGO SOCIETY.

The Annual Report of the Ethical Society of Chicago shows that the Society has had a prosperous year. Forty-five have been added to the membership list. A series of interesting Conferences have been held. Among the subjects upon which papers were read and discussed are the following: The Best Reading for Children; the Ethical problems in "Felix Holt;" the French Revolution; Philanthropic Work.

The Ethical School has seven classes. The youngest class are studying Fables and Fairy Tales; the next three classes, Hebrew Legends; the two above those, The Duties of Life; and the oldest class, The Life of Paul.

The Young People's Union—which is open to all young people of good character whether members of the Society or not—has held regular monthly meetings. The object of the Union is to develop in young men and women a higher appreciation of the social duties of life.

The Sunday Lectures have had an increased attendance. Mr. Salter has spoken upon the following subjects: "The Rights of Capital;" "The Rights of Labor;" "Matthew Arnold's Views of Religion;" "Matthew Arnold's Defence of Christianity;" "Memorial Day;" "The True Basis of Religious Union;" "The Aims and Needs of the Ethical Move-

ment;" "Social Peace and How We May Have It;" "The Highest Rule of Life;" "The Attack on 'Robert Elsmere';" "A Man's Duty to Himself;" "Ethics and Worship;" "The Ethics of Belief;" "A Great Social Sin;" "Christmas from an Ethical Stand-point;" "Is Chicago Doing Its Duty by Its Children?" "Signs of a Higher Nature in Man;" "Progress of the Ethical Movement;" "Ethics and Reforms;" "Reforms Good Men May Agree About;" "Vanity and Pride;" "The True Dignity of Man;" "Patriotism, True and False;" "Motives to the Moral Life;" "Helps to the Moral Life."

Lectures have also been delivered by Professor Adler, Edwin D. Mead, W. L. Sheldon, Professor Thomas Davidson, M. M. Mangasarian, Gen. M. M. Trumbell, Jos. W. Errant, Mrs. Celia P. Wooley, and Henry D. Lloyd.

The Sixth Anniversary of the Society was observed with special exercises Sunday, April 21, in the Grand Opera House, where the regular Sunday meetings are held. The platform was decorated with flowers, the children of the Ethical classes sung a hymn, and addresses were made by W. M. Salter, Judge Booth, H. C. Bennett, and C. S. Darrow. An original poem was read by Miss Juniata Stafford.

THE ST. LOUIS SOCIETY.

Bible Club.—The young people of the Society have taken for their study for the winter the literary, historical, and religious value of the Bible. In order to have all the views brought out the members of the club were assigned portions from some leading writer on the subject. One took Milman's "History of the Jews" in order to bring out the most orthodox stand-point. Another took Ladd's "What is the Bible?" for the broader view of the New England theology; a third took Dean Stanley's "Lectures on the Jewish Church" for the liberal attitude of the English Church; a fourth read Renan's "History of the People of Israel" for a French stand-point; a fifth took Kuenen's "Bible for Learners" to bring

out the views of the Dutch School on theology ; and a sixth, in order to have the purely historic attitude of the German students, read Duncker's "History of Antiquity."

The Workingmen's Self-Culture Club.—An important step in the direction of practical work has been inaugurated in forming a literary club among the workingmen of the city. It is called the "Workingmen's Self-Culture Club under the auspices of the Ethical Society." They make their head-quarters at the Free Reading Rooms, which were opened by the Society last year. They have a debating club which meets on an afternoon for the discussion of some practical subject. On Tuesday evenings they have a Young Men's Reading Club for the discussion of some biography. On Monday evenings a Boys' Club meets, which has been formed for the purpose of developing their literary taste. On Friday evenings lectures are delivered by the ablest men of the city on history, art, travel, or natural science. Upward of thirty lectures of this kind have been given during the season, and the rooms and the main hall have been filled and often crowded throughout the winter. There are from seventy-five to one hundred regular members of the club, but indirectly through its work it probably reaches several hundred workingmen of the city.

School for Domestic Economy.—The Ladies' Philanthropic Club of the Ethical Society have undertaken some very active work with children, especially girls. They have carried on a free kindergarten for little children who cannot be received in the kindergarten of the public schools, being under six years of age. A Girls' Club for the study of domestic economy meets on Saturday afternoon. The plan is to have classes in all the departments of home-life, such as light laundry, cooking, sewing, household decoration, family reading, etc. Only one or two of the departments have as yet been introduced; but the members are already outgrowing the rooms, and the school bids fair to be a large success in the coming year. The girls are given reading to take

home with them during the week, and several of them this summer are to receive tickets for the Public Library with lists of reading which they can carry on. One Saturday afternoon in the spring the whole club was taken out to Forest Park on a natural science excursion with a lady who gave them talks on the botany of what could be seen in the park. In connection with this school a Mothers' Club has been formed which meets on Friday afternoons. The work is assuming already the form of a neighborhood institution for the north side of the city, and plans are being discussed for starting a similar work in the south side of St. Louis.

Centennial Celebration.—The Society commemorated Washington's inaugural by making it particularly a young men's celebration. The subject of the Sunday morning was "American Young Manhood of the Coming Century." There were five short addresses by Messrs. Charles Nagel, Thomas Knapp, N. O. Nelson, G. W. Krall, and W. L. Sheldon. The young men of the city came in large numbers, and it was perhaps the most satisfactory undertaking in the history of the Society in St. Louis.

Lectures for the Season.—The Sunday morning exercises have been held at Memorial Hall. The music has consisted of a quartette under the charge of Mr. W. H. Pommer. Mr. Sheldon has spoken upon the following subjects: "Are we still Jews and Christians?" "Modern Scepticism: Is it Dangerous?" "Henry George and the Single-Tax Theory," "Ethical Considerations in the Political Situation," "The Ethics of Communism and Socialism," "Robert Elsmere," "Count Tolstoi and his Social Ideal," "Religious Education of the Young," "The Theology of Robert Elsmere," "Do we need a Substitute for the Church?" "In How Far is it Essential that we should Believe in a God?" "The Moral Significance of the Design Argument," "The God of the Bible and the God of Natural Science," "The God of the Bible compared with the God of History," "The Ethics of Goethe," "The Ethics of Wordsworth," "The Ethics of Shakespeare,"

"Ethical View of Prayer;" "The Poet Shelley and his Social Ideal;" "American Young Manhood of the Coming Century;" "Evolution and its Influence on Morals and Society;" "The Religion of Goethe compared with that of Shakespeare."

The audiences at Memorial Hall this season have averaged much larger than the previous year. Many more persons are taking an interest in the Society than formerly, and it appears gradually to be becoming an institution of St. Louis. Mr. Sheldon has given six lectures before workmen the past winter. He read a paper before the Unitarian convention in Chicago on the subject "The Influence of Evolution on Morals and Society," and gave a lecture the last of May on "The Ethical Movement" in Wyandotte, Kansas, where there are a number of persons interested in forming a nucleus around which may ultimately grow an Ethical Society.

THE PHILADELPHIA SOCIETY.

The Young People's Section has met regularly on the second and fourth Tuesday evenings of the month during the past season. The first part of the evening has been taken up with the presentation of an original paper, and the latter part devoted to social intercourse. The following papers have been read at these meetings: "Mind in Nature," by Professor E. D. Cope; "Music in Nature," by Professor Bacheller; "The Single-Tax Theory," by A. H. Stevenson; "Ethics of Criticism," by John H. Clifford; "Idealism" and "Emerson," two papers, by Horace L. Traubel; "Walt Whitman," by Dr. Buck; "Schumann," by Mrs. J. Fels; "The Public Conscience," by Stephen F. Weston.

Members of the Young People's Section have been studying during the year Spencer's "Data of Ethics," with considerable collateral reading. This class has met every Sunday morning the hour before the lecture. Much credit is due to the young people of the Society for the interest and activity they have displayed the past year.

The Business Section meetings have been held fortnightly—the first and third Tuesday evenings of the month. At these meetings the following papers have been ably presented and discussed: "The Relation of Tariff to Wages," by Professor Simon N. Patten; "The Ethics of the Tariff," by George D. Black; "Marriage and Divorce," by Professor Cope; "Economic Basis of Prohibition," by Professor Patten; "The Ethics of Trusts," by Thomas B. Harned; "Profit Sharing," by Dr. George M. Gould; "The Liquor Question in Politics," by George Iles.

ETHICAL SOCIETIES IN ENGLAND.

South Place Society.—The South Place Ethical Society, under the leadership of Dr. Coit, is in a most flourishing condition. The membership of the Society has largely increased, and continues to do so at the rate of ten to twelve new members a month. The Sunday meetings are attended by five to six hundred people, and the lectures are widely reported in the papers.

The *Manchester Guardian* of March 25 contained the following despatch from a London correspondent:

"A growing interest is being manifested in the lectures delivered on Sunday mornings at South Place Chapel, Finsbury, by Dr. Stanton Coit. Dr. Coit delivered yesterday morning the last of three lectures on the moral and religious training of children in board schools. In the first he commended warmly the system of Bible reading now almost universally adopted as enabling the young to become familiar with what is best in religious literature, but he complained that the teachers seemed hardly alive to the opportunities these readings gave them, and confined themselves to dry details that do not touch the heart, instead of pointing out and illustrating by reference to modern life the spiritual significance of the tales. In his second lecture he called attention to the system adopted in the primary schools in France, where morality is taught without reference to theology, care being taken to prevent the lessons becoming abstract and ineffectual by the use of the historical method. In this way a system of political and civic virtue is inculcated on the authority of the national will as illustrated by the growth of contemporary institutions. In his lecture yesterday Dr. Coit advocated the introduction of a similar course of instruction in English board schools, not as an alternative but as a supplement to moral instruction based on the Bible narratives."

The Inquirer of May 18 contained a long abstract of the address delivered by Dr. Coit the preceding Sunday on "Ethical Culture." We give below a few passages from the *Inquirer's* abstract.

"The aims and principles of the Ethical movement are very simple, and any one may both understand and sit in judgment upon them. . . . He would call the Ethical movement a religious movement, although the term 'religious' in its stricter meaning might be held to be inexplicable. . . . If it be said that Ethical Culture is not religion because it does not insist on the worship of God, then he would admit that, if such be a correct definition of religion, it is not a religion. . . . The bond of religious union should be solely *devotion to the good* in the world. . . . The Church unites in devotion to a personal God and to Christ. They (the Ethical Societies) centre their efforts in devotion to 'goodness,' and they do not, like the Theistic Church, which makes belief in God an essential, exclude from their community even those who do not believe in God. Nevertheless, in asserting this, they do not deny either God or Christ as existing or as worthy of love. What they do deny is that devotion to God or Christ should be made the basis of communion. When there is such a basis an injustice and therefore a wrong has been done; and on that ground, for conscience' sake, he stood out of the Church. They do not put 'the good' in place of God or Christ and worship it. They make no fetich of it; they do not worship it as an idol. It is only a bond of human fellowship and brotherhood. The difference between them and other sects is that they make a direct appeal to men's sense of justice, a direct appeal to conscience. To make men love goodness it is not necessary to make them love first God and Christ. On the basis of experience they find that there is no need to first fill men with the love of God to make them love their brother. If this be not believed, try it, and you will find the response. If the conscience be touched directly by saying 'that is wrong,' 'that is mean,' 'that is unworthy of you,' 'that is an insult to mankind,' he finds, and they will find, that these appeals to conscience are effective without any supernatural sanction. Thus, unlike all the Churches, they are enabled to advocate rectitude without advancing the doctrine of immortality as a basis for it. There is adequate motive to right action without putting before men the hope of heaven or the fear of hell. . . . Goodness cannot exist but as an active force. 'Deeds not creeds' is the motto of the Ethical Society. There is no way to convince people that one believes in brotherhood, but to show oneself a brother. Their distinctive feature is to work for their fellow-men."

Extension of the Ethical Movement.—Many indications come to us that the ethical movement is taking deep root in England. A London Correspondent to *Unity*, May 11, says, "I hear that Ethical Societies are spreading in this country. There is that over which Dr. Coit presides, there is one having its head-quarters at Toynbee Hall, and another at

Essex Hall. In addition there is one in connection with each of the Universities, and now I hear of a Nonconformist Ethical Society."

Notable Addresses.—Some of the most distinguished English scholars and professors are reported to be taking an active interest in the Ethical Societies connected with the Universities. Professor Caird, of the University of Glasgow, accepted the presidency of one of the London Societies, and chose as the subject of his presidential address, "The Moral Aspects of the Economic Problem." This address has been published in pamphlet form, and deserves a wide reading. Professor Sidgwick, author of "Methods of Ethics," delivered an important address before the Oxford Ethical Society,—of which, we believe, he is president,—in which he laid special emphasis upon the importance of a scientific study of the different branches of practical ethics, and urged the Oxford Society to devote itself to work of that kind.

Another address to which we would call particular attention is that recently delivered before the Ethical Society of Cambridge, England, by Professor Seelye, and published in the April number of the *Fortnightly Review* under the title "Ethics and Religion."

The author of "Ecce Homo," though not a member of the Cambridge Society, is strongly in sympathy with its purpose, and he gives valuable words of warning and advice to the organizers of the Society that should be read and seriously considered by all who are interested in the substantial progress of the ethical movement. He warns the Society against becoming a sect for the propagation of particular doctrinal views, and against taking an attitude hostile to the churches; they should rather co-operate with the churches and endeavor to carry the ethical movement into them.

Professor Seelye acknowledges that the teachings of the church are insufficient. In the popular Christianity of the day "there is more than enough of error, and mischievous error. . . . The very fact that you found new ethical societies

is a proof that you do not intend simply to repeat what clergymen and dissenting ministers have been preaching so long. I dare say many of your members are orthodox Christians, but I think we must all alike hold that the Christian teaching of the present day is insufficient, exceedingly insufficient. You found ethical societies because you consider that so large a part of practical morality is either forgotten or only treated perfunctorily in church or chapel, that the Christianity of the day may almost be said to teach religion perhaps, but not ethics."

The feeling is widely prevalent "that existing churches and existing forms of Christianity are not equal to the burden which the age imposes on them in respect to moral teaching." The Ethical Society, according to Professor Seelye, is needed; there is an immense opportunity before it. The importance of the movement lies in the fact that it "offers an ethical supply at the moment of an exceptional ethical famine."

The moral condition of England, says Professor Seelye, was never in a lower state than at the present time, and the Ethical Society should direct itself against this great evil rather than waste effort in doctrinal controversies. "Those who fully realize the dangers of this time will feel that it is no time for sophistical wit-combats, but for the greatest possible union and co-operation among serious men of all schools." If the Cambridge Society stood by itself it could accomplish but little in overcoming the evils of the time, but "your movement is only one among many that have taken the same direction, and the sum total of the force thus set in motion, if it is applied to the best advantage, may produce great results. Societies precisely like yours are springing up in all parts of the country; the very word ethical has been brought to us from America by our energetic friend Dr. Stanton Coit. . . . The word ethical has for the first time gone to the root of the matter."

GENERAL NOTES.

—MR. SALTER'S NEW BOOK, "Ethical Religion," advertised by Roberts Brothers on the fourth page of the cover, should be read by all who wish to know the real spirit and purpose of the Ethical Movement. It is a valuable addition to the Movement,—one of the best fruits it has yet produced. The book does not pretend to be a philosophical treatise. Its purpose is purely practical and moral. The moral purpose that holds Ethical Societies together and animates their work is here strongly and beautifully presented. Every page is a call to the higher life. The gospel of the supremacy of Ethics is nobly vindicated.

A more extended critical review of "Ethical Religion" will appear in the next number of the RECORD. In the mean time we hope all our subscribers will purchase and read it.

—THE project of founding a School of Philosophy and Applied Ethics, to which the last number of the ETHICAL RECORD was largely devoted, is making encouraging progress. A meeting of the New England members of the General Committee appointed at the Philadelphia January Convention was held in Boston April 27. Measures were taken to perfect the plans, and to increase the endowment fund of the proposed institution. It is expected that a meeting of the entire committee will be held in the autumn, when a report of the work accomplished in the interval will be given.

—PROFESSOR BURGESS, of Columbia College, in a pamphlet of unusual value on "The American University" (Ginn & Co.), makes certain suggestions worth considering by those of us who are interested in the School of Philosophy and Applied Ethics. As to the selection of professors, he favors the choice of a president who is himself deeply learned in the science of education, a broad scholar, and an accurate judge of men, and *then confiding to him* the selection of the professors. After the faculties are once successfully constituted, however, he holds that they are themselves the best judges as to who

should be their coadjutors and successors. As to the location of a university, he says that, as a rule, it should be near by where the individuals reside who have the wealth to bestow upon the university, and the disposition to bestow it,—*i.e.*, near some centre of wealth and culture. "The greatness of the amount necessary to found and maintain a university can hardly be secured without the incentive of local pride." Possibly this consideration would not be so pertinent to the more modest scheme of a School of Philosophy and Applied Ethics, not to say that it may be deemed most expedient to establish the latter as a school in some already existing university. The central point in the organization of the university, Professor Burgess says, must be the corporation, which may originate either through voluntary association, or through nomination by a donor or donors. It should be self-perpetuating. The faculty itself should have only such functions and powers as are conferred upon it by the corporation, though the faculty should control the system of discipline and education. He returns to the necessity of a permanent presidency in a country like ours, where the university must rest upon voluntary contribution for its support. There must be "a man who shall not only be a great scholar and a sound pedagogue, but who shall be possessed of social position, dignity of manner, and business tact, of energy, enthusiasm, and the power to inspire,—in other words, a man who can direct the surplus of great incomes into the university treasury and give wisest counsel to the trustees in its expenditure."

—MR. ARTHUR W. HUTTON's able paper on "Hymns and Music at Ethical Meetings," given before the South Place Ethical Society of London, and published in this number of the RECORD, will be of special interest to those attending the regular Sunday meetings of the Ethical Societies in this country. These meetings have appeared to many somewhat barren, inasmuch as they omit nearly all the established forms of church service. In this respect they have often been compared to the meetings of the Society of Friends. The lecture is the only regular exercise common to all the societies.

Some of the lecturers read appropriate selections from ancient or modern literature as an introduction to the address, and some of the societies always have music before and after the lecture. This has been the custom of the New York Society from the beginning. The music provided is an organ and a quartette. The selections for the quartette are old pieces re-adapted or original songs written especially for the occasion. The Chicago and St. Louis Societies also have either vocal or instrumental music at their meetings. A large part of the meetings of the Philadelphia Society have thus far been without music of any kind.

The Ethical Societies have experienced great difficulty in finding appropriate music, and this is the reason that so little has hitherto been provided. The societies do not object to music. The barrenness of the meetings, in this respect, has been mainly due to the fact that few songs or hymns could be obtained that express ideas and sentiments suitable to the meetings. There are signs that this difficulty will not long exist.

Dr. Bartol once made a remark to the editor to the effect that the new thought—the new ideas and sentiments—must break forth into song before they could spread and take any deep hold upon the mass of the people. Already the ethical idea is beginning to find expression in hymn and music. Emerson's prophecy of thirty years ago is beginning to be fulfilled:

"There will be a new church founded on moral science, at first cold and naked, a babe in a manger again, the algebra and mathematics of ethical law, the church of men to come, without shawms, or psaltery, or sackbut; but it will have heaven and earth for its beams and rafters; science for symbol and illustration; it will fast enough gather beauty, music, picture, poetry."

Nearly twenty years after Emerson wrote the above, he said "ethics has not yet its first hymn." Since then a modest beginning has been made. A few verses of Professor Adler's hymn "The City of the Light," set to music, was published in the first number of the *ETHICAL RECORD*. Each number of the first volume of the *RECORD* contained hymns and tunes used by the children's ethical classes in the dif-

ferent societies. This was the first step towards making a collection of hymns and tunes for Ethical Societies. The Chicago Society has printed a little pamphlet during the past winter for its own use, entitled "Songs of the Society for Ethical Culture," which contains a collection of eight hymns set to music. The titles are "City of the Light," "Day-spring," "Ye Friends of Freedom," "Nerve thy Spirit," "Earth's Reformers," "I believe in Human Kindness," "Bearing one Another's Burdens," and "The Law of Love."

A similar collection of sixteen hymns with music in four parts has recently been printed by the South Place Ethical Society of London. It is interesting to note that one of the hymns in this collection—one of the best of them—was written by Cardinal Newman. Some of the hymns in both the Chicago and South Place collections are from Christian writers, but, with one or two slight exceptions in the South Place collection, they are wholly free from theological phraseology and doctrinal implications, and a purely ethical spirit predominates in all of them.

Another collection of hymns which should be noticed in this connection is "The Cosmian Hymn-Book, containing a Collection of Original and Selected Hymns for Liberal and Ethical Societies and the Home," published by Oliver Dittson Co., of Boston. This collection contains two hundred and fifty-eight hymns. There is not a theological word or phraseology of any kind in the whole collection, though many of the hymns as originally written were distinctly theological. Such words and phrases have been struck out and others inserted in their place. But the old familiar hymns used in the churches have not been re-adapted with the best literary skill or with much poetic feeling. Apart from these there are many hymns in the collection which liberal societies will find very useful and helpful. The collection, in our judgment, would have been more valuable if the hymns requiring re-adaptation had been left out.

Now that Ethical Societies are multiplying there is great need of hymns and music suitable for ethical meetings. This need will not be adequately met, however, until new hymns,

embodying the idea and sentiments of the ethical movement, have been written. These will come in time. The collections we have noticed above are heralds of something better.

—THERE are few things more difficult than the preservation of pure minds in young and growing children. Parents who are sensible of this will thank us for calling their attention to a remarkably wise and well-written article in *The Open Court* (Chicago, May 9) on the subject by A. H. Heinemann. Mr. Heinemann, finding his boy's curiosity excited to such a pitch as to require satisfaction, made up his mind to instruct him in the natural process of propagation. He obtained a number of books with drawings on the physiology of plants, animals, and man, and commenced with plants. He showed him a great many drawings of the generative organs of plants, calling his attention to the beautiful leaf-like shapes of these organs, and, more particularly, to the difference between these organs in the male and female flowers, the transmission of the pollen and the development of the seed in the female flower. "I continued that part of the subject until he ceased asking questions upon it and said he understood the matter." The father went on with animals, from worms to mollusks to fishes, birds, and mammals, until the boy said that he had seen enough and understood it perfectly. All morbid curiosity thus vanished; "he will not listen to anything his friends will tell him upon these secret matters, because he esteems their talk idle prating of ignorance." For this and other suggestions, we commend the whole article to our readers.

—A CORRESPONDENT from Cornell University writes:

"Professor Adler visited us June 3d and 4th at the request of the Fortnightly Club. Monday night he lectured to a large audience upon the general purposes of the Ethical Culture Movement. Tuesday afternoon he explained the principles and methods of the philanthropic work of the society, and answered questions relating to its various enterprises.

"The number attending the lectures was surprisingly large, especially at this busy season for students. All were pleased and interested. The intense reverence and earnestness of the man disarmed all prejudice, while it transformed many admirers into ardent disciples."

The Union of Societies for Ethical Culture.

President.

PROFESSOR FELIX ADLER . . . 1521 Park Avenue, New York.

Treasurer.

DR. C. N. PEIRCE . . . 1415 Walnut Street, Philadelphia.

Secretary.

MR. S. BURNS WESTON . 405 N. Thirty-third Street, Philadelphia.

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"The general aim of the Ethical Movement, as represented by this Union, is to elevate the moral life of its members and that of the community, and it cordially welcomes to its fellowship all persons who sympathize with this aim, whatever may be their theological or philosophical opinions."

All persons in sympathy with the general aim of the Ethical Movement as expressed above are cordially invited to become members of the Union of Societies for Ethical Culture. Application blanks may be obtained by writing to the Secretary.

To each person received into the Union will be sent a blank for contribution to its funds. Those who contribute annually will receive THE ETHICAL RECORD, if they are not subscribers, and, hereafter, all the lectures published during the year by the different Ethical Societies.

By a provision of the Constitution of the Union, two-thirds of the money received from annual contributions will be set aside as a fund to be devoted to the training of Ethical teachers.

Application for membership should be made to the Secretary of the Union.

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No. 3

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(ENTERED AS SECOND-CLASS MATTER.)

THE ETHICAL RECORD.

OCTOBER, 1889.

GEORGE ELIOT'S VIEWS OF RELIGION.

BY W. M. SALTER.

It is always interesting to turn from theories to life. "Ideas are after all poor ghosts; they pass athwart us in thin vapor and cannot make themselves felt. But sometimes they are made flesh; they breathe upon us with warm breath, speak to us in appealing tones; they are clothed in a living human soul, with all its conflicts, its faith, and its love. Then their presence is a power, and we are drawn after them with gentle compulsion, as flame is drawn to flame." It is a drawing like this that every one must experience who has come to know through her writings that modest, self-distrustful, and yet truly great and beautiful soul known to the world as George Eliot. I purpose no critical estimate of her writings, nor any sketch of her life; there was indeed nothing eventful in her life, and a literary judgment I am scarcely competent to pronounce. It is the records of her soul, the growth of her mind, its attitude to religion and life,—it is her own religion and view of life that I should like to speak of.

Two things mark off George Eliot from all the other great novelists of our day: the first is the breadth of her culture, the second is the immense seriousness or religiousness of her nature. No other one has had so philosophic a mind, no other one has thought so deeply on the problems of life and

the world, no other one has arrived at more radical conclusions; and yet no one else has preserved through all changes so religious a spirit, no other literary person was ever that and so much more, no other novelist ever wrote with greater moral earnestness or a stronger moral purpose. The first glimpses we have of her as a young woman furnish a marked contrast with what we know of her in later life. The ordinary Christian conception of life she shared to the fullest extent, and she treated it with the seriousness that always characterized her. She could not have a faith that she did not try to shape her life in accordance with; and so, we are told, the pursuit of pleasure was a snare in her eyes, dress was vanity, and society a danger. How strange—how amusing, I should say, were it not impossible to indulge in pleasantry at any really serious conviction—to hear her speak of marriage as one of those earthly ties, which though powerful enough to detach men's hearts and thoughts from heaven, are so brittle as to be liable to be snapped asunder at every breeze, and confess her belief that those are happiest who consider this life merely a pilgrimage and a scene calling for diligence and watchfulness, not for repose and amusement! How surprising, when we think of the fact that music was one of the delights of her later life, and that her own capacities in this way were of no mean order, that in those early years she should say that it would not cost her any regrets if the only music heard in the land were that of strict devotion, and that she doubted whether a pleasure that involved the devotion of all the time and powers of an immortal being to the acquirement of an expertness in so useless an accomplishment could be quite pure or elevating in its tendency. Oh, that we could live only for eternity! she exclaims, that we could realize its nearness! And then again,—and the spirit of this she never outgrew,—oh, that the Lord might give her such an insight into what is truly good that she might not rest contented with making Christianity a mere *addendum* to her pursuits, or with taking it as a fringe to her garments! "May I seek to be sanctified wholly!" Such was her earliest piety; the Catholic Church she connected in true Protestant

fashion with the prophetic epithets applied in the Apocalypse to the scarlet beast; it was a piety of the fervent and narrow evangelical type, such as Puritanism intensified in England, and such as has been so powerful in shaping religion in our own country that to many piety seems synonymous with other-worldliness. Hannah More was one of the saints of her early religion; how complete the change was is shown in her saying to a friend in later years that she was glad that her friend detested Hannah More's letters; as for herself, she liked neither her letters, nor her books, nor her character.

What were the influences that brought about so great a change in this pure-minded and earnest young woman? Underneath them all, we must place her eagerness for positive knowledge; this it was, said one of her friends, that made her an unbeliever. When twenty-two years of age she had her doubts, though she tells us that eight or nine years earlier she had been impressed by one of Bulwer's characters, who was a "very amiable atheist," and had been considerably shaken by the feeling that religious beliefs were not a requisite to moral excellence. George Eliot was one who felt the spirit of the age in which we live. She experienced no angry revolt against Christianity, such as was common in the last century. She never ridicules it. She seems not to have been influenced in any way by such writers as Voltaire or Paine. She said in later life, indeed, that the system of Deism which they professed, seemed to her the most incoherent of all systems, but to Christianity she felt no objection save its want of evidence. She felt towards Christianity as one might towards some belief which had seemed most solid and sure, but which turned out, on closer questioning and reflection, to be not solid or sure at all. The characteristic of the present age is the felt necessity of evidence for our beliefs; it is not enough that a religion has exalted conceptions, that it appeals to the imagination and the poetic instincts, and seems to satisfy our hopes and needs. We want to know that it is true; and the very raising of the question, together with the standard of truth it implies, as something separate from our wishes and feelings and prepossessions, signifies a new stage

and level of intellectual life. George Eliot early turned to the origin of Christianity. She tried to find what we may certainly know of Jesus, upon whom the whole edifice rests. She consulted the most scholarly and independent English and German treatises on the subject. She tried to read herself into the spirit of the times in which Jesus lived; her whole soul, she writes at the time, was engrossed in the most interesting of all inquiries, and to what results her thoughts might lead she knew not, but her only desire was "to know the truth, and her only fear to cling to error." We see the perplexity of soul into which she was plunged, and which certainly every one has known who has, with a similarly religious and earnest spirit, taken up such inquiries,—we see it exhibited in her exclamation,—“What a pity that while mathematics are indubitable, immutable, and no one doubts the proportions of a triangle or a circle, doctrines infinitely important to man, are buried in a charnel-heap of bones, over which nothing is heard but the barks and growls of contention.” And the result of it all was, not the rejection of Christ, but a sense of the uncertainty of a great deal that the religious world claims to know about him, and of the dubiousness of the theological doctrines that have been built upon the authority of his name. Doubtless her feeling was expressed to the full by Strauss, whose “Life of Jesus” she soon engaged herself in translating, when he wrote that the Jesus of history, of science, is a problem, and that a problem cannot be the object of religious worship. The existence of Jesus, the main outlines of his life, that, as she has poetically expressed it, he was a divine man who taught and was hated in Capernaum, this she never doubted; but the view of him on which the Church is built, and all the supernatural claims that have been made for him, and he may have mistakenly made for himself—these were little better than legend and myth to her, and would likely never have arisen, as she no doubt thought, save in an age and part of the world where scientific habits of thought existed most scantily. Religion then must have, she felt, quite a different foundation from that of the church of which she had been so conscientious a

member, and the same earnestness and truthfulness that she had always shown led her to break with the customary forms of worship, and to give up going to church. She afterwards relaxed so stringent a rule, her sympathetic nature leading her to enjoy fellowship of the spirit where she could not fellowship of thought, but in thought she always stood apart from the church, and she has told us of her delight in a passage from one of the writings of a friend, in which certain extravagances of unbelievers in Christianity are said to be in no way implied of necessity in the formal rejection of it.

How did this great change of belief show itself? She did not set about attacking Christianity. She confessed, indeed, in later years, her lack of sympathy with the arid narrow antagonism which in some quarters was held to be the only form of liberal thought, and even declared that she had little sympathy with Free-thinkers, as a class, and had lost all interest in mere antagonism to religious doctrines; her solicitude was only to protest against the claim of the Evangelicals to an exclusive possession of higher motives to morality, and, as for herself, she said that she was influenced in her conduct by far higher considerations, and by a far nobler idea of duty, than she ever was when she held Evangelical beliefs. Some one had said in commenting upon a children's story written by a friend, that no motives were presented to the children in it; and George Eliot wrote, "I fear the fatal fact about your story is the absence of a God and hell. It is really hideous to find that those who sit in the scribes' seats have got no farther than the appeal to selfishness, which they call God." It might be thought that one effect of her change of belief would be to make her despondent; but we find her, instead, meditating, writing on the superiority of the consolations of philosophy to those of religion (so-called). We hear a great deal of the sadness of George Eliot, and, probably, few Christian writers speak of it without referring to the loss of faith as its cause. But the fact is, as Mr. Frederick Harrison has pointed out, that her sadness is most noticeable in her Calvinistic and Biblical period, and she herself has told us later on that she was one of those exceptional people whose early

childish dreams were much less happy than the real outcome of life. A certain note of sadness does indeed run through many of her writings; but it seems to be simply the sadness of one who thought deeply and felt much about human life, and would have existed whatever her religious philosophy. As a matter of fact, it is nowise inconsistent with grand strains of hope for the future such as we find in her poem, "The Minor Prophet," and in such an outburst as this in one of her letters: "Is it not cheering to think of the youthfulness of this little planet, and the immensely greater youthfulness of our race upon it? to think that the higher moral tendencies of human nature are only yet in their germ?" George Eliot is sad, so far as she is so, because she paints human life as it is; the consoling, uplifting, inspiring thought is always that of human life as it might be, and to paint that is not the function of the novelist, but of the prophet and the seer. But many of our writers leave no sadness with us, simply because they do not know human life at all; because they entertain us with pretty plots spun out of their fancies that have no basis in this actual, much-suffering and often tragic life of ours.

The loss of Christian faith is often said to make nature seem as dead and hollow as life itself. But George Eliot tells us that certain landscape paintings brought a whole world of thought and bliss to her; that the ocean, and sky, and the everlasting hills themselves were spirit to her mind, and would never be robbed of their sublimity. And how is her conscience affected? Is it any less fine in its sense of right and wrong,—and less sensitive? "I have been holding a court of conscience," she writes to a friend,—and I cannot resist the impulse to quote the whole passage, so touchingly is her own inner life thus brought before us,—"I have been holding a court of conscience, and I cannot enjoy my Sunday's music without restoring harmony, without entering a protest against that superficial soul of mine which is perpetually contradicting and belying the true inner soul. I am in that mood which in another age of the world would have led me to put on sackcloth and pour ashes on my head, when I call to mind the sins of my tongue, my animadversions on the faults of

others, as if I thought myself to be something when I am nothing. When shall I attain to the true spirit of love which Paul has taught for all ages? I want no one to excuse me. I only want to remove the shadow of my miserable words and deeds from before the divine image of truth and goodness, which I would have all beings worship. I need the Jesuit's discipline of silence, and though my 'evil-speaking' issued from the intellectual point of view rather than the moral,—though there may be gall in the thought while there is honey in the feeling, yet the 'evil-speaking' is wrong. We may satirize character and qualities in the abstract without injury to the moral nature, but persons hardly ever. Poor hints and sketches of souls as we are,—with some slight transient vision of the perfect and the true,—we had need help each other to gaze at the blessed heavens instead of peering into each other's eyes to find out the motes there." What pathos, what purifying sadness are in these words! If a new book of scriptures should ever be compiled, surely they would make a sacred chapter on the sins of the tongue. I cannot find that her conscience lost any of its scruples, or that her moral life suffered in any way by her abandonment of Christian convictions. Her marriage with Mr. Lewes, I know, may seem an exception, and I cannot undertake to discuss this now, though I do not believe, at the worst, it was more than an error of judgment on her part, or that the really sacred and even Christian law of marriage,—that, namely, of the life-long faithfulness of one man and one woman,—she ever violated. The ideal of marriage she never wavered about any more than about the ideal of any other great relation in life. Again and again does she utter her belief that human relations are sacred beyond the inclination of changing moods. In "Adam Bede" she says, "What greater thing is there for two human souls than to feel that they are joined for life, to strengthen each other in all labor, to rest on each other in all sorrow, to minister to each other in all pain, to be one with each other in silent, unspeakable memories at the moment of the last parting." And again, in one of her latest novels, its heroine, Dorothea, says, "Marriage is so unlike everything. There is

something even awful in the nearness it brings. Even if we loved some one else better than those we are married to, it would be of no use." Contrary to the spirit of all this I do not believe George Eliot ever acted or could have acted. I doubt, indeed, if there is an instance in biography of more earnest co-operation or greater faithfulness and affection between husband and wife than that between Mr. Lewes and George Eliot till death did them part. George Eliot felt the power and the glory of such a genius as that of Rousseau or as that of George Sand, but she did not blind herself to their faults. In reference to the Byron scandals that were travelling over the English-speaking world, some eighteen years ago, she said that nothing, to her mind, could outweigh the heavy social injury of familiarizing young minds with the desecration of family ties. How her moral feelings were stirred by the gambling-tables, the dull faces bending around them, the hard-looking men and the hateful, hideous women playing there, that she saw at Homburg! "Hell is the only right name for such places," she exclaimed with an intensity all unusual to her. What indignation arose in her at the rich brewers in Parliament and out of it, who planted these "poison-shops,"—as she called the public houses or saloons of England,—for their million-making trade, while probably their families were figuring somewhere as refined philanthropists or devout evangelicals and ritualists! With all her sympathy with the scientific view of ethics, how true she remains to her moral nature and sense of humanity against the specious attacks sometimes made in the name of science on one of the noblest elements of morality,—namely, charity. Some one had called it humbug. She said if by charity was meant mere almsgiving it might vanish away; but if it covered the meaning which it had in the early English, which the translators of the Bible meant in their rendering of the thirteenth chapter of first Corinthians—*Caritas*, the highest love or fellowship,—that she was happy to believe no philosophy would expel from the world.

How true it thus seems that her moral ideas had a basis altogether independent of the theology she had outgrown,

that pity and fairness—two little words, as she said, which carried out would embrace the utmost delicacies of the moral life—do not rest on an unverifiable hypothesis, but on facts quite as irreversible as the perception that a pyramid will not stand on its apex; or, as she has elsewhere put it, that fellowship between man and man, which has been the principle of moral and social progress, is not dependent upon conceptions of what is not man; and the idea of God, so far as it has had a high spiritual influence, is the ideal of a goodness entirely human. Instead of narrower sympathies, as is always prophesied of those who give up the old religions, she had broader sympathies as her life went on.

She had sympathies, for example, with those for whom many Christians have almost felt it a duty to renounce all sympathy, though it be the people from whom their own religion first came. The Jewish element in Daniel Deronda had created much popular resistance and even repulsion; but, she says, "precisely because I felt that the usual attitude of Christians towards Jews is—I hardly know whether to say more impious or more stupid when viewed in the light of their professed principles, I therefore felt urged to treat Jews with such sympathy and understanding as my nature and knowledge could attain to. Moreover, not only towards the Jews, but towards all Oriental peoples with whom we English come in contact, a spirit of arrogance and contemptuous dictatorialness is observable which has become a national disgrace to us. There is nothing I should care more to do, if it were possible, than to rouse the imagination of men and women to a vision of human claims in those races of their fellow-men who most differ from them in customs and beliefs. But towards the Hebrews we western people, who have been reared in Christianity, have a peculiar debt, and, whether we acknowledge it or not, a peculiar thoroughness of fellowship in religious and moral sentiment. Can anything be more disgusting than to hear people called 'educated' making small jokes about eating ham, and showing themselves empty of any real knowledge as to the relation of their own social and religious life to the history of the people

they think themselves witty in insulting? They hardly know that Christ was a Jew. And I find men, educated, supposing that Christ spoke Greek. To my feeling, this deadness to the history which has prepared half our world for us, this inability to find interest in any form of life that is not clad in the same coat-tails and flounces as our own, lies very close to the worst kind of irreligion. The best that can be said of it is, that it is a sign of the intellectual narrowness—in plain English, the stupidity—which is still the average mark of our culture."

She felt the power of the ideas that broke forth in the French Revolution, in the great one of '89, and again in that of '48,—she saw that, as one result, the French working-classes were much superior to those of England,—the *mind* of the people in France being highly electrified and full of ideas on social subjects. "Poor Louis Blanc!" she exclaims after the failure of some of his plans in the revolution of '48. "The newspapers make me melancholy; but shame upon me that I say 'poor.' The day will come when there will be a temple of white marble, where sweet incense and anthems shall rise to the memory of every man and woman who has had a deep *Ahnung* of the time when this miserable reign of mammon shall end; when men shall be no longer 'like the fishes of the sea,' society no more like a face one-half of which—the side of profession—is fair and God-like; the other half—the side of deeds and institutions—with a hard, old, wrinkled skin puckered into the sneer of a Mephistopheles." I worship the man, she says, who has written as the climax of his appeal against society, "the inequality of talent ought to result not in the inequality of rewards, but in the inequality of services." What a grand social idea does this suggest to us, what grand hope for the destiny of humanity does she reveal! George Eliot never becomes a doctrinal teacher, indeed; she viewed it as her function to rouse the nobler emotions which make mankind desire the social right, but not to prescribe special measures; none the less is she personally interested in special schemes; and it is interesting to note that but a short time before her death she speaks of reading an account of Leclaire's

experiment of profit-sharing with his workmen, calling it an excellent plan, and promising to send a copy of it to a friend.

Nor, so far as they are distinguished, were the foundations of religion any more than those of morality shaken for this noble woman by her giving up of the Christian faith. She lost all interest in mere antagonism to religious doctrines; she said she was anxious only to know, if possible, the lasting meaning that lay in all religious doctrine from the beginning till now. She, indeed, never turned her face backward; she saw the folly of Romanticism, and as vain as for the Emperor Julian to seek to restore the Greek religion and its spirit did she hold it for men to-day, no matter how powerful and full of genius they might be, to try to bring back that simple, childlike and, indeed, childish mind, to which the myths and legends and fairy-tales of the Christian system were literal fact; but though the forms of religion perish, and an ancient form cannot be resuscitated, religion itself does not die, she held, but like a subtle spirit escapes from the decaying ruins of the past, and takes on a new guise and grows to nobler proportions. Religion gathers to her mind no more about indemonstrable persons, but about demonstrable laws. "Poor child!" she writes about Maggie Tulliver, in "*Mill on the Floss*;" "as she leaned her head against the window-frame, with her hands clasped together tighter and tighter, and her foot beating the ground, she was as lonely as if she had been the only girl in the civilized world of that day who had come out of her school-life with a soul untrained for inevitable struggles,—with much futile information about Saxon and other kings of doubtful example, but unhappily quite without that knowledge of the irreversible laws within and without her, which, governing the habits, becomes morality, and, developing the feeling of submission and dependence, becomes religion." Here is a conception of religion which makes a sure foundation for the religion of the future. We are encompassed with something our own hands have not made,—the world without us and the laws of the moral world within; the highest knowledge is to know these laws and to know that we cannot change them. Morality is the habit of obedience to them,

and religion, so far as it can be distinguished, is the accompanying sense of submission and dependence. This may not be as poetic or imaginative a conception as the Christian one, or as the ancient Greek one. We human beings love persons like ourselves, and love to people the world with them; but it is at least a true conception, it is one to solidly build upon; and as to the Christian conception of one or three persons, or the Greek conception of many, it is hard for many to say whether it is true or not,—and making religion hang on any one of them seems like making religion hang on something in the air. George Eliot looked with interest on the different new religious movements of our day, but she allied herself with none. She came nearest to doing this in connection with Positivism; she repeatedly acknowledges her obligations to Comte, the founder of that system; she corrects misinterpretations of his views; she is said to have contributed for many years to what is known as the Comtist Fund in Paris. But, on the other hand, she regarded Positivism as one-sided; she probably felt with her friend, Herbert Spencer, that it was impossible to deify humanity as Positivism practically does; the sense of the mystery transcending humanity she could not banish from her mind, and not long before her death she remarked to a friend that she could not submit her intellect or her soul to the guidance of Comte. She had faith in the working out of higher possibilities than the Catholic or any other church has presented; and those, she said, who have strength to wait and endure are bound to accept no formula which their whole souls—intellect as well as emotions—do not embrace with entire reverence. The ‘highest calling and election,’ she was sure, was to do without opium, and live through all our pain with conscious, clear-eyed endurance.

George Eliot’s own working theory of life and religion have been already foreshadowed. At first she remained a theist, but the definite outlines of such a faith soon faded from her mind. Creative design did not seem to her a tenable conception; she felt indeed a greater disinclination every day, she said, for theories and arguments about the origin of things in the presence of all this mystery and

beauty and pain and ugliness that floods one with conflicting emotions; she doubted if in our own natures any more than in the world without we could find a key to the Divine mystery. Yet the sense of a Divine mystery is what always keeps her from dropping into materialism; familiar as she made herself with the science of the day, and particularly with the great revolutionary theory of Darwin, she felt there was something that science could not grasp, and once said in reference to Darwinism that that, and all other explanations of processes by which things came to be, produced a feeble impression compared with the mystery that lies under the processes. It is sometimes said that she was contented with humanity and recognized nothing beyond it. I do not read her mind in that way. Outside of man she recognized forces working to his benefit and delight; we reap what we sow, she said, but nature has love over and above that justice, and gives shadow and blossom and fruit that spring from no planting of ours. There are unseen elements, she knows, that surpass the wisest human calculations; and if one of her characters called them the Divine will and filled up thus the margin of our ignorance with trust and resignation, she doubts if the profoundest philosophy could fill it up better. The sense of the Unknown is particularly borne in upon us in times of sorrow and affliction, and it is one of the beneficial results of suffering that it vivifies that sense which is ordinarily so feeble in us.

But it is the idea of duty that is clearest and strongest in her view of life. This, indeed, is the central thing in her religion. That idea is the recognition of something to be lived for beyond the mere satisfaction of self, and no man, she says, can begin to mould himself upon it without rising to a higher order of experience; a principle of subordination, of self-mastery, has been introduced into his nature; he is no longer a mere bundle of impressions, desires, or impulses. Uncertain as she was about God and immortality,—in the ordinary personal senses of those words,—she pronounced with terrible emphasis, it is said, one evening walking with a friend in a college garden at Cambridge, how peremptory and

absolute was duty. Duty, indeed, is its own evidence, she thought; it shines by its own light, as honest Adam Bede said about a certain passage of Scripture, and wants no candle to show it. Charity, George Eliot writes, is a duty about which all creeds and philosophies are one; here the conscience cannot be dogged by doubt; here you may begin to act without settling one preliminary question. "This blessing of serene freedom from the importunities of opinion lies in all simple direct acts of mercy, and is one source of that sweet calm which is often felt by the watcher in the sick-room, even when the duties there are of a hard and terrible kind." One might say that the main thing in her thought of duty was a sense of the sacredness of human lives about us, so that we should never have light thoughts of human suffering, or indulge in frivolous gossip over what may seem to us blighted human lives. Oh, the anguish of the thought, she exclaims in one of her early stories, that we can never atone to the dead for the stinted affection we gave them, for the light answers we returned to their complaints or pleadings, for the little reverence we showed to that sacred soul that lived so close to us, and was the divinest thing God had given us to know! She speaks of the mother's yearning as the complete type of the life in another life which is the essence of real human love, and says the mother feels the presence of the cherished child even in the base degraded man. What a type, I might say, is that of the way in which morality would have us regard all human beings,—to see the preciousness of even the lowest and the least, to see the ideal in every man.

And yet our actual life she looks upon with a serious eye. She is no pessimist, nor, on the other hand does she give herself up to optimistic dreams, as if everything in the world were good could we see it aright. No; there are wrongs that men do that can never be altered. "I hate that talk of people," says Adam Bede, "as if there was a way o' making amends for everything;" our deeds are rather like children born to us, that live and act apart from our will; nay, children may be strangled, but deeds never; they have an indestructible life, both in and out of consciousness. It is this that gives almost

an aspect of fatalism to her views of life ; but she is not a fatalist. It is *we*, after all, who do these deeds, and we are not compelled to do them. It always remains true, she once says, that if we had been greater, circumstances would have been less strong against us. "I will elect my deed," she makes one of her heroes say, "and be the liege,

Not of my birth, but of the good alone
I have discerned and chosen."

And that power of choice, no doubt, she recognized as existing in every man.

Happiness she looks on as a dangerous aim in life. "It's plain enough," says Adam Bede: "you get into the wrong road in this life if you run after this and that only for the sake of making things easy and pleasant to yourself." There are so many things wrong and difficult in the world, George Eliot declares, that no man can be great—he can hardly keep himself from wickedness—unless he gives up thinking much about pleasure and rewards, and gets strength to endure what is hard and painful. She knows that the tragedies of life consist in the necessity of the choice between happiness and duty ; and she never hesitates as to which we should choose.

"Slowly she moved to choose sublimer pain ;"

"Some deep energy compels me to choose hunger,"—

such are lines descriptive of Fedalma in that masterpiece of modern tragedies, the "Spanish Gypsy." Again and again does George Eliot speak of a moral law restraining desire, of the sublime prompting to do the painful right, of that ideal condition of the soul, where inward vision over impulse reigns. Duty, indeed, she feels is given us, and in this sense men cannot choose duties any more than they can choose their birth-place, or their father and mother ; they can, of course, choose to forsake their duties, to avoid the sorrow that they bring, but the result they will find to be sorrow without duty,—bitter herbs, and no bread with them.

How close home to men in business life does she come, when she makes Felix Holt say, "The world is not a very fine place

for a good many of the people in it. But I've made up my mind it shan't be the worse for me, if I can help it. They may tell me I can't alter the world—that there must be a certain number of sneaks and robbers in it, and if I don't lie and filch somebody else will. Well, then, somebody else shall, for I won't." And again, "I'm determined never to go about making my face simpering and solemn, and tell professional lies for profit, or to get tangled in affairs where I must wink at dishonesty and pocket the proceeds, and justify that knavery as part of a system I can't alter."

For those whose lives are quiet and retired from the world, and seem so trivial that they are sometimes oppressed with their littleness, how apt are those words about Dorothea: "Her finely touched spirit had still its fine issues, though they were not widely visible, . . . for the growing good of the world is partly dependent on unhistoric acts; and that things are not so ill with you and me as they might have been is half owing to the number of those who lived faithfully a hidden life, and rest in unvisited tombs."

Yes, what a comfort for us all, who often have dim instincts of good and want to do the right even when we don't know just what it is, are Dorothea's own words, that by desiring what is perfectly good, even when we don't know what it is, we are part of the divine power against evil—widening the skirts of light and making the struggle with darkness narrower.

Yes, George Eliot teaches us not only how to live, but how to die. She pictures Arion, doomed to death by the mariners who coveted his gold, donning his solemn robe, nearing the prow of the vessel, taking his godlike stand there, cithara in hand, pouring out his soul in "a song unsung before," and then, his descant done, leaping on high,

"Not asking, 'Is it well?'
Like a pierced eagle fell."

So I should say of us all,—if we must die, let us do one last moral act before we die; let us do one deed of charity, or breathe one thought of resignation, or sing one song of thanksgiving that we have been permitted to live.

And about what comes after death, she has no negative, any more than positive dogmatism. In our uncertainty about it, she is simply anxious to show that the reasons for the noble living still go on. Nor is her image of the grave always one of darkness and gloom, natural enough as such an image is by way of contrast with the light and joy of life. No, she knows that as life issues from a background of great and awful mystery, so it returns thither,—'tis not nothingness into which we sink, 'tis rather what in so many words she calls "the All-creating Presence."

Such was George Eliot's view of life and the world; such made practically the working religion by which she lived. A Meliorist she was: she herself invented the word, believing that life may always be made better, that the world is becoming better, that some grand future awaits the race that now struggles with its littleness, its suffering, and its sin. Good-speed, I say, to the day when that thought shall animate hundreds and thousands of our fellow-men, when that future religion of which she dreamed shall be an active and powerful factor in the world, regenerating society, inspiring hope, and lifting life to levels that seem so far off now!

COURSES IN ETHICS IN HARVARD COLLEGE.

BY JOSIAH ROYCE, PH.D.

THE development of the Elective System of college instruction at Harvard has gradually led to a great multiplication of the courses offered in all the departments. Where students have great freedom both in the choice and in the arrangement of their topics of instruction, there is a constant demand for the establishment of new courses which shall bring into connection various branches of learning, and there is also a continually increasing disposition on the part of our teachers to accommodate themselves to such demands. Students choose courses because they desire to know in each case what the professor has to say about some particular topic; while the instructor himself is equally anxious to secure a convenient number of industrious and enthusiastic pupils. In consequence, a subject like Ethics, which suggests so many sub-topics, and which has bearings and relations of so manifold a sort, is sure, under our present system, to attract the attention of other departments besides that technically called the Department of Philosophy. In fact, then, the courses at Harvard which would appeal to the student of ethics are both numerous and decidedly various.

I begin with the philosophical courses proper. As an introduction to philosophy at large the Harvard student may take any one of three concurrent elementary courses, one of which, offered by Professor Palmer, treats of the History of Philosophy, with special reference to Greek Philosophy, while the other two courses discuss both logic and general psychology. The student of ethics would naturally begin with one of these three courses. Courses of a second grade, classed as "advanced courses," cover together a considerable portion of the field of general philosophy. Specially devoted

to ethics are two of these courses, one on "Systematic Ethics," by Professor Palmer, and one on the "Ethics of Social Reform," by Professor Francis Peabody. Professor Palmer's course was omitted by reason of his absence during the past academic year, and in place of it Professor James offered a course on "Modern Discussions of Ethical and Religious Problems," his principal text-books being Dr. Martineau's "Types of Ethical Theory," and the same author's "Study of Religion." I need not say to any one who knows either Harvard or Professor James that the work of this course did not consist in a mere exposition and defence of Dr. Martineau's beautiful but not precisely conclusive investigations. The lectures presupposed, indeed, the constant reading of the text-books, and explained Dr. Martineau as they went, but, as I know both from long acquaintance and from special conversations with the instructor, there is not a little difference between his own philosophical views and those of Dr. Martineau, and the lectures contained even more of criticism and of independent construction than of exposition.

I fancy that this method of criticism and of independent construction, with the use of a text rather as the starting-point than as the support of the lecturer's opinions, both now is and long will be characteristic of a majority of our philosophical courses at Harvard. The method has rather forced itself upon us. The students want to know historically the views of prominent authors, and not merely to learn our own personal doctrines. We are equally desirous of getting a hearing for ourselves; but we are also not unwilling to do critical work, as well as to give constructive lectures. The result is that we often choose an author as the basis of a course for the very purpose of making plain the contrast between our own point of view and his. The lecture becomes thus a sort of dialogue between author and instructor. Each has his say, and the student is expected to stand examination on the controversy. The modern freedom of teaching, which at Harvard is complete, encourages of course this fashion of work.

Professor Palmer's course on Ethics was formerly founded upon a critical study of English Ethics from Hobbes to Mill, followed up by a similar study of the Kantian Ethics, with a use of Abbott's translation of Kant. Of late years Professor Palmer has been more disposed to give his course the form of a constructive statement of his own ethical theory, and the work announced for the coming winter will consist of a systematic discussion of the ethical consciousness in its principles, and in its bearings on general philosophy.

The course of Professor Francis Peabody, who is Plummer Professor of Christian Morals, is announced from year to year as one in practical ethics. It treats such problems of "Social Reform" as Charity, Divorce, the Indians, Labor, Prisons, Temperance, etc., and the aim is to teach concrete ethical doctrine not as a matter of theory, but in its direct application to life. Professor Peabody's students get opportunities to become personally acquainted with the facts of society which furnish some of these problems. By visiting prisons, factories, the meetings of labor organizations, or the offices of charitable organizations, they study the problems in concrete form, and are expected to write theses upon some of them.

All or nearly all the advanced courses in Philosophy now use this method of thesis-writing,—*i.e.*, the production of original essays on assigned topics, as a test of a student's power of work, and as an aid to the advancement of his knowledge. Lectures without the reading of books accomplish little; and both are comparatively vain unless the student reacts upon what he receives by trying, however crudely, to express his own thoughts upon the serious problems of philosophy.

Of other advanced courses Professor Bowen's lectures on Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann give a critical discussion of Pessimism. My own advanced undergraduate course in philosophy bears upon ethics only secondarily. The topic is "The Philosophy of Nature;" the treatment is based upon a criticism of Spinoza and of Mr. Herbert Spencer. Yet in dealing with Spinoza my text is his "Ethics" as a whole, and the ethical problems come in sight, here and throughout, not

merely because Spinoza devotes so much attention to them, but because, to my own mind, the great philosophical problems are all so organically connected that no one can be treated wholly apart from the others. The main problem of this course is in fact the relation between the postulates of the scientific explanation of nature, and that ethical interpretation of the external world which has in past given rise to so many forms of teleology. In a brace of articles published in the *Unitarian Review* for July and August of this year, under the title, "Is there a Philosophy of Evolution?" I have set forth the substance of what is expanded into a considerable portion of this "Philosophy of Nature" course, and any one who cares to glance at those articles will see that ethical problems are by no means below the horizon of my discussion.

No account of our ethical courses would be at all complete which omitted reference to the lectures bearing upon the History and Philosophy of Religion, as well as upon the history of the great ethical crises of humanity. As soon as I undertake to mention these courses, however, I am, almost at once, led beyond the Philosophical Department proper, into the larger field of those courses which the elective system, and the general demand of our students for an exposition of the relations between different departments of learning, have already brought into existence.

Professor Francis Peabody has indeed, among our courses in Philosophy, one, a "half-course" (that is, one confined to fewer hours per week, and so counting towards a degree only one-half of the value of a full course of work), on the "Philosophy of Religion," and its history from Lessing to Schleiermacher. To this we must add Professor C. C. Everett's course on the "Comparative History of Religions." This appears on our list among the history courses, but is, as all will know, the work of an accomplished philosophical scholar and author. Its subject-matter embraces the study of Vedic, Persian, and Chinese Religion, as well as of Hindoo Philosophy. Three other courses on the historical list bear upon the history of religion. Of these, two—Professor Emerton's courses

on "The Conflict of Christianity and Paganism" and "The Mediæval Church"—will be omitted for the coming year by reason of the instructor's absence in Europe. The third will be given next year. It is by Professor A. V. G. Allen, author of a well-known book on the "Continuity of Christian Thought," who now for the first time lectures in the college on the "Era of the Reformation from the Rise of Humanism to the Council of Trent."

Passing to the various Philological Departments, we find offered to the ethical student several courses of historical importance for his work. Two of the classical courses may here first be mentioned. Of these one is on "Ancient Philosophy as set forth by Cicero," and is given by Professor Greenough; and the other deals with "Plato and Aristotle," including the *Phædo*, the *Phædrus*, part of the *Republic*, and part of Aristotle's *Ethics* in a series of expository lectures for advanced students of Greek. This course is announced for the coming year by Professor Wright. It was formerly given by Professor Goodwin. Professor Frederick Allen also announces for the coming year a course on Roman Religion. Among the Semitic courses, one by Professor Toy, treats, after the methods of modern historical criticism, the "Religion of Israel." Professor Lanman, in his Sanskrit and Iranian courses, devotes attention to the documents both of ancient Persian and of Hindoo Religion. And thus the student of the connection between ethics and religion, as well as the student of ethical speculation proper, will find that the philological departments offer him not a little aid.

In the very elaborate lists of courses in modern foreign literature and in Political Science, the various *Hilfswissenschaften* of Ethics are not without considerable representation.

I have spoken thus far of the courses offered to undergraduates and to graduates alike. In the philosophical department proper there are also three courses offered exclusively to graduates. One of these, by Professor Palmer, is a course of "special advanced research," entitled "Questions in Ethics." The character of the course is to be adapted in any year to the personal needs of the advanced students who may

offer themselves, but the work will in general consist, as far as possible, of original historical and critical research under the guidance of Professor Palmer.

In the Harvard "annex" Professor Palmer and myself have alternated in offering courses on ethics to the women who are there pursuing college studies.

ETHICS IN CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

BY J. G. SCHURMAN, D.SC.

ALL the philosophical courses in Cornell University are elective save an initiatory course in logic and psychology, running twice a week throughout the year, which is required of all Sophomores in all departments except the technical. The courses in Ethics (of which an account is desired by the editor of this magazine) begin, therefore, in the Junior year. The first consists of a general course (three hours a week throughout the year), open to all students above the rank of Sophomores, but naturally most largely attended by Juniors. In the session of 1888-89 the class was composed of seventy-eight registered members, and (for the greater part of the time) about half as many more unregistered attendants. The subject was treated by the professor under three main divisions: (1) the facts of morality; (2) the theory or principles of morality; and (3) the application of these principles to life. About half the year was devoted to the first topic, and an attempt was made, besides analyzing the moral consciousness of the American of the nineteenth century, to represent the moral ideals, sentiments, and institutions of mankind in all stages of development. The *a priori* construction of facts being reprobated as pernicious in every science, and hitherto especially baneful in Ethics, it was decided to limit this survey of the manifestations of the moral consciousness of mankind to such facts as fall within the horizon of history (in the broadest sense of that term) and of contemporary observa-

tion. The unconscious morality of savages and barbarians and of civilized peoples like the Egyptians, Hebrews, Greeks, and Romans, as well as the conscious morality of the Socratico-Platonic dialogues and the Sermon on the Mount, along with their energizing, by way both of development and of degeneration, in the Hellenic and the Christian world, formed the leading points of this division of the subject. Upon the basis of the facts thus accumulated a theory of morals was, in the second place, attempted, by the aid, however, of an outline history of ethical theories from the rise of reflection among the Greeks down to our own day; and, to secure as much impartiality as possible, two text-books were prescribed,—Mr. Spencer's "Data of Ethics" for Utilitarianism and Dr. Robinson's "Principles" for Intuitionism.* During this part of the course two-thirds of the time was devoted to discussions and essays. A theory of the moral faculty, the moral law, and moral obligation having been obtained, or at least postulated, it remained, in the third place, to apply its principles to the regulation of life, individual, family, political, and social. And to this realm of applied ethics were assigned the problems of labor and capital, poverty and crime, marriage and divorce, the abuses of the ballot and civil service, and the subjects of war, peace, and arbitration. Though this part of the course had to be treated briefly (and is hereafter to be investigated in detail in the philosophical seminary), it was attempted to illustrate the moralization of mankind from the history of the growth of international law, which Austin properly recognized as merely international morality.

Of this general course all our other courses in Ethics are specializations. The student who has completed it is offered in 1889-90 a course in Aristotle's "Ethics" (for the moral ideals of the Greeks), a course in Sidgwick's "Methods of Ethics" (for an analysis of the moral consciousness of modern Christendom), and, if he has already mastered Kant's "Cri-

* In other years I have used Mr. Martineau's "Types of Ethical Theory," vol. ii., and President Porter's manual, and I think of trying Professor Calderwood's, with Mr. Spencer's "Data." I have sometimes used Darwin's "Descent" (the early chapters) or Mill's "Utilitarianism."

tique," a course in Kant's "Ethics" (for the most famous modern theory of morals). The method of instruction followed in these classes, which meet from once to twice a week, is that of discussions and essays, with enough of questioning to make sure that the student has mastered his author. For graduates who have completed these courses there is a seminary devoted to the investigation of ethical as well as other philosophical subjects. The topic in 1888-89 was Hegel's "Philosophie der Religion," but in 1889-90 we shall probably take up either the nature and growth of the morality of the Hebrews or the forms and variations of the institution of the family and of marriage. In the seminary students are charged with the investigation of special problems under the general subject, turned into the library with directions regarding sources, and requested to report progress once a week, when all come together for a general survey of the field. It is not customary to have more than two or three, and there may be fewer, members of such a seminary, though there happened to be more in 1888-89.

The foregoing description applies to the Cornell of to-day ; and this remark is all the more necessary, as there is a strong probability of the speedy enlargement and reorganization of our entire department of philosophy.

ETHICS IN THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

BY JOHN DEWEY, PH.D.

I SUPPOSE I may best supply what is desired if I first say something about the ethical courses to be given in the collegiate year 1889-90, considered as parts of the University curriculum, and then go on to say something of their standpoint and purpose. The only required courses in philosophy in the University are those in logic and psychology, one or other of which must be taken by all candidates for degrees, excepting by the students in the various engineering courses.

Psychology is required precedent to the first course in Ethics. This is a lecture course of two hours per week, given in the second semester of the year, and is taken mainly by Juniors. Following this course is a lecture course of two hours per week in Political Philosophy,—taken accordingly mainly by Seniors. In the second semester comes a seminary course in Political Philosophy, which may be taken by candidates for advanced degrees, and by undergraduates, if they are deemed suitably prepared. In recent years special courses in the Ethics of Plato, of Aristotle and of Kant have been given, but it happens that no one of them is upon the programme for this year.

The first course in Ethics is a purely general one; its aim is theoretical rather than historical or practical. The greater number of students in ethics take also the course in the History of Philosophy, three times a week through the year; and this, together with the criticism of various systems in the course in ethics, is relied upon to give sufficient historical data. Readings and reports by the students are required; the references being to such authors as Aristotle, Plato, Hume, Kant, Mill, Spencer, Stephens, Green, Martineau, etc. For convenience the subject is discussed under three heads. The first is the theory of the Moral Ideal; the second, the objective Moral World; the third, the Concrete Moral Life of the Individual. The aim of the first part is to discover the ethical ideal,—or answer the question, What is the chief end of man. The question is discussed largely on a basis of comparative criticism; the hedonistic theory, in its simplest form of individualism, and in its development in utilitarianism, and through the theory of evolution, are discussed; then is discussed the so-called theological ethics, as represented by Paley, and the theory of formal obligation, as represented by Kant; and while the attempt is made to recognize the truth in each of the previous forms, it is finally concluded that only the theory that the ideal of conduct is realization of personality answers all the demands of the problem. The same discussions that give conclusions regarding the ideal are shown to answer the problems regarding the basis and nature of obliga-

tion, and the nature of goodness. In the second part it is shown that the realization of personality both demands and occasions society, or the community of those having common interests and purposes, regulating themselves by common laws (implicit, conventional, or reflective), and recognizing common rights. This society with its substratum of expectations, institutions, laws and rights is characterized as the objective ethical world, as real in its way as the "external world" is physically. The various forms of this world in the family, the nation, the structure of industrial society, and the church, with their underlying principles, are briefly set forth. In the third part, the individual born into this world, and having to realize the ethical ideal in and through it is considered. In this connection are discussed the way in which the individual becomes aware of moral distinctions, the conditions of his freedom of action, the nature of his concrete duties and rights, and the modes of moral progress in the individual.

The second course, the one in Political Philosophy, begins by stating the various answers which have been given to the questions, first of the nature and origin of the state; secondly, of its functions; and, thirdly, of its constitution and forms. The outline of the subject being brought before the student in this comparative way, the same ground is gone over again from a different stand-point. First is taken up the general theory of society, as a natural (or biological) organism, and its gradual development into an ethical organism through the emergence of rational will is discussed. This ethical organism is shown to involve the political organization of mankind in the state. The function of the state is defined as the guaranteeing, defining, and extending of rights. This necessitates a discussion of the nature of rights, which really forms the backbone of the course. The basis of rights, the theory of "natural" and "positive" rights, the various forms of rights, are taken up. This gives occasion for consideration of questions relating to property, punishment, war, etc., which are discussed at some length. The nature and aim of law is then discussed on the basis of the results regarding rights. The lectures then take up questions relating to the actual constitution of

the state, the division of its powers, its various forms as aristocracy, democracy, etc., the tendencies and limits of present legislation. The latter topic leads up to the questions of legislation as respects the family, industrial relations, etc., and in this connection are considered some of the practical problems regarding marriage and the labor question. The course closes with a brief critical discussion of current political ideals, aiming to point out the practical and morally valid aims of national life. The subject of the seminary course for 1889-90 is Special Subjects in the History of Political Philosophy. It is difficult to form the exact line which a course of this nature will take, but the intention is to make as exhaustive a study as possible of the various allied theories of the "state of nature," natural rights and the social contract theory, taking up these topics on the basis of such authors as Hobbes, Grotius, Locke, and Rousseau.

That these courses are limited in extent as well as in number is evident; with but two instructors it is impossible to do much special work in ethics without the neglect of other departments in philosophy. Another year a course will probably be offered in the Ethics of Plato, Kant or Hegel. The limited amount of the work in ethics has been less noticeable in the past because of the profound ethical spirit in which the lamented Professor Morris carried on all his work in philosophy, and which he imparted so successfully to all his instruction.

THE AIMS OF THE ETHICAL SOCIETY.*

BY FELIX ADLER, PH.D.

THE aims of the Ethical Society are :

1. To teach the supremacy of the moral ends above all other human ends and interests.
2. To teach that the moral law has an immediate authority not contingent on the truth of religious beliefs or of philosophical theories.
3. To advance the science and the art of right living.

The conviction that the binding force of moral obligations is independent of religious creeds or metaphysical speculations is the corner-stone of the Ethical Society. The fact of moral obligation is undeniable ; it is invested with the highest kind of certainty, the certainty that rests on experience. Philosophical theories of ethics are attempts to explain the facts of the moral life. The facts are more certain than the explanations. The religious beliefs of civilized communities, when traced to their source, are found to be inferences from the facts of the moral life. The facts themselves are more certain than the inferences. That we ought to practise justice and not injustice ; that we ought to lend a helping hand to the needy and the oppressed ; that we ought to show gratitude to our benefactors ; that we ought to be faithful and loving as parents, as husbands and wives ; that we ought to devote our-

* The name "Society for Ethical Culture" was originally chosen, and is still used, in order to express with exactness the purpose for which the Society was founded. The name "Ethical Society," if assumed at the outset, might have created the impression that the members of the Society already regard themselves as thoroughly ethical in spirit and in practice. Nothing, of course, could be more absurd and unethical than such a pretension. Moral growth, or progress towards the good, is the utmost that man can hope to achieve. But if the name "Ethical Society" be understood with this qualification, it recommends itself on the ground of brevity and convenience, and it will be thus used in this paper.

selves to the public weal, to the extent, if need be, of self-sacrifice,—these, and other obligations of a like nature, are ratified by the common consciousness of civilized humanity. Concerning them there is a general agreement among good men and women everywhere, no matter how widely their opinions diverge in regard to the questions with which theology and philosophy deal.

The Ethical Movement is an attempt to take this body of accepted moral truths as a new rallying-point, to constitute it the common ground on which all who desire the moral progress of the race may stand and work together, to make it the basis of a new fellowship, more inclusive than that of the churches. It is an attempt to concentrate attention upon *the duties of life*, to explicate the implications of the concepts of duty and to enhance their influence on conduct.

Such being the aim, it follows that all who honestly and earnestly desire to further this aim are welcome as members of an Ethical Society.

The Ethical Society is not a club of free-thinkers, having for their sole aim the emancipation of the multitude from superstition. It does not appeal exclusively to the cultured classes; it does not seek to draw together an intellectual *élite*; it brings into the foreground those fundamental moral needs and aspirations, in regard to which all men are equal. The Ethical Society emphasizes the sublime moral idea of universal brotherhood. It throws its door wide open to the poor and rich, to the educated, the half-educated, and the uneducated. It does not exclude even the sinner, but rather holds out its hand to him with an especial warmth and tenderness, provided he shows a willingness to desist from his evil doing, and to set his face again in the direction of the light. There is, therefore, only a single test to which the members of an Ethical Society must conform. It is that of a sincere desire to aid in the work of moral regeneration. The mere fact of joining an Ethical Society is understood to imply such a desire, and with it the actual life led by the members is expected to be, as far as possible, in accord.

The Attitude of the Ethical Society towards the Churches is

not antagonistic. It is perhaps unavoidable that every new movement should in the beginning be misunderstood and misreported; hence, it cannot excite surprise that the Ethical Society has been stigmatized as an atheistical society, or a society of atheists. But a categorical denial of this charge is proper in this place. The object of the Society is constructive, not destructive. Its sole aim is to promote moral progress. It is at war with none except with those who oppose moral progress. It shuts out none except those who are indifferent to moral progress in themselves or in others. But the question has sometimes been asked whether it is possible to be a believer in the current religious doctrines and at the same time a member of an Ethical Society. That depends, we are bound to answer, on the spirit in which these doctrines are believed, whether it be the dogmatic or the ethical spirit. The dogmatist ranks belief above duty. The ethical believer agrees with us in placing duty above everything else, only that he regards the law of duty as at the same time the expression of a divine will, and the fulfilment of duty as a divine service. The dogmatic believer is not excluded from an Ethical Society, but excludes himself. For he maintains that there are certain things more important than the leading of a good life, and he naturally attaches supreme value to the things which he regards as most important. With respect to the great body of dogmatic believers, the Ethical Movement has a mission; namely, by its teachings, by its example, by the new emphasis which it puts on righteousness, to convert them from being dogmatic into becoming ethical believers. For those who are ethical believers already the Ethical Movement has nothing but words of cordial welcome. They are in their natural place as members of an Ethical Society. For while the Society, as a society, confines its attention to the moral life, and does not take sides for or against religious doctrines, the members of the Society are free, either singly or in groups, to express whatever religious beliefs best satisfy them. The function of religion is to raise up before the inward eye the ideal of the fulfilment of the moral law, and the value of such ideals it would be difficult to over-estimate. Indeed, a

new religious ideal is the hope and desire of many a heart to-day. It will not come unless the moral nature of man shall have been previously stirred to its depths and quickened and refined. It will not come unless ethical culture shall have prepared the soil. The fire of a new moral enthusiasm is needed to fuse the elements from which the new ideal will be shaped, and it is the dream of those who started the Ethical Movement that it will in time succeed in kindling that fire.

The Attitude of the Society towards the "Un-churched."—To those who have lost their religious home the Society offers a refuge. The conviction, often reached through painful struggles, that the beliefs which were at one time regarded as the most sacred and certain are untenable produces a crisis in many a life, and this is frequently followed by a period of reaction which leaves the mind in a state of despondency and gloom. To those who pass through this experience life seems emptied of its holier meanings, the world a dark enigma, and there appears to be nothing left that is worth living for. To such as these the Ethical Movement speaks in the trumpet tones of moral duty. It summons them to join in the battle for the good and true that is everywhere being waged, to be soldiers of the Light, and to find solace and strength in bearing their part well. It tells them that the real sanctities of life are inalienable and indestructible. It points their eyes aloft and bids them see that, though the brilliant constellations of faith may pass out of view, the pole-star of morality never sinks below the horizon. And that is sufficient to steer our course by through the sea of life.

Furthermore, for such as these, the existence of the Ethical Society is a *safeguard*. Doubtless there is danger of a moral interregnum. Since the teachings of morality have so long been bound up with the doctrines of theology, it is to be feared that those who cast aside the latter may, at least for a time, be tempted to rebel against the former; that a reign of the passions may set in which, however brief, might prove desolating in its effects. A movement which aims to enforce the claims of duty, and to show their reasonableness apart from theological sanctions is well fitted to avert this danger,

and to guide society safely through the perilous period of transition.

But the aim of the Ethical Society is not only to preserve existing morality intact and to guard it as a precious heritage from the past, but at the same time to expand and enlarge it. It is a mistake to suppose that the moral code has ever been completely revealed. On the contrary, as society progresses and new conditions arise, new moral problems are started, and the attempt to solve these must lead to wider and deeper ethical knowledge. There is ample room for new discoveries in the field of morals. To pave the way for such discoveries is one of the principal objects of the Ethical Movement. Hence, from this point of view, the Ethical Society may be described as an Association for the Advancement of Moral Science, and all its members are invited to take part in the studies and investigations which look to this end. Not to communicate moral heat only is our aim, but also to shed the light of knowledge upon the more difficult and recondite questions of duty. Many of us stumble, not because we lack the desire to do what is right, but because we fail to discern what the right is.

The Attitude of the Ethical Society towards Social Reforms.—Social reforms are, at bottom, moral reforms. The movement for the elevation of the working classes which at the present day absorbs the attention of the world, and whose developments are watched in breathless suspense by the friends of progress everywhere, is inspired and sustained by profound moral feelings. It is a protest against injustice, a struggle for a higher type of justice. How can an Ethical Society remain an indifferent spectator of such a struggle?

“The lion roars, who will not tremble?
The Lord God speaketh, who will not prophesy?”

And certainly a divine voice is struggling for utterance in the cry of the people for better conditions. A higher power, a quickening of the moral sense, manifests itself in these upheavings of the bosom of society, and amid the painful throes of social conflict, a larger morality is coming to

the birth. But at the same time, the Ethical Society cannot merge itself with any of the special movements for social reform.

First. Because it directs its efforts to the cultivation of personal as well as of social ethics. And of such efforts there is special need at a time when social aims are in the foreground. The very splendor and vastness of these aims tend to withdraw attention from the narrower, but no less sacred field of private duty. Many a social reformer has suffered the shipwreck of character in consequence; many a man who allowed his whole energy to be absorbed by the pursuit of public ends has failed miserably in the fulfilment of the nearest and most obvious duties, and has thus brought discredit upon himself and his cause. The efforts to regenerate society must spring out of *the whole character*. The new social ethics must rest on the foundations of private morality.

Secondly. Every movement which is conducted in the interest of a special reform is of necessity occupied with many practical measures which of themselves have no ethical significance whatever, but are important as minor ends subsidiary to the main end. Experience shows that the prominence necessarily assumed by these practical measures tends to obscure the high moral end itself. There is needed a distinct movement for *the definition of ethical ends, for the clarification of ethical ideals*. And such a movement the Ethical Movement is designed to be. It remains in contact with the living questions of the day, but it does not suffer itself to be drawn into the whirlpool of agitation. It seeks to embrace every special movement for reform within its scope, and yet to stand above them all. It tests and tries all personal and social aims whatsoever. It seeks to refresh in the minds of men the consciousness of the infinity of the moral ideal, an ideal which all the practical reform movements of our time, if their wildest hopes were realized, would still fail to satisfy.

Such being the objects of the Ethical Society, it remains to state briefly the ways and means by which it is hoped to promote them. Our hope for the future lies mainly with the

young ; hence our efforts are turned primarily in the direction of improved education.

1. A rational system of moral instruction for the young is to supersede the crude methods of the Sunday-school.*

2. Genuine ethical culture requires intellectual and æsthetic culture for its support. Hence, to develop the moral nature properly, it is important that the mind and the feelings shall be rightly trained at the same time. An attempt must be made to get possession of the entire schooling of the young, to impress the ethical ideal on the daily school in all its branches. With this end in view, an experiment has been conducted by the Society in New York during the past eleven years.† And the new school is at the same time to be regarded as a contribution towards social reform. For, in the main, the working classes must be trusted to work out their own salvation, and only a better and higher education will enable them to do so.

3. The Ethical Society is intended to further the moral development of its own members. Those persons who feel that, morally speaking, there is nothing left for them to learn, who are persuaded that "they are good enough," who resent the suggestion that they stand in need of moral improvement, prove by that very fact that they have advanced but little on the road of moral experience. We are, and remain to the end of our days, mere beginners, both in the science and the art of right living. To those who realize this truth the Ethical Society offers its help. The weekly lectures from the platform, on Sundays, are intended to instruct, enlighten, and to awaken earnest resolves for the leading of a better life. But the Sunday meetings alone are extremely insufficient. The best and most lasting ethical work is accomplished in small groups rather than in large public gatherings. And such groups or classes should be formed. In them the members themselves will be given an oppor-

* A provisional outline of such a system, as used by the Society in New York, is given in the *Ethical Record* for July, 1889.

† A summary account of this experiment will be found in the *Century Magazine* for October, 1889, under the title "The Democratic Ideal in Education."

tunity to take an independent part in the elucidation of moral questions, and to contribute their share towards the development of the ideals of conduct. It is intended to make this feature hereafter far more prominent than it has heretofore been in our Ethical Societies; indeed to lay upon it the chief stress. In accordance with this plan it is proposed to organize, as occasion may arise, classes for the study of the ethics of economics, for the study of political ethics, of the ethics of the family; classes (especially designed for mothers) in the science of childhood; classes for the comparative study of religion; classes for the reading of the world's best spiritual literature, etc.

It is also hoped that the studies of these classes will more and more bear fruit in practice, that the new moral insight gained will shine out in the work-day life, and that from among those who thus have been joined together for the pursuit of moral knowledge, there may be formed in time "a nucleus of the righteous," a union for the higher life, in which the ideal of an Ethical Society will be visibly typified.

THE ETHICAL MOVEMENT DEFINED.*

BY STANTON COIT, PH.D.

THE aims and principles of the Ethical Movement are so very simple that any one, although with no philosophical education, may both understand and sit in judgment upon them. I need not speak in parables, or use symbolic language; but there is need of explanation. People are so accustomed, when religion is spoken of, to look for mystical and transcendental ideas, which are remote from men's common every-day thoughts, that, when the whole nature of the Ethical Movement has been explained, they still look for

* Reprinted from September number of *Time*. London: Swan, Sonnenschein & Co.

something further. Its very simplicity makes them fail to understand it, or, if they understand, they fail to appreciate it. "Is that all?" they are apt to exclaim. But we count it no defect in our Ethical Movement that it is thus simple and close to the working thoughts of every-day life. This simplicity is one reason for the hope that it will some day reorganize the spiritual life of civilized nations. Let me now set forth our main doctrines.

The first of these is that the bond of religious union should be solely *devotion to the good* in the world. By "the good" is meant simply a certain quality of human character and conduct: the quality which we have in mind when we say that a judge is good, because he is impartial; that a father is good, because he looks out for the lasting welfare of his children; that a brother is good, because he causes his sister no pain if he can help it; that a citizen is good because he is willing to sacrifice personal gain to the prosperity of the whole people. The desire to spread more and more this quality of conduct and character, and to root out badness from human life, is, we affirm, the true bond of religious union among men. Nothing could be clearer and more definite than this doctrine; we aim to preach it everywhere. We believe that by declaring devotion to the good in the world to be the bond, and the whole bond, of religious union we shall ultimately induce men to remove all other qualifications for membership in churches; and that immediately men who are now outside of all religious fellowship, or who chafe under the dogmatic restraint of the Church, will form themselves into societies for the spread of goodness, and that such fellowships will be the means of thorough and permanent social reforms in politics, in education, and in family and industrial life. This idea of forming societies in devotion to good character and right conduct, we believe, stands equal in dignity and power with Christ's conception of a kingdom of God on earth, and that it comes to-day with all the freshness and vigor of a new social revelation, for which, however, the ages of Christian development have been preparing men's hearts and intellects. Not only is the idea clear and definite in itself, but when em-

bodied in a society we have a social institution distinct from every other now existing. An Ethical Society, a fellowship solely in devotion to the good in the world, is wholly distinct from every Christian Church, whether Orthodox or Unitarian; for the Church, besides devotion to the spread of goodness in the world, demands allegiance to a personal Creator of the universe. An Ethical Society, therefore, differs from every Christian Church in that its basis in the first place is clearer and simpler, is capable of being understood by the most ignorant man of ordinary intelligence, because all men know at least sufficiently well for practical judgment what goodness in human character is. But the idea of a personal Creator of the universe has baffled the speculative efforts of the best disciplined and philosophic minds. In simplicity, therefore, an Ethical Society may claim precedence over any Christian Church, and from this it follows that an Ethical Society is in its very nature more suited to men of average intelligence and of busy life. But it also differs from Christian Churches in being broader in its fellowship. It excludes no one because of scepticism as to the existence and personality of God or the divinity of Christ. But, on the other hand, let it be distinctly known that we are not, as a society, agnostic. We do not deny the possibility of knowing the existence of God. We do not request or exact that a man shall first give up his belief in a personal God and immortality before he shall become a member of our societies. We simply ask that he have a direct desire to plant good conduct and root out evil. As a society we are not pledged to any theory as to the origin of the universe, or of conscience itself, nor to any theory as to the limits of human knowledge. We are not an agnostic society; we have no theory at all, as a society, concerning the limits of knowledge; therefore the charge which has been made against us that we are agnostic is due to a misunderstanding.

When, on the other hand, it is brought as an objection against us that we have no theory which accounts for the moral enthusiasm which we possess and manifest, we point out the following distinction: As a society we have no such

theory, but each individual member may entertain whatever theory addresses itself to his reason as true. One may be a Theist, another a Materialist, another an Atheist. We simply maintain that no one shall make his theory a barrier between himself and his fellow-men. And yet let no one infer from our emphasis of goodness in human conduct that we set it up in the place of God as an object to worship. We recognize that goodness is purely an abstraction; that unless it exist in concrete acts and dispositions of the human will it has no reality or value for us. We make no fetich of it; it does not exist except as we are good; we cannot say, therefore, that in our view of life and the universe it takes the place which God or Christ holds in the Christian view, except, simply, that it is the bond of human fellowship and brotherhood. We demand that no one shall make the ideas of God and immortality the bond of religious union; that no one shall place any moral blame or stigma upon any other man for not holding them.

But although thus different from all Christian Churches, it does not follow that we approach any nearer to non-Christian religious fellowships, which have recently sprung up, than we do to the Christian Churches. We are quite as distinct from Positivism, Secularism, and Socialism.

The Positivists set up the worship of humanity, adoration of the great and good men of the past regarded as constituting an organic being, as the bond of religious fellowship. We do not condemn in itself the adoration of humanity so long as it be not made the bond of fellowship; but when set up as the foundation of a new Church we count it as unjust and unwise. It is unjust to every man who cannot naturally cast his motives for doing good chiefly into a sense of gratitude for the good which he has received from humanity. Many a man has a feeling that although he had derived no good and perfect gifts from humanity, still that he should and would serve his fellow-men; in short, the love of mankind is in many a heart deeper than the conscious debt of gratitude. We are, furthermore, distinguished from Positivists in not exacting special recognition of Auguste Comte and his services.

Nor do we, like the Positivists, recognize for a moment that the basis of religious fellowship is the sum total of all the positive sciences constituting the philosophic doctrine of the universe. We believe that science becomes an unjust dogma the moment it be made the basis of a Church. The worship of Humanity and the doctrines of positive sciences are the Positivist bond, while ours is simply the furtherance of good character and right conduct.

Equally distinct are we also from the Secularists. The Secularists, as their very name implies, are reactionists against theology; whereas we demand simply that theology be not made the condition of spiritual fellowship. Moreover, the Secularists, while affirming the dignity and worth of this world, and attempting to reconstruct society, do not lay down good character and right conduct as the starting-point of all social reform; in this we are more definite than they; they are in danger of incoherence, now setting up political power and now industrial revolution as the true means of making society happy and just; whereas we would start from the moral sentiment and recognize that mechanical changes in institutions and the execution of better laws must be supported by the moral consciousness of the community. Environment and law also affect character; but the impetus towards the doing away with evil conditions of life must arise in men who are bound together for the spread of goodness in the world.

We are also distinguished from the Socialists. I for one never met a sincere Socialist who did not, like ourselves, have the good of the world at heart; but, as the Church condemns any one who does not believe in a personal God by excluding him from fellowship, so the Socialists, by the very fact that they name themselves Socialists, condemn all who do not believe in the transference of the ownership of land and capital from private citizens to the state. Whether the socialistic policy is in itself right or not is not the question on which we can take issue with them. We simply say that their doctrine of reform should not be the basis of spiritual fellowship among men. An Ethical Society would include both Social-

ists and Individualists, permitting each group to work in its own way for the elevation of society; but would not allow either for the sake of his special remedy to break the bond of human brotherhood with those who differ from them. The Ethical Society Movement believes that it will draw to itself many men and women from all kinds of Christian Churches and from all non-Christian fellowships. It believes, further, that its influence will affect even those who remain in old fellowships until they will transform these into Ethical Societies; and if devotion to the good in the world be the right bond of religious fellowship it would be strange if this movement of ours did not tend to conciliate all conflicting groups of earnest men. Thus, without swerving from the straight line of our conviction we feel sure that we shall draw all men into brotherhood. We are not a new church, as churchmen themselves define a church; and we do not pretend to be; we have no desire to destroy the old Church, but to vivify it until it shall throw off all except the vital element of fellowship, devotion to the good in the world. Our first and main doctrine, then, is this which I have been stating. We would go about everywhere, but especially among the poor and the down-trodden, urging men into this higher fellowship, which we believe will prove the salvation of the world from misery and from moral evil.

Our second doctrine is that each man must bestow the highest reverence of his heart, the feeling of absolute sacredness and inviolability upon the doing of every individual duty as it presents itself to him. In fervor of devotion, in the sense of absolute and supreme worth and dignity, each duty is to be done; and, so far as the feeling of inviolability has been an element in religion, we affirm that the doing of duty is religion; with us every attack upon iniquity is a religious crusade. In this respect we are like the Salvation Army, which goes forth to fight sin. Every individual social reform which we take up becomes to us, in sacredness at least, a religious task. For us goodness must exist in human hearts and institutions; and to bring it into existence is the highest that we know. We preach that right conduct is of supreme importance, more important than doctrine, more important

than ritual, aye, more important than the worship of God or Christ in the heart. We believe that right conduct is the way, and the only way, of a joyful, peaceful, inspiring life. We believe that it is the way to attain a life of perfect selflessness, which has no anxiety about the future either before or after death, which is willing to become annihilated at death, if such is the lot in store for us. Devotion to right conduct is, we believe, the way, and the only way, of freedom from the haunting presence of our own past transgressions. Complete devotion to the right is the only act of atonement by which we can become reconciled with our past selves. Thus, conduct, because it is the way of life to the individual and of gladness to society, is of supreme importance; every other attempt at self-reconciliation, or to attain joy and self-confidence, is folly and evil. What food is to the hungry man, what water to the parched lips, what the sun in spring-time is to the trees and flowers, such is right conduct to the inner spiritual life of man. We preach this devotion to the good not only as the bond of fellowship, but as the way of inward peace and life.

Akin to this doctrine of the supreme importance of right conduct is our affirmation that this human life of ours—even though we have no outlook towards an immortal existence—still contains adequate motive, more than sufficient incentive, to work and to suffer for mankind, and to carry out the severest injunctions of duty. We maintain that the grandeur of the motive to be upright and just is not diminished one whit by omitting the ideas of personal immortality, and of a personal God. There are persons who affirm that if these ideas be taken away, although morality would remain, nevertheless the motive to right action would be deprived of its grandeur; but in saying this they simply declare that for them the grandeur is gone, that in their experience they find themselves lacking motive. And as this statement is based on their personal experience, there is no wisdom in bringing against it logical arguments. We can only set over against it the testimony of our own moral experience, which is that the motive for right conduct which remains, although we have no thought of God and immortality, is still so sublime, nay,

so overpowering, that there is no room in human imagination to admit any additional incentive. If we fancy that there is, it is because we have not yet realized the significance of morality in reference to our individual and social life, however limited, here on earth. What we must do is to train our imagination until we are able to comprehend better the beauty and social significance of holiness. Our doctrine is that the motive to right conduct, when its significance for our earthly life is fully appreciated, becomes practically infinite in grandeur, and that any one who affirms the contrary is false to moral experience.

When any one asks us, "Why should I do right?" as men sometimes do who think they need the hope of immortality to inspire them to duty, we may find it difficult to give an answer that will satisfy them; as when a blind man asks us what we mean by the sun and the glory of his beams, we cannot tell him; and yet it is not because we do not know the sun and his light, but because the man is blind. And when a man deaf from his birth asks us what we mean by music and what feelings it stirs in us, we cannot tell. There is such a thing as a defect of moral perception. The unworthiness, the perversion of the moral nature, implied in the question, "Why should I do right?" becomes evident if we make this question more specific and ask, "Why should I care for and watch over my child? Why should I refrain from beating my wife? Why should I not murder my brother? Why should I not delight in cruelty?" When any one asks us such questions, it is becoming in us to pity, and, perhaps, to condemn, but not to argue or reason. Men have asked us, "Why should a man suffer and sacrifice, even his life, if there be no hereafter for him? Why should Jesus go to the cross, if that was to be the end of Jesus?" It is easy to tell why Jesus *would* go to the cross: he would because he loved his fellow-men, and saw that he could best serve them by dying for them. And it is also easy to tell to a man who loves his fellow-men why Jesus *should* go to the cross: it is the same reason for which he did go. He ought or should go because it would serve his fellow-men. If any one asks,

"Why should I love my fellow-men?" we must say, "Stop this is blasphemy against mankind, and we will not tolerate it without a protest against such degrading scepticism." Love for mankind we see and feel in our own experience to be inviolable; it is final. Love knows no ulterior motive beyond itself, and will permit no doubt as to the fact that it is its own justification.

And yet let no one imagine that we are mere visionaries and weak-minded idealists as to the moral worth of man. Although we emphasize and believe in a direct appeal to the moral sentiments in man, nevertheless we recognize that belief in a personal God, and the hope of immortality, have helped to keep men up to the line of duty; and if we had nothing to fall back upon but the direct love of righteousness we should count our movement weak indeed. But we recognize that, besides love for mankind and conscience, there are many other motives to which we could appeal as supports to the moral life. These motives are lower, but nevertheless are necessary, and serve the cause of goodness. Besides the inward moral sanction to right action, we would set before men the four other sanctions: first, we recognize that nine times out of ten, among the uneducated classes of society, wrongdoing is due to ignorance of the natural consequences of the wrong act upon the bodies and minds and fortunes of the doers. We would aim to remove this ignorance, thus bringing home to men's imagination the evils to which they unwillingly or thoughtlessly expose themselves. The natural consequences, which we call the natural sanction of conduct, thus furnish us with a powerful appeal to enlightened self-interest. But to the natural sanction may be added the legal sanction, which attaches in society to the coarser forms of wrong-doing; and to both these the social sanction, the praise and blame of one's neighbors, may come in as a powerful supplement. The love of approbation and the fear of disgrace may be made a thousand-fold more effective than they are to-day. Besides this, we can develop sympathy, and thus bring to our aid the desire to avoid the pain of seeing others suffer, and to gain the pleasure of seeing others happy.

But to teach these aids to character and conduct is only a part of our undertaking as an Ethical Movement. Preaching is not our chief means of furthering the spread of goodness throughout society. We shall also attempt, so far as lies in our power, to change the physical and social environment of men, so that it shall be more favorable to a truly human life. We expect the members of our society to do more for the community than the current morality of the day demands. We recognize that work for mankind of every wise sort is the most eloquent preaching. There is no way to convince people that one believes in brotherhood like proving one's self a brother.

WHAT IS AN ETHICAL SOCIETY?

BY W. L. SHELDON.

THE thought of a religious movement is often long in the germ before it develops into an organization. The Ethical Movement may, perhaps, trace its origin to the philosophy of Kant, at the close of the eighteenth century. The step from the doctrinal teaching of morals, as springing from the will of God, to the conception of the subjective standard of right; the idea of the law of duty as being the offspring of the human consciousness itself,—this was the leap of thought that gave the basis for a religious movement in ethics. From the time of Kant, morality has been steadily coming into the foreground. It arose into great prominence in the teachings of Fichte. In England it assumed a like importance, though from an entirely different stand-point of philosophy, in the thought of George Eliot and John Stuart Mill. Auguste Comte likewise reflects the tendency in the French philosophy. In this country, Emerson may be said to have heralded the tendency in his celebrated address on "The Sovereignty of Ethics."

These writers may be looked upon to be the forerunners of the ethical movement, though its teachers profess no disci-

pleship to any of them. But the forerunners have gone to their long slumber. Mill sleeps by his wife, in Avignon. George Eliot has joined "the choir invisible." Emerson rests, along with Hawthorne, in "Sleepy Hollow," at Concord. Comte is no more. Fichte is at rest. Immanuel Kant reposes in the dust of the province from whence he never travelled. The time has come that the tendency should develop into a religious organization.

An Ethical Society has for its purpose to establish, above all other human interests, the supremacy of ethics. There is something more important than having true thoughts about God. The first essential is that we lead true lives. The man who can stand upright in his integrity is closer to the inner sanctuary of religion than the man whose first interest is to fall on his knees.

It is of much more concern that fathers and mothers should be faithful to their children; that men should be strict and just in their commercial relations; that everybody should be true and loyal citizens and have the public welfare at heart; that the young should have respect for their parents, and learn to revere character more than wealth; that men in the stress and strain of business life shall have ideal aims, and care for something more than material prosperity; that in the struggle for the means of subsistence we do not forget the higher self within ourselves; that in whatever circumstances of life we are placed, we have interests larger than our personal selves, and cares higher than simply getting a livelihood; all this is of much greater concern than having correct ideas about "eternity." And this is what we mean by the words "supremacy of ethics."

Many, of course, will say that this is the purpose of the churches. Unfortunately, we fear that that is not true. If it were so, we would be there ourselves; for it is the results we are interested in, and not the creeds. A few of the leaders may, perhaps, lean that way and aspire to go farther in that direction. But they are paralyzed in their efforts by the great burden of tradition and authority which is against them. The church starts in its teaching at the other end; it will insist on

creed; it must give the first place to its theology. If it did not do so it would not be a church. The laity may not make so much of the dogmas, but that is because the laity is ahead of its own leaders. The listeners in the pews are much in advance of the teachers in the pulpits, in so far as their personal convictions are concerned. Business-men often have better judgment on matters of religion than the clergy.

Ethics is the science of morals; conduct and its motive is here the one object of consideration. An Ethical Society, therefore, is a society which has for its effort to lead religious enthusiasm in this one direction, of lifting human conduct and human motive up to an ever higher and more perfect plane. This is the basis of our idealism. The creeds and dogmas can wait; they have had their turn. Would a mother rather have her son saved for a better life on earth than to have him saved for "eternity?" Let the mother reply. Moral worth for its own sake,—this is the lesson of all lessons; whatever else may prove an illusion, this abides forever.

We care to revive the unswerving loyalty to duty, the faith in character and principle, that once animated the hearts of men, but now seems on the wane for want of a true basis on which to rest. We desire to make of this a religion,—to give it the very same ardor, the same devotion, the same enthusiasm, that men in other days have given to their hopes for "Israel," or to their "love of Christ." We would not abate one jot of that loyalty; only we would have it rational and free of mysticism; so that young men and young women shall not look down upon it as "mere sentiment;" so that business-men shall not shrink from it because it is "unpractical." Why cannot we be as devoted and earnest about that which is real, as about that which has around it the halo of mysticism and supernaturalism?

We want a business-man's religion,—something that can inspire us with pure feelings and high aims, whether at home or at the office, on the street or in the library; yes, or even in the billiard-room; not a religion which a man takes off and puts on with his Sunday coat. We want something that

shall make all the events of life sacred, by making them all practically a part of our religion. The "ideal saint" is not the hermit in prayer, but the ideal man of the world. We say this in a very few words; but it could be said in volumes.

We desire to carry this spirit into our philanthropy, to work for men, not "for Jesus' sake;" but, just as Isaiah and Jesus did, for the sake of the very fellow-men for whom we are working. With this thought in mind, we want to put a new spirit into our work for our fellows. We, too, would have our work of charity. We, too, would encourage self-sacrifice, only not for the purpose of saving our own souls, but for the sake of alleviating the suffering of others; for the sake of our personal sympathy in the joys and sorrows, as well as in the moral well-being of our fellows. So our charity shall be actuated with the aim of doing away with the need of charity, of helping men to help themselves. Philanthropic work, in obedience and fidelity to the fact of our human brotherhood,—this would be the practical motive actuating an Ethical Society.

So, too, in our works for the young. It is a plain everyday observation that children do not carry into practice the teaching of the Sunday-school. Parents send their children with the thought that "perhaps they will get some good out of it." Yet how unsatisfactory does the result often appear! We wonder vaguely that after so much religious teaching the children are really so little influenced by it all; that instead of following the "Sermon on the Mount," they adopt the ethics of their neighbors, and do "just as other people do." But there is the same difficulty. The teaching is begun at the wrong end. The first question put to the child is, "Who made you?" when it ought to be, "Whom do you love?" "To whom would you be faithful?" "What would you be?" "What ought we most to care for?" Fidelity in human relations should be the starting-point in the religious education of the young. This will be the direction in the Sunday-school of an Ethical Society.

So, too, in the work for ourselves. Many have thought that, because they do not feel the need of a "church," because

they are conscious of their own integrity, therefore it is not for themselves but for the rest of the world, for the poor and illiterate, for the "half-moral," that an Ethical Society is needed. But do they fully appreciate what is meant by moral culture? Does a man come to a plane of moral elevation when he can say, "I can go no farther; I am at the summit." We shall not reform the world unless we are ever reforming ourselves. The most perfect man is never more than half perfect in comparison with what he might become. From the dawn of earliest consciousness down to the last hour, when we are passing out through the portals into the realm of eternity, through that vista of years along which we pass, there is not a day nor an hour when we do not need to be in a process of *inward refining*. The education of the inward man, of the inmost man, never stops. This purification of the inward feelings, this constant lifting up of the better self within ourselves, this is the supreme purpose of an Ethical Society.

It is for this purpose that we meet together on Sunday morning. We would revive the purer ambitions which may have lain dormant in the activity of the week. Only, we would accomplish this purpose not by meeting in order to talk about God, but by coming together for an ever new consideration of the problems of human duty. For them who may be looking towards the glories of the sunset, just as much for them who in the morning hour are still thinking of the splendor of mid-day work, there is just the same need. The aspiration after something better and higher within ourselves is the basis of all that is worthy of the name of religion.

This, in outline, is the meaning of an Ethical Society. It welcomes all men and women into its association, without regard to religious belief. Church members, or people outside of the churches; devout believers in God, or unbelievers; Hebrew and Christian; whoever has the care to be an honest man, to rise in the scale of personal moral life; whoever desires that the world in the future shall be better for his having lived in it, these, one and all, are welcome in such an association. We know that there is an invisible Ethical Society of

vast dimensions in the world. It consists of the men and women, in multitudes, who feel these things yet have not given expression to them. Many of them are still in the churches, many more are out in the world adrift, yet all looking in this direction. We can only say to them: Make the experiment; try this other method. For the most practical, as well as the most ideal, it offers itself as the direction towards which modern religious thought has long been half-blindly groping. And so the enthusiasm which has been waning may revive once more in the ardor of faith in the supremacy of ethics.

THE LONDON (ESSEX HALL) ETHICAL SOCIETY.

THE Ethical Society organized in London three years ago, and which held its meetings for two years in Toynbee Hall, has been meeting for the past year in Essex Hall. The president of this society is Professor William Wallace, of Oxford. Bernard Bosanquet is chairman of committees, and J. H. Muirhead, M.A., honorable secretary. The object of the society is "to contribute, both by precept and in practice, to spreading moral influences on a non-dogmatic basis." In furtherance of this object the society sustains a course of public Sunday lectures, extending from the middle of October till the end of May, and engages in practical philanthropic work. The practical work of the society for the past year has consisted of a daily kindergarten for the poorest children, and boys' and girls' guilds, which meet on alternate nights of the week. The third annual report of the society, recently issued, publishes a list of the Sunday lectures given at Essex Hall during the session of 1888-89. The following, among them, indicate the general character of the course: "What the Ethical Society may do," Professor J. R. Seeley; "Moral Education in French Government Schools," John Trevor; "The Home Discipline of Children," Stanton Coit, Ph.D.; "Cause and Cure of some Moral Defects," Mrs. Sophie Bryant, D.Sc.; "The Morality of Strife," Professor H. Sidgwick;

"The Ethics of Democracy," J. Allanson Picton, M.P.; "The Ethics of Work," Percival Chubb; "Duty," Professor W. Wallace; "Jewish Ideals," J. Jacobs, B.A.; "Factors in the Growth of Moral Responsibility," G. J. Romanes, F.R.S.; "Life and Political Ideas of the late Mr. T. H. Green," J. H. Muirhead, M.A.

The most valuable and interesting part of the report is the following clear and able statement of the general principles of the society:

"1. The good life has a claim upon us in virtue of its supreme worthiness, and this claim is the highest it can have.

"2. It is, therefore, in no way dependent upon belief in a system of supernatural rewards and punishments.

"3. In practice it is to be realized by accepting and acting in the spirit of such common obligations as are enjoyed by the relationships of family and society, in so far as these are a means to the fullest development of our nature as man.

"In setting forth these principles, the society believes that it meets a growing want of the age.

"There are many who recognize the inherent worthiness of the life commonly regarded as good and noble, but who consider the motives commonly assigned for pursuing it unworthy and inadequate. These the society invites to co-operate in the establishment and exposition of the true principles of social morality.

"It also seeks to satisfy a need felt by those to whom the breaking up of older modes of thought and feeling, as to the grounds of moral obligation, seems to have gone far to destroy the obligation itself. The allegiance of such persons to the higher moral life has been claimed on the ground of external and often arbitrarily selected sanctions. But now that their reverence for these has been undermined by the necessary progress of thought, their reverence for goodness itself is likely to suffer. In endeavoring to remove the confusion here involved, the Ethical Society lays down no dogmatic formula of duty, but appeals to moral experience in proof that the real satisfaction of human aspiration is to be found in the good life alone.

"The Ethical Society has also a special claim on the interest of social and political reformers. It aims at co-operating with these, by means of its lectures and publications, in the formation of a true conception of human good. Believing, as it does, in the supreme importance of character as the determining element in a nation's well-being, it claims that all educational and social reform should be tested by this question: Does it or does it not further the development of good character among the citizens?

"The means by which the society hopes to carry on its work are mainly these:

"1. Sunday lectures and courses on Ethical and Political Philosophy in connection with University extension, political and social clubs, as well as religious and other organizations.

"2. Publication and diffusion of literature illustrative of the higher moral and religious thought of mankind.

"3. The embodiment and illustration of its ideas in such institutions as it may have it in its power to form.

"From this account of the aims and methods of the society it will be obvious that it does not propose to enter into competition with existing religious organizations. It does not propose, as has been thought, to found a new religious worship. It merely aims at disentangling what is distinctively moral in the teaching of the churches from the more transient forms of doctrine and ritual in which it is imbedded. At a time when these forms are being subjected on all hands to a critical and destructive analysis, it is felt that such a disentanglement is of supreme importance, and is especially incumbent upon those who have the moral education of young people entrusted to them.

"On the other hand, it is not a rival of those who advocate social or political reforms in any particular field. It holds that truer views of the nature and meaning of human life must issue in juster laws and political institutions. It holds, moreover, that the improvement of the present surroundings of many is an indispensable condition of the moral welfare of all. In this sense the society may be said to aim at political and social reforms. But it does not propose in its corporate ca-

capacity to interfere with the work of organizations which deal with particular social evils. So far as these organizations aim at good and noble ends, the Ethical Society is in entire sympathy with them; so far as they adopt means which are in themselves moral, they may in particular cases have its hearty co-operation. But its foremost aim as a society is to set forth and bring home to men's minds those universal principles of well-doing and well-being, the observance of which is essential to the permanent usefulness of all reform."

PROFIT-SHARING.*

THERE are four ways of dealing with profits: (1) for the employer to appropriate them,—the present method; (2) to abolish the profit-system and have articles produced by salaried public servants at cost,—socialism; (3) to retain the profit-system, but have profits go entirely to wage-workers,—co-operation; (4) to divide profits between employers and wage-workers,—profit-sharing. Mr. Gilman is an advocate of the last-named method. His book is the first complete, systematic, and, at the same time, critical work in English on the subject. One cannot praise too highly his industry, his discrimination in using his material, and his modest estimation of his own work and of the *rôle* which profit-sharing is likely to play in the solving of "labor troubles." He first briefly states the industrial problem, then considers the various forms of *product-sharing* in agriculture, in the fisheries, and in mining; then explains the wages-system and defends it against those who regard it as a social curse or a species of slavery (though he says it must be modified by profit-sharing); then gives an interesting and fresh account of the father of profit-sharing, M. Leclaire, the Parisian house-painter and decorator, and continues with a carefully-prepared and detailed history of

* Profit-Sharing between Employer and Employé. A Study in the Evolution of the Wages-System, by Nicholas Paine Gilman. Houghton, Mifflin & Co.: Boston and New York, 1889. Pp. 445. Price, \$1.75.

profit-sharing on the continent, in England, and in America, along with a summary and analysis of the experience gained,—closing with a well-considered argument for the system, to which is appended an excellent bibliography of the more important books, pamphlets, and single articles on the subject, and a copious index.

It appears that thirty-six of the profit-sharing experiments which Mr. Gilman considers belong to the past; for some reason they have been discontinued, though in several cases for reasons which were quite foreign to the merits or demerits of the plan itself. One hundred and thirty-seven experiments are now in operation, here and in Europe. As Mr. Gilman remarks, these are not pure “successes” any more than the others were pure failures; but the failures can hardly be said to throw serious discredit upon the system, since in business ventures generally, it is said, ninety or more fail where ten succeed. One even wonders whether co-operative experiments, which so frequently fail, make a much poorer showing than ordinary businesses, if this estimate is correct. In fact, we should like to ask Mr. Gilman what statistical or other foundation there is for this estimate,—or is it mere rumor and hearsay? It is a matter of interest to note that the two republics of France and the United States show the longest lists of profit-sharing firms. The system seems applicable to a wide variety of industries,—to manufactories of various kinds, to foundries and brass-works, to newspapers, even to railway and insurance companies and banking establishments.

Profit-sharing may be looked at from either a business or a moral point of view. Mr. Gilman purposely avoids, “as irrelevant, the consideration of profit-sharing in the light of moral and religious duty.” Undoubtedly his object is to recommend the plan to business-men, and to do this with any chance of success he thinks it advisable to appeal mainly to business motives. He steers clear of abstract theories of justice and right. “What has been done,” he says, “has interested me more than what ought to be done.” There is doubtless an advantage in this manner of treatment, but from an ethical point of view the general result is not altogether

satisfying. Let us note first the business aspect of profit-sharing. Mr. Gilman points out at some length and with much show of reason the advantage of the wages-system to the employé; whether a business yields large returns or not, a workman employed in it receives his stipulated wages,—that is, he has a fixed regular return apart from the risks of the enterprise, so that we may say after M. Leroy Beaulieu that “wages are a kind of insurance against the possible incapacity or eventual *maladresse* of the commander and director of labor.” But the wages-system furnishes also a great possible advantage to the employer. If he takes all the risks, he can have all the profits. Profits are the difference between his expenses and the value of his products; so that the lower he can make his expenses, the greater—other things remaining the same—are his chances of profits. Wages are a part of his expenses, so that it is to his interest to keep them down. This difference in interests naturally breeds antagonism between him and his workmen; their wages being fixed, they have no (interested) motive for economizing the raw material with which they work, or for avoiding carelessness in handling tools and machines; they, moreover, are tempted now and then into strikes and bring serious loss to their employer as well as to themselves. If then the employer, while retaining his profits, could devise some means by which this antagonism and all its fruits should be removed, it would be greatly to his advantage. Now “profit-sharing” is such a device. It does not involve the employer in any sacrifice. There being a certain rate of profit to which he has become accustomed or with which he would be satisfied, he says to his men, “If you by greater diligence, energy, care, and economy will make an additional profit over and above this amount, I will agree to divide it with you.” Mr. Gilman’s carefully-chosen language is worth quoting: “Profit-sharing advances the prosperity of an establishment by increasing the quantity of the product, by improving its quality, by promoting care of implements and economy of materials, and by diminishing labor, difficulties, and the cost of superintendence. It thus accumulates an extra fund of profits under the same general conditions, any in-

creased outlay being mainly for the larger amount of raw material demanded for the greater product. Out of this extra profit comes the share of the men, whose diligence and care have created it" (p. 416). Mr. Besselièvre, a French calico manufacturer, began profit-sharing in 1877, and declared in 1883 that the 80,000 francs then paid out in this way had cost the firm nothing. There is a general agreement among those employers now practising profit-sharing, as reported in this book, that it is "good business policy," that their own share is greater than the whole profits were under the simple wages system."

As a business or money-making project, profit-sharing, as Mr. Gilman represents it, merits much consideration. Is it equally satisfactory from the ethical stand-point? Mr. Gilman says that the extra profits which are in part divided among the men in profit-sharing establishments are *created* by the men; the general conditions are the same, the only addition to the outlay of the employer or capitalist being in extra raw material needed for the greater product. Why, then, barring the amount necessary to cover the expense of the extra raw material, are not the whole of the extra profits given to the men? Profits are ordinarily reckoned as the legitimate return for the services of the employer in the work of production; but, according to the supposition here made, he renders no extra services,—Why then should he have extra profits? If Mr. Gilman will ponder over this, we think he will see that in defending the wages-system itself he has overlooked one weak point in it. This is, that workingmen are not ordinarily in a position to make a fair contract with their employers. Allowing for all the rhetorical extravagance of labor-agitators, we fear there is more truth than our author allows in their assertion that the wages-system is "a species of slavery." Workingmen are not paid what their labor is worth (*i.e.*, what its products will sell for), but what and as low as anybody can be found who will render the labor. The difference between what labor is paid and what its products are sold for makes a large part of profits. If there were no difference, the laborer could have no sense of wrong; as it is, he feels that he is

taken advantage of. Yet he cannot help the imposition; his necessities constrain him to accept whatever he can get, and that, owing to the number of his competitors, is a low amount. There is a method of profit-sharing which would remedy the effects of this inequality between workingmen and employers, so far as a remedy is possible (in the present system). Wherever a business yielded profits over and above wages, interest on capital, and a fair salary for the employer,—that is, wherever there were, in the narrower sense of the word, profits at all,—they might be divided between master and men. If, owing to the state of the market, there were no profits, the loss would fall on both classes alike; but if there were, the disadvantage under which the men have previously stood would be in a measure made up to them. In equity, we conceive that all of what Mr. Gilman calls *extra* profits belong to those who *create* them; and that profits in general should be divided among those who *join in creating* them.

Mr. Gilman, it should be said, departs from the purely business stand-point in the closing paragraph of his book. After saying that he had purposely avoided, as irrelevant, the consideration of profit-sharing in the light of moral and religious duty, he declares his conviction that true Christianity is opposed to the class-selfishness which the existing wages-system tends to increase, and which profit-sharing, generally diffused, would greatly diminish. "Economics," he says, "must be aided by ethics; the commercial spirit must be tempered by the Christian feeling of the brotherhood of man." This is highly commendable; but how the demand is anywise met by profit-sharing, as Mr. Gilman has explained it, it is difficult to see. As a contribution to political economy proper, this book, however, has great value.

GENERAL NOTES.

—THE ARTICLES by Professors Royce, Schurman, and Dewey, in the foregoing pages, on the Courses in Ethics at Harvard, Cornell, and Ann Arbor are the beginning of a series of articles by college and university professors, to be published in future numbers of the RECORD, giving an account of the opportunities for the study of ethics now offered in the higher seats of learning, both at home and abroad. In view of the proposition to found a school to be wholly devoted to higher education in philosophy, the science of religion, and ethics, these articles will be of special value and interest.

—THE MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE on a School of Philosophy and Applied Ethics will be held too late to obtain their report for this number of the ETHICAL RECORD. We can inform our readers, however, that the project is being pushed quietly but vigorously on. The need and importance of such a school cannot be overestimated, and it is hoped that the necessary funds to found the school will soon be forthcoming. A general outline of the work proposed for the new school was described by Professor Adler in the April number of the RECORD. A reprint of the article may be had upon application to the editor.

—THE PRIZE OF ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS to be offered by the Union of Ethical Societies for the best paper on some specified subject in Applied Ethics has been raised or guaranteed, and the committee of judges in part selected. Among the topics for the essay that are now under consideration by those having the matter in charge are the following: "The History of the Idea of Justice," "The Application of the Principle of Justice to Economics," and "The Ethics of

Divorce, with a Review of the History of the Subject, and a Summary of Existing Legislation in Regard to it among Civilized Nations." As soon as the subject has been chosen, the judges selected, and other necessary arrangements completed, the Committee will send out a circular of announcement to all the leading colleges and universities in this country and abroad. The prize will be open equally to the students and scholars of all countries, and a year given for writing the essay.

—A PRINTED STATEMENT, clearly defining the stand-point and meaning of an Ethical Society, has often been asked for. This number of the RECORD supplies what is wanted. The articles by Professor Adler, Dr. Coit, and Mr. Sheldon, and the one on the Essex Hall Ethical Society, of London, clearly define the aims and general principles of an Ethical Society. They are each independent statements, and cover much the same ground, but should all be read by any one desiring to know the meaning of the Ethical Movement.

—THE SUNDAY MEETINGS of the Ethical Societies are generally held in public halls and theatres. The lectures of the New York Society are at Chickering Hall, which is used at other times in the week for concerts and public meetings of various kinds. The Chicago Society meets in the Grand Opera-House, the St. Louis Society in Memorial Hall, belonging to Washington University, and the Philadelphia Society has thus far been holding its Sunday meetings in Natatorium Hall, which is used during the week for social entertainments. For the coming season the lectures will be held in St. George's Hall.

Would it not be greatly to the advantage of these societies to possess buildings of their own, suitable for Sunday lectures, ethical classes, schools, and philanthropic work? Professor Gizycki, of Berlin, raises this question in a recent letter to one of the lecturers of the Ethical Societies. He writes as follows:

"A few months ago I attended church for the first time for a long while. The superiority of the Ethical Society to the Church impressed itself upon me afresh. One of the greatest advantages of the churches, however, is that they possess buildings of their own, especially adapted to the purposes for which they are used, and call art (architecture, sculpture, painting, and music) to their aid. The Ethical Societies might equally well avail themselves of these aids, provided only the material means were at hand. The value of such externals should not be underestimated. The power of the association of ideas and feelings attaching to such places is great. What an influence a noble and beautiful hall which is only used for holy purposes exerts upon us! How mighty, indeed, this influence is, particularly if we have been accustomed to assemble in such places, from childhood on, on solemn occasions! How different, on the other hand, is the impression produced on our minds by a theatre! The speaker who delivers sermons in such a place is not helped but hindered by the influence of the surrounding atmosphere. Could you not persuade your Society to build a chapel for its own use? This would, without doubt, result in largely increasing the Society."

Professor Gizycki's suggestion that the Ethical Societies should, like the churches, have buildings of their own is an important one, and we should be glad to learn the opinion of those most interested in the growth of the Ethical Societies in regard to it. It strikes us that it would greatly help the growth and work and influence of our Societies to meet in buildings of their own rather than in places with associations so foreign to ethical ideas and feelings as public halls and theatres suggest. But these halls and theatres afford a *central* meeting-place, which is quite important, especially in our large cities; and the cost of erecting suitable buildings in such central localities would be far greater than most of our societies could at present afford. The South Place Ethical Society, of London, possesses a building of its own,—South Place Chapel,—owing to the fact that the Society itself is an evolution from a church. Other churches may in time—we believe will in time—develop into Ethical Societies, and church buildings be thus converted into places for ethical meetings, but such transformations will doubtless be infrequent for some time to come. The signs of the times, however, point in that direction. There is at present an unmistakable ethical movement—a distinctively ethical tendency—inside as well as outside of the churches, and it is to be hoped that these two movements will in time unite.

But even if churches or synagogues should come into the possession of Ethical Societies, they would have to be considerably modified to suit them to the purposes of an Ethical Society. Christianity and Judaism have each a distinct type of architecture suited to their own use, and when buildings come to be erected for the use of Ethical Societies, a type of architecture different from either will be required. They will not be planned and constructed merely or mainly for Sunday services; they will be built for carrying on such daily practical philanthropic work as the societies see fit to engage in; they will be dedicated to whatever helps towards realizing the ethical ends of man.

And not only architecture, but sculpture, painting, music, and poetry, which have been the valued handmaids of the Church, should be brought into the service of the Ethical Societies. We need not, however, concern ourselves much at present whether we have these helps or not. They will be added in time, and it will be time enough for them to be added when they have themselves been born out of ethical ideas. It will not do to hasten such helps by merely grafting them on from without. There is much, however, in Christianity and Judaism that is in perfect accord with the principle and aims of our Ethical Societies. All that, and the art that gives expression to it, we should freely adopt and use, for it belongs as much to us as to them, inasmuch as it is a part of the ethical life and history of man.

—A ONE THOUSAND DOLLAR PRIZE MANUAL.—The following important circular has lately been sent to us, the circulation of which we are glad to help extend :

“THE AMERICAN SECULAR UNION, a voluntary association having for its object the complete separation of Church and State, in practice as well as in profession, and in no way committed to any system of religious belief or disbelief, acting herein by its president, Richard B. Westbrook, A.M., LL.D., as its special trustee and attorney-in-fact, hereby offer a premium of One Thousand Dollars (\$1000), lawful money of the United States, for the best essay, treatise, or manual adapted to aid and assist teachers in our *free public schools* and in the *Girard College* for orphans, and other public and charitable institutions professing to be unsectarian, to thoroughly instruct children and youth in the *purest principles*

of morality without inculcating *religious doctrines*, thus recognizing the *legal right* under our *Federal Constitution* of all our citizens, Jews and Gentiles, Catholics and Protestants, Liberals and Agnostics, and all other classes, whether believers or disbelievers, to have their children instructed in all the branches of a common secular education in our *State* schools, without having their tender minds *biased* for or against any sect or party whatever.

"It is desired that the manual for which this premium is offered shall not be a *reading* book for schools nor a mere *code* of morals, much less a *system* of ethical philosophy, but rather a concise yet comprehensive and suggestive exhibit, with familiar and practical illustrations of those universal foundation principles and axiomatic truths which underlie all sound morality and *rightfulness*, thus developing and educating that inherent *moral sense* which is more or less common to all rational human beings. In short, to show how to teach children the *natural* and *essential* difference between right and wrong, and the reasons therefor, without reference to sacerdotal creeds and sectarian dogmas, is the chief object to be kept in mind in writing for this premium; as it is the unquestionable right of every tax-payer and citizen of this free republic to have their children educated in our common schools without having their minds prejudiced on those disputed subjects which may safely be intrusted to the family, the churches, and the Sunday-schools, where they properly belong.

"While each writer will be expected to confine himself or herself to the main object of this offer, the widest practical freedom in the form and range of treatment will be allowed, but all prejudice and partisanship regarding current controversies should be scrupulously avoided.

"The manual should not contain less than 60,000 words, nor more than 100,000, though these limits will not be insisted upon in a work of special merit.

"The papers should all be submitted by April 1, 1890, though more time will be granted if necessary; but the committee will be ready to receive manuscripts by the first day of January, 1890.

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—"A STUDENT'S MANUAL OF ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY," adapted from the German of G. von Gizycki, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Berlin, by Stanton Coit, Ph.D. is an important volume, of 304 pages, that has come into our hands just as we are going to press. Professor Gizycki, who belongs to the Utilitarian school, is the author of several important ethical works. He has made himself thoroughly acquainted with the leading English moralists, and some of his best works are an exposition of their writings. We once heard Professor Zeller recommend to his audience of several hundred students, as a book of great value, Professor Gizycki's work on Shaftesbury. The present volume is a translation of his latest work, "*Moralphilosophie*," one chapter from which, entitled "*The Church and Ethical Society*," was published in the April number of the *RECORD*. There are numerous references throughout the volume to the principles and aims of the Ethical Societies. Professor Gizycki has already rendered great service to the Ethical Movement in making it known and respected throughout Europe through his translation of Mr. Salter's lectures, and the German edition of the present volume adds to that service. "Student's Manual" is a systematic treatment on moral philosophy, which we trust—thanks to Dr. Coit's faithful labors in making it available to all English readers—will have a wide circulation in this country and England. The following few sentences from the introduction indicate the important subject-matter of the book:

"Ethical philosophy has both a scientific and a practical aim. Its scientific aim is to furnish a man with a clear consciousness of his moral life, and to give him a deeper understanding of this most significant side of reality, so that he may grasp its ultimate principles. Its practical task is to answer that most personal and earnest question, *How am I to act? How ought I to conduct my life?* Thus, as the great art of a good and wise life, it becomes the most important of all teachings. It is a science for all; inasmuch as every one is in need of enlightenment and guidance."

The publishers are Swan, Sonnenschein & Co., Paternoster Square, London.

—**DR. WARD'S VIEW OF RELIGION.**—Dr. Duren J. H. Ward, whose personality and enthusiasm for the scientific study of religion captivated so many in attendance upon the January Convention of Ethical Societies, has written a modest little book,—“*How Religion Arises: A Psychological Study*” (Boston: Geo. H. Ellis). It is slightly disappointing, as it is not so much a direct psychological study as a criticism of different philosophical theories on the subject. We have been unable to get a perfectly clear idea of what Dr. Ward means by religion. In some form, he says, religion is at home in every breast. The object of a man's adoration may be a tree, a mountain, his ancestor, a noble woman, deified humanity, an ideal life, an anthropomorphic pantheon, or “the high and holy one who inhabiteth eternity.” According to such a view, religion is in essence a sentiment of reverence and awe, whatever may be the objects that call it forth. Elsewhere, however, Dr. Ward seems to favor the customary view. On page 60 he seems to identify it with the regeneration of a super-sensible order, of “another self in nature,” or, as on page 55, of “a spirit of which the beholder regards himself in some way a miniature likeness.” We mention this, not in criticism, but because we wish to know what Dr. Ward's view really is. Can the sentiment of reverence and awe before a moral ideal or the moral law be properly called religion? This is very different from asking whether religion has its origin in morality, which Dr. Ward very justly answers in the negative.

—**A REVIEW** of Mr. Salter's new book, “*Ethical Religion*,” by Mr. Thomas Davidson, will be printed in the next number. It was received too late to be included in this.

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THE ETHICAL RECORD.

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THE IDEA OF JUSTICE IN PLATO'S "REPUBLIC."

BY PAUL SHOREY, PH.D.

THE essential significance for modern ethics of the conception of justice embodied in the "Republic" can be stated in a brief paper only by a resolute disregard of all the irrelevancies with which unscholarly philosophy and unphilosophic scholarship have encumbered the study of Plato's masterpiece. In the finished texture of the completed design, analysis distinguishes three separate strands of thought which, in our clumsy and composite modern speech, we may call the dialectical, the psychological, and the sociological. Men who have raised themselves above the merely animal existence and gained a clear prospect over their being's whole, will always strive to introduce order, system, and definition among their experiences and ideas; to know themselves and the inmost spring of action that determine individual weal or woe; and to conceive, portray, and bring about the kingdom of God on earth. All the circumstances of Plato's life conspired to intensify in him these natural impulses of thoughtful and ardent souls. The Greeks of the fourth and fifth centuries before Christ found in their mythologies, their epic, lyric, and dramatic poetry, in their atomistic and pantheistic philosophies of evolution, and in their marvellously diversified political,

economic, and social life, the germs at least of nearly all the ideas that burden the more complex modern mind. But they lacked the formal logic and ethic, the historic jurisprudence, the body of precisely registered observations of nature, the hierarchy of the physical sciences,—all the machinery of system and classification whereby the modern world maintains a semblance of order among its far-reaching conceptions. And, after a generation or two of super-subtle and seemingly fruitless logomachies, they were partially redeemed from utter confusion only by the development of the cross-examining *elenchus* of Socrates into the dialectic of Plato and the formal logic of Aristotle. In ethics and religion a like anarchy prevailed. Use and wont and ancestral tradition were no longer accepted as sufficient guides of life. The old religions were fast dissolving under a criticism that was sceptical without being philosophic or serious. They were maintained only in the interests of a superstitious priestcraft, strikingly similar to that against which Luther rose in revolt, and less dangerous to civilization only because it was less strongly organized. The interpretation of the profounder religious meanings of Greek mythology by the “imaginative reason,” which Matthew Arnold finds in the great Attic poets of the time, could influence only a few. And when a Socrates and a Plato looked forth to moralize upon the world which Aristophanes flouted and Thucydides depicted with pitiless cynical analysis, they were confronted by the problem of a large body of opinion, real or feigned, which denied to virtuous or moral action any sanction save the purely external ones of arbitrary human convention. Such scepticism could be impressively combated by eloquent enforcements of the ethical religion of the choruses of Æschylus and Sophocles and the odes of Pindar, and this is sometimes the way in which Plato confronts it; but it can be fairly met and confuted only by one who turns an inquiring analytic gaze inward on the soul of man and finds there the chief sanction of moral conduct, in that intimate unity and interdependence of all the faculties whereby moral failure inevitably entails its own sufficient punishment. Lastly, the Greece of Plato’s time,

though at the acme of intellectual and artistic achievement, was socially in a state of disintegration. The heritage of Greek thought, art, and literature was secure, but Greek society itself was wasting with inward rot and breaking up under the heavy pressure of an outer barbarian world which it was powerless either to assimilate or repel. It was not for Plato to "forecast the years and find in loss the gain to match." It was not for him to anticipate the altered social conditions of a future separated from him by two thousand years of painful development, and to foresee the vast republics that would be made possible by representative government and steam. It was his task, within the limits of Greek conditions, to oppose to the Athens of Lais and Eubulus and the Sparta of Phœbidas and Cleombrotus his dream of an ideal city, leaving it to posterity to distinguish between the permanent human significance of his picture and its perishable and narrow, though exquisitely beautiful, Hellenic frame.

An ardent and active mind suffuses all its aims in a common emotion and links together all its thoughts by subtle dialectical bonds. And where our analysis distinguishes problems of ethics, psychology, and sociology, Plato, poet, philosopher, and artist, found but a single thought with diverse aspects. His aristocratic soul was reluctant to admit the possible divorce between supreme intellectual force and supreme moral worth, to which a longer experience of disillusionment and the blessing pronounced upon the poor in spirit have half reconciled the modern world. The predominance in the soul of clear-eyed conscious reason was to be united in his perfect man, as it was in his teacher, Socrates, with absolute moral self-control and an instinctive perception of the inherent psychological impossibility of building up effective unity of life and happiness upon a foundation of wrong-doing. And his social ideal was a state whose institutions, laws, schools, and churches should all conspire to the production of this harmonious type of character under the direction of statesmen trained in the best scientific culture of the age.

It is by no mere literary artifice or accident, then, that the "Republic" opens with a dramatic picture of an Athenian

logomachy, concerning the conceptions of justice popularized by the gnomic poets and moralists; rises to the problem of the intrinsic operation of righteousness as an indwelling power in the individual soul, and passes on to solve the problem by an elaborate working out of the analogies implied in the biological metaphor of the social organism. No great moral problem can be adequately stated by men who lack the dialectical skill to frame and test definitions; nor followed far without transcending mere verbal formulas and taking us into the inner laboratories of thought and motive; nor finally solved save by study of the interrelations of the individual life and that larger social life of which it is literally and not figuratively a part. This is the unity that for Plato and for appreciative readers binds together the seemingly disparate elements of his masterpiece. And those who grasp this central thought of the "Republic" will pass lightly over the misconceptions involved in current criticisms. Grote's persistently-urged objection that the "Republic" nowhere offers us the final and formal definitions of moral terms demanded of the sophists by Socrates in the tentative dramatic dialogues, will carry weight only with those who believe that a great ethical problem can be exhaustively stated in a formula, or who fail to perceive that Plato, for all his insistence on the dialectical necessity of definition and division, was quite as well aware of the purely instrumental and relative value of definitions as his great modern disciple, John Stuart Mill. De Quincey's crude analysis of the legislation of the "Republic," as if it were a bill on its way through Parliament, needs no examination in an age which has acquired the historic sense. Herbert Spencer's ponderous demonstration that, with the aid of Huxley and Carpenter, he can find analogies between the body politic and the physiological body, in comparison with which those of Plato are mere child's play is—very funny. German professors, who find the "Republic" wanting in philosophic and artistic unity, and who dissect it into a number of detached and heterogeneous compositions which they suppose to have been artificially pieced together by an after-thought, must be left to perish in their sins. Less in-

genious readers will feel no breach of continuity as they pass from scene to scene, but only the cumulative impression produced by the evolution of one central thought in many aspects and in successively heightened stages of reflection.

The tentative discussion of popular definitions of justice in the first book shows us, far more clearly than any abstract historical analysis, the state of ethical thought in the Athens of the day, and at the same time brings into prominence the ethical scepticism that it was Plato's chief endeavor to combat,—the doctrine of Callicles in the "*Gorgias*," the creed of the clever materialists in the "*Laws*," the formula of the survival of the fittest, interpreted to mean might makes right, the theory that moral laws are an arbitrary convention of the many weak against the few strong, and that "Nature's darlings—the great, the strong, and the beautiful—are not children of our law." Thrasymachus, the dramatic representative of this view, is easily confounded by Socrates's superior dialectic as he would have been in reality. But when modern scientific thinkers, who have been taught to regard Plato as an irrational intuitionist, point out that many of these arguments are like those of the "*Gorgias*," purely verbal, and attempt to correct the answers of the sophist, they overlook the fact that Plato himself attributed only a dramatic significance to this preliminary logical fencing. Plato was well aware that more than captious dialectic is required to convince men that morality is of the nature of things, as is shown by his restatement of the entire problem at the opening of the second book. In this passage, which has been justly called a monument of Plato's fairness of mind, are set out with matchless force all those doubts of the existence of a disinterested morality which have in every age been loudly voiced by some Thucydides, Machiavelli, La Rochefoucauld, or Mandeville, and which at moments find a traitorous echo in the unconfessed thoughts of all of us, making us wonder like Renan, though we may not venture to say it, whether to be virtuous is not indeed to be a dupe. Will the just man if he has the ring of Gyges to hide or the barefaced power to avouch the gratification of his lusts still abstain? Will the pure abdess,

locked in the cell with her lover on the eve of the summons to the guillotine, remain pure? Is it true, as Emerson says, that we never speak of crime as lightly as we think? In the Athens of Critias and Antiphon, Plato's ears, as he says, had been ringing with the catchwords of sceptics of this kind. He here presents the strongest statement of their case in literature and then bends all his powers to answering them. It is a task, says Aristotle, to harmonize the good of the one with the good of the many. This task Plato undertakes by showing the psychological sanction in the individual soul of the conduct required for the good of the whole. Even the most logical of modern utilitarians—a Mill or a Morley—are wont to evade this difficulty by eloquent declamation. But Plato cherishes no illusions on this score: the greatest good of the greatest number, he substantially says in the "Laws," cannot be the direct and proximate motive of any human action. The elaborate account (in the second and third books) of the genesis of a typical state and its transfiguration by music, gymnastic, and dialectic into an ideal Hellenic state, is distinctly subordinated to the solution of this ethical problem.

This state is generated in theory by the inability of isolated man to supply his wants, and its fundamental principle is a division and co-ordination of labor that will enable a small society to provide for the prime necessities of a simple civilization. This "necessary" state, which is perhaps in part a satire on contemporary Rousseaus, is then enlarged into a fully-developed Greek city by what Herbert Spencer would call the "multiplication of effects." Plato is not unacquainted with the facts that support the patriarchal theory of the origin of society. The essence of all that has been said on that topic from Aristotle to Sir Henry Maine is to be found in the "Laws." But the special object of the "Republic" makes it more convenient to take the individual than the family for the social unit. The economic division of labor, out of which the primitive state is supposed to grow, is introduced in symbolic anticipation of the separation in an ideal society of the three typical functions of war, government, and industrial production generally. These three functions or classes in the state

are compared to the appetites, the active emotions, and the reason in man. And by subtle artifices of style the cumulative effect of which can be felt only in the original, the reader is brought to conceive of the social organism as one monster man or leviathan, whose sensuous appetites are the unruly mechanic mob, whose disciplined emotions are the trained force that checks rebellion within and guards against invasion from without, and whose reason is the philosophic statesmanship that directs each and all for the good of the whole. While conversely the individual man is pictured as a biological colony of passions and appetites which "swarm like worms within our living clay,"—a curious compound of beast and man which can attain real unity and personality only by the conscious domination of the monarchical reason.

The discussion begins with the temperament and training of the guardian or military class, symbolizing the discipline of the emotions with reference to the pleasures and pains of primary appetites on which the more prosaic "Laws" insist as the first stage of ethical culture. With Plato's special justification of the parallel between man and state, and his condemnation of the moral and religious ideas of a popular education founded on Homer and the poets, we are not directly concerned. Modern critics object to Plato's coercive assimilation of the social to the individual organism. But an illustrative metaphor can hardly be detached from its context and tested in this literal fashion. It is worth just what the literary skill of its inventor can make of it. We must also pass over the metaphysical and scientific inquiries that open up when a selected few of the guardians are trained for the special function of government by the higher philosophic education in mathematics, science, and dialectic. When the parallel between man and state has been worked out, the definition of justice easily detaches itself; but, as often happens, the formula when won is less significant than was anticipated during the search. Of the four cardinal virtues (which were first distinctly enumerated here and thence passed through Cicero's "Offices" into ethical text-books) wisdom is typified by the rulers, courage by the soldiers, and temperance partly by the self-

control and voluntary subordination of the producers, and partly by the self-knowledge of the entire society which leads to the self-limitation of each class to its own functions. In this second aspect the subjective virtue temperance is hardly to be distinguished from its active and objective correlate justice, which is the original principle of the division of labor applied to prevent any class from trenching on the domain of the others.

Plato has often been claimed by the socialists, and, speaking generally, it would be possible to say that the political justice of Plato is dignity and power in proportion to ability, and remuneration (in part) according to need. But such a statement would require many qualifications. Plato's socialism has little in common with the "equal division of unequal earnings" of the moderns. Nor is his social ideal an extension of the comforts and luxuries of the bourgeois class to the proletariat. The communistic prescriptions of the "*Republic*" relate only to the military and governing classes, and their object is partly to facilitate the necessary discipline of those classes, and partly to preserve their members from the temptations to oppress the producers to which private property and selfish interests would expose them. But there are no special provisions for interference with the natural laws of competition and of the accumulation of wealth within the producing class, though the imposition of such restrictions would always be in the discretion of the rulers. Plato would have had little sympathy with the modern feeling that the good things of this world ought to be distributed equally. If he demanded equality it was because the extremes of inequality, extreme poverty and extreme wealth, corrupt the soul and the state, producing beggars and malefactors at one extreme and cowardly, sensual tyrants at the other; and so break up the unity of the state into two hostile camps of rich and poor. But the individual's claim of right to an equal share in the instruments of sensuous gratification he would have met with austere contempt. When it is objected to him that the severity of their discipline and regimen does not leave his guardians much private happiness, he answers that the state

is not organized to secure the happiness of a class but the good of the whole. His real moral feeling is expressed in the declaration that those who submit themselves to this simple rule of life may be happiest after all, and that the guardian who is misled by childish conceptions of good to abuse his power for selfish ends will learn too late the profound truth of that word of Hesiod, "the half is more than the whole." But it is a mistake to examine the symbolic conceptions of the "Republic" as if they were so many *projets de loi*. The community of wives among the guardians and the strange regulations of the relations of the sexes, which have proved such a stumbling-block to modern critics, are, as Schopenhauer justly observes, Plato's paradoxical expression of an intense conviction that the social reform of mankind cannot be accomplished by purely external means, but must be wrought from within by the way of heredity. What seemed possible to Plato within the limits of Greek conditions we may learn from the "Laws." There, after gratifying the idealistic impulse by the repeated affirmation that the perfect society must be based upon a total abolition of individualism, he ordains that every citizen must own one of the equal lots of land into which the public domain is apportioned and that no citizen may possess other property to more than three times the value of his lot. Commercial enterprise is checked by a provision (already suggested in the "Republic") that the state will not enforce monetary contracts and the repayment of loans. This is merely an exaggeration of the principle of policy on which modern states refuse to enforce aleatory contracts. Interference with the relations of the sexes is limited to the prescription of certain regulations tending to bring about physiologically desirable unions, in place of the customary alliances of vanity, interest, or caprice.

But it is time to return from this objective aspect of justice, which preoccupies modern attention, to the subjective side with which Plato was chiefly concerned. Within the individual soul justice is an harmonious adjustment of the faculties and a government of the lower centres by the higher. The just man is he whose disciplined emotions, like well-trained

hounds, keep order among the unruly crew of his appetites at the bidding of the shepherding mind. He is the man

"Whose even-balanced soul,
From first youth tested up to extreme old age,
Business could not make dull nor passion wild."

While the unjust man is he in whom, to borrow a most un-Platonic formula from Herbert Spencer, "a sudden discharge sent by a pain or annoyance through those plexuses which adjust the conduct to painful and annoying agencies, is unaccompanied by a discharge through those plexuses which adjust the conduct to many circumstances instead of a single circumstance." Such transcendental definitions of justice, Plato is careful to affirm, will stand all vulgar tests. The man whose faculties are so harmonized will not be led astray by inordinate desire to lie, steal, or commit adultery; while the man who, lacking this inner temperamental harmony, happens to conform to conventional morality is, as is said in the "*Phædo*," upright and brave through fear, and temperate by cunning calculation of intemperate lusts. His virtue is a counterfeit symbol not redeemable in the true coin of wisdom and righteousness. And thus the question which profits a man most, righteousness or unrighteousness, would reduce itself to the question whether a diseased soul is more desirable than a healthy, whether it is better to foster the brute beast within the man and starve out the humanity. Nevertheless, Plato does not content himself with these impressive analogies, but passes on to the more difficult task of producing conviction that the man in whom reason and the rational emotions predominate, will choose rather to limit his appetites than, as the sophistic ideal of life would require, to develop them and feed them fat. For it is through the affirmation of unlimited appetites in a limited world that strife and wrong-doing arise among men, and if the highest individual happiness can be procured by the gratification of carefully-cultivated appetite, no adequate motive for righteousness can be presented to an acute and powerful intelligence.

This problem is still the crux of the modern utilitarian

ethics, and neither Mill nor Sidgwick has added much to Plato's treatment of it. We all feel what the practical answer must be. The desires that lead to wrong-doing are essentially unbounded. They contain no inherent principle of restraint. Yet the nature of things will somewhere set them a limit to which each subjective failure in restraint makes conformity more difficult. And such is the bewildering entanglement of objective relations, such the infinite subtlety of psychical associations, that even the most prudentially-calculated wrong act introduces a painfully discordant note into the complicated harmonies of life. But can we go beyond these vague poetical analogies, or must we limit ourselves to Chamfort's saying that virtue is "*la place du bien plutôt que le bien même*"? Can we demonstrate to the ethical sceptic the necessary practical unwisdom of injustice? Perhaps not, but a Platonist will always be impelled to try.

Beginning, then, with the ideal state whose government is a monarchy or aristocracy, Plato sketches, parallel to the actual disintegration of the Hellenic society of his time, and in striking anticipation of the Roman empire and nineteenth century France, a typical process of degeneracy through timocracy, oligarchy, and ochlocracy to tyranny. Were we studying the "*Republic*" as a whole, it would be interesting to dwell on the wonderful literary skill that has embodied so much suggestive historic and political speculation in artistic forms, the beauty of which will blind only literal-minded critics to the thought they contain. Very suggestive too are the accompanying portraits of individual types,—the "*oligarchical*" man whose valor is hardening into ferocity and whose principle of honor is degenerating into arrogant self-will and avaricious greed; the democratic type of "*young Athens*," who has no character at all but is all mankind's epitome, and who in place of a kingly reason to counsel and command elects a new ruling passion every month to preside over the tumultuous mob of his appetites. But for the main ethical argument we need only the tyrant city and the tyrant soul.

Fully to grasp this argument we must recall to mind the mingled feelings of admiration, envy, and hatred which the

successful tyrant aroused in a thoughtful Greek,—feelings marked at one extreme by the standing epithet “divine,” applied to absolute rule in the earlier poets and Euripides, and at the other by the scholion of Harmodius and Aristogiton. In a state of the size and wealth of nineteenth century France the orgies of Napoleonic luxury sink into insignificance compared with the dangers of Napoleonic policy; but in the smaller Greek state the most striking thing in the tyrant’s position was the unlimited license it afforded to unbridled lust and appetite. The tyranny then was for Plato an apt figure of the soul in which the desires have thrown off all restraint and grasped the reins of conduct for themselves. And the vivid portrayal of the hell of suspicion and fear thinly covered by the glittering exterior of the tyrant state and man—a picture that deeply impressed the imagination of antiquity and was applied to Cæsar by Cicero and to Tiberius by Tacitus—formed the most suitable transition to the final ethical demonstration that happiness cannot be won by submitting all things to desire and nurturing appetite to such a bursting forth.

By way of proof three formal arguments are brought forth. The first is the detailed analogy between the tyrant city and the tyrannical type of soul. The second is the *ultima ratio* of John Stuart Mill’s utilitarianism. Granting that there are three (or more) types of life, the life of sensuous gratifications, of pride and ambition, and that of intellect and virtue, and that the follower of each will affirm the surpassing happiness of his own, the judgment of the intellectual and virtuous man must be preferred to the others, because he alone has necessarily had experience of the pleasures of all the three. The votary of pleasure and the man covetous of what men call honor may never have known the joys of severe thought or of active benevolence, but the virtuous philosopher has necessarily experienced to some extent the gratifications of appetite and the satisfactions of pride, and he alone can rightly practise the “art of measuring” postulated in the “Protagoras,” the “hedonistic calculus” of modern ethical theory. This argument, which Mill has deigned to borrow, possessed

for Plato probably only a passing dialectical significance. His ethics are really based on the principle which Schopenhauer learned from him,—the doctrine of the essential negativity and worthlessness of pleasure in the ordinary sense. This doctrine, which is scientifically expounded in the "Philebus" and briefly resumed in the third argument of the "Republic," Plato does not push as far as Schopenhauer, for he recognizes a small, positive class of pure pleasures, but this psychological difference does not affect the ethical results. The sensuous satisfactions for which "men gore and rend each other like brutes with horns and hooves of iron," and from which arise all forms of discord and injustice among them, are proved by our deepest inner experience to be inherently valueless and illusory. Some of us are long in learning this lesson. Some never learn it until all force and courage for helpful activity are gone. But whether instinctive in those "that have fore-known the vanity of hope, foreseen the harvest, yet proceed to live," or the ripe fruit of experience in one "whose mind hath known all arts of government, mused much, loved life a little, loathed it more," this knowledge it is that produces that voluntary self-effacement at the eager banquet of life which is the first condition of all genuine justice and benevolence to others. "There is little in human life worth the careful zeal of a man," says Plato, sadly, "but zealous and careful we must needs be."

But the "Republic" is the work of a great moral teacher, who is too wise to dwell long upon a thought which, however stimulating it may prove to duly tempered minds, has in its direct enunciation a disheartening sound to the generality of men. His attempted demonstration of the unwisdom of wickedness may ultimately rest upon those minute and curious considerations, but practical human life has other guides than dialectic. And in his closing book he is careful to point out that the original hypothesis, adopted for the sake of argument, of an outwardly successful career of the unjust man in this world is a barren and unreal abstraction. He withdraws what Emerson calls the immense fallacy of the concession that substantial justice is not done here and now. Even in this

world the unjust man, however fairly he may start upon the race, is certain to stumble and falter before the goal is reached, and it is the righteous man who wins in the end. And then, unwilling to forego any sanction of right conduct, he rises from the region of dialectic demonstration to the world of faith, aspiration, and trust, and offers us in place of the rejected gross material paradise of Hesiod and the Orphic poets, one of those beautiful tales of the after judgment and retribution in which Martineau, their best interpreter, finds a genuine if somewhat melancholy and uncertain anticipation of triumphant Christian hope.

But alike for those who feel with Martineau and for those who venture only to affirm (with Benn) that "memory, if not hope, is the richer for those magnificent visions," the Platonic "Republic" is a work from which the ethical teacher can derive invaluable inspirations. As has been observed in the case of the Homeric poems, minds corrupted by the pedantries of the modern scholasticism can recover the true meaning only by an elaborate historical culture. But its distinctively human quality, if clearly and plainly presented, appeals at once to the unsophisticated. The product of a remote and alien civilization, the book necessarily contains some local and temporal matters that possess no living significance for us. But when these few perishable and detachable elements are disregarded, there remains little that cannot be effectively taught even to students unable to read the original text. Such students may in some cases be more open to its suggestions than the hot-house plants of hypercriticism. Their enjoyment of the dialectic comedy will not be spoiled by historic doubts that Thrasymachus is not getting fair play. Reading rapidly for the thought they will remain in happy ignorance of the clumsy junctures which German criticism has detected soldering the heterogeneous parts. They will not inquire too curiously whether the details of Greek history show that Greek states did, as a rule, pass from monarchy to tyranny through the intermediate stages of oligarchy and the rule of the mob. They will be supremely indifferent as to what modern biology has to say concerning the analogy between man and the social

organism. But their minds will be invigorated and enlarged by the beautiful dramatic presentation of a stage of ethical reflection as necessary in the development of the individual as in that of the race, and the moral atmosphere of the book will be to them like that which Plato sought to create for the youth of his visionary city, "a breeze bringing health from places strong for life." For the ethical and religious feeling of the Platonic writings is very separable from the physical and metaphysical dogmas with which it is implicated. Different teachers will be inclined to interpret and judge these diversely, but all may unite in the conviction that, could we only grasp and hold with "adamantine faith" the lesson of salvation inculcated by the saved and saving tale of Er, the Armenian, the principles wherewith Socrates schooled himself to confront, not the Athenian dicastery, but the more awful bar of Rhadamanthine justice, why then, "both here and in all the after Pilgrim's Progress of the soul, with us it will be well."

THE ETHICS OF DIVORCE.*

BY FELIX ADLER, PH.D.

IN approaching the problems of divorce, it will be convenient to begin by enunciating the following propositions, which, I am persuaded, are of fundamental importance to a right understanding of the subject:

1. Divorce is a social disease, the causes of which must be traced in the constitution of modern society.

2. The integrity of the family must be preserved at all hazards. To this end it is necessary that the nuptial tie should normally remain intact. Whatever tends to encourage a hasty and frivolous dissolution of the bands, or to introduce an element of caprice and uncertainty into the marriage relation, is an unmitigated evil, and a crime against the social order.

On the other hand, true marriage is a *moral fellowship*, and cases occur in which the maintenance of the relation not only entails unspeakable suffering, but is morally degrading. It has been truly said that society is justified in inflicting suffering on some, or at least in withholding from them relief, if by this means the interests of the larger number are secured. But society is not justified in sacrificing the moral well-being even of a single individual for the sake of all the rest. This distinction may possibly prove helpful in determining the limits within which divorce should be permitted.

3. In dealing with any difficulty, there are commonly two methods between which we can choose. We may cut the knot, or try to unravel it. In the case of divorce we may cut the knot with the sword of the legislator by means of stern restrictive laws, or we may try to discover the causes which

* An address delivered before the Society for Ethical Culture of New York, Chickering Hall, November 17, 1889.

have led to the increase of divorce, and search for the remedies. The former method recommends itself to many on account of its apparent simplicity and directness,—the latter alone is likely to produce permanently beneficial results.

A Report on Marriage and Divorce in the United States has been published recently by the Hon. Carroll D. Wright, Commissioner of Labor. The facts brought out in this excellent and profoundly instructive document are calculated to impress even the most indifferent. My purpose to-day is to state some of these facts, and to try to realize their meaning.

Bertillon, in his "*Étude Démographique*," remarks, "It is impossible to dispute that dissensions in households have increased more and more whichever country we consider, whatever the laws or the race or the religion or the manners may be. This fact is absolutely general." And again: "It seems that in the last ten years, I cannot say what breath of discord has passed over Europe. Conjugal quarrels have become more and more frequent," etc. The United States have participated in this general movement, but at an accelerated pace, and to an extent equalled or paralleled nowhere else. This is brought out with startling clearness in the Report. During the twenty years, from 1867 to 1886, the total number of divorces in the United States was 328,716. The annual figures rose from 9937, in 1867, to 25,535 in 1886. 25,000 in the United States as compared with 6211 in France, 6078 in the German empire, and 475 in the United Kingdom! The ratio of divorce to population increased from 1 divorce to 3517, in 1870, to 1 divorce to 2051, in 1880. The ratio of marriages to divorces shows the same tendency. For the whole period of twenty years, the ratio of marriage to divorce in Maryland was 61.94; but there was a decline from 74.33, in the first year, to 51.13 in the last. Massachusetts averaged 31.28 marriages to every divorce, but the ratio fell from 45.44. The District of Columbia averaged 30.83, but the ratio fell from 68.29. In Vermont and Connecticut there was a relative increase in the number of marriages,—in Vermont from 18.20 to 20.06; in Connecticut, from 9.56 to 13.09. But the absolute figures reached are far from satisfactory. In New Hampshire

the ratio in 1886 was only 8.72 marriages to 1 divorce. Regarding the country as a whole, it is unquestionably true that the divorce movement has gained headway to an alarming and hitherto unprecedented extent.

Now, what are the explanations of this phenomenon? Quite a number have been proposed. It is one of the services rendered by this statistical report that, without indulging in theories of its own, it dispels many of the popular theories respecting the causes of divorce, and exhibits their utter inadequacy. Let us see what some of these fallacious popular theories are. In the first place, it is widely believed that the frequency of divorce is due to the conflicting and inharmonious statutes of the various States, some being more lenient and others more stringent; whence it is inferred that persons living in a State whose laws are strict will naturally seek release from the marriage bond in a State whose laws are lax. But do the facts support this inference? Thus, as Colonel Wright informs us, it is the popular belief that persons residing in the State of New York, where the law is strict, are in the habit of seeking divorces in Rhode Island or in Pennsylvania. But the statistics show that of 4462 divorces granted in Rhode Island, only 97 were to parties married in New York, and of 16,020 granted in Pennsylvania, only 765 were to parties married in New York. While of the 289,546 couples whose place of marriage was ascertained, 231,867—or about three-fourths of the whole number—were divorced in the same State in which they had been married. So that the theory that the increase of divorce is due to the inharmonious laws of the several States, and would be radically affected by a national law on the subject, does not appear to be tenable.

It is worth our while to inquire, in passing, to what extent intemperance has been a serious factor in promoting the increase of divorce, the opinion being entertained by many that intemperance is the chief social evil, and the prime and prolific source of all the rest. An examination was made in forty-five representative counties in twelve States, and the result of this examination shows that intemperance was a

direct or indirect cause in about twenty per cent. of the whole number.

But the theory commonly put forward with the greatest confidence, to account for the phenomenon which we are considering, is that our divorce laws are too liberal. Converse upon the subject with your friends, and in nine cases out of ten, when you have described the evils, you will hear the answer, "What can be expected with such laws as ours?" I have already alluded to the fallacy that the clashing of the statutes of the various States is accountable for the evil, and that a national law would radically cure it. But, apart from this, there seems to be a general impression that the trend of legislation, in most of our States, taken singly, is too favorable to a lax construction of the marriage obligation. In the Report of the government, this allegation has been examined with some care, and the result is contrary to what most persons would have expected. Legislation is not found to have had that influence on the divorce movement which most persons ascribe to it. And this is the most important negative result established by the Report. In this respect it will mark an epoch in the discussion of the subject. In Illinois, for instance, which has the unenviable distinction of being the banner State in regard to divorce, and which heads the list with a total of 36,072 for the twenty years, "there have been no changes in the legislation that could account for any particular increase in numbers from year to year," and yet the annual figure rose from 1071, in 1867, to 2606 in 1886; nor are the laws of Illinois more lenient than those of certain other States in which the number of divorces is considerably smaller. In Tennessee the figures have risen from 287 to 801, "but nothing is found in the legislation of the State to account for this increase." And so in more than twenty States the verdict of the Report is that legislation has had no appreciable influence,—that other causes must be sought out than those contained in the statutes. Moreover, if we compare the American with the European laws, we shall find that the American laws, even where they are the most liberal, are not more liberal than those of some of the most civilized

European nations, and yet the increase of divorce in the United States is vastly greater than it is anywhere else.

If the laws themselves are not at fault, it is assumed by many that the administration of law is to blame,—that the discretionary powers vested in courts of justice are not used with sufficient prudence. It can hardly be denied that this is true in some cases. Instances are mentioned in the Report in which divorce was granted on the ground of cruelty, and the charge of cruelty appears to have been supported by the most flimsy pretences. In one case the wife complained that during their whole married life her husband had never offered to take her out riding, and that this had been a source of great mental suffering and injury to her. In another case the plaintiff's husband was accused of cruelty because he failed to provide a proper supply of water, and did not repair the house so as to make it comfortable. In another case the husband fancied himself a spiritualistic medium, and declared that he could not develop fast enough while living with the plaintiff, which declaration caused plaintiff great mental anguish. In another case the plaintiff accused the husband of using tobacco, and thus aggravating her headaches. Finally, a rich girl married a man, seemingly at the point of death; the man had the audacity to recover, and the wife brought suit for cruelty and fraud. But while instances of this sort are apt to be selected for public comment, and to stick in the public mind, it is not just to assume that they are characteristic of the dealings of the American courts with the subject of divorce, as a rule. The government Report arrives at the very opposite conclusion. It is pointed out that while during the twenty years 328,716 divorces were granted in the United States, the petitions for divorce amounted to 484,683,—in other words, about thirty per cent. of the petitions were denied. And basing his judgment on this fact, the author of the Report expresses the opinion "that our courts, instead of being careless in the matter of granting decrees, weigh well the causes alleged and do not grant decrees unless the allegations of the libellants are fairly sustained."

At all events, the primary causes must be sought not in the

statutes nor in the methods of administration. There are deep, underlying causes. What are these causes? No conscientious student will be prepared in the present state of our knowledge to answer this question with any degree of confidence. The investigation has barely begun, the statistics of the subject, even in European countries, are still sadly incomplete. A hint of what some of the causes may be can be derived from a curious set of figures which are embodied in the Report. It would appear, judging from these figures, that there are two critical periods in which the stability of married life is particularly threatened. The greatest number of divorces occurred after four years of marriage. The number of divorces granted to couples who had lived together four years amounted to 27,909. The figures declined to 15,000, 10,000, 4000, in the later years. But there seems to be a second critical period. "It is surprising to find that 25,371 couples, after living together twenty-one years or more, were obliged to seek divorce." So that it would seem that persons who had lived together for twenty-one years and over found it increasingly hard to continue the connection. And this points to the possible existence of physiological causes which it does not fall within our province to examine. Again, there are wide-spread social causes. Von Oettingen points out that a sudden rise in the price of food is likely to be followed by a decrease in the number of marriages and an increase in the number of divorces. The occurrence of war affects the divorce rate. Then again, the figures for divorce are very much larger in certain occupations than in others. Bertillon says, "Divorce and separation occur most frequently in bourgeois callings, more particularly among the mercantile class; divorce and separation are rare among the cultivators of the soil." In France, the participation of merchants in the divorce movement is expressed by the figure 13 and a fraction to every 100,000; the participation of the agricultural class by the figure 2 to every 100,000. In Sweden the figures are: of persons engaged in transportation, 67; of persons engaged in commerce, 62; of persons engaged in agriculture, 19.

But returning to the question in which we are mainly in-

terested,—namely, why the number of divorces should be so much larger in the United States than in Europe; why, admitting that the divorce movement is a general one, it should nevertheless have gained so much greater headway in this country than anywhere else, I think we can trace the operation of certain causes which may help us to explain this anomaly, and a few of these I shall venture to suggest.

The first cause I believe to be the higher position accorded to women in the United States. Every gain entails a corresponding loss. The frequency of divorce is perhaps the obverse side of the medal whose bright side is the elevation of the female sex. American women will simply not tolerate what German or even English women would bear without protest. The profound feeling existing in the United States against wife-beating is only one instance of a complete, though comparatively recent, change of sentiment respecting the rights and privileges of woman. In German theological and philosophical works the statement is still frequently made that the household is a monarchy, and that the final decision in all things belongs properly to the husband. Such opinions as to the mutual relations of wife and husband do not prevail among the American people. The higher position accorded to women, and their sensitiveness in regard to that position, seems to me to be one reason for the increased number of divorces.

A second reason I find in the migratory habits of our people,—habits which are adverse to rooted home feeling, fixedness and stability of households, and hence dangerous to the permanency of the marriage bond. This general restlessness and mobility is a matter of common observation, and is statistically proved by the circumstance that in the last census year, 1880, nearly 10,000,000 of the population were found to be living in States other than those in which they had been born. A vast number of our people are ever on the march, or at least ready to strike their tents at short notice. What lends color to this suggestion is the fact that in the United States *the principal ground for divorce is desertion*,—the largest number of petitions for divorces were granted on the ground

of desertion,—while in France and other countries, having an older and steadier civilization, desertion is one of the minor grounds. The connection between the migratory spirit and desertion is clear enough without further comment. In regard to this cause of divorce, the most active and potent of all, we have at least the cheering prospect that it will eventually be outgrown; that when American civilization will have become more settled, when the whole continent will have been fully occupied, the mobility of the population will be diminished and the danger that comes from this source will be averted.

But a third cause remains to be mentioned, more deeply seated and more difficult to deal with than all the rest. I mean the false idea of individual liberty which largely prevails among our people. At the time of the French Revolution, the National Assembly declared that “the right of divorce is the offspring of individual liberty, which is necessarily destroyed by bands indissoluble.” Ah, here we come upon one of the main roots of the evil. It is the false Rousseau idea of liberty; the doctrine that the *individual will* is the fountain-head of all rights and duties; the unwillingness to concede that there are certain duties into which we are born, whether we like them or not (the filial duties are of this description), and that there are certain other duties which we are free to assume or not, but which, having once been assumed, become as binding as those into which we are born,—the duties of marriage are of this description. The false idea of individual liberty is largely held in America. Our whole political system is infected by the virus of individualism. And from the political sphere it is imported into the domestic sphere. *The false political principle has begun to endanger the family principle.* So that I am constrained to think that the prevalence of divorce is to be ascribed in no small degree to the influence of democratic ideas,—that is, of false democratic ideas,—and our hope lies in advancing towards a higher and truer democracy.

I have said that legislation does not radically affect the movement of divorce, but this statement requires to be qualified. It is possible to pass laws so strict as greatly to

repress the divorce movement or even to suppress it entirely. In South Carolina divorce does not occur at all. In the State of New York, which recognizes only one ground of absolute divorce, the figures are remarkably conservative, the total for the twenty years being 15,355 as compared with Illinois's 36,072. Are we then to leap to the conclusion, as some have done, that the divorce laws of the State of New York ought to be copied throughout the country,—that New York, in this matter, has found the solution? I ask this question,—If a physician is called in to treat a case of grave disease, is he to direct his energies towards a repression of the symptoms? Is that cure? Are we to make it a matter of chief anxiety that the social disease which we are discussing may not appear on the surface? Are we rather to let it spread inward and attack the vitals? In the United Kingdom, where the laws are severe and the costs of divorce suits heavy, there were in 1886 only 475 divorces to our 25,535. Are we therefore to believe that English married life is proportionally better than ours? "We may boast of our monogamy and condemn polygamy," says an English clergyman, "but there is not a nation under heaven where polygamy is more openly practised than in this Christian country." And the eminent physician, James Hinton, exclaims, "What is the meaning of maintaining monogamy? Is there any chance of getting it? I should like to know. Do you call English life monogamous? Explain to me; I do not understand." Or are we to regard France in the days before the Revolution, when, according to the Catholic theory, absolute divorces were not granted at all; or Paris of the eighteenth century, or for that matter Paris of the middle of the nineteenth century, as the shining example which we are to imitate? I cannot believe for a moment that the policy of stern repression or suppression will avail. It will only satisfy us if, as was said of the Pharisees of old, we are chiefly concerned in maintaining an outward decency, in making the outside of the platter clean while within it will all the more be full of filth and corruption.

It is, I think, a fatal mistake—a mistake which has hitherto befogged the whole discussion and prevented a right under-

standing of the real point at issue—to suppose that the occurrence of divorce is the evil against which we have to contend. The real evil is the failure of marriage in an increasing number of cases. Whether this failure be made public in a suit of divorce, or be decorously concealed from the eyes of the world and left to work itself out in all manner of secret turpitude, does not change the main fact; the failure of marriage is the disease and divorce is but the symptom.

(To be continued.)

A SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS.

BY CARROLL D. WRIGHT, A.M.

IN the *ETHICAL RECORD* for April, 1889, Dr. Felix Adler, in giving the broad plan for the founding of a School of Philosophy and Applied Ethics, said, "It is proposed to found in one of the large cities of the United States a school for the scientific teaching of Philosophy, Ethics, and the History of Religion." This school the projector would have divided into three departments,—the Department of Philosophy, the Department of the Science of Religion, and the Department of Applied Ethics. The latter department he would have embrace, (*a*) Education, (*b*) Economics, (*c*) Practical Reforms.

The object of the present article is to outline the practical work of a School of Economics, as it should exist under the department of applied ethics in the great school of philosophy and applied ethics, the institution of which, it is hoped, will not be deferred to a very late date in the future.

The broad scheme discussed by Dr. Adler, in the article referred to, hints at the general character, and in many ways at the specific features, of the different branches of the new school. The elaboration of some of these hints may be of use at this time, as showing how, in the real work of the school, matters which may seem to the casual observer to be in the air, can be brought to the realms of a class-room.

A School of Economics should consider, (1) the theory and practice of statistics, (2) the history of labor legislation in the world, (3) the history of industrial and social movements, (4) an account of experiments in municipal and state control, (5) the history of landholding, (6) a study of national temperaments, in their relation to methods of reform. These subdivisions, or topics, are capable of varied extension, for a better comprehension of which they will be considered topically.

Before entering upon the study of the subjects just stated, the members of a School of Economics should be thoroughly instructed in the relation of ethics to economics. This, perhaps, could best be accomplished by a review of the works which have been written on political economy and moral philosophy, so far as the particular schools, and writers under them, are concerned, and thus getting at the history of political economy the class would be able to understand whatever of vitality there was in it in the earlier days, and how that vitality has been expanded through the influence of moral forces, and of the principles of moral philosophy.

The history of political economy having been compassed, so that the student may be well grounded not only in those elements of this branch of knowledge which have permanence in their value, but conversant with its shifting phases, the changes which come through industrial development, and the application of new principles arising therefrom, he would be well equipped to enter upon the technical study of the various topics already outlined. While not attempting to present an exhaustive plan, which should in itself be the curriculum of a school of economics, in all the branches suggested, a skeleton may be presented, on which the completed plan could be constructed.

First, the theory and practice of statistics. The Columbia School of Political Science has indicated very clearly what might be adopted as a general outline of work under this branch. The basis of the work of the Columbia School involves a course of "Statistical Science: Methods and Results," which is intended to furnish a basis for a social science by supplementing the historical, legal, and economic knowledge

which the student may have gained from previous work, taking up, under the head of the statistics of population,—race and ethnological distinctions, nationality, density, city and country elements, sex, occupation, religion, education, births, deaths, marriages, mortality, immigration, and all the facts which come under what is known as the census statistics of a country. Under economic statistics, the Columbia College School treats of land, production of food, raw material, labor, wages, capital, means of transportation, shipping, prices, etc. Under the head of moral statistics, it places statistics of society, vice, crime of all kinds, causes of crime, condition of criminals, the repression of crime, penalties, and effects of penalties, etc. And in its final work it considers the methods of statistical observations, the value of the results obtained by such observations, and the possibility of discovering social laws from the study of statistical science. This forms a very excellent general plan.

A School of Economics to be established on the ethical basis, and to be a part of the great school of philosophy and applied ethics, should, however, step out boldly into the philosophy, as well as the science, of statistics; it should teach the theory and practice of statistics, meaning by the theory of statistics a statement of what it is desired to accomplish by it. The object of every branch of social science is to explain the facts of human life, and there are some facts which can be explained only by statistics. The theory of the science should point out where the statistical method is applicable, and what it can and cannot accomplish. In the latter, perhaps, may be found the most important feature of teaching, the limitations which surround statistical science,—instruction in how far it falls short of explaining the facts of human life. For this purpose this country offers the richest material.

In the new School of Economics one of the principal adjuncts of a class-room would be a well-equipped and varied library, consisting of the statistical reports of the Federal and State governments. From these can be drawn all the illustrations that may be essential to illustrate the strong and the weak places in the theory and practice of statistics. An immense gain to ethico-economic science could be secured by the right

kind of instruction in our new school, in the directions just indicated.

Experience makes us sceptical of the exact uses to which statistics can be applied. We ask constantly, "Are the conditions constant, under which statistics have been gathered?" We want to know what they mean; we want to know what lies beneath the figures; and whether the results stated are not due to causes other than those generally assumed to exist. Figures themselves do not constitute statistical science; they may be denominated "statistics," but they are not essentially scientific.

With the governmental statistics various experimental tests could be applied, and the student made to comprehend by such practical work the real uses of statistical science. He would, in addition, become familiar with the condition of the country, and be gradually fitting himself for the higher work of economic writing, as well as laying the foundation of the most astute historical efforts. Of course, the American statistical publications should be supplemented by the best statistical data to be obtained from other countries. But above all, the student should be so guided and instructed in his use of them as to learn how to discover the real facts surrounding human life, rather than how far especially selected facts can sustain particular philosophic or economic views. Only by such a course of instruction could the true ethical features of statistical science be instituted and maintained.

The study of statistical science offers the very highest elements for economic considerations: The relation of wages to production; of prices to wages; of markets to prices and production; of capital to production and profits; and in innumerable ways the science may be applied. Nearly every feature of such application can now be illustrated from official statistics, and concerning those features for which statistical science cannot now furnish illustrations the student should be encouraged to make original studies. In such ways, and through the teaching which they involve, the study of economics would be vitalized, and the student given an enthusiasm which the mere study of the literature of political economy does not furnish.

Above all, in this branch of the work of the School of Economics, the study of statistical science, the student's researches should be directed on ethical lines, and he should be taught to find out ways by which, through the application of the science, moral conditions and relations in life can be ascertained. Social science demands a higher appreciation of the utility of statistics, in the endeavor to use it for elevating the conditions of humanity. But until late the statistician has been quite unable to aid the social scientist. Fugitive investigations, fragmentary studies, have formed to too large an extent the bases for the widest and most generally applied conclusions. To such fragmentary investigations there should be added the truths taught by wide statistical collections of facts, on clearly-defined lines. The danger of making such collections can be averted only through the services of men who know, through careful training, the limitations of statistical science.

Second, the history of labor legislation in the world. Not only should the plain history of such legislation constitute a topic of study, but its influence not only upon the condition of laborers, but in the solution of problems, should be considered. The term "labor legislation" should be expanded to its broadest limits. The work of the school should not be confined to what is popularly known as "factory legislation," but should comprehend all that relates to the status of the laborer before the law: his ability to make contracts; his privileges and limitations under combinations; his rights of recovery of wages; and, in fact, every line of statute law which affects his being, his condition, his rights and privileges, should be fully and clearly studied. The evolution of labor legislation from the earliest time would constitute an exceedingly important feature of investigation, not only in its relation to the legislation of modern times, but in the development of systems of labor. The interpretation of the courts, wherever such interpretation has been given, of any phase of statute law affecting the laborer, should, of course, be brought into the examination of the subject.

Lectures by thoroughly-equipped lawyers would be an

attractive feature in this branch of study, in the School of Economics.

Third, the history of industrial and social movements. The relation of the evolution of industrial forces to that of social conditions makes a study sufficiently attractive in itself to lift a School of Economics into great prominence. The history of mankind is full of illustrations, and the earliest times offer experiences which may be studied with great profit. The curriculum of a School of Economics should comprehend not only the history but the causes and results of the leading industrial and social movements of the world, wherever there has been any alliance between the industrial and the social elements of such movements, and this it would be found would apply in nearly all great experiences; for industrial progress cannot take place without affecting materially the social conditions of the environment of the workers of society. The literature of the movements would in itself constitute a vast storehouse of knowledge, to which the student could have access, and by a thorough familiarity with it he would be in a condition to judge calmly and critically the passing industrial and social movements.

The ideals which have been erected by writers should not, of course, be lost sight of, in the study of the history of actual movements. In fact, the direct influence of such ideals upon real movements would form a feature not insignificant in the study of this branch of social science.

Fourth, an account of experiments in municipal and state control would necessitate not only a wide examination of the growth of such control, but of the history of experiments the world over. And the account should not be limited to successful experiments. The knowledge to be drawn from failures in this line of investigation may oftentimes furnish material of as much value as the successful experiments. So the tutor in the School of Economics, having charge of this branch of study, should be able to direct those under him into the broadest paths. Rich material can be drawn from the practices of municipal and state governments of the present century in controlling works for the benefit of the people. The economy, or the lack of economy, of such con-

trol, and the influence exercised upon the constituents of the government undertaking to control affairs, should be the prominent feature of the work of this branch.

Fifth, the history of landholding under all civilizations should be brought prominently to the front. A comprehensive understanding of the principles which have determined the form of landholding at any time, the comparative systems of landholding in different countries, and the influence of each upon the subjects of the countries involved, are features of study made all the more attractive by the developments of the last quarter of a century. The ethical influence of this or that system upon the personal characters of the people involved calls for a discriminating study not usual in the departments of economics, as at present directed. Here and there such phases of study are brought out, and wherever they are the subject of inquiry in the modern college the very best results are experienced. The history of landholding involves so much of vital importance in the history of a people that it cannot be disconnected from the moral characteristics of the same people. The material for the study of such history is ample, easily accessible, and has the elements of popular presentation in it always found in economic topics.

Sixth, a study of national temperaments, in their relation to methods of reform, while constituting an important element of economic study, trenches upon psychological research, but perhaps only to a legitimate degree. Expanded, the work under this branch of the new School of Economics would contemplate the influence of racial temperaments, not only upon the methods of reform which different communities have considered and undertaken, but upon the very character of the industrial system which may at the time prevail. The character of the industrial system would seem to indicate the methods of reform which should be resorted to, when the faults are so glaring as to indicate the necessity of reform; but the power of racial temperaments in the institution of the systems themselves would be of primary importance in the study of the relation of such temperaments in the later sphere of reform. This branch would give room for the investigation

and study of the different systems which have existed in our own country, as related to the past industrial systems, for we have had, in modern times, the slave and the wage systems of labor, which are severally antecedent and subsequent to the feudal system. So, too, the different elements of the present wage system, as it exists under the diversified racial temperaments of the United States, would bring out the highest psychological capacity of the teachers in the new school.

With this outline of work, one is brought naturally to the contemplation of a faculty necessary to its proper development. Certainly the professor of economy could not, alone and unaided, or aided by assistant professors of economy, bring a school organized on the basis described to its highest usefulness. His work should be supplemented by that of the jurist, the historian, the social scientist, and the student of psychology. Equipped with men able to give instructive lectures in the six branches of work that have been outlined, the School of Economics would be able to send young men into the world with a knowledge that cannot be obtained within the necessarily limited teaching of the ordinary college. A full course of economics should form as attractive a feature of educational work as any other to which the attention of universities is given. Our future statisticians, economists, and social scientists will find a practical field of work, which has to a large extent been closed in the past, and the great need under the development of governmental powers which is bound to take place in the future, and the absolute necessity of the best training to enable one to be of service under such widely developed governments, demand a training not only broad and comprehensive, but severe and specific; and a School of Economics, as a branch of the grand University of Philosophy and Applied Ethics, must be equipped with teachers perfectly competent to train the men for future public usefulness.

The specialist is a power always; but a specialist, in order to have the greatest usefulness, must have an eclectic education, broadening not only his culture in his own field, but in all related fields.

ETHICS IN YALE UNIVERSITY.

BY PROFESSOR GEORGE T. LADD.

ALL the courses in Ethics here—whether required or elective, elementary or advanced—imply that a required course in Logic and Psychology, three hours a week for a year, is taken as preliminary or parallel. Most of this required work in Logic and Psychology falls in Junior year. The only required course in Ethics is for the Senior class in the Academical Department, and extends, three hours a week, through two-thirds of the year. The first half of this course is taught by Mr. Duncan upon the basis of a text-book; the second half consists of lectures and instruction (only partly connected with a text-book) by ex-President Porter. In Dr. Porter's course the principal ethical theories are briefly discussed, and the conclusions from these theories applied to the practical and religious life.

All other study of Ethics at Yale is elective, and is pursued as a matter of psychological, historical, and philosophical inquiry. This more comprehensive way of regarding those phenomena and doctrines, and that development of human nature, which are called "ethical," is—in my judgment—the only true and safe way. The teaching of Ethics has suffered, incalculably, through isolation from its connections with the whole being and evolution of man. I desire to represent only myself (though I speak without hesitation concerning the truthfulness of my remark) when I say, There is no such thing as a scientific study of Ethics apart from psychology, political and social history, and philosophy. With this understanding of the plan pursued here, the following courses are to be counted as belonging to Ethics:

Ex-President Porter conducts a course of study in critical analyses of the principal ethical theories, with the constant

use of Sidgwick's "History of Ethics," and references to a number of other works. Among such works are Martineau's "Types of Ethical Theory," Laurie's "Ethica," two or more books on Kantian Ethics, and the ethical writings of Herbert Spencer, Leslie Stephens, and Professor Green. He has also a course, designed more particularly for graduate students, in which Locke, Hume, Spencer, and other writers are studied, especially as criticised by Professor Green.

Last year I went through with all of Lotze's "Microcosmus," with a class of Seniors and graduates; and the same course is being repeated this year. Any one familiar with this voluminous work knows that it is ethical to the very core, and gives an admirable chance for the discussion of almost every problem treated by the teacher of *Ethics*,—in the most comprehensive sense of this word. Last year a class of about thirty, consisting chiefly of special graduate students of philosophy, but with a few students from the Divinity School, after a careful study of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason," in both editions, made an equally careful study of his "Critique of Practical Reason," and of his "Metaphysics of Ethics." In this course, lectures by the teacher, discussion between the teacher and the class, and among the different members of the class, and the reading of numerous short papers on various subordinate parts of the general theme, were freely intermingled. As the leader of this band of mature minds, I can testify to the great benefit received in this way. This year, a class of similar character is making a thorough study of the Ethics of Pessimism, by reading the whole of Hartmann's "Philosophy of the Unconscious," with constant reference to Schopenhauer, who was studied two years ago by certain members of the same class.

Every year one of Professor Harper's courses considers certain writings of the Old Testament from the ethical point of view. Last year the Hebrew legislation was the subject of study; this year the writings of Prophetism are being read by a large class in two divisions,—one handling the matter with use of the Hebrew Bible, the other using only the English. In this course the *ethical* character and results

and doctrines of Old Testament prophecy are constantly kept in view.

Several courses, chiefly or quite distinctively ethical, are being pursued in the ancient Greek and Latin classics. Of such courses Professor Seymour has two, both of which extend through the year,—one of them being designed for graduates. These are a course in the "Phædo" of Plato and the "Ethics" of Aristotle, and a course in the "Gorgias" and the "Republic" of Plato. Assistant Professor Goodell has a class, two hours a week for a part of the year, in the study of Socrates's personality, teaching, and influence, as illustrated by the writings of Xenophon and Plato. Mr. F. G. Moore conducts the study of the Latin moralist Seneca by reading his "De Providentia" and "De Constantia Sapientis" with a class of Juniors and Seniors.

In the study of the "History of Modern Philosophy," Mr. Duncan spends a considerable part of the time—two hours a week through the entire year—upon the writings of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, and Kant.

No account of the study of Ethics in Yale University would be complete, however, which omitted to emphasize the various courses treating of Christian Ethics and the Philosophy of Religion. Professor Harris's course in the "Philosophical Basis of Theism" and the "Self-Revelation of God" deals, of course, largely with ethical problems. It is attended usually by a number of graduate students, in addition to students from the Divinity School. The same teacher annually conducts a class of advanced students through some work like the "Ethics" of Dorner (or the "Dogmatics" of the same author). The study of Pflaiderer's "Philosophy of Religion," and of kindred works, for several years until this year, under Professor Russell, has been in the same line.

This year I am also giving a course of lectures on the "Philosophy of Religion," from the point of view of speculative thinking, rather than of historical development; in these lectures ethical phenomena and doctrines bear a principal part.

A fund, left for this purpose some years since to the College,

provides for a course of lectures on practical Ethics, or manners and morals. This course is usually given by the acting President. The ethical teaching from the pulpit at the services on Sunday (attendance on which is still general here by the Academical students) needs only to be mentioned.

It should be added, in closing this account, that the books read and particular ethical questions most emphasized in several of these courses change from year to year. The above statement will give, however, a fair impression of the kind and amount of work annually done in ethical lines in this University.

ETHICAL TEACHING AT THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.

BY PROFESSOR GEORGE STUART FULLERTON.

As the University of Pennsylvania, in common with so many other institutions of learning, has been undergoing in the last decade a process of expansion and I may almost say renovation, there have been many changes in the courses offered in most departments of instruction. Such changes are still in progress, as they should be; and in describing, as I am requested to do, the facilities for the study of Ethics at the University, I must be understood as referring only to the present and the immediate past. My description would not fit the more remote past, nor, we hope, will it square with the not very remote future.

Our ethical teaching is represented by—(1) Courses in Ethics proper, both undergraduate and graduate. (2) Courses in philosophy and psychology which give particular attention to Ethics. (3) Courses in other departments bearing upon the subject, and which may be called ethical in the broader sense of the word.

I have been accustomed to offer a course in Ethics of two hours a week for half a year to Juniors in all departments of the University. In this course a general view of the subject is taken, and though the history of ethical speculation is not

overlooked, an effort is made to have the teaching as simple and practical as possible. Some hand-book (which is apt to be changed from year to year) is made a basis for instruction, but much of the work consists in lectures and discussions. I have usually found it profitable to choose a hand-book with the doctrine of which I am not in entire sympathy, as the clash of opinions wakes the student into taking the one side or the other and provokes to animated discussion. This year the course will be taken by about seventy students.

A course somewhat similar to the above, but devoting more attention to theories of Ethics and the history of ethical speculation, has for some time been offered to Seniors in the Arts and Philosophy courses. This has not been open to students from the Scientific School.

Last year and this there has been a course in Ethics exclusively for graduates. This course is critical, historical, and constructive; but is devoted wholly to theoretical Ethics; being supplemented in the Department of Philosophy by courses delivered in cognate subjects which have a more immediate practical bearing. These will be mentioned later. This year the graduate class contains nineteen men, and as the freest discussion is encouraged, the evenings spent together are most pleasant and profitable to me, as they would not be if the instruction were more formal.

I may now mention the courses in philosophy and psychology which give particular attention to Ethics. I will omit any reference to other courses in these fields.

There is, in the first place, a course in the "History of Philosophy for Seniors." This is occupied more especially with the study of the Ancient and Mediæval Philosophy, and the development of ethical speculation is carefully marked through the course.

A course in "Comparative, Social, and Abnormal Psychology" is offered by Professor Cattell, also to Seniors, and this is very fruitful and suggestive to the student of Ethics.

A two years' course in the "History of Philosophy" is offered by myself to graduate students. We are this year studying the Ancient Philosophy, and are occupied just now

with Plato. An essay on the subject of "Plato's Ethics" will be read by one of the more advanced students, and will be followed by a discussion in which all are expected to take part, and for which all are expected to prepare. An effort will be made to make the discussion of value not merely from the stand-point of the History of Philosophy, but also from the purely ethical stand-point. So it is throughout the course. The evolution of the science of Ethics is followed with close attention.

As cognate courses of great value to the student of Ethics, I may mention the numerous courses offered by Professors Thompson, James, Patten, and MacMaster on "Social Science," "Political Economy," "Civil Government," and "Constitutional History;" as well as the courses offered by Professor Parsons on the "Development of Legal Institutions and Jurisprudence." These represent both graduate and undergraduate work. Particularly in the fields covered by Professors Thompson and Patten the ethical interest is kept in the foreground. In Professor Patten's seminary, and in his graduate courses, the relation of Economics to Ethics is formally taken up and discussed as a foundation to Economics. I may refer here also to the prominence given, in Dr. Falkner's course on "Statistics," to the Moral Statistics of different nations.

Finally, I note with pleasure a course of ethical lectures, of a somewhat different kind from the foregoing, inaugurated at the University during the past winter. The Rev. Dr. George Dana Boardman, the eminent Baptist clergyman, was requested by the Board of Trustees to deliver a course of lectures in the chapel of the University on Sunday afternoons. He chose as his subject the "Ten Commandments." The lectures were listened to by crowded audiences, and have since been issued in book form, and widely distributed. Dr. Boardman has been asked to deliver a similar course this year. He has announced his subject to be "The Ethical Teachings of the Minor Prophets." It is possible that other clergymen of various denominations may be asked to give instruction in somewhat the same way, and that this may be only the beginning of a very important movement.

EXTRACTS FROM AN ARTICLE ON "THE TEACHING OF THE HISTORY OF RELIGIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN EUROPE."

BY JEAN RÉVILLE IN THE *REVUE DE L'HISTOIRE DES RELIGIONS*, VOL. XX. No. 2, SEPT.-OCT., 1889 (PARIS).

THE school for the history of religions in the United States is as yet only a project, but it is a project which emanates from an active and enterprising man, who will soon be able to insure its realization. It has reached us in the form of an article published in the *ETHICAL RECORD* of April last, under the signature of Professor Felix Adler. . . .

Professor Adler, like a number of judicious observers in Europe, is struck with the insufficiency of the scientific training of those who intend to become the religious and moral guides of their fellow-citizens. The theological schools, he says, have two grave faults: they are not favorable to intellectual liberty, and they exclude from their programmes much knowledge the acquisition of which is of great importance to the future spiritual leaders of humanity. . . .

One, indeed, cannot assert that the colleges which have given rise to Strauss, Bruno Baur, Zeller, or those which count, as at Leyden, professors such as M. Tiele or M. Kuenen, are not centres of a perfectly free science. But this liberty is only secured on the condition of watching with a jealous care over incessant encroachments of which the ecclesiastical powers are guilty. Up to a certain point it is true that the teaching of religious history, when it depends upon a religious association, upon a church, which makes use of it to illustrate its own superiority, is always exposed to the despotic attacks of preconceived ideas. . . .

That the men who are called upon to become the religious and moral advisers of a large portion of their fellow-citizens

may be liberally instructed in the questions which they are to handle is simply social hygiene. The Americans are a practical people, even when they are idealists like Professor Adler: it is from a practical point of view that he demands the creation of a philosophical, religious, and moral instruction which shall be absolutely free from all sectarian trammels. The idea is a just one.

The second reproach addressed by the eminent professor to the theological schools of the United States reflects more directly on the teaching of the schools and colleges of theology in Europe, with a few honorable exceptions. Yes, most of the institutions for higher instruction, where religious history and philosophy are treated, are confined in far too narrow a circle, and live in an entirely different atmosphere from that of society at large. The perpetual sifting of the same texts, and continual intercourse with teachers who sustain an opinion because it agrees with their faith, rather than for its intrinsic value, is poor nourishment for the modern mind.

How much more fruitful would it be for the future instructors of youth, and for spiritual guides, to possess a sound knowledge of pedagogy, of political economy, or of what is now called sociology!

Furthermore,—and it is this above all that interests us in the *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*,—the schools and the colleges of theology, at least in great part, are confined exclusively to the study of Christianity and of Judaism, even when they have abandoned the idea of a divine revelation exclusively given to the Jewish people. Judging from their catalogues one might be led to suppose there is no religion outside that of Christ. For them, Buddhism and the religion of Confucius do not exist; while the religions of classical antiquity only receive attention under the head of "paganism," because they are regarded as having prepared Greek and Roman society for the gospel. I will not now consider the objections, philosophical or historical, by which modern science has made the conception of a supernatural revelation, confined to a few provinces of Palestine, untenable. I content myself with saying to him who teaches the history of the

religious development of humanity, "Whatever may be your dogmatic opinions, it is inadmissible that you should circumscribe this religious development, of which you claim to give a scientific account, to a single religion; that you should continue to leave outside your horizon all the great forms of religious life which have existed before Christianity, or which now exist beside it, and in which the great majority of men, born on earth since the beginning, have lived, have suffered, have prayed, have blessed God, and faced death. Even if all these non-Christian religions should seem to you the work of the devil, still you should study them, if you wish to make a scientific study, not only of religion in general, but even of *your* religion; since its intrinsic value can be established only by comparison."

We cannot leave out of sight the fact that steam and electricity have brought nearer to us than ever before those immense populations of Asia, and of Africa, among whom the lotus flower and the crescent replace the Christian cross. Their relations with us are becoming more and more frequent. We cannot continue to live as if, outside of Christian civilization, there were only crowds to be neglected. And, on the other hand, in proportion as the religious and moral history of our own past is freed from the prejudice of supernaturalism, which made it appear an isolated production in universal history, we recognize the necessity of studying more thoroughly the religions of the ancient world, in order to understand the genesis of our own religion; to familiarize ourselves with the beliefs and practices of other forms of worship, so that we may judge more clearly by comparison the original value of our beliefs and practices.

Such are the considerations which have suggested to Professor Adler the idea of a large institution consecrated to the scientific study of all that pertains to the moral life of humanity. . . .

For the present I only wish to point out that among the *élite* of American society the same need of a transformation and extension of theological studies is felt, the symptoms of which I have for several years observed in most civilized

countries. The reform of the theological colleges in Holland was the first manifestation of this new spirit. The creation of chairs of Religious History in the College of France, in Brussels, in Rome, in Geneva, in Zurich, and in a few other cities; the organization of a complete course for the history of the principal religions in the section of religious sciences of the École des Hautes-Études, in Paris; the conferences on natural theology, instituted in the four Scotch universities by the generosity of the late Lord Gifford; the institution of a Musée de Religion, founded by M. Guimet, first in Lyons, then in Paris; the formation of special reviews devoted exclusively to the History of Religions; the voluminous publications which supply to all workers materials indispensable to the study of religions, such as the "Annales du Musée Guimet," and, above all, that admirable collection of the "Sacred Books of the East," published at Oxford under the direction of the father of the Science of Religion, Mr. Max Müller; the publication for the use of students of text-books such as those of Messrs. Tiele and Chantepie de la Saussaye; the appearance of a whole series of works on the history of religions; such are the most characteristic phenomena which may be cited in support of the proposition which we maintain without intermission in the *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*. They form a body of testimony already sufficiently considerable to prove beyond dispute that the need of a more extended and more general study of the science of religion is strongly felt in the scientific world. I am glad here to record a new manifestation of this tendency in the United States with a character at once bold and practical, adapted to the spirit of the American people.

THE NEW INTEREST IN ETHICS.*

BY PROFESSOR W. KAWELIN.

ETHICAL indifference is the sure precursor of the moral death and decay of nations. The upholders of tradition and orthodoxy triumphantly point to the moral indifference and social corruption of modern society, and with immense self-righteousness assert that such is the inevitable result of a departure from the ancient tenets of religion. Shall we adopt their view?

On the other hand, the pioneers of modern progress, the enthusiastic disciples of science, who trusted in the power of intellectual culture to redeem the world, have suddenly become aware of the true state of things and have found the reality to correspond but poorly with their expectations. Was there one of these enthusiasts who would have hesitated to declare, thirty years ago, that mind-culture, enlightenment, and liberty in religious matters would suffice to lead society to perfect moral conditions? Alas! they are to-day despondent and discouraged men. Alas! it is but too plain nowadays that underneath the surface of civilized manners the original nature of man may remain unchanged, and that combined with culture may be found the most unbridled passion, the most unblushing license and cruelty. It is natural to ask, Is there not

* To those who watch with sympathy the rise of an Ethical Movement in the United States, it must be highly encouraging to hear a voice of cheer from distant Russia, and to read the words of an eminent man, who, working on independent lines, has reached similar convictions to those which inspire the American movement, and who looks toward the same goal. Professor W. Kawelin, lately deceased, filled the chair of Social Science in the University of St. Petersburg, and was not only respected for his abilities but revered almost as a saint on account of his personal excellence. Some time ago there appeared from his pen a series of articles on Ethics, in *Vystnik Yevropy*. A summary of the introductory article of this series is herewith presented to our readers.—
EDITOR.

something lacking; is it not true that something remains to be said which we human beings need to hear; that a demand which our nature puts forth has remained unsatisfied? Shall we return to the ancestral faith? Or shall we persuade ourselves that the path of scientific investigation has not been followed far enough, and shall we press on farther in the hope of at last finding a satisfactory basis for our moral ideals? Or, again, shall we disown our ideals altogether, throw them overboard as useless ballast, abandon our higher aims as delusions, and reach out only for what is material and tangible?

Under such conditions the interest in Ethics has recently revived, and men are looking to it to assist them in solving the old questions that will not be put aside. This new interest in Ethics seems to have reawakened almost simultaneously throughout the entire civilized world like a growing life which no obstacle can prevent from rising. A marked difference, however, is already to be noted in the kind of interest which the subject calls forth. While in the older countries of Europe it is treated in a calm, objective spirit, we see, on the other hand, that in Russia and the United States the problems of Ethics are discussed with deep feeling and are made the subject of heated controversy. This difference can be sufficiently explained by considering the different stages of civilization respectively reached by the countries named. Among the peoples of Western Europe the conditions of social and political life—whether better or worse than elsewhere is not here the question—are at any rate more stable and fixed. The place of each individual in the great social and political machine is clearly marked out for him. The laws, administered by conscientious and unimpeachable servants, sustained in public opinion by the high standing of judges and jurists, preserve the outward integrity of the population; the public life of the citizens is kept in narrow bounds, and the functions of society are distributed and balanced as in a complex but well-adjusted organism. Among men trained to such conditions the demand for individual morality must naturally be greatly diminished; ethical problems will, as a rule, excite only a theoretical interest. If ever it comes to pass in such

countries that the general equilibrium is disturbed, nobody is inclined to look for the cause of such disturbance in the inadequacy of ethical ideals or the failure of moral satisfactions. The reason is rather sought for in defective institutions or in the imperfect working of the social and political machinery. But the case is different in those countries where permanent institutions and stationary forms of society are not yet established. There, men are unable to find satisfaction and repose in an unchangeable social order, and they are naturally led to seek for these in the ethical relations and the moral possibilities of individuals. And where industrial individualism and the egotism of daily life are most pronounced, as is the case in countries which, like Russia and the United States, are only just passing the threshold of a new civilization, there the great need of moral regeneration is most deeply felt among all classes of the population.

In view of the facts which we have just noted, the theory has been advanced that, in order to render men contented and happy, all that is necessary is to perfect the social and political machinery; and some have gone so far as to predict that the present interest in Ethics is likely to be short-lived, and that the desire for moral ideals will soon be forgotten. But we do not share this fear. To be sure, we agree most earnestly with those who seek to impress on mankind the absolute and pressing need of social reforms and who point out the important influence of material conditions on the moral progress of men. But to rely simply on material progress, and to expect from social amelioration a satisfactory solution of all the problems that have arisen in the course of human evolution, would imply a total misunderstanding of the trend of this evolution, and a complete failure to appreciate the strength of a movement which has already deeply stirred the best minds of two worlds. In truth, even in Western Europe, the relative stability of institutions, of which we have spoken, has not entirely extinguished the desire for moral regeneration. It still exists as a latent force, though it expresses itself with less emphasis and ardor than elsewhere.

The ethical needs of the present cannot be exhausted by a

statement of the social and economic problems of modern society. Even if these social and economic problems were all solved, our ethical nature would not be fully satisfied. Nor should we regard this new movement in the direction of Ethics as a mere temporary deviation from the well-beaten path of human development. On the contrary, it denotes a change to an entirely new route,—a change which has been prepared by the labors of past centuries.

A CRITIQUE OF "ETHICAL RELIGION."

BY THOMAS DAVIDSON.

ETHICAL RELIGION. By WILLIAM MACKINTIRE SALTER. Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1889. 12mo, pp. vi., 332.

THIS volume consists chiefly of lectures delivered before the Society for Ethical Culture of Chicago, of which Mr. Salter is the head. They do not profess to represent the views of the Ethical Movement as a whole, but merely those of the author, who, however, acknowledges his deep indebtedness to Dr. Adler, the founder of the movement.

In his preface, Mr. Salter disclaims for his work all scientific pretensions, and says that his aim in publishing it is "not intellectual, but practical and moral." He admits that it contains "varying points of view" in regard to "religion, God, ethics, Christianity," and hints that, if he had attempted to write a philosophic treatise, he would "perhaps have been able to clear up some of the confusion and inconsistencies" in which his "thoughts may seem to be involved," and to explain his "inability to assent either to theism, on the one hand, or to positivism on the other."

This last remark contains the key-note to the whole volume and to the whole thought-system of its author, with all its moral sublimity and all its scientific imperfection. The heart of a Christian saint and the head of a humanitarian positivist trying to work themselves into harmony; such, in brief,

is a description of Mr. Salter and his book. As long as he is pouring forth the thoughts of his heart, trying to express that overpowering moral awe whose meaning transcends even our highest finite concept, that of personality, we feel that we are in the presence of one of the mighty, of an inspired prophet, to whose utterances our inmost hearts and all that is best in us respond with a fervent Amen. When, on the other hand, he tries to ground his inspiration in terms of the thoughts of the head, his inspiration at once leaves him, and he becomes timid, hesitant, and not infrequently self-contradictory. The truth is, the scepticism engendered by the superficial thought of the time has attacked Mr. Salter's head, but, instead of communicating itself to his heart, as it does in so many cases, it has roused therein a passionate opposition. So heart and head are at bitter warfare, for which there is neither truce nor compromise. Indeed, Mr. Salter's attempt at reconciliation must be pronounced an utter failure. The ethics of Jesus, to which, despite manifold protestations to the contrary, Mr. Salter clings with his whole soul, cannot be reconciled with the secularism of positivism, to which his intellectual training for the time inclines him. The ethics of Jesus, with its call for complete self-surrender, was intended for men and women sure of personal immortality, and becomes irrational the moment it is separated from that conviction, or put forward as the norm of life for ephemeral participants in the evolution of an impersonal humanity. "He that loseth his life shall save it," is the watchword of Christianity,—that is rational; that is just. "Lose thy life that another may gather its fruits," says Mr. Salter,—that is irrational; that is unjust; that finds no true response in man's heart. Nay, not even in Mr. Salter's, as is clearly shown by his varying and contradictory statements with regard to man's ends, and the motives for moral conduct. At one time, for example, we are told that men's ends are "a living income, a decent home, some leisure for thought, for the culture of the higher part of their nature" (p. 77); at another, "For public ends we are to live" (p. 212); at another still, "The ends of moral perfection are not for our personal

satisfaction, but we for them" (p. 225). If this last statement were true, it would certainly remove all motive for moral action; for a motive, by its very definition, is something that gives personal satisfaction. If it were true, man, in whom, we are told, there is "somewhat of measureless possibilities, of priceless worth," would be but a means for an end higher than himself. And, indeed, Mr. Salter often speaks of man as if he were a mere instrument for the realization of righteousness, and of righteousness as if it were a commodity which could exist apart from conscious beings. But he is by no means consistent in this. On page 224 he tells us: (One feels) . . . "that nothing less than the perfect, and this shared in by all, can be the end, the goal." And on the very next page we read: "Do we survive with this good? . . . I know not, and I hold it to be at best a curious question." One rubs his eyes as he reads this, for how can any one share in a good with which he does not consciously survive? In another part of his book, Mr. Salter speaks as if man might derive sufficient reward for all his moral efforts from picturing in imagination the future utopia to which these efforts might be supposed to contribute. "It is not necessary that he hope actually to witness the final triumph,—it is enough, I believe, that he can think of it; that something of the glory of it may descend upon him as he toils for it; that the labor of his hands have an eternal issue there" (p. 276). One may affirm with perfect certainty that a faith like this will never conquer the world. Nor, indeed, ought it to do so, for it means crying injustice. That I should toil for an ultimate good, and receive, as my portion, only an imperfect picture of that good, surely denotes that there is unrighteousness at the very heart of things. The truth is that Mr. Salter, like many other moral enthusiasts, runs unselfishness into the ground, by making selfishness include the desire for the highest good to oneself. He seems to think it the highest morality to labor for the temporary moral good of others, and yet wrong and mean to crave everlasting moral good for ourselves. Now, if it is morally right to desire that a morally perfect being should exist for a few years, it surely cannot be

wrong in me to desire to be that being, and to perfect my perfection by adding to it the element of eternity. And, indeed, without that element, there is no perfection. The plain truth is that Mr. Salter, like many noble men of our time, has allowed himself to be so bamboozled by the fashionable thought as not only to have lost faith in personal immortality, but even to join in the cry that the desire for it is selfish and ignoble. It is the very essence of nobility to desire to be a noble and beneficent being to all eternity; it is mean and ignoble to be content with anything less. Mr. Salter may rest assured that all his efforts, and all the efforts of ten thousand Ethical Societies, will count as nothing in the furtherance of ethical regeneration, compared with the work of the man who shall again convince the world that every human soul is immortal and that its conscious weal or woe to all eternity is determined to some degree by every one of its own acts, and entirely by the sum of them. And that such a task is not beyond the reach of man I am thoroughly convinced.

But it is not merely with regard to man's aim and the motives for morality that Mr. Salter shows inconsistency of thought; the same is true, even in a higher degree, with regard to the source and bearer of the moral law. At one time we are told that it is in ourselves, at another that it lies in the nature of things, at still another that it is above us, above the stars, "from somewhat older than they."

I might go on and show the same confusion in Mr. Salter's thought with regard to all our deepest conceptions; but the task would be a thankless one. At the same time, I may be allowed to express my profound regret that a man in whom all that is ethical is embodied should not have striven with all his might to give us a consistent theory of ethics, since that is what the world demands more than anything else. It is intellectual doubt and scepticism that are eating out the heart of morality by discrediting its necessary postulates, and to this scepticism Mr. Salter gives the weight of his weighty influence. I can only hope that this will be true but for a short time, and that he will soon wash off, in the waters of Lethe, all the influences of the desolating philosophies of the present day, and,

bathing in the Eunoë of the world's highest thought, recover that spiritual insight, that faith in the postulates of morality, which shall render him "disposed to mount to the stars."

REPLY BY MR. SALTER.

It can hardly be said that Mr. Davidson states my positions with great care. I am described as being, intellectually speaking, a positivist. Now positivism I understand to mean taking account practically only of the phenomenal world. Yet I said in "Ethical Religion," after asserting an "unseen Power by which we live," a "mystery in the bosom of which we and this wide world rest," that "it is not, let me distinctly say, in the name of materialism or phenomenalism, but because of a deeper sense of that mystery, that I abandon prayer" (page 289). In fact, positivism has never attracted me as a philosophy (if indeed it can be dignified by that name); and I happen to know that positivists find whatever philosophical implications there are in my book repellent to them.

Again, Mr. Davidson says that in my case heart and head are at bitter warfare. I am not conscious of such a warfare, and I suspect that it is Mr. Davidson's rather hasty inferences from my ill-understood positions that are at war with one another. No "scepticism" that has attacked my head has ever roused passionate opposition in my "heart" (if by the term is meant the conscience or moral nature); for my doubts have been as to such speculative conceptions as a personal deity and personal immortality; scepticism as to duty, such as my critic apparently would have in the absence of a faith in personal immortality, never assailed me; nor should I count it honorable as a human and rational being to tolerate it. I do not mean that I have not had my full measure of grief and distress in giving up the faith in which I was born and nurtured; but never was my conviction disturbed that there is a right and a wrong, a better and a worse, and that to hate, to lie, to be cruel, to be unjust, or to be a coward in the defence of truth and justice, was unworthy of a man.

Mr. Davidson, I am aware, may hold that this is my personal idiosyncrasy or good fortune, that, logically, ethics, in any deep sense, would go with the loss of faith in personal immortality. He seems to say as much, declaring that the "call to complete self-surrender" becomes "irrational" when separated from this conviction. Discrimination is necessary at this point. I have not denied nor do I deny personal immortality; I have only said that in the absence of belief in it the reasons for the higher moral life still go on. The starting-point in my own ethics is the sense of the sacredness of human personality. Whence-soever it comes and whithersoever it goes, it is the highest thing we know. Respect, reverence for it are the fundamental ethical emotions; and ethical conduct is action drawing thence its ultimate inspiration. Ethics as personal is rooted in self-reverence; as social it is rooted in reverence for the humanity of all. Personal ethics might be defined as voluntary dedication to the total idea of one's being; social ethics aims at an equal realization of the ends of all men. Justice is an expression of this equal reverence; and love is the flowering of it in human affections. All this is perfectly consistent with indignation, blame, and punishment in view or on account of human wrong-doing. Ethics is thus

essentially an ideal,—something at war with the thoughts and impulses and lives of most men, and with the order of society as it has existed in most ages of the world. As a rule, men do not honor one another; they take advantage of one another. They do not truly honor themselves; they follow their appetites. Society is not founded upon brotherhood, but upon self-interest. Hence he who follows ethical inspiration, in contradiction to the habits and customs and institutions of men, is liable to suffer, and sometimes must suffer. The unrighteous world will not hear him, and, perhaps, tries to stifle his voice. In a word, there arises the necessity of sacrifice; sometimes the good man must die,—there is no other alternative, if he will keep true to the ethical ideal. Is it then irrational to die save with the assurance that one will live again? So Mr. Davidson asserts. But rationality and irrationality are determined by what one recognizes as first principles. Mr. Davidson's first principle (in ethics) seems to be that no one should do anything to cut short the duration of his life. With this as a first principle, it is irrational to die save as one hopes to live again; it is also irrational to suffer any harm by which another is benefited (unless one knows beforehand that the harm will be made up to him); all uncalculating disinterestedness is irrational. But with another first principle, disinterestedness is rational. If the fundamental rule is, Honor and love all men, and live and labor to the end of making such honor and love the impulse and rule of all human action, and the foundation of every custom and institution of society, then it is not only rational to sacrifice one's life, if one must, in such efforts, but one has nothing else in honor to do, when the choice is between death and disloyalty. To my own mind, Mr. Davidson's first principle, as just conjectured (though I cannot believe that as a *man* he holds to it), is no principle at all, but at best a subordinate maxim, which holds only so long as no higher rule conflicts with it; at bottom it springs from, and is the mere logical formulation of, the instinct of self-preservation. And, after all, what is the sacrifice of which we speak? What is death? It is the mere ceasing to breathe. It is not doing wrong, it is not abating a particle from one's loyalty to the moral ideal. What harm is there in ceasing to breathe?—what moral harm, I mean. What harm to any one whose thought is, while he breathes, to do right and keep his soul in harmony with the highest demands? To flinch, to be a coward, to turn from one's best visions, for the sake of life to lose the ends of living,—that, it seems to me, were a real harm; that were a dying, for which life, though prolonged to eternity, would be poor compensation.

Mr. Davidson speaks of Jesus. Now, not to dwell on the fact that losing and saving one's life may have a much deeper interpretation than Mr. Davidson gives it, has he forgotten that passionate appeal for a disinterested morality which Jesus makes and which reaches its climax in, "But love ye your enemies, and do good, and lend, *hoping for nothing again*" (Luke vi. 35)? Does he not call to mind the sublime protest of St. Theresa and the lines of Francis Xavier (both of which I have indeed given on pp. 53, 54 of "Ethical Religion"), or would he call action without

"The hope of gaining aught"

irrational? To my mind, Mr. Davidson does not reach the heights of the Christian morality he defends. For within the church as well as without it there have

been those who wished to serve the highest ideal (whatever they called it), not for the sake of any ulterior end, whether of life or happiness or heaven, but solely from love of it, solely from a deep inward need of harmonizing with the essential fitness of things,—those who have been ready to say with Job, "Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him."

But it is one thing to ask, What are the motives of moral action, and with what thoughts can one rationally consent to give up his life? and another to ask, What can really happen, what will the nature of things permit? Mr. Davidson does not distinguish between these two things; and it is impossible to follow in detail his confusion and consequent misunderstanding of my words. I hold that man can willingly give up his life as I have stated; I also hold that the nature of things cannot permit such an one to absolutely perish. Emerson combines the two truths when he says, "The love that will be annihilated sooner than treacherous has already made death impossible." It is the very willingness to be blotted out rather than be untrue that gives the soul imperishable worth and an eternal destiny. The one truth is one of ethics, or of psychology; the other is one of philosophy. And if the latter is not brought out and emphasized as it might be in my book, it is because the book is not one of philosophy; and, I may add, because the truth itself, being one of speculation rather than of experience, belongs, in my judgment, rather to the completed edifice of religion than to its foundation stones. And yet I have not omitted to indicate this view of immortality in several passages (pp. 41, 58, 140, 225, 316 of "Ethical Religion").

Personal immortality, however, is another matter. Belief in this means the assurance that we shall *know* in another life that we are the same beings we were in this; it means the preservation of *conscious* identity. If the very same being who sacrificed his life in some righteous cause should not know hereafter he had sacrificed it nor have any memory of his earthly existence, he would not be the same person (in the common understanding of that term). If Mr. Davidson, instead of so easily taking offence, had really tried to read my thoughts, he would surely have seen that this was my meaning (*cf.* p. 58); and he would scarcely have charged me with confusion and inconsistencies that are in the mere form of statement. How very acute, for example, and yet how ill-considered, is the criticism upon my remark that "the ends of moral perfection are not for our personal satisfaction, but we for them"! Why can I not aim at moral perfection without being sure that I, William M. Salter, who might conceivably lose his conscious identity even in this life, shall ever derive personal satisfaction from its attainment? Can a man not build a house, firm, strong, and beautiful, not for himself, but for his children to live in, or simply start one for them to complete, dying happy in the thought that the work will go on? By a bit of sophistry (no doubt unintentional, but not so easy to pardon in a philosopher), Mr. Davidson confuses personal satisfaction as I use it with one's temporary psychological condition in seeking moral perfection. Of course, I seek moral perfection because it gives me personal satisfaction to seek it (though there might be two opinions about calling this the motive); but I no more have to think of moral perfection after it is attained (if that were possible), *as enjoyed by me*, than a man has to think of himself as getting personal satisfaction out of the house he has built for his chil-

dren, long after he is dead. The spring of every free action is personal pleasure, but the end of such action may be as far removed from personal pleasure as the heavens are high above the earth.

Yes, I will take up my critic's words and say that man, as he now exists, is "but a means for an end higher than himself;" and if one will not be a precisian and treat ordinary language as he would that of a scholastic philosopher, he may see that this is but another way of stating that man is a being of "measureless possibilities." Yes, man is "a mere instrument for the realization of righteousness,"—*i.e.*, of the total Divine idea of his being, far above and beyond his actual self. True, righteousness cannot exist apart from conscious beings, but, as the habit of a man's will, it may conceivably survive the loss of his conscious personal identity. My own view of life is that we are here for the realization of the infinite possibilities of our natures, or, more properly, to start upon that path. This is the good, and the good-will is the will that wills this good; and the good-will cannot die. But whether I (if perchance there *is* this soul of good in me, and I do really try to mould myself after the Divine idea) shall know myself in a future state as the same person I was here, whether the *I* will survive as *I*, seems to me still, as I said in the passage which Mr. Davidson criticises so sharply, at best a curious question,—an affirmative answer to which is by no means involved in the thought that the Divine ends of my being will be worked out. Surely, no one will understand me as denying continued conscious identity, or making any argument against it; I only say that, so far as I can see now, there are not the positive grounds for believing in it that there are for believing in the indestructibility of the virtuous will. Without the latter the moral universe would be unmindful of its own ends; but I can see no such organic and necessary relation of what we call our personal consciousness to the moral order. Happily, it is only our belief that we determine; the fact lies in other hands. Though we find not reason enough to believe, conscious identity may continue all the same. And if it is given me in another life to know I am the same person as once existed here, though there are some things I should be glad to forget, there are others I shall be thankful to remember; and if it is given me to know my dead, to see those angel faces,

"Which I have loved long since and lost awhile,"

it will be a grace, a benignity, to which I could lay no claim, albeit no stranger perchance than other sweet surprises I have known in this life, and in keeping with the largeness of that grace which I suspect lies at the heart of things.

Mr. Davidson equally forgets that it is not scientific (*i.e.*, exact) language I am using in speaking of the source of the moral law. Why may this not be "in ourselves," in one sense; "in the nature of things," in another; and "above us and above the stars," in still another? Suppose some unscientific soul should try to write out its thought of God; and should say, he is within us, he is without us, he is above us, he is beneath us,—yet most truly in a realm to which neither within nor without, neither above nor beneath, have meaning or application. Would any one, who had philosophical insight and at the same time a sense of the difficulties of human language, object to this varied description as self-contradictory? Yet literally it is a mass of contradictions.

I am by no means insensible to the praise which Mr. Davidson pours on my defenceless heart if not head; I am perfectly sure it is undeserved, and that my heart is worse and my head better than he thinks. Why, in commenting on "Ethical Religion," should he profoundly regret that I have not done what I never sought to do? Yet I, too, have an intellectual interest in ethics; and if leisure and strength are given me, I hope some day to present "a consistent theory of ethics." I cannot say that this is my highest ambition, but it is a very eager one. However, my method will probably be so different from Mr. Davidson's that I can scarcely hope to satisfy him; and in working out the results I should have the simple aim of getting the truth, leaving "conquering the world" out of account.

AUTUMN FESTIVAL OF THE WORKINGMAN'S SCHOOL.*

THANKSGIVING DAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1889.

[The platform in the main hall is profusely decorated with trees and plants. In the background is seen an autumn landscape. At the left there is an immense horn of plenty, filled with fruit and all kinds of natural products. At the right stands a throne on which Autumn is seated surrounded by a group of six maidens. Autumn and her maidens are dressed in white adorned with autumn flowers and leaves. In front of the platform is erected an altar, on which, in golden letters, is inscribed the word "Charity."]

FROM 10 A.M. till 12 the work of the pupils and the methods of instruction have been exhibited in the various classes. Punctually at 12 the visitors are assembled in the main hall and are briefly addressed by Professor Adler. In substance he says:

"It is desirable that we celebrate festivals of nature more than has hitherto been the case; festivals of the spring, of the summer, of autumn, of midwinter. Our city children, shut in between walls of brick and mortar, see too little of nature, live too little with nature, do not follow sympathetically, as they should, the changes in the life of nature. Every season has its own peculiar charms. The changes of the seasons should reflect themselves more fully in our consciousness.

"Unfortunately, we cannot take our school-children out to nature as much as we should like, we must try therefore to bring

* The Workingman's School is under the auspices of The United Relief Works of the Society for Ethical Culture of New York. It is located at 109 West Fifty-fourth Street.

nature to them,—into the school. We attempt to-day, for the first time, an autumn festival. The programme consists of poetic selections and songs celebrating autumn, of a short address by the young lady who impersonates autumn, in which the moral meaning that we attach to this season is brought out, and of a procession of the school, which will pass before the seat of Autumn, at whose hands each of the children will receive a wreath of leaves and flowers.

"There is one more feature to be mentioned. You see here this altar with the word 'Charity' inscribed upon it. Our pupils have heretofore been entertained at dinner in the lower hall at the close of the exercises on Thanksgiving days. This year the question was put to them whether they would not prefer to give rather than to receive. It was proposed that each child should bring some simple offering of fruit or flowers, to be symbolically deposited at the base of this altar, and to be sent to the convalescent sick in the hospitals later in the day. The proposition was hailed with delight by the children, and will presently be carried out. It is certain that charity is not a prerogative of the rich. There is none so poor but he can share with those who are in still greater need, especially with the sick, and the sharing of the gifts of nature with others is particularly appropriate in connection with an autumn festival."

As soon as Professor Adler had ended his remarks a slow march was struck up on the piano, the doors of the hall were thrown open, and the school, which at present numbers three hundred and fifty pupils, marched in. The pupils passed before the altar, where they deposited their offering, and then filed into their seats and remained standing.

One of the boys, leading the school, stepped upon the platform, and said, "It is thrice blessed to give."

The whole school responded, "More blessed than to receive."

The leader: "We too can give."

The school: "All can give."

The leader and the school, together: "We bring our offerings from the bounty of the year for those that need."

The children took their seats, and after a short musical prelude, one of the oldest girls rose and repeated the first verse of the song "Charity":

"There is a blessed friend that came
On earth our steps to guide;
Sweet Charity they call her name,
And love she scatters wide.
She banishes our dismal fears,
She soothes each smarting pain;
She leads us from the vale of tears
Unto the light again."

This verse was then sung by the whole school.

Two recitations followed,—“This is the Feast-Time of the Year” and “The Autumn Festival,” by Whittier.

A song—“Thanksgiving Day” (written for the school)—came next.

When the song was over, Autumn arose and spoke these words: “I am Autumn, the giver of gifts. To those who have sown their seed in the spring, who have tended their crops in summer’s heat, I give my reward. When the leaves fall, blessings shall fall unto them,—golden fruit and grain.

“My children, what is the best fruit of all? Fruit of the mind and heart. You now stand in the spring-time of life. These (pointing to the teachers) are the sowers. Your minds are the field. Knowledge and virtue the seed.

“So live, so learn, so labor, so endeavor that when your autumn comes you too may bear rich fruit of noble lives, rejoicing your benefactors and the world.

“And now to you who have given I give in return. As you have thought of my poor, so have I thought of you. Come then, my maidens, and crown the children all with flowers from the fields and gifts from the plenty of the year.”

When Autumn had finished, a slow, solemn strain began to be sung to the words,—

“Autumn fair, in these thy bounties
All our happy hearts delight;
All thy flowers and thy glories
Still shall live in memory bright.”

The school passed in procession across the platform, each pupil receiving a wreath at the hands of Autumn or her attendants, the highest class leading. Those that remained in their seats kept up the song. When the first three classes had received their wreaths they took up their position near the entrance of the hall and maintained the singing while the lower classes continued to pass across the platform.

Before the children left the building, each received a bag containing fruit of various kinds and confectionery, while the members of the three highest classes were presented with tickets for a *matinée* performance of "Little Lord Fauntleroy."

GENERAL NOTES.

—SINCE the issue of the first number of THE ETHICAL RECORD, in April, 1888, it has grown from forty pages to its present size, and there has been a corresponding growth in variety of contents. We shall endeavor to continue developing the RECORD in the direction of making it a valuable quarterly journal of ethics. Special attention will be given to the subject of applied ethics. The work in progress by the Ethical Societies will from time to time be reported. The friends of the RECORD can give us material aid in developing our plans by making an effort to enlarge the subscription list. The low price of subscription places the RECORD within the means of all.

Many subscriptions expire with this number. It is hoped they will be promptly renewed, and that many new subscribers will be sent in before the issue of the next number. The RECORD is stopped at the expiration of subscription if not renewed.

—WE publish in the present number an article from the pen of Hon. Carroll D. Wright on "A School of Economics." This is the first of a series of articles on the special schools which are to be included in the Department of Applied Ethics in the proposed School of Philosophy and Applied Ethics.

We hope to print in subsequent numbers articles on a School of Pedagogics, a School of Penology, a School for the Science of Charity, etc.

When the circular of the proposed School of Philosophy and Applied Ethics was first sent out, an interesting and suggestive communication was received from Dr. Paul von Gizycki, in which the fear was expressed that the new school would be modelled too closely on the plan of the German university. The prominent place assigned to the practical schools above mentioned should serve to show that such fears are unfounded. Dr. P. von Gizycki declares that the new college should be located in a city where an Ethical Society already exists, and that the advanced students of the college should serve an apprenticeship in the teaching of ethics to the young. We can say, as a matter of fact, that the lecturers of our different societies have all served such an apprenticeship in the School for Moral Instruction, supported by the Ethical Society of New York. We can assure Dr. P. von Gizycki that we heartily appreciate the spirit of his criticism, and that, in the main, the opinions he expresses are in harmony with those which prevail among us.

—In an address delivered before the National Unitarian Conference, recently held in Philadelphia, Dr. Francis Ellingwood Abbot made the statement, since published in the *Unitarian Review*, *Christian Register*, *The Inquirer* (London), and other papers, that the Ethical Movement is seeking "to establish itself upon an agnostic foundation." The implication of this statement, that the Ethical Movement is committed to agnosticism, is unwarranted, as the following facts clearly show.

The Union of Societies for Ethical Culture, organized in Chicago, November 19, 1887, adopted in its Constitution (Article II., Section 1) the following statement:

"The general aim of the Ethical Movement, as represented by this Union, is to elevate the moral life of its members and that of the community; and it cordially welcomes to its fellowship all persons who sympathize with this aim, whatever may be their theological or philosophical opinions."

The above statement, which was deliberately and conscientiously framed and adopted more than two years ago, at a

regular Convention of the Ethical Societies, was afterwards endorsed by each society separately, and has been repeatedly published since in the ETHICAL RECORD.

It is therefore an authoritative statement of the object of the Ethical Movement. This object, it is clear from the above statement, is the furtherance of practical ethics. To promote *righteous living* and *righteous doing* on the part both of the individual and of the community is the one aim of the Ethical Movement. All who sympathize with this aim—all who share this common moral purpose—are invited to join the Ethical Movement, "*whatever may be their theological or philosophical opinions.*"

This basis of fellowship makes it clear, in the second place, that the Ethical Movement does not take a stand for or against any particular theology or philosophy. No one, in becoming a member either of the Union or of any of our societies, pledges himself, or is implied to pledge himself, to accept or reject any particular theology or philosophy. Neither the Ethical Union nor any society belonging to it has adopted any kind of theoretical creed. Moreover, there is no tendency to do so. It cannot be said, therefore, for instance, that the Ethical Movement is committed to either supernaturalism or anti-supernaturalism, or that it is founded on theism or pantheism or atheism or materialism or agnosticism. It is founded wholly and solely on *the facts of the moral life*,—those facts which all accept, whatever may be their theology or philosophy. And it is seeking—not as Dr. Abbot says, to establish itself upon an agnostic foundation, and not, as some others seem to think, to destroy theological beliefs, but rather, on the other hand—to do positive and constructive work in a particular direction,—namely, *the building up of practical righteousness in the world.*

The view of the Ethical Movement we have here briefly stated has been again and again more elaborately set forth in public addresses and in the columns of the RECORD by Professor Adler and the other lecturers of the Ethical Societies.

It may be stated, in conclusion, that theists as well as agnostics are on the membership lists of the Ethical Societies. Dr.

Abbot, himself a pronounced theist, has long been an honorary member of the New York Ethical Society, and was one of the first to join the Union of Ethical Societies. And not only are theists cordially welcomed into membership, but Trinitarians who are willing to unite with us in the positive work of practical ethics would be equally warmly received. This alone refutes the notion that the Ethical Movement is committed to agnosticism.

—THE MEMBERSHIP of the Union of Societies for Ethical Culture includes, but is not confined, to the membership of the several societies. The present membership list embraces people in different parts of the United States and some in England and Germany. Any person sympathizing with the general aim of the Union is, as stated in the preceding note, invited to become a member.

Members at large are asked to contribute annually towards the expenses of the Union, but the amount of their contribution is optional. All annual contributors are entitled to the regular publications of the Union. Application for membership should be made to the Secretary, S. Burns Weston, 405 North Thirty-third Street, Philadelphia, Pa.

The Constitution of the Union is contained in the printed report of the proceedings of the first two Conventions of the Ethical Societies, held in New York and Chicago. This report also includes the exercises and addresses of the Tenth Anniversary of the New York Ethical Society, making a pamphlet of fifty pages. This will be sent to any address by the Secretary on the receipt of ten cents.

—ERNST PRUSSING, one of the earliest members and most generous supporters of the Chicago Ethical Society, died November 28. Compelled, while still a university student, to flee his native land, Germany, on account of his espousal of the revolutionary principles of 1848, he brought an ideal enthusiasm to the support of almost every forward movement in politics and religion in this country. He left a bequest of \$3000 to the Chicago Society, of which he had been a trustee and the vice-president. Mr. Prussing's remains were cre-

mated, in accordance with his desire. Mr. Salter's funeral address is published in the *Open Court* (Chicago) of January 2.

—THE *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*, published in Paris, under the editorship of Jean Réville, is about to enter upon the tenth year of its career. It set out with the aim of devoting itself to the furtherance of the science of religion, and by strict adhesion to its original programme of excluding from its columns all controversial matter, as well as and more especially through the valuable character of its contents, it has achieved an enviable reputation for itself. Among its contributors it numbers such authorities as Abraham Kuenen, Ernest Renan, Albert Réville, Joseph Halévy, Georg Maspero, Pierre Paris, C. P. Thiele, Ignaz Goldziher, Harting Derenbourg, Goblet d'Alviella, and Maurice Vernes. In addition to original studies, it contains, at regular intervals, exhaustive "Bulletins" of new works, and investigations within the various subdivisions of the ever-growing territory of comparative religions,—studies which enable the student to acquaint himself with problems and results outside of his own specialty; and the value of the *Revue* is still further enhanced by a complete bibliography of new publications, articles as well as extended works, besides short reviews of all noteworthy publications. The *Revue* does not appear to be as well known in our own country as it deserves to be, and now that the interest for the line of studies represented by it is also growing among us, we deem it proper to call attention to this periodical. As yet, it is the only publication of the kind, and while the articles are published in French, articles from American scholars will be heartily welcomed, and, if written in English, provision for their translation into French can readily be made. Six numbers are published yearly, each number containing, on an average, 125 pages. The subscription price is 30 francs or \$6. Ernest Leroux, 28 Rue Buonaparte, Paris, is the publisher, and, for the convenience of subscribers, Professor Morris Jastrow, Jr., University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa., will forward such names as may be sent to him.

We print in the foregoing pages extracts from an article in a late number of the *Revue* by the editor, on "The Teaching of the History of Religions in the United States and in Europe."

—A SOCIALISTIC VIEW OF FEMALE LABOR.—What are we to think of the increasing employment of women in factory and shop? Should we oppose it? A late socialistic writer—Clara Zetkin, in the third issue of the *Berliner Arbeiterbibliothek*, published by the *Berliner Volks-Tribune*—says not. Not only is it useless to try to prevent female labor, but by means of it, she holds, women have the first opportunity they have ever had of emancipating themselves. Heretofore they have been in subjection to men, and, as wives and mothers, have had to do the tasks which men appointed to them. Now they can earn their living apart from the household; and though they are in temporary subjection to "capitalists," and seem thus to have only exchanged one form of tyranny for another, they will in time learn to co-operate and will acquire political rights, and then they will aid in accomplishing the "social revolution" which will free them from the domination of capital. Already, mothers who work in factories and shops, being unable to care for and educate their children, must give that duty to others, and in time the whole training of children, after they have been weaned, will be intrusted to organized society or the state. Such are the views of this writer, which we forbear to comment upon. It would be indeed strange if the industrial tendencies of modern society should work out the disintegration of the family, and bring back the primitive state of things, when parental responsibilities sat very lightly on the shoulders of those concerned.

—THE RECEPTION accorded in Germany to "Die Religion der Moral," a volume of fifteen of Mr. Salter's lectures, translated by Professor Georg von Gizycki, of the University of Berlin, and published by Wilhelm Friedrich, Leipsic, 1885, has led the same translator and publisher to issue a new collection of Mr. Salter's lectures, under the title "Moralische Reden."

The report has reached us that Mr. Salter's book has been prohibited in Russia.

The Ethical Record.

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S. BURNS WESTON, Editor.

APRIL, 1890.

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THE ETHICAL RECORD.

APRIL, 1890.

II.—THE ETHICS OF DIVORCE.

BY FELIX ADLER, PH.D.

(Continued from January number.)

HUSBAND and wife are designed to be each other's completing counterpart. Marriage is a fellowship, instituted for mutual aid and furtherance in efforts to reach a higher stature of manhood and womanhood. It exists as a means for the attainment of moral ends. It follows that when the moral ends of marriage are irretrievably lost, in other words, when the relation has become an immoral one, it should be dissolved.

I cannot subscribe to the opinion, which is held by some, that the cooling of the affections constitutes a sufficient ground for divorce. For he who enters into the estate of matrimony thereby accepts certain duties, which he is bound to discharge, whether his ideal of love be realized or not. The affections are in their nature shifting and variable. To say, as some do, that love and marriage should be coterminous, and that the decline of the one should be followed by the annulment of the other, would be to open the door to the wildest license. So long as the duties of marriage are capable of being performed, the relation should remain intact. And it will often be found that an honest attempt to fulfil these duties

will lead to a renewal of the affections, and that the partners of the wedded life, whose sentiments have been alienated for a time, will find each other anew on the plane of their common duties, and will thus be more closely and more permanently united.

To the question whether the matrimonial bond should ever be dissolved the Catholic church has answered No, and has affirmed, speaking through the mouth of one of her principal dignitaries, that the "First, best, and last reason for this No is, Thus saith the Lord." I, for my part, cannot bow to this "Thus saith the Lord," nor respect it as the highest utterance of conscience in the matter.*

The central principle of marriage, as I have said, is duty; duty supported by love, duty leading to a renewal of love, where the latter has gone astray. But it is plain that there are cases where an irreparable breach of duty has occurred on one side or the other, and in such cases the marriage is dead, and the law should not hesitate to publish its extinction. I fully appreciate all that can be said concerning the necessity of "bearing one's cross." It is in marriage, if anywhere, that the words of Jesus apply, which he addressed to him who asked, "How often shall I forgive? Shall it be seven times?" and Jesus answered, "Seventy and seven times." The rule of marriage is that we take each other as we are in order to make each other better than we are, and this making each other better than we are is a task full of sweetness and the source of infinite delight to those who are well mated, but becomes sheer martyrdom to those who are ill-mated. Nevertheless the rule must be obeyed. We must not weary in efforts and appeals. We must still try to infuse our strength into the feebler nature at our side, we must still seek to kindle the faintest spark of a better humanity beneath the

* The position of the Catholic church is based upon the sacramental view of marriage. God is a third party in every marriage celebration. God literally joins the bridegroom and the bride together, and it is deemed impious for the human State to undertake to undo what God has done. It will be perceived that this is a purely theological scruple, with which we are not concerned in discussing the ethics of the subject.

ashes of selfishness. We must still, like some strong swimmer in the waves, hold up our drowning companion and try to bring him to shore, and only when we feel that he will inevitably drag us down, too, unto moral death, are we justified in letting go. There will always be an infinite amount of suffering in married life, which cannot be relieved. The finest natures will always shrink from a public exposure of their most intimate sorrows. But, if we cannot relieve in all cases, that is no reason why we should withhold relief where it is possible to extend it.

Among the sufficient grounds for divorce I briefly mention the following: The sin against the seventh commandment. This is recognized as sufficient in all codes. Wilful desertion is another cause. It is, as we have already seen, the single cause for which the greatest number of divorces are granted in the United States. Wilful desertion implies a refusal to discharge any and all the obligations of marriage. Habitual cruelty, habitual intemperance, when the hope of reformation is excluded, inherent depravity, conviction of felony, I regard as sufficient grounds. For marriage is a moral fellowship, instituted for moral purposes, and it is not right that a man or woman should be tied in lifelong companionship to a beast or to a fiend. I ought to add that incurable insanity, too, is, in my eyes, a sufficient ground for divorce. It is recognized as such in the laws of Prussia, Baden, Saxony, Switzerland, etc. The incurably demented are certainly incapable of fulfilling the duties of wedded life. They have practically passed out of the ranks of the living. Their life is not a real life at all, but a kind of death in life. I am aware that a tender estimate of the loyalty which is due to the memory of him or her who was once dearest to us, constitutes in many minds an objection to the ground of divorce I have mentioned last, but the same tender loyalty ought to prevent second marriages. The decision in such cases should be left to the fine feeling of the person concerned. But the law has no right to interfere. If the law permits remarriage after the death of husband or wife, there is no reason why it should not also permit remarriage after either husband or wife have lost their reason.

Enough has now been said to indicate the general principle upon which, in my opinion, divorce legislation should be based. The special applications of this principle often involve delicate considerations, into which it is not our business to enter here. The general tendency of divorce legislation in this, as well as other countries, is, on the whole, in the direction of greater liberality in the laws rather than of increased stringency. Far from regarding this tendency as pernicious, I am inclined to think that the idea of marriage will be "graded up" and not degraded by such legislation. It is distinctly the sign of a more sensitive public conscience if not only the grossest outrages, but other transgressions, hitherto regarded as comparatively venial, are deemed sufficient to procure a separation. Every such separation pronounced by the courts is an object lesson given to the community on the sacredness of the duties implied in marriage. Always, however, with the proviso that a distinction be made between the guilty and the innocent party in a suit for divorce and that the guilty party be punished. In a State in which a violation of the marriage law is regarded not only as a private wrong but as a public injury, in which adultery is treated as a crime, in which desertion and habitual cruelty are treated in the same manner, the liberality of the law will not stand as a temptation in the way of the reckless and the licentious, but, on the contrary, the penalties exacted and the odium incurred will act on the evil-minded as a powerful deterrent, and prove a safeguard and protection to the weak.

I stated in the earlier part of this address that the corruption of marriage is the disease and that divorce is only a symptom. Bartillon and others, who have made a special study of the question, agree that the stringency or laxity of laws has but little effect in checking or increasing the number of divorces. The divorce movement is steadily gaining headway, irrespective of the character of legislation, both in Europe and the United States. And this being so, the remedy should be applied to the disease itself and not to the symptom. The elevation of marriage, the strengthening, the purifying and ennobling of family life, is the only effective cure of the evil.

I shall now briefly consider what the State can do in this direction, what Society can do, and what the Church can do. The State can at least do something in the way of throwing additional safeguards around marriage by enhancing the dignity of the marriage celebration. The American democracy is open to the charge that in the mean scramble for material wealth it has ignored some of the essential conditions of social well-being. In the mere matter of the proper registration of marriages, the state of things in this country is disgraceful. Commissioner Wright, of the National Bureau of Labor Statistics, informs us that, in preparing his valuable Report on Marriage and Divorce, he was able to use the marriage records of only 1700 counties out of 2600. In the remaining counties either no records at all were kept, or they were in such a condition as not to be fit for use. To show what looseness is tolerated the instance of one county is mentioned, whose records were wanted but could not be found. On inquiry it was discovered that the county clerk, in a certain year, had refused to hand over the records to his successor and kept them in his house, and that his wife had used them to kindle fires with. A proper system of registration is the first requirement. A second is the repeated announcement or publication of intended marriages, a requirement which other civilized nations have long since adopted and found to be indispensable. This will not only serve to check the abuse of minor's marriages and afford an opportunity to discover lawful impediments where they exist, but the deliberation and publicity thus enforced by the State will help to impress the importance of the step about to be taken upon the minds of the parties concerned. Again, it is extremely desirable that the civil ceremony, where it is preferred, shall be performed only by high civil officers, whose very presence is calculated to give solemnity to the act, and not by obscure notaries or so-called justices of the peace, or, as in our large cities, by owners of grog-shops, called aldermen. Whatever the State can do to invest the marriage celebration with greater dignity and to impress upon it an element of deliberation is a safeguard.

If we ask, in the next place, what Society can do, an adequate answer to this question would involve a consideration of the deepest social and economic problems of the age, and would lead us far beyond the limits assigned to this discussion. It is plain, for instance, that our present industrial system, which has drawn hundreds of thousands of women, married and unmarried, into the factories, and which takes the mother away from her babe, is a constant and fearful menace to the moral life of the community, to the integrity of the home. It is equally evident that the modern tenement house, with its overcrowded, dark, ill-ventilated rooms, is adverse to anything like rooted home-feeling. The movement for social reform must bring the answer to the question what Society can do in order to elevate the family life. Indeed, "the salvation of the family" is the watchword, which the advocates of social reform should inscribe upon their banner. For it is above all other considerations the fact that, under present conditions, the family life is steadily and inevitably deteriorating, that makes the so-called labor question a burning question.

Finally, what can the churches do? The Church has a sphere of her own, distinct from that covered by the social reformer. It is the business of society to create the outward conditions which are favorable to the moral life. It is the business of the Church to disseminate those ideas and principles without which the best external conditions are useless. It is the business of the social reformer to improve the machinery of society. It is the business of the Church to supply the power to this machinery. And moral power can only be generated and kept up with the help of clear moral ideas. If, then, as we have seen, the marriage relation is founded on mutual duty, it should be recognized as the peculiar function of the Church to teach the duties of marriage. And, in undertaking this function, the Church has an opportunity to atone for her long neglect and to free herself from the reproach that "the ethics of marriage lag far behind all other Christian ethics." There has been too much false delicacy on this subject, too great a disposition to shrink from the questions here involved, a too great readiness to cover up the

evils of which all are cognizant, instead of grave and earnest attempts to remove them. It is a truth which no one who knows modern society will contradict that the relations of the sexes of the present day are not only impure outside of marriage, but to a large extent unsound and immoral in marriage. To counteract this growing degeneracy, the moral ends for which marriage exists should be made plain to young people before they marry. And this is a task which the women of the churches are specially called upon to undertake. In ancient Rome there was a senate of matrons, who laid down the law in regard to the externals of behavior. So let there be in each of our religious societies a senate or council of mothers, who shall lay down the laws of behavior in regard to these inward matters. So that our young men and women may not cross the threshold of matrimony in childish ignorance, or gazing upon the veiled nuptial moon through the silver haze of the passions, but with a full knowledge of the high and delicate responsibilities which they assume towards one another and towards the future generation which is destined to spring from their union. For marriage is the fountain upon which the tree of humanity depends for its very life. If that fountain be clear and fresh, the tree will flourish and bear wholesome fruit. If that fountain be poisoned, the tree must perish.

OUTLINE OF A SEMINARY FOR THE PROMOTION OF THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES.

BY EDMUND J. JAMES, PH.D.,

Wharton School of Finance and Economy, University of Pennsylvania.

ONE of the most characteristic features of modern civilization is the tendency to establish a school corresponding to each great want of society. Antiquity, it is true, had also its schools. Its poets, historians, orators, artists, jurists, captains did, of course, enjoy some kind of systematic training, and that this training was not altogether inefficient we may fairly conclude from the magnificent examples of high ability and skill in all these lines which the ancient world produced. The training of the foregoing classes was chiefly obtained under the direct tuition of practical men; but for some of them there were also schools. We do not know enough about these schools to enable us to speak confidently as to their organization and efficiency. They were at places and at times very large and possessed many excellent teachers.

But, I think, we may fairly enough say that there was nothing in Athens or Alexandria or Rome which, for variety in subjects of instruction, or for efficiency in method, was anywhere nearly equal to the University of Berlin, for example. Nor was there at any time, in any one place within the territory afterwards included in the Roman empire, any such large group of equally distinguished men associated in the work of instruction as can be found to-day in Berlin and Paris.

Neither the modern university nor any institution corresponding to it could have existed in the ancient world. But the modern university is only a small part of our system of schools. If we take it in the German sense, it is only a preparatory school for one of the professions,—teaching, law, medicine, or theology. In addition to it, and of essentially the

same grade, are the great polytechnic schools to prepare for the so-called technical professions. Besides these, there must be mentioned the agricultural schools for the farmers; the commercial schools for the business classes; the schools of art, drawing, painting, sculpturing, singing, acting, military schools, normal schools, and, finally, trade schools for the artisans. Nor should we forget the great system of elementary education which underlies and sustains the whole superstructure. In a word, every calling in life is recognized as demanding a corresponding training, and it is agreed that certain portions of it can be given in a school better than anywhere else. Germany, France, Italy, and Austria are, perhaps, the only countries where this system is approximately carried through, but in its broad outlines it appears in all modern countries and is rapidly developing in all the progressive ones.

We have, moreover, come to recognize that underlying all these different arts there is a science, and that, if we would raise the level of our art, we must foster and promote the science. It is true that in America we do not fully recognize this fact, because we have been able to borrow our science so largely from other nations that we have not yet begun to feel how quickly our arts would cease to advance if science were neglected. But in Europe, and again, more especially in Germany, the nations act upon the conviction that by some means science must be cultivated, if civilization is to advance; and so various means are employed. Higher education is made cheap in France and Germany, prizes are offered for scientific services, a good income awaits first-rate scientific ability. Academies are supported at public expense, whose members are left free to pursue science pure and simple.

It is, again, Germany, however, which has developed in its university system what, with all its defects,—and they are many,—is perhaps the best scheme for the promotion of science yet devised. A combination of the academy and the school,—an investigating and instructing body in one,—a university, in which the faculty finds that it pays to do original work, in which strong inducements are offered to add something to the sum total of human science, in which the students may

fulfil their professional requirements, and yet give the bulk of their time to hearing the professors state the results of their own work in the respective fields, or to training themselves to enter the same race for the highest efficiency and excellence in the work of promoting science by original investigation. This system has doubtless contributed no little to give Germany that proud pre-eminence which she now enjoys in nearly all departments of scientific achievement.

Other countries have now begun to imitate her in this work, and none more successfully than our own. The institutions which have of late years influenced American education more powerfully than any others—Michigan, Harvard, and Johns Hopkins—have steadily kept German models in this respect before them. The other leading institutions have also been more or less affected directly by German example, often supposing, it is true, in their ignorance that they were copying German models when they were departing most widely from them.

If we wish, then, to-day to influence powerfully and continuously any great department of our national life, we naturally cast about for some kind of a possible school which shall embody in some way our ideals, which, if possible, shall prepare for some art and promote its underlying science, since we recognize in this combination a most powerful lever of progress.

Another striking characteristic of modern, as distinguished from ancient, society is the large extent to which we are substituting, or trying to substitute, conscious for unconscious effort in the field of progress. There never was a time when reformers were more active, and reformers of a type unknown to antiquity in any considerable numbers. Solon was a reformer, but he became so not from any general consideration of the defects of society about him, not from any feeling that there were certain abuses, which, in the name of humanity, ought to be abolished, but simply because a point had been reached in the conflict of parties when society threatened to dissolve. Something had to be done immediately to prevent a relapse to barbarism, and only enough was done to

relieve the condition of acute disease, as was shown by the acts of succeeding reformers.

All ancient reforms, so far as we know them, were carried through practically at the point of the sword. The problems of antiquity were, moreover, simple. Society was satisfied with conditions which every modern nation would regard as intolerable. Social progress was therefore largely unconscious. Few people reflected on what might be the consequences of any given policy. Fewer would listen to any discussion of the matter. National policy was an outgrowth of national sentiments,—almost an automatic expression of national characteristics and qualities. Very few matters formed the subject of legislation. The written laws gave no complete view of the spirit of the people, did not reflect to any great extent national feeling and wisdom.

The modern world is different. We have entered upon a conscious period, or at least, we think it is conscious. The reformer is abroad. Men and women will devote their time and money to the promotion of causes in which they have no interest in the ordinary material sense of that term. They refuse to mind their own business. They even think they are their brothers' keeper and act upon that belief. They insist that this, that, and the other thing must be done in the interest of society. Animals must be protected, asylums for the sick, insane, idiotic, must be built. The poor must be supported, the unfortunate helped, even the criminal must be treated humanely. The ignorant must be educated, the inefficient trained, the weak strengthened, the sick kept alive, and so a thousand and one things are demanded to-day which, if proposed to a Greek or Roman, could only have excited a smile of derision. At one extreme stand those who insist that society shall take upon itself the burdens and cares of the individuals and direct all the physical and mental effort of the race towards the goal of the greatest good to the greatest number. Between the socialists at one end, who form as yet a small fraction of the world's population, and the *laissez-faireists* at the other end, who are still less numerous, stand at varying distance the great bulk of our society,—borne away

with an ever-increasing speed from the position of *laissez-faireism*, and if not carried towards socialism, yet at least to a policy in which government shall attempt to do far more than it does now.

Action, then, it is safe to say, will be taken in some direction by government, and that in an ever widening sphere. If this action is to be consciously wise, it must be based on a knowledge of the facts and forces of society. Our legislators, who are coming to be more and more the great public and less and less the so-called representatives at Washington or Albany, must be instructed in these things. But this knowledge is unfortunately not at present to be found in any very large or unadulterated quantities. Still we have a start, and know something about the way we should go at it. How shall the end which now appears desirable—education of the public in the facts and forces of society—be attained? In view of the first point presented, there can only be one answer,—a School of Social Science; an institution which shall do two things,—investigate and teach. Not merely teach the students who may come to its halls, though this is indispensable, but also teach the public through the daily press, as well as through books and pamphlets.

Now, a school of this kind must, of course, be a development. There is almost no limit to its ultimate size and influence. But it will cost money, and it is, therefore, a practical question, With what shall it begin? At what point in this limitless field shall it enter? It seems to me that much of its immediate success depends upon whether it takes a strategic position at the start. It might begin with the earliest geologic remains of men, and try to infer from such remains as we find what the original and indestructible social tendencies and forces are, or it may begin with some of the practical questions of the day. Without desiring to belittle in any way the importance of the first class of investigations, I do not hesitate to say that the latter offer more hopes of interesting the American public.

Institutions of learning to be highly successful in America must be popular. The universities of the various States,

though intended primarily for the education of specified classes of people, engrafted an element of popularity by practically abolishing fees. Harvard College and Cornell University have grown as they have become more popular in character, have appealed to an ever-widening clientele. Even Johns Hopkins, which seemed to have become somewhat exclusive in establishing a chair of Assyriology, yet aimed to become popular, on the other hand, by taking the public into its confidence and recording with the regularity of clock-work every movement of its professors and students. Its success in this line should be a lesson to every American institution.

So the school of social science must be popular in some way or other. It should fix from the very start national attention upon itself. It should let the American people feel that it has something for them, then there can be no question of their supporting it in a royal fashion. Now, is this possible? Is it possible to select a point of attack upon public esteem which will be surely and largely successful from the very start? I believe it is, and I should propose something like the following :

A school of the kind proposed, while not neglecting any portion of the field of political and social science, should take up at once the investigation of some practical problem of American political life,—some problem which is likely to be of interest for a long time to come, which is likely to increase in importance, and which is of a character to attract public attention in all parts of the country. With no desire to exclude other topics (and there are many of as deep and general interest), I would suggest the subject of city government. This would possess the qualifications enumerated above and would have in addition the great advantage of being easily understood.

The first work to be done would be the collection of information about the government of cities in this country and Europe, the organization of the cities, their relation to superior political bodies, their powers, the distribution of functions among the various organs. This work has not been performed by any one yet, although it is necessary to do it

before anything else can be accomplished. But this is by no means enough. One must descend to details. The items of expenditure and income must be ascertained and classified according to some convenient system; the budget, in other words, must be studied and set forth in a clear manner. It must appear how much money the cities spend for the various objects of their care; what is the cost of schools, roads and bridges, justice, water, sewerage, lighting; the whole cost, the cost per capita, per unit of wealth, etc. The system of income must be studied. It must appear how much income is derived from taxes, from fees, from earnings of productive property in the hands of the municipalities; of what kinds and how numerous the taxes, the method of their collection, etc.

The methods of carrying on public business must be carefully investigated and duly set forth. It must appear, for example, whether the streets are cleaned by contract or by laborers hired directly by the city authorities; whether streets are paved by contract or by city laborers under the direction of city engineers. The method of supplying water should also receive attention,—whether by public or private management, whether by lump charges or by metres; also the amount of water used per capita, etc. No one, I presume, would deny that this information would be valuable. Every one knows that it is at present not attainable, and that it can be collected only by systematic investigation carried on for a long time through Europe and America.

But why should something like this be the first work of the school?

1. Because it would be comparatively easy to bring forth valuable results in this line almost from the start,—results that would aid in the solution of many of the most difficult questions of our politics. The methods of doing the work are plain; suitable persons could be easily found in sufficient numbers to accomplish satisfactory results.

2. Because it would attract universal and continuous attention. From Maine to California, from the Gulf to Minnesota, there are hundreds of communities, each of whom has had to settle these questions for itself, and in each of them they will

not stay settled for more than a few years together. The members of council, in spite of all slanders to the contrary, desire, as a whole, to do the best things for their cities. But they are ignorant, and there is no one to enlighten them as to what is best. There are scores of citizens who are willing to spend time and effort in arriving at a clear view on these topics; but they know not where to go for information. All these people—first in one city and then in another, now in Maine, now in Texas, now in Chicago, now in New Orleans—are agitated by these circumstances, and would with one accord have recourse to any person or any school who could tell them how this or that plan has worked in this or that city.

A word or two of personal experience may not be out of place in this connection. A few years ago I made a brief study into the relation of the modern city to the supply of artificial light,—more particularly of gaslight. The work had no great merit; but no one else had done it. It related to a topic which has attracted attention all over the country. As a result, I was flooded with inquiries from every section of the country and almost from all classes of people. City councilmen wanted to know how this, that, and the other point could be best arranged in a proposed grant of power to certain gas companies. State legislators wished to know the best form for a general law touching lighting and water companies. Members of citizen committees desired advice as to the best way of protecting city interests. Many of those inquiries related to points I had not studied; many called for information I did not have. If I had had time and money enough to carry out the work I had begun in the pamphlet published, I have no doubt that the policy of municipalities in these matters, the country over, would have been powerfully influenced by the mere possibility of getting accurate information as to the points at stake.

3. The result would be to impress the public mind with the fact that systematic investigation into the facts of society by suitably qualified scholars is a valuable practical thing and not a mere theoretical pastime. It would get the public into the habit of looking to the results of scholarship rather than

practical politics in such matters. This would undoubtedly lead to a greater respect for the work of scientific research which could not but react upon the public in a manner favorable to the endowment and adequate equipment of research in general.

4. It would certainly open the eyes of the average citizen to what is doing and what is possible in the way of social reform and social progress. The most progressive American community—the most radical of Western American cities—is still chiefly under the domination of custom and habit. If any one proposes a reform in any direction, it is always met by the objection, “Ah, that is nice enough in theory, but it would never work in practice.” If, however, one is able to show exactly how some other community, no more intelligent, not so rich, even more unfavorably situated, has succeeded in doing this very thing, much to the benefit of all classes, the first step has been taken towards convincing the public of its practicability.

Take, for example, the question of housing the poor. The idea of a municipality undertaking the work of securing better houses by the method of condemning land and erecting model dwellings strikes an American at first blush as something most extraordinary. When he learns, however, that English cities, which are of all cities most like his own, not only have authority to condemn property for this purpose, but have exercised this authority with notable success in many instances, he is ready at least to hear what can be said on the subject. When he learns how many conveniences, like public bath-houses, parks, drinking-fountains, public wash-houses, exist in different parts of the world and how easy it would be to increase public comfort in countless directions, one of the most serious hinderances to progress is removed. When he comes to appreciate fully how barbarous are many of the conditions under which he and most of his fellow-citizens are living, how inferior their school facilities, how wretched their streets, how bad their water, compared with the best that other human beings are enjoying elsewhere, his eyes will be at last opened to the fact of his condition, and the way opened

for a sprouting desire to have the very best "that is going." No one can have studied the facts of American municipal life without coming to see that the desire to have as good a thing as anybody else is one of the most deep-seated motives of public-spirited action in our American communities. Now, to make this thoroughly efficient, we must steadily keep before the public what is the best thing that other towns have. Keep steadily before the human being, as he exists in our society, the possibility of some great improvement in his condition which lies within his easy reach, and you are constantly applying the most efficient inducement to make the effort necessary to obtain it. And what is true in this respect of the individual is also true of the community.

Our orators—fourth of July, Washington's birthday, etc.—are never tired of extolling the advantages of American workingmen as compared with those of England, Germany, and France. He eats meat once or twice a day instead of once a week or once a month. He wears better shoes, better clothes, and lives in better houses. This is all true; and we have every reason to be proud and thankful that it is so.

But suppose he carries the comparison a little further, so as to include something more than the bread that enters the mouth. Suppose he asks, say, about the schools, about the chances for an education which are within the reach of the workingmen for their children. What would his answer be? As to the elementary school, there would not be much difference. Honors are easy in this respect as between America, Germany, and France anyhow, though all three excel England in those opportunities. Suppose, however, the boy has some unusual talent, for the development of which the father is willing to make some sacrifices. Where can he get what he wants with the least sacrifice? It is still true that people with small incomes can procure much better advantages for their children in Paris or Berlin than in New York or Philadelphia. It is impossible to secure advantages in Philadelphia, for example, for a boy to prepare himself properly for the classical course in college except by the outlay every year for tuition alone of more than one-fifth of the income of

the average skilled laborer of the better class. This is certainly double the relative cost in Berlin or Paris. If the laborer himself wishes for something more than satisfaction of his grosser wants, what is the cost of the refining pleasures, music, art, and the drama? In most cases in this country they do not exist at all. Where they do exist, they are far beyond not only the reach of the skilled artisan, but also of the people whose income is on the average double that of the skilled artisans. And yet we talk of democracy, and are content with a condition where nearly everything that makes life worth living on its finer sides is only for the rich.

Suppose we go a little further, Where are the opportunities for the enjoyment of good air and good walks, when the laborer wishes to recuperate? Not, by any means, in our American towns, which, taken as a whole, do not have much in this line at least to offer to him of little means. The consolations of religion are all that is left, and while I would not by any means underrate these, yet where all our thirst for amusement must seek an outlet in religion, our religion is apt to sink to the level of an amusement.

Now, of these facts the average American is ignorant. He imagines in his blindness that he has the best of everything; and if what he has is not perfect, why, that is a mere incident of all human things. No greater service could be done to the cause of social progress in this country than to present and keep presenting the facts of social conditions and progress elsewhere. No agency could do this so efficiently in the present state of our society as such a school of the social sciences as proposed in the paper.

It will be seen that the foregoing plan calls for a school organized on a somewhat different plan from the ordinary one. Let a professor, or, if the term suits better, a director, be appointed for each general subject of investigation. Place at his disposal means enough to enable him to prosecute his inquiries in a thoroughly systematic way, taking up by way of preference pressing questions first. He should, of course, have whatever library facilities and clerical help should be needed. He should also be allowed to engage men of suitable

education and training to assist him,—men who could be sent to whatever part of the world the work demanded, and for such length of time as circumstances should make necessary. It goes without saying that abundant facilities should be at hand for the publication and dissemination of results.

The school may very well be connected with some existing institution so as to dispense with the necessity of duplicating existing facilities. It may be begun with one professor or director and expanded as rapidly as circumstances will permit. I think it will be found that as soon as the result of its work in one line shall be found valuable, men and societies will co-operate in establishing new departments for the investigation of the subjects of special interest to them. For example, I have little doubt that if the school should show by an investigation into the subject of municipal government in general what excellent results are awaiting systematic work in this direction, those interested in *pœnology* would establish a department for this subject; those interested in charities would do the same for it; and thus, in course of time, the whole field of political and social science could be covered.

We should not be content, however, with the mere work of scientific investigation, though that must lie at the basis of all valuable work in this field. We must utilize the facilities for the education and training of those who shall become teachers and preachers in this department. Future professors of political and social science would find a longer or shorter stay at such an institution an indispensable element in their preparation for work. The future clergymen would find here an introduction into certain phases of the work falling to his lot which could be furnished nowhere else. Future politicians and statesmen would seek here a preparation for forming judgments on the complicated affairs of modern social life.

But the school should not stop even here. It should send out lecturers and teachers throughout the country to press upon public attention the facts and principles of social science in the broadest sense of that term,—explain to them how and what beneficial changes lie within their easy reach, preach the gospel of social progress, advance high the standards of

popular education and popular health,—mental, moral, and physical.

As to the name, I should suggest "Seminary for the Promotion of the Political and Social Sciences."

A SCHOOL FOR THE SCIENCE OF CHARITY.

BY REV. J. G. BROOKS.

THE growing number of charities is often used to point a hopeful moral. The new institutions are pointed to as signs of a higher civilization or a more alert Christianity. It is however, not without misgivings that one asks why such vastly extended charity, organized and unorganized, is necessary.

What does it signify of social health and soundness that such innumerable "Homes," "Retreats," "Asylums," "Organizations" are not only called for but are so filled that everywhere we hear the same story, "We could do twice as much good if we had more means and more room." "We cannot begin to meet the demand for help," etc. All of which signifies that if these charity institutions were doubled in size they would be filled.

In Maxime du Camp's long list of such institutions, almost without exception this is the story. In more than ninety American reports of different charities there is this urgent call for money to enlarge the work. How shall we construe this growing demand into a sign of social health? The really hopeful fact about it is the increased social sensitiveness that such enlarged and various effort implies.

Especially in our older and larger cities nothing is more remarkable than the growth of this distinctively *social* sympathy. It looks indeed as if the sheer mass of it would grow faster than any method that is available for its training and direction. Here is the opportunity as it is the necessity of a school of charity.

Nowhere is the need more keenly felt than in older cities, like Boston, where the newer methods based upon experience have been tried long enough to prove their value, and also to learn how sharp and narrow are the limits within which the best curative work is now confined.

A school of charity must first recognize the changed conditions of industrial society.

Commerce is forced now to submit to the conditions not of a local or even national market alone, but of a "world-market." The price of a nation's surplus, that decides the price of the whole product, is more and more determined not within the national boundaries, but in the market of the world, and thus every little bay and creek of our industrial life is affected by the "seas that know no limit but the globe."

We cannot too soon learn that many of our gravest and most local charity problems are a very pulsing part of distinctively world relations. An old and very intelligent worker in New York told me, recently, "I begin to see in my institution that it is only dipping water with a sieve so long as this immigration goes on." The work was no less sacred because it was hopeless, neither was there any question that it must be done.

Here, however, was a new recognition of the "world-market." It is seen that a local city charity is part and parcel of Italian immigration, and immigration ever more from the South of Italy with its least desirable elements.

Here is work for a school of charity. It will not be its function to stop immigration though it may furnish both facts and influence that shall help towards its intelligent control. The real function of such a school will be to deal systematically and organically with the entire conditions which determine our local work. There was once a village charity as there was a village market with no "over-production." There was once a city charity as there was a city market. Both have passed away not to return. Insanity, suicide, pauperism, the tenement house "trampery," indeed, almost all the baffling problems, are so vitally a part of somewhat greater than ourselves that we must study also from the side of the

whole, or miss altogether the real causes of our special and local ills.

It is apparent that such school for broad and scientific study must be able to command, for purposes of comparison and investigation, the widest field of fact and experience. It is plainly absurd that several German societies for the theoretic and practical study of these problems should have no sort of relation to our own organizations existing for the same work. Of one of the most important organizations, both for theory and practice, that has ever existed, "La Réforme Sociale," in France, we as yet have practically no knowledge whatever, yet it has had many years of experience, is highly and elaborately organized, in such manner as to secure the regular service of the best experts in the country. Judges, engineers, merchants, economists, agriculturists of the first rank in France, are so related to this society as to give to it systematically the results of their special experience. It has a history; a large and rapidly growing literature that is not in the least like the earlier French speculation upon social subjects. The new studies are largely by men of special and practical knowledge, as they are in a sister society for the propagation of profit-sharing, where every man upon the board is a business-man of large experience, like Charles Robert, Van Marken, or Laroche-Joubert.

What society for the study, practically or theoretically, of profit-sharing could skip the regularly published experience of this French society? "La Réforme Sociale" has an equal importance for general questions.

As the importance of a school for charity will depend largely upon the *method* it adopts, I cannot better illustrate what such method should be than by reference to this society founded by Le Play. With its body of doctrine or the contents of its method I have nothing to do. The method is strictly that of organized experience,—the method of science.

I must speak, too, only of the present phase of its working, not of Le Play and his noble life-work, out of which it has all sprung.

There is first at Paris, holding monthly meetings, the Inter-

national Society for the Study of Social Economy. Its presidents have been men often of European reputation,—Batie Wolowski, Michael Chevalier, De Lesseps, Professor Leroy-Beaulieu. In its paying membership we find the names of Lavallée, Levasseur, the historian Taine, and a score of other distinguished Frenchmen. Taine was not ashamed to divide the honor of his pet method with Le Play, the founder of this society.

At these monthly meetings papers are read and discussed upon every phase of the "social problem," prison reform, trusts, strikes, sanitary legislation, servant question, hours of labor, Employers' Liability Act,—indeed, upon nearly fifty topics touching every side of "the great question." The best of these papers are printed regularly in a fortnightly magazine, together with elaborate reviews of the new books upon social science, accounts of experiments, legislative and social, in other countries, etc. Now this Central Society of experts does not work alone. It is bound organically to a large number of local clubs in the large French cities and towns. These clubs exist for the systematic study of the same problems. They are able, by special and local studies, constantly to furnish the Paris society with important matter. The magazine is the organ of the Economic Society, and goes to the members of the local clubs, thus putting into their hands regularly and systematically the latest results of social investigation and experiment,—*not*, let it be noted, the unweeded mass of it, but only that upon which the experts of the Central Society have passed judgment. A local society has thus the supreme practical advantage of getting for its local and special problems just the experience sifted and criticised by the experts that it needs for its own work.

From a single recent number of this magazine the following articles illustrate the high character of the work.

1. "Workingmen's Institutions in Alsace and the Social Legislation of the Empire."
2. "Commercial Crises."
3. "The Population Question."
4. "Organization of Charity at Paris."

5. "Accidents to Workingmen."

Four of these articles are written by men that have more than a national reputation. A school for scientific charity must first of all adopt this method:

It must have (1) a central bureau in close and systematic alliance with the different societies at home and abroad. This will give us instant command of the new literature and experience.

(2) It must have a publication fund to secure the translation of such portions of the literature as throw light upon our problems.

(3) It must be able, as the Le Play Society, to command special and expert opinion on the new studies, that they may be sifted for our special uses.

(4) It must be brought into such working relation with our local clubs, colleges, charities, penal and other institutions, as to become a regular distributing centre of the world's best experience and most important experimenting.

It is now mere chance whether we hear of the most important results abroad or not. A discouraged American co-operator, after years of self-sacrificing work, reads for the first time the story of English co-operation. "Why," he said, "if we had known that experience we needn't have failed." Yet this experience was old. A co-operation experiment at Lyons, in France, has put at its instant disposal by the Central Society all the experience attainable. This local enterprise has thus the advantage of watching for its guidance both the failures and successes of all attempts in its own kind.

For every attempt in profit-sharing, who could afford to miss the experience regularly published in the bulletin of the French Society? There isn't a "theorist" on the board, but only business-men actively engaged in widely various schemes of profit-sharing. It is indeed one function of this society to put its experience into such shape that others may be able to use it safely.

It is this society that has had Böhmert's great work ("Die Gewinnbetheiligung") translated. When Mr. Gilman published his recent "Profit-Sharing," this society made it widely

known. Such portions of it as might be useful to the French are to be or have been translated.

Here for every one of the pressing problems is work for a school of charity. The new methods of "associated charity" are slowly spreading in our larger towns, yet the extremely interesting history of this movement, that we wrongly connect with Elberfeld, is not known in English.

One of the most competent men in Germany, Professor Böhmert, writes the history of charities in seventy-seven cities. There is, I think, not even a summary of these results in English. He is now publishing regularly "*Der Helfer*," in order to carry on this work of making known the new results and methods. In the first issue we find actively interested such names as Von Bunsen, Siemens, and Gneist. There is, of course, in these foreign studies and experiments a great deal that is purely local, and could but indirectly or not at all interest us. There is, however, much of which we as yet know nothing, that concerns us just as vitally as it concerns a chemist or a surgeon to know of new scientific discoveries in their work. We shall soon be forced in this country to deal with the tramps. Before beginning to experiment (and simply driving them from one place to another), would it not be well to take advantage of the German experience? It represents a widely organized attempt, covering now many years. There is a literature upon this question, much of which is written by men of large and special experience. It has a record of failures that would be as serviceable to us as their successes. Upon such deeply fundamental matters as the "*Housing of the Poor in Cities*," "*Penal Question*," "*Prostitution*," etc., a body of experience exists wholly indispensable to any large and adequate study of these problems.

There is, moreover, a special reason why we ought to have access to the studies and experience of the Le Play Society. It is based upon a very pronounced "individualism."

No difficulty is now practically greater than to know where, in these problems, to call for state or municipal aid, and when the "private initiative" and "self-help" will suffice. Between

"individualism" and "collectivism" the issues are ever more sharply defining themselves. It is thus of real consequence that a society so important should be constantly furnishing us experience as to the value of either of these methods. Shall the State manage mines? Shall it insure workingmen? Or, independent of all theory, can the private corporation best accomplish these things?

This French society has a large and very specific experience, indicating the clear superiority of the *private* as against the *State* management. In several of our most perplexing problems we should be helped by these studies.

Our first object, then, seems to be this: So to relate our centre of study to all other important centres of work that we may avail ourselves regularly of their experience. In no other way can data at all adequate be secured. We have seen that our problem is commensurate with the "world-market," and will every day become more so. These larger affiliations, therefore, only recognize the real extent and nature of our problem. This recognition of its greatness, moreover, is not without weighty practical consequences.

We are told that it is the too local and undramatic character of our politics that accounts in part for the lack of interest in American issues; that, on the other hand, the ablest young men in England are excited by the sheer magnitude of the English politics. It is not merely England, but Egypt, India, Ireland, in a word, world issues, with which they are concerned.

Our "charities" are not so imposing as politics; but no one can see even dimly the magnitude of these questions in their causal relations without feeling that they have a greatness worthy of the highest gifts that men can bring. The first all-pressing need now in America is really to interest those who have social power.

If one rich English merchant, like Mr. Booth, can do so much by taking the method of business into East London, what could one hundred such men do? But the tiniest fraction of our strength has as yet been put out on these problems.

What could a dozen men capable of managing a large bank,

railroad, or corporation do, let us say, with the tenement-house problem, if they were really to turn their skill upon it as Mr. Booth did upon his problem?

Much of the best work in German cities has been done by an aroused public opinion that brought into active working sympathy with these questions the bankers, editors, and large business-men. These men will read what Professor Gneist, Von Bunsen, or Siemens write upon these topics. In France they will read what is written by Professor Jannet, Raffalovich, De Foville, and Professor Juglar.

Is it to be doubted that a school for the scientific study of charities and reforms could so bring before the public these abler discussions and experiments as to kindle an interest among those whose help we most need? Neither could such schools fail to counteract wholesomely a very pernicious tradition, still powerful in the churches, that people are saved by certain forms of intellectual assent to this or that creed.

It cannot be denied that, especially out of the larger cities where public opinion will less and less tolerate it, the churches are kept in a state of isolation that cripples their best *social* work. Differences of intellectual belief actually prevent hearty and effectual co-operation in reformatory work. It is sufficiently extraordinary that a dozen men in a community "set apart to do God's work" should actually be *kept* apart, except for ineffectual attempts at the temperance problem, from systematic and intelligent discussion, and dealing with those questions which most concern the cleanness and health and safety of the town in which they as ministers work and live.

A prominent orthodox clergyman tells me plainly, "I cannot get my brother ministers to work together with any cordiality or good result whatever, hardly in a revival, because of local jealousies. They seem to fear that I shall get away some of their flock."

I doubt if organized charity reform will have any more interesting result than in forcing men—as already in the great cities—to test religious values, not from their intellectual differences or peculiarities, but solely from the measure of simple human improvement resulting from their efforts. In

the large centres public opinion is growing impatient of any other test of true religion. In Boston one may often see in the associated charity work the clergy of every sect heartily co-operating towards this end of social welfare alone, forgetful wholly of the intellectual differences that separate them. What will another generation or two of these experiences produce?

But what, finally, can be said about the conditions under which such centres of study could be started? Considerable money would be necessary both for its running and for its publication fund.

The Central Economic Society in France raises much of its money from fees of members in the local clubs scattered about the country. Would our clubs, existing wholly or in part for the study of social questions, furnish a considerable paying membership? Questions have been put to some fourteen American clubs. Most have given encouraging answers: "We will answer for fifteen five-dollar members." "I will guarantee twenty to pay five dollars yearly," etc.

A central school would be immensely strengthened by this alliance with local clubs. It could send them, as does the French Society, its regular *Social Science Magazine*, together with such translations, reviews, leaflets, etc., as might be needed for theoretic study or practical work.

An American club reports, "What we want is the most recent experience of the Gottenburg Liquor experiment."

The school should be the medium of furnishing translations of Dr. Wieselgren's reports.

But if our experience were like that of the French, the Central Society would gain as greatly as the clubs. It ought to draw from the clubs, colleges, and conferences of charity a great variety of special local studies which could be examined by experts and published for the widest common use. There should, too, be prizes to advanced economic students in the colleges for special studies and investigation; the making of bibliographies, etc. Three college presidents have expressed very cordial approval of such plan and a willingness to co-operate heartily in its furthering.

Great use could be made at once by such a school of ex-

isting societies like the National Conference of Charities; various Prison Associations, American Social Science Association, etc. Affiliation with these and with clubs and charity conferences would strengthen the common work at every point, and especially at its weakest points.

Of the location of such school and the actual mechanism of instruction it is too early to speak. It may, however, be said that this specific question is now under consideration. New York City is fittest of all places because of the extent and character of its problems. A single centre, however, with adequate teaching force implies great expense. It seems possible at present only to start by utilizing some existing society like that of the American Social Science Association. Without greater outlay than could probably be met, by securing five dollar memberships from existing organizations, a bureau for the intelligent and systematic distribution of selected information may begin at once. In connection with this first all-essential work lecturers could be secured by conferences, clubs, colleges, etc. Such beginnings it is easily possible to make at once, leaving any more definite shaping of the scheme to the future. The call for this kind of work has begun. At the last council meeting of the London Charity Organization Society this specific question was discussed. The need for systematized teaching and lecturing upon these themes is so strongly felt that Canon Bradby moved (seconded by Mr. Valpy) the adoption of the following resolution: "That the council should, if possible, in connection with the 'University Extension' and other similar centres, arrange for addresses, or courses of lectures, on the history of charity, poor-law, and social economy." Here the existing mechanism of the university work is to be used, but the resolution throws the expense upon the charity organization itself, so important does it consider the need of such instruction. Mr. Myers, representing the University Extension, promised to bring the matter before the council of that body.

NOTE.—After the above article was written a leaflet was received containing the "Statuts de la Société Internationale

pour l'Étude des Questions d'Assistance." Here is a society just founded for the international study of charity problems.

Its definite object is,—

"La recherche des moyens les plus efficaces et le plus immédiatement applicable de soulager la misère et de combattre le paupérisme."

It proposes to reach its object,—

1. Par l'institution de réunions périodiques où sont étudiées les questions d'assistance dans les différents pays;
2. Par la publication d'un bulletin périodique;
3. Par l'organisation de conférences;
4. Par le concours moral qu'elle offre aux sociétés qui s'occupent de venir en aide à toutes les formes de la misère;
5. En joignant ses efforts à ceux des comités chargés d'organiser les congrès internationaux d'assistance.

It has a council of administration to control the machinery of the society, select questions for discussion, etc.

It has a bureau, composed of its general officers, to direct all practical work. There are monthly meetings, at which theoretic and practical questions are discussed, such as,—

1. Assistance en général;
2. Services de l'enfance;
3. Hôpitaux, hospices, assistance à domicile;
4. Aliénés, dépôts de mendicité, monts de piété.

There is also a publication fund and a definite "propagande," to spread information.

Funds are raised,—

1. Des cotisations et souscriptions.
2. Des dons et subventions.
3. Du produit des publications, et des autres ressources obtenues à titre exceptionnel.

The fee is a minimum of twenty francs yearly.

Is it for a moment to be doubted that the advantages of an organic connection with the above society would be very great? A school for the science of charity would establish such connection with the chief sources of investigation and experiment both abroad and at home. It would thus powerfully stimulate a new interest in social problems, at the same time that such awakened interest was directed, disciplined, and instructed to its proper end.

J. G. B.

A HELP TO THE MORAL LIFE.

BY WILLIAM M. SALTER.

THE moral life, to which in our better moments we aspire, is the life dominated by the good purpose. It is not merely one right in the eyes of the world, but one in which the animating thought is to do right and to do all that is right. It is a life the centre of which is within, and in which hidden things—thoughts, feelings, imaginations—count as much as anything that others can take notice of, and more. May I be wholly pure, wholly true, wholly patient, wholly brave, wholly free from vanity and pride!—that is the instinct of the moral life.

There may be various helps to such a life, but one that I have now particularly in mind would be a book that should put us into the frame of mind we desire, that should serve in the midst of our busy lives to remind us of higher things; that should freshen our aspirations and nerve our will. Almost every one, who has tried the experiment of setting aside a little time each day for serious thought, knows how difficult it is to concentrate one's attention without some external help. Sometimes good thoughts visit us and sometimes the soul is barren and dry,—our efforts seem like pumping an empty cistern. It is, of course, possible that at rare times our moral insensibility may be so great that nothing can break it up; but ordinarily we may almost without intention or effort on our part find ourselves gliding into a serious mood by reading some chapter or passage in an appropriate book. I should convey a poor idea of what I have in mind, if it were thought that I proposed reading in some set and consecutive fashion books or writers like the Bible, Plato, Marcus Aurelius, or Emerson. The books are rare—I confess I do not *know* of any—that could serve just the purpose I have in mind. We should surely never think of treating

the Bible (as a whole) in this way, but for the Protestant reaction and extravagance. The Bible is really a great literature, or rather a number of literatures; there are pages in it that are simply statements of fact (or what purport to be), there is folk-lore in it, there are philosophical arguments in it, there are harmless love-poems, there are songs of vengeance, and there are pages and, I might say, books almost unintelligible to us without scholarly commentary. What is most needed at the present day, as it strikes me, is not so much revised translations of the Bible nor critical commentaries upon it (though both are valuable), but such selection from it as would give what is available for the moral life of man to-day,—a selection that could be put into the hands of the common people and might be every man's friend.* For there are passages, pages, in the Bible that belong to the immortal literature of the world, that can be, and forever will be (if they can be found without too much searching), sources of moral inspiration to men,—trumpet-calls to the higher life. The Catholic church itself—which we are accustomed to think the most superstitious, but is perhaps the most reasonable of all churches in practical matters, as its worship is the most picturesque and affecting—never dreams of asking its members to read the Bible, chapter by chapter, from beginning to end, and has never made such a fetish of the Bible as we of Protestant lineage often have. Yet, of course, the principle of selection I now suggest is different from that which the Catholic church has followed. I would select only that which would help to build up the moral life. There are Psalms, there are lines from Isaiah and other prophets, there are passages in the New Testament that have and always will have their power, their charm, their deep value for this purpose.

In a similar way we may treat Plato. I know of nothing so profoundly moving in Plato as a passage or two in Isaiah; he was a poet and philosopher,—a philosophical poet, we may say, rather than anything else. Yet there are at least in his

* As a praiseworthy effort in this direction, *The Ethics of the Hebrew Scriptures*, arranged and edited by the Rabbis Isaac S. and Adolph Moses (Chicago, E. Rubovitz & Bro.), may be mentioned.

"Apology of Socrates" (whether the language be original with Plato or not) sentences that lift us to the very heights of moral heroism, that give us a courage, a serenity, a sublime confidence in the sovereign nature of the good in the universe itself, that no other writings could better inspire. Perhaps no one book, easily accessible to all, comes so near being wholly good, none might be made so unhesitatingly a companion and friend, as the "Meditations" of Marcus Aurelius. There is less that is strange in it, less that offends either the common sense or the cultivated thought of to-day, less that jars upon us, than there is in the Bible or any other book of the ancient world that could be brought into comparison with it. It is a solace, a reminder, and an inspiration. I can well remember the heights to which it seemed to lift me when I first read it. The sky of those June mornings was not more blue, more serene, more clear, than was the atmosphere of thought and emotion into which its pages transported me. Yet Aurelius has his limitations; he is not uniformly inspiring; he sometimes depresses us; and sometimes he does not move us at all. It is what really touches and helps us that needs to be culled out and preserved for habitual use.

It was surely no detraction, nor meant as such, but the loftiest praise, when Matthew Arnold said that Emerson was not so much either philosopher or poet as the friend and helper of those who live in the spirit. To no one person, perhaps, could so many young men and young women (and older ones, too,—for the days are passing) bear testimony to-day, as one who had quickened what is best in them, who had led them out into ample ranges of thought and emotion, who had released them from tyrannous bands, who had put manliness and true womanliness, strength and sturdy truth, into them, as to Emerson. Yet there is not a volume of Emerson that will bear to be used as a close companion in just the sense I have in mind. While the moral sentiment is a ground-tone in all his writings, it is not and is not to be expected to be a distinct note everywhere. Emerson was a Yankee, and there are passages where Yankee wit and keenness alone shine. We should not wish to miss these passages, but they are not moral

inspiration. He discusses men and events, he is the critic of literature and art, and his ultimate stand-point is always the ethical one; but there are whole pages that do not bear on the personal life or communicate moral impulses. Moreover, I must confess that there is something lacking in Emerson. He always writes like one in perfect health. He hardly seems to know our human weaknesses. If there were faults in that serene and elevated soul, they never prompt to confession. For example, in all his writings I do not know of anything of such power and pathos, of such purifying sadness as a passage in one of George Eliot's letters on evil-speaking,* which, should some new book of scriptures ever be compiled, would surely make a sacred chapter on the sins of the tongue.

These are but a few writers or books. I should not even venture to say that they are the chief sources from which moral help may be drawn. There are passages from Lowell and other American writers that would serve, passages from Matthew Arnold, from Browning, from John Henry Newman, from Frederic W. Robertson, from Channing, from Wordsworth, from Carlyle, from Schiller, perchance from Goethe, to go no further back; but none who did not love the good in their own souls, no matter how learned or profound they were, or however perfect the literary form they used, can ever communicate that love to others.

I am aware that in speaking of a help to the moral life, I am speaking of something that, so far as I know, does not yet exist; for no collection of passages from just the point of view I have in mind (*i.e.*, with the sense of our intimate personal needs) has as yet fallen under my observation. No one would think of treating Conway's "Sacred Anthology" as such a companion, or Mrs. Child's "Aspirations of the World," though the latter comes nearer the mark and the former is a monument of industry and useful learning. The book that can be once more to us a sacred book, that shall endear itself to us in the sacred moments (or what we may make such) of each day and may be helpful whenever we take

* I have quoted the passage in *THE ETHICAL RECORD*, October, 1889, p. 126 (article, "George Eliot's Views of Religion").

it up, has yet to be made. And as every one's individual experience is apt to be more or less narrow, and yet as every thoughtful person must now and then in his reading meet with passages that peculiarly affect him and seem to touch the springs of his better life, the ideal way to make such a book would be to have it the outcome of the experiences, the suggestions of many minds. If ten, or, better, a hundred, persons would agree to send from time to time such passages as I have described to some one who might serve as editor of the collection,—do so for a period of five or ten years,—something valuable might be the result.*

ETHICS IN CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY.

BY JOHN S. MACKENZIE, M.A.,
Trinity College, Cambridge, England.

THE study of ethics here is, for the most part, of a very strictly academical character, and is participated in by only a small proportion of the students. This is the inevitable result of the Cambridge system, according to which every one devotes himself from the first to a single department of study,—viz., to mathematics, classics, natural science, theology, law, history, Indian languages, Semitic languages, mediæval and modern languages, medicine, or “moral science.” The last of these departments—which includes psychology, logic, metaphysics, ethics, political philosophy, political economy, and history of philosophy—has, of course, but a poor chance among so many others. The undergraduates who come to Cambridge have, as a rule, received a certain amount of preliminary

* If any persons after reading this article should feel prompted to send me selections which have moved them, I should be very grateful; and if no one better fitted is found, I might myself undertake in time to edit such selections as commend themselves to me. I may be addressed at 516 North Avenue, Chicago.

W. M. S.

training in mathematics, classics, or natural science, and naturally prefer to continue their studies in these subjects instead of entering upon an untried course,—especially upon a course like that of the study of philosophy, which is apt to seem at once unintelligible at the start and unpractical at the close. The known is preferred to the unknown and the fruit-bearing to the light-bearing, and the consequence is that, if it were not for a small contingent from Scotland, Wales, and Ireland, the number of those who listen to lectures on ethics in Cambridge would be practically evanescent. An exception must be made, however, with regard to lady students, who are, as a rule, less hampered by previous preparation, and with whom practical considerations weigh less (or at least weigh in a different direction). Yet even in the case of women the attractions of philosophy have not hitherto proved equal to those of classics, mathematics, natural science, and history (not to mention mediæval and modern languages, which is a subject that has been only recently introduced).

For those who do take up the study of moral science, however, the course provided here is certainly not lacking in thoroughness. There is a previous preparation in psychology and metaphysics (taught by Dr. James Ward and Mr. G. F. Stout), logic (taught by Dr. Venn, Mr. Keynes, and Mr. W. E. Johnson), and economics (taught by Professors Marshall and Foxwell and Dr. Cunningham). In the courses on psychology and metaphysics the foundations of ethics are to some extent discussed, and in the lectures on political economy ethical considerations are freely introduced. But the final investigation of ethical questions is reserved for the classes of Dr. Sidgwick, in which the subject is treated both systematically and historically. Perhaps the term "systematic" is somewhat misleading; for Dr. Sidgwick, as is well known, has a strong objection to anything of the nature of dogmatism, and consequently even the more systematic parts of his exposition are to a considerable extent critical and tentative. They are, however, systematic in the sense of being carefully reasoned examinations of the fundamental principles on which ethical theory rests. In the more historical courses, on the

other hand, the doctrines of such writers as Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, Mill, and Herbert Spencer are analyzed and discussed. Aristotle and Hegel, to whom so much attention is devoted in the sister University of Oxford, are here almost entirely ignored, as is also Spinoza. In recent years, however, Dr. Sidgwick has given a considerable part of his time to lectures on political science and on the growth of political institutions; and in this part of the subject the views of Aristotle occupy a prominent place. But perhaps the most interesting part of Dr. Sidgwick's teaching work is to be found in the discussion classes which he conducts from time to time. These classes (which are similar in nature to a German "Seminar") usually meet round a table in one of the rooms in the professor's own house. Papers are written by the members of these classes either on particular ethical questions or on the views of some particular ethical teacher. Considerable portions of Martineau's "Types of Ethical Theory" and of Green's "Prolegomena to Ethics," for instance, have been discussed in this way. These classes are generally attended by the more advanced students,—frequently by graduates,—and those who take part in them commonly find them more profitable than any other kind of instruction in enabling them to become clear as to their own ideas, and also with regard to the ideas of their professor, and of other philosophers.

There are two points in the teaching of ethics in Cambridge with which a stranger can scarcely fail to be struck,—viz., the absolute separation between the study of ancient theories and that of modern theories, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, between the study of theology and that of ethics. Ancient theories are not entirely neglected; but they are taken up almost exclusively in connection with the study of classics, and students of moral science are, as a rule, not supposed to know anything about them. The doctrines of Plato and Aristotle are, however, very efficiently taught, under the direction of such men as Dr. Henry Jackson and Mr. Archer-Hind; but more attention is directed to their metaphysical than to their ethical speculations. As regards

theology, on the other hand, the divorce between it and ethics has been hitherto almost absolute. Dr. Sidgwick is very careful to avoid any direct reference to theological controversies, and the professors of Divinity do not, as a rule, meddle with ethics. Recently, however, there have been some signs of the establishment of a closer connection between the two subjects. Mr. V. H. Stanton, the newly-appointed Ely Professor of Divinity (who was at one time deputy professor of Moral Philosophy), is at present delivering a course of lectures on Christian ethics; and the way in which these have been received seems to augur well for the success of such an attempt.

From what has been said about the strictly academic character of the teaching of ethics, it ought not to be assumed that no interest is shown in ethical questions outside of the moral science tripos. Students of other subjects are not entirely without opportunities for the discussion of ethical questions, if they are inclined; and not unfrequently they are inclined. In the Moral Sciences Club, for instance, which meets once a week, there are usually some members who are not students of moral science. The meetings of the Society for the Study of Social Questions (which are conducted under the superintendence of Professor Marshall) are also of a more or less ethical character; and these are well attended by the members of the University, who are thus furnished with an opportunity of hearing some of the problems of practical ethics discussed by lecturers who have had special opportunities for their study. Recently also an Ethical Society has been started here, under the presidency of Dr. Sidgwick; and the lectures which have been provided under its auspices (as instances of which may be mentioned one by Dr. Sidgwick on "The Morality of Strife," one by Professor Wallace, of Oxford, on "The Ethics of Socialism," and one by Professor Edward Caird, of Glasgow, on "The Relation of Ethics to Religion") have been attended by large and appreciative audiences. Discussions have also been carried on by this society on subjects suggested by the lectures; but these have not hitherto been so largely attended.

It may be interesting to mention that among those who attend the lectures on ethics in Cambridge there are frequently one or two American students. Dr. Cattell, for instance (now professor in the University of Pennsylvania), studied here for a considerable time; and Dr. W. S. Hough (now professor in the University of Minnesota) was also with us for a shorter period.

MY GRANDMOTHER'S RELIGION.

BY SIDNEY H. MORSE.

SHE was ninety-two when she died. She might have lived to be a century old, but for an accident. One afternoon, under her favorite pear-tree, on the sunny slope of the little hill that rose gently from the rear of the old farm-house, she was bringing down pears with her cane. Somehow she slipped, fell, and broke her leg. The bone would not unite, and death ensued. The clergyman came, but he only asked, "How do you do this morning?" "Very well, I thank you," she replied; then the conversation turned to the weather and other topics not related necessarily to the last moments of a departing soul.

"It looks like a beautiful day out," said she. "How I should be enjoying it, but for breaking my poor leg."

There was a dish of pears on the stand near by.

"Give me one, please, just to hold. The tree was just twenty years old last March, twenty-first day. I planted it myself, and grafted it. How it *did* grow! Never a tree thrived like it. How I watched it to see it grow. It seemed almost as if it *knew* I was watching it, and tried to do its best. *Pears are good!* Don't *you* think so? I never lost my relish for them since I was a girl."

"I am quite fond of them," said the clergyman.

"I am glad to hear you say so. Take one, do. Liking pears is a good sign, I've always thought. . . . Have you been to the barn? No? Well, you *ought* to. There are

three of my calves out there. I wouldn't permit them to kill them, they stood up so fine and looked me so straight in the eye when I went out to see them. One's light red, one's brindle, and one's deep red. The last'll make the best cow, I guess. You must go and look at them. Oh, they're good size now. Do you like calves? I laugh till I most *cry* when they come bunting around three or four days old. They're so awkward and cunning. I like anything that's got life that way, and don't know too much, isn't puffed up, and swelling with its own conceit. You must go out and look at them for me; but take care they don't upset you. That wouldn't sound well to your congregation if they heard of it.

"I knew some of your people once,—Deacon Halloworthy and his wife; they used to come here to play whist. He was so fond of cards, and of my pippin apples, and cider,—he didn't like the cider *too* sweet, either. He'd put a grain of saleratus in it and drink it down foaming. His wife used to play (and eat the pippins, too, I thought), more for his pleasure than her own. When there were four partners without her, she got out of it, and sat snugged up in one corner of the fireplace, knitting. She was a dear, kind soul. You have a good attendance on your ministrations?"

"Why, yes, fairly good. The membership has been increased of late, and that is encouraging. There will be twenty confirmations when Bishop Morehouse comes."

"You enjoy preaching?"

"Yes, it's a pleasant duty."

"All duties should be pleasant, and perhaps are, after their fashion. But, some way, I never had so much experience with them as some people do. They kind o' slipped through my fingers, I suppose, when I didn't know it.

"But I guess I mustn't talk more now. You can call again, if you like. You'll find me here, I reckon, some days yet. Don't you keep in-doors too much these fine October days. They're worth more than books. Go up to the barn, by all means. Marcus is there. He'll show you the calves, and he's got a new horse,—a fine animal, they say, but I haven't seen it. Good-by, sir. I wish I had a few of my nice dough-

nuts to send the children,—but I fear I shall make no more in this world. Good-by, sir; *good-by.*”

When the clergyman came a few days later it was to read the burial service of the Protestant Episcopal Church.

“The old lady, whose calm, sweet face lies before us,” he said, closing his few remarks, “was not a communicant, nor had she been a visible member of the church in all her life. And yet, at this solemn moment, I am constrained to say that *she is with God*. I know not how it is, but somehow God seems to be satisfied with some people just as they are. What a gathering of neighbors from near and far is here! All come in grief that this good old lady is dead. So many pleasant memories have been imparted to me. She went her own ways, so simple, modest; so unpretending, not even her own left hand knew what her valiant, most charitable, so capable, and so loving right hand was doing. And I believe God is satisfied.

“The day I called on her she told me of the pear-tree she had planted twenty years ago. There were some of the fruit on the stand near by. How she loved that pear-tree. But the real secret of that love, I think, she did not confide to me. Perhaps she did not even think of it herself. It would have been characteristic of her whole life not to do so. You, her friends and neighbors, need not to be reminded of it by me. You have all eaten pears from Mercy's pear-tree. That was her name, though I am told she was christened Merciles. When she was a little girl she would repeat it over and say, ‘Merciles, Merciles,—*Mercyleless*. It sha'n't be. It shall be only just Mercy, and that's enough!’ No wavering from that on to the end, and they let her have it so. The change was made in the parish records. Her pear-tree and its bountiful harvest, so widely distributed, were the symbols of Mercy's religion. Brave little woman! in all things she kept her faith. Her wan, care-worn body is here before us, resting after ninety-two years of life. Was she not, though she prided not herself in it, nor much thought of it, perhaps,—was she not all these years a veritable servant of the Most High?

"Good neighbors and Christian friends, tell the stories of her life, as you all know them, over and over again among yourselves; tell them to your children and your children's children; and may the blessing of God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost be with you all forever. Amen."

My two maiden aunts were both members of Rev. Mr. Playfair's church, and were, as everybody said, consistent members. They believed in the church; thought everybody else ought to, and labored with all diligence, not forgetting home duties, to further its interests. With their mother, whom they loved tenderly, as children should, they had expostulated in vain. No word was ever vouchsafed in reply. Only a smile,—a forgiving smile,—and their non-church-going mother went the daily rounds of her busy life, with Monday and Saturday and every day as sacred as Sunday, bestowing herself wholly on the things of this earth. "Life here is so pleasant to me, and there is so much to do, I shouldn't mind living here forever." She kept the flowers blooming o'er the grave of her first-born in the field hard by, where a picket fence with a little gate protected it. What she thought of that Future into which he so early fled no one ever knew. This only was plain, she was content to live on without pretending to a wisdom beyond this world's ken. "Life is *life* / *be* alive; that is all," she cried, rather brusquely, to a neighboring woman who had much vexed her by droning, dolefully, "After all, what's the use of living!"

Ten miles away was the city of New Haven. That was the farthest she had ever been from home. So her experience of "the round world and they that dwell therein" was limited; but, such as it was, she wove it into sweetness and light. She was a persuasive power. One day Henry, fourteen, a son of Marcus, came crying into the house. His father had struck him. Grandmother stroked his head, but made no comment. That evening she said to Marcus, "Marcus, when you were about fourteen years of age, you gave your father much trouble. He was a mind to be severe with you, but I did not permit him to strike you. I called you in one day,—do you

remember,—we had a talk. From that on you and your father were companions and friends. I had been hoping that lesson would stay with you through life.”

“I see,” Marcus broke in. “I was wrong. I——”

“Send Henry to me.”

As with Marcus so with Henry. The result the same. Henry stole out, placed his hand in his father's, and looked him in the eye. There was no word spoken. The forgiveness was mutual. A new friendship was born.

This peace-making power was not confined to her own immediate family. It had extended itself through the neighborhood and won many a victory.

Hence it was when her good church-going daughters, o'er-swayed by theological tenets and anxiety for her spiritual weal, had urged upon their clergyman the great need of his speaking to their mother on the subject of “vital religion, including Sunday and church observances,” this same Mr. Playfair, after repeated visitations (from all of which he had gone having uttered no word of the sort required), declared to them,—

“I simply can't do it. The *duty* doesn't give me the *courage*. I am ashamed in her presence of the purpose I am harboring. It all appears to me superfluous. And I tell you now, had I a congregation made up of souls like her, I believe I would dismiss them all, and go seek a new flock elsewhere. I should be abashed in their presence as I am in hers. I must have sinners to preach to, not saints. My supplication would be, ‘Lord, have mercy on me, the sinner, and let these, Thy people, depart from this house to carry their light and peace to the waiting world beyond.’”

Rev. Mr. Playfair, as I remember him, was a comparatively young man. His discourses, I heard it said, were “brilliant, but——” There the matter dropped. But I now suspect that in that word, beginning an unspoken sentence, lurked much meaning. Somewhat amiss the good church-people evidently felt. More amiss, I opine, than they dreamed of. For I take it that the Rev. Mr. Playfair was a discerner of spiritual qualities, and had the good judgment to not press

the church forward for service when she had been, by whatever reason, bereft of a mission. He had caught a meaning from Emerson's lines, perhaps, or had in his own native bent anticipated them.

"I like a church, I like a cowl,
I love a prophet of the soul;
But not for all his faith could see
Would I that cowed churchman be."

RECOLLECTIONS OF A DISTRICT NURSE.*

BY EFFIE R. BENEDICT.

It was my lot during the years that I did "district nursing" to be interviewed from time to time by people interested or curious, occasionally even by newspaper reporters. Now, as I attempt to write concerning that work I find that I am in the position of interviewing myself. I have no history papers accessible; I cannot give statistics, and they are always impressive. So I must fall back upon my memory. And when I stop and think of the work of five years and more, the recollections crowd so fast and thick upon me, I should have to write a book in order to say all that I would. But I must be brief. I used to ask people to visit with me when I had time, and let them see for themselves what the district nurse did; and as we walked along I could tell them much of interest concerning the people,—my patients and their families.

* The work of district nursing was inaugurated by the Society for Ethical Culture of New York eleven years ago. Nurses had previously been sent out among the poor by missionaries and partly for missionary purposes. But district nursing in connection with dispensaries was begun by the New York Ethical Society. Since then it has been largely taken up in other cities, and has proved widely beneficial. We publish the experiences of the lady who started the work and carried it on for the first five years. The work has been growing from year to year.

The annual report of district nursing in New York issued in 1889 states that one nurse made 2938 visits during the year, and another 2791. The smallest number of patients of either nurse, during any month, was 50; the largest number, 106.—EDITOR

Those visitors generally went away, I believe, convinced that it was a *very practical* charity that the Society for Ethical Culture was doing, by sending a nurse to the sick poor in their own homes, feeding them if hungry, warming them when cold, clothing them when naked,—for district nursing in its broadest sense and as they did it meant all this.

If the case was a proper one for the Relief Committee a visitor took it up, gave more aid if necessary, or as much as was practicable or possible; sometimes paid rents, found work for the unemployed members of the family and better positions for those found working at perhaps starvation wages, improved the condition of the family generally, and put them on their feet once more. And all this was done regardless of their creed or their nationality or their individual worth. Sufficient was it that they were sick and were poor. The most intelligent of all the women patients I ever had was one who was sick from a hopeless heart-disease. She was one of the first visited, and was still on the list when my successor took up the work. Though an ardent and devoted Roman Catholic, she wended her way a couple of times (and it was hard work for her) to Chickering Hall just to see what manner of people were those who took such interest in her and gave her help when she needed it (she never took help when she did not need it) and *never* bothered her about her religion.

It was in April, eleven years ago, that I began the new work of district nursing in connection with a medical dispensary. A straightforward answer was once demanded of me to the question, "And what were your qualifications for this undertaking?" I had to answer that I did not know that I had any, except youth, and health, and strength, and boundless enthusiasm. As youth is hopeful so was I, and I thought I could do it. I had just finished the training in Bellevue Hospital. Two years of service in the wards of a great charity hospital does much to acquaint a nurse with poverty and the class of people that usually live in tenement-houses.

All pioneer work is hard work, and this was no exception. The positive discouragements were many and the petty vexations legion. I have to confess that, despite my enthusiasm, it

took a great deal of moral propping and encouragement to keep me going those first months. I hope Professor Adler has forgotten how many times I went to him fully determined that I must resign. I think now it was the trifling things that worried me most. When the cases were so many that I did not find the day long enough I was best satisfied. I never thought of resigning then.

I was first placed at the German Dispensary in Eighth Street. After three weeks of trial this was found unsatisfactory. I remember that I spent half of my time in hunting up places, only to find that the people I sought did not live there, and about half of the remainder of the day sitting in the dispensary waiting to get a chance to see the different physicians, who were to give me the cases. At that time there were no visiting physicians at the dispensary. Some of the cases I then visited I have not forgotten,—they were my first and best remembered,—a boy with a broken leg, a baby or two, a little child with a crushed back and wise old face, whose father took all the care of it in the minutes he stole from his shoemaker's bench,—for its mother was dead.

I was next placed at the Demilt Dispensary under the direction of the visiting physicians, working in two districts. And now began the real work; and as equipment for it I was provided with clothing and bedding and a monthly fund for "incidental" needs, etc. The cases of the first year were as varied and as interesting and as hard and as trying as any year that came after. The story of one year is almost the history of another. The particular histories of these cases would disclose much of heart-ache and woe, much of the misery that comes from gaunt poverty, from ignorance and depravity as found in tenement-house life. But against this sombre background would be occasional gleams of happiness and even humor. Life among the lowly is not always misery; but the district nurse (as does the nurse anywhere and always) sees the darkest and saddest side of life. And, too, there would be in the history of these cases many incidents of touching devotion, of true courage, and of brave endurance.

In the summer of 1883 I was sent, or rather *loaned*, to

Chicago. I left the district in New York with my sister. To her, for her energetic and interested management of the district during my vacations and long absences, and for many happy and useful suggestions about the work, I have been greatly indebted. I stayed in Chicago six months and left them with two districts running smoothly, and my part was accomplished. But the history of the Chicago district nursing is a history by itself. For my own share of what was very hard work indeed the memory of one case alone repays me. There comes down to me, through all these years, the voice of the Swedish woman saying in her broken English, "Heaven bless you, miss, wherever you are, and those that sent you, for when you not come I had not my baby." The baby had been so sick and she was so tired and disheartened, she thought it must die. But the baby got well, and she was grateful for the help (this help was nursing alone, not alms) I gave her and for what I taught her.

"But tell us exactly what the district nurse does," says the persistent one who cannot yet understand. In the first place, if the nurse is working with the assisting doctor of a dispensary, as we suppose she is, she carries out the doctor's orders, as the "good and faithful nurse" always does. To do this I have many times been at my wits' ends. For instance, it is so much easier to order a poultice than it is to get it made, *sans* meal, *sans* cloth, *sans* fire, *sans* everything. But the nurse gets the poultice made, and others like it, and sees to it that some one else is taught how to make and apply it, if it is a question of poultice. The nurse gives baths, makes beds, etc. Let any one stop and think what a nurse does for any case of illness, whether the patient be of high or low degree. Or let any one turn to the report of any training-school for nurses and read there the plan of instruction for nurses. I venture to say that there was nothing that I was ever taught in Bellevue that I did not do sooner or later in the district work, and a great deal more besides. I make exceptions in regard to important surgical cases. These the district nurse is not apt to have, though there is more or less of minor surgical dressings for her to attend to. The matter of

getting the rooms cleaned seems to bother people, who fancy that the nurse does or ought to do the cleaning herself. "You didn't clean?" No, certainly not. I made clean some very dirty people, and sometimes I think, if it had been a matter of preference and I had known as much about scrubbing floors as I did about scrubbing bodies, I would rather have done the former. And I never washed clothes. The nearest I ever came to that was taking garments from disinfecting fluids that the woman I had hired was afraid to handle. A rather sensational article in a monthly magazine represents a nurse as leaning from a fire-escape and hanging clothes on a pulley-line, leading one to infer that the nurse had been doing the family washing. The sentiment may be very fine, but the practice would be a failure. And although I recognize the fact that

"Who sweeps a floor as for God's law
Makes that and the action fine,"

I rarely swept floors. I have washed dishes, have "tidied up" rooms, and made fires. I grew quite proud of my accomplishments in fire-making in the miserable, dilapidated stoves. One with its full complement of drafts and dampers I was apt not to be so successful in managing. I have often cooked "sick dishes" for patients, and have more often shown some one else how,—for the district nurse is always teaching. I can hardly enumerate all the things I did do. The cleaning was done by women that were paid for the work; usually this woman was some one that was very much in need of work, so that two people were helped and the cleaning business became a double charity. If there was some person in the family who could do this cleaning, that person did it. It was not always so easy to get people whose habits were filthy to make themselves and their rooms clean and decent. But as a matter of fact many of them did do it. Sometimes it was accomplished by entreaty, sometimes by threats. Of what? Of leaving them if they did not mend their ways. This was usually effectual, for the people get fond of the district nurse,—for the good they get from her visit, perhaps; at any rate, they would prefer to clean rather than have

her visits cease. I have been often asked if such improvement would be permanent. I am not so sanguine as to believe that the people who from childhood had lived in these dirty places, or others just like them, would become so enamoured of cleanliness that they would keep in the latter condition all the rest of their days; and candor compels me to state that dirty and untidy Mrs. O'Toole, whose children had measles, was still untidy Mrs. O'Toole when the next year they had scarlet fever and their number was augmented by another baby. But the struggle a second time would be less; perhaps there would be an excuse offered and the rooms cleaned, before I came again, without my having invited it. The nurse makes daily visits,—once, twice, perhaps three times a day. These visits vary from fifteen minutes to two hours or so. That is all the time the nurse has for one patient. The nurse does not stay all night. Some people think she ought to, or, "what's the use of having a nurse?" But it goes without saying the district nurse does not remain over night. She cannot. There is no place for her. Once I remained all night with a patient,—a little child, whose mother was also sick. I watched it till the dawn, when it died. I shall never forget the horror of that night. But this was not a sensible thing to do. I knew it was not at the time, but I fancied it was duty. It was not duty, but sentiment, and too much sentiment is worse than not enough.

The training-schools are taking up district nursing now. The idea is good, but I think the training should be given as such, and be as thorough as in any other profession. District nursing ought not to be made obligatory, for if there is any nursing that should be done *con amore* it is surely this. I hold it as an axiom that the district nurse cannot be too well trained or too accomplished in her profession. There are always arising emergencies, and she will have plenty of scope for all her attainments. In this training she would learn much about disease that is very valuable from a professional point of view. She would learn much about a kind of life that she could not learn in any other way,—of a life that everybody would be the better for some knowledge of. She would

learn to "get on" with the poor in their own homes,—a little different sort of management from the patient in the hospital, for, after all, a man's house is his castle, even if it be in attic or the basement of a rear tenement,—and she would find use for all the tact and sympathy and patience—especially the latter—that she possesses.

My story is incomplete, but I have answered some questions and have told something of my personal experience, extending over a space of five years and more. But I cannot help thinking how little that seems compared to the work of my co-laborer at the New York Dispensary, who did not, like myself, fall by the way-side and give up, but has the richer experience of ten years at the work. And here I must record my gratitude to the Society for Ethical Culture not only for their unremitting kindness to myself through a long illness, but for the opportunity they gave me of doing district nursing during those five years, *the best years of my life*,—and to thank also those members of the committees with whom I worked for their unfailing sympathy and encouragement and for their generosity, which never failed to respond to any call I made upon them.

PLAIN WORDS FROM A FRIEND.

BY FRANCIS E. ABBOT, PH.D.

In the January number of THE ETHICAL RECORD, I find the following editorial paragraph among the "General Notes:"

"In an address delivered before the National Unitarian Conference, recently held in Philadelphia, Dr. Francis Ellingwood Abbot made the statement, since published in the *Unitarian Review*, *Christian Register*, *The Inquirer* (London), and other papers, that the Ethical Movement is seeking 'to establish itself upon an agnostic foundation.' The implication of this statement, that the Ethical Movement is committed to agnosticism, is unwarranted, as the following facts clearly show," etc.

Being thoroughly convinced that neither the editor of THE ETHICAL RECORD nor any of his co-laborers in "the Ethical Movement" would willingly seek to repel one act of injustice, real or imaginary, by committing another, I ask leave to state what I actually did say, and why I said it. The paragraph containing the statement complained of (which cannot be fairly presented in a few words arbitrarily selected) was as follows:

"No ethical enthusiasm which is empty of a scientific idea can long sustain itself in the wild turmoil of modern thought; it must at last go down before any idea sufficiently virile to ground itself upon scientific reason. Enthusiasts who seek to unite Ethics with Agnosticism imagine that the Agnostic principle destroys theology alone. What fatal blindness! The Agnostic principle destroys Ethics no less certainly than Theology. When Agnostics begin to demand, as they will demand, some cosmical reason why Ethics should not be thrown overboard together with Theology, what faintest glimmer of a reason has Agnosticism to offer? 'Indeed,' says Mr. Salter, in his recent most beautiful and noble book, 'no serious man wants a reason.' So wide of the truth is this, that no man is serious until he *does* want a reason; all seriousness begins in wanting reasons. Without a reason, Ethics itself must die down into mere custom or convention; the ideas of reason and of right are Siamese twins. The 'ethical passion,' if it contains not the ethical idea, is the weakest passion of the human soul—has in itself no more continuance or abiding life than a beautiful cut flower; yet, for modern men, there can be no ethical idea which is not grounded in the known constitution of an ethical universe. It is pathetic, it is tragic, to behold a sincere and lofty ethical movement seeking vainly to establish itself upon an Agnostic foundation. Who cannot foresee the end of such a movement? Either it will seek, before it is too late, a new foundation in Scientific Theology, or else it will die of intellectual and spiritual thirst in Agnosticism. For it stands written in the nature of things that, amidst the fury of contending passions, the Moral Ideal itself shall go to the wall, unless it drink omnipotence from the Divine Idea."

It surely will be perceived by any one that I was not speaking of *organizations*, but of *movements in general*,—movements as characterized by *constitutive ideas*, and not by *articles of association*. I did not say "the Ethical Movement;" I said "a sincere and lofty ethical movement." And I wish I had said what I actually meant, "*any* sincere and lofty ethical movement;" for I was thinking not only of "the Ethical Movement," but also of the Secularists, the Positivists, and all agnostic unions for "the building up of practical righteousness in the world." I used the words "ethical movement" as

a common name, and not as a proper name; and the mischievous inaccuracy, seeming to imply by the use of capitals that the *Ethical Culture Movement* is the only *ethical movement* in the world, lies, not in my statement, but in the unintentional misquotation of it. When Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism, and every great religion have been movements for "the building up of practical righteousness in the world," it would be a piece of egotism quite inexcusable to assume that the world saw no "ethical movement" till the birth of the Ethical Culture Movement,—a piece of egotism of which no one of the earnest and devoted spirits active in the latter has been, or could be, guilty.

Since, however, my words did undoubtedly include the Ethical Culture Movement, not at all as an organization, but as a general movement in religious and ethical thought, I do not mean to evade my just responsibility for them. But I am altogether unwilling that they should be made, by an innocent misunderstanding, to put me in the position of one who misrepresents that movement or who is unfriendly to it. I do not think I misrepresented it; I know I am not unfriendly to it. What I said at Philadelphia was spoken in the spirit of earnest devotion to all *ethical movements*, but no less in the spirit of earnest opposition to all *agnostic stagnation*. I spoke of no technicalities, no articles, no constitutions; I spoke only of ideas, principles, and ultimate moral grounds,—of what is necessary to give to morality the force of binding obligation, supreme sanctity, commanding and irresistible authority, as an august and inviolable ideal in the lives and the hearts of men. I referred to "the Ethical Movement" so far only as it is a body of living lecturers, preaching the gospel of ethics in the name of religion. Be their articles of union and organization what they may, their power for good in the world depends wholly on the gospel they preach; and all that I said turned wholly on the nature of this preached gospel. That the terms of fellowship in the Union of Societies for Ethical Culture are most wise, broad, and generous, I gladly acknowledge; and for that reason I was not only "one of the first to join it," but shall also be one of the last

to leave it. But the *essential gospel* of "the Ethical Movement" is not to be found in any articles of association whatever; it must be found in what the lecturers, as individual and unorganized living voices, are proclaiming to the world as the all-sufficient religion of ethics.

Am I, then, mistaken in believing that all the individual lecturers of "the Ethical Movement" are, to a man, self-announced agnostics? If I am not mistaken in that belief, then that movement, in the only sense in which the world can care for it either much or long, is, as I said, "seeking vainly to establish itself upon an agnostic foundation." For, just as surely as knowledge will triumph over ignorance in the end, just so surely will the moral philosophy based on the scientific method triumph over any moral philosophy which has no scientific basis at all. This is a question only of time. If the Ethical Culture Movement is to live and grow and conquer the world, it must dig down, cost what it may, to a philosophy which shall find the Moral Ideal to be the very bottom fact on which the universe itself is built. If it cannot or will not do this,—if it is too much bewildered or bewitched with the shallow agnostic sophistries so fashionable to-day to discover that there is *no morality outside of personality*, and *no universal morality outside of universal personality*,—then it is but one more of the many ephemeral movements of the age, doing, doubtless, its little good by the way, but sowing no seed that shall grow forever. Whoever aims at the moral upbuilding of the world must not remain contentedly ignorant how the world itself is built; he must declare a moral law which is nothing less than the core of all law, and which commands Man in the name of Nature because Man is an organic part of Nature; he must proclaim a human ideal which reflects the majesty of Infinite Being itself; he must have skill to touch those deepest chords of the human soul which respond only to the Divine. Not to know any basis for the moral law outside of man himself is to know no moral law which man is bound to obey. In the long run, man will obey nothing but reason; if the moral law has no reason to rest on, then he will turn his back upon it, and live by any law, expediency,

self-interest, passion or what not, which can render even a lame or false reason for itself. If the Ethical Culture Movement is ever to become a power in the world, it must wake up to the absolute necessity of rendering a reason, a strong reason, a resistless reason, for the moral law itself. To be without such a reason—above all to be professedly and contentedly without it—is exactly what I meant by the words, “seeking vainly to establish itself upon an Agnostic foundation.” For, so far as I have been able to discover by reading the published essays of its lecturers, the Ethical Culture Movement has no common foundation whatever beyond a strong and noble ethical enthusiasm. What it seems to me to need most imperatively, as the necessary condition of a high and wide success, is a *scientific philosophy, grounded on the facts of the real universe, and itself serving as ground to a scientific ethics*. Until it shall have worked out such a philosophy, found a reason for the moral law, and learned to press that reason home upon the intellects, the consciences, and the hearts of men, I submit that the Ethical Culture Movement is, and must continue to be, “seeking vainly to establish itself upon an Agnostic foundation,”—that is, upon no rational foundation at all.

Not as an enemy, but as a most sincere and true friend, do I say these things. The Ethical Culture Movement, despite this one great lack, appears to me to be the most earnest, honest, and hopeful religious movement anywhere visible; and, even at the risk of offending by my plain speech, I say them now, as I have long wished to say them, out of a certain Socratic willingness to be “a gnat to the noble horse of Athens.” It matters little if I do offend, provided these lecturers themselves, nobly equipped as they are in brain and soul, are stung into a deeper consideration of the necessary philosophical foundation of a successful movement “to build up practical righteousness in the world.”

We are glad our brief note in the last number has furnished Dr. Abbot an occasion to say to the lecturers of the ethical societies the things he has “long wished to say;” and we assure him that we take his earnest words in the spirit in which he meant them, and we doubt not that our lecturers and members will read them carefully. A few observations are pertinent.

(1) We think that our interpretation of Dr. Abbot's language in his Philadelphia address was natural and unavoidable, and is, moreover, entirely borne out (notwithstanding his rather verbal criticism) by the above communication. To say, after commenting upon Mr. Salter's book, "it is pathetic, it is tragic, to behold a sincere and lofty ethical movement seeking vainly to establish itself upon an agnostic foundation," would lead any one to suppose that Dr. Abbot was referring to our movement along with any other he thought to be similar ones; and it was incumbent upon us to correct his mistake and to show that agnosticism is not the foundation on which we are trying to build.

(2) The ethical movement has taken particular pains not to commit itself to the philosophical views of its lecturers. It made a statement of its aim (in the constitution of the "Union") after mature consideration, and expressly welcomes to its fellowship those who sympathize with its aim (the elevation of the moral life) "*whatever their theological or philosophical opinions.*" Dr. Abbot, hence, does violence to it in judging it by the occasional philosophical utterances of any of its lecturers. A lecturer with Dr. Abbot's philosophy would have the same right to express his views that Professor Adler and Mr. Salter have to express theirs, the only wrong would be in judging the *movement* (in such a case) by Dr. Abbot's philosophy.

(3) We doubt if a single one of our lecturers is a "self-announced agnostic" in the sense in which Dr. Abbot uses this term. "Agnostic" is a term of much vagueness that is bandied about very loosely at the present time.

(4) Dr. Abbot is a champion of the scientific method, and apparently thinks that the only basis for moral philosophy is "Scientific Theism." He does not seem to realize that some equally earnest with himself may think that the scientific method (*i.e.*, the method of observation and verification by experience) is inadequate when one deals with ultimate philosophical problems. The ethical movement avoids laying down the law as to what school of thought its members or lecturers shall follow.

(5) Mr. Salter wishes us to say that a wrong impression is conveyed by Dr. Abbot's quotation from his book. He says (p. 38) that "no serious man wants a reason," but not with any such question in mind as Dr. Abbot imagines to be propounded, namely, what "cosmical reason" is there "why ethics should not be thrown overboard together with theology." Reasons sufficient, "cosmical" and other, he believes, could be adduced against such a procedure. What he does say in substance is that, when once a supreme moral rule is discovered, no serious man wants a reason for *it*. "It is," writes Mr. Salter, "a part of the very idea of things supreme and ultimate that nothing back of them, no reason for them, can be discovered; for example, if space is an ultimate reality, no reason can be given for its existence, and the same would be true of matter in the materialist's conception, or of God in the theist's conception." To Mr. Salter the moral law is a part of the ultimate nature of things (discovered, of course, by man, but not made by him), as he repeatedly says in his book; and he holds that philosophical wisdom consists as much in knowing where to stop with questions as in propounding them.—EDITOR.

GENERAL NOTES.

—WE have in hand an article on "The Study of Ethics at Oxford," by S. Alexander, M.A., author of "Moral Order and Progress," which will be published in our next number.

—A SIGN of the tendency of the time and, perhaps, of Dr. Coit's influence in London, is furnished by the recent action of the London Progressive Association (offices, 5 Blandford Street, Marylebone). Recognizing that "although its avowed object was of an ethical character, too large a portion of its work has fallen short of taking a definitely ethical direction," the Association has made a new departure by altering its subtitle to "A Society for Ethical Culture." Among the members of the general committee we find the names of J. H. Muirhead, M.A., William Clarke, M.A., Percival Chubb, and G. Margerison. The Association has published "Hymns of Progress" (price, 2*d*; cloth, 4*d*), containing some forty or more hymns "dealing solely with the largest and simplest aspects of human life, human love, and human hope." The selection has been made with discrimination and taste, and the little book is the best of the sort we know of.

—A YOUNG MEN'S CLUB, with fifty members, has recently been formed in the Chicago Ethical Society. Its objects are stated to be: (1) to promote closer fellowship among the young men of the Ethical Society; (2) to encourage higher standards of personal morality among its members; (3) self-instruction in the problems of philosophy and social ethics. Mr. Percival Chubb addressed the opening meeting on "The Social Movement in London, and What Young Men are doing in It." Mr. Salter has also spoken, giving "An Introduction to the Study of Philosophy and Social Ethics," the suggestions of which, it is hoped, will lead to somewhat serious and systematic work in the club. Mr. Henry D.

Lloyd, whose article on "The New Conscience," in *The North American Review*, was first given as an address before the Chicago Society, and has attracted wide attention, addressed the club on "The Labor Question" one evening, enunciating principles and speaking in a large and balanced way; and Mr. Sheldon spoke at the last meeting on "Young Men and Their Interest in Art." The meetings are held fortnightly, every alternate one beginning with a dinner.

—MR. PERCIVAL CHUBB, one of the founders of the London (Essex Hall) Ethical Society, who contributed the admirable introduction to the Emerson volume in the Camelot series (London, Walter Scott), is spending a year in this country, and has spoken for the Ethical Societies of Chicago and Philadelphia. Mr. Chubb is a philosopher of no mean ability, an earnest student of the social questions, a man of letters who writes with something of the charm peculiar to cultivated Englishmen, and withal captivates those who meet him by his sweetness and simplicity of manner. We trust that the *Record* may be able to print something from his pen at no distant date.

—THE *Vossische Zeitung* (Berlin) said of Mr. Salter's *Die Religion der Moral*, that it furnished "new and beautiful proof that not only dollars, but ideas, are powerful in America." Still more beautiful is bringing dollars to the service of ideas, an example of which is furnished by the founder of the *Open Court* (Chicago), Mr. Edward C. Hegeler. This weekly paper occupies a unique place in American journalism. It brings the results of the latest French and German researches in psychology and physics to the notice of its readers, and in harmony with them constructs a theory of the universe, which it calls Monism. One cannot fail to admire the intellectual enthusiasm which lies back of this undertaking, and the editor, Dr. Paul Carus, displays tact and unfailing good temper in its management. Some of his editorials were well worth reproducing in permanent book form, as has been done, with the title, "Fundamental Problems;" and the enterprise shown by

the Open Court Publishing Company in bringing out volumes by Max Müller, Binet, and Ribot is to be highly commended. A recent number of the *Open Court* contains a friendly exhortation to the ethical societies to establish themselves upon a solid philosophical basis. We think there is some lack of clearness as to what a basis of ethics means; as there was, perhaps, also in our use of the phrase, "the *facts* of the moral life," in commenting on Dr. Abbot's misstatement of our position in the last number of the *Record*. The aim of the ethical movement consists in "the elevation of the moral life;" and we are certainly bound, as against possible misunderstanding, to state what is meant by the moral life. The moral life, as we understand it, is the life dominated by justice and love; or, as the statement might be altered, the life whose rule is justice and whose impulse is love. We conceive that the obligation of justice and love is self-evident to rational beings.

—CULTURE AMONG WORKINGMEN.—The Ethical Society of St. Louis took the initiative, two years ago, in a movement to bring the opportunities of higher education in that city to workingmen and their families. Mr. W. L. Sheldon, the lecturer of the society, organized a "Workingmen's Self-Culture Club," which has met with success from the start, and is growing to be an important social and educational institution for the working people of St. Louis. Interesting accounts of the work done by this organization have recently appeared in some of the leading papers of our Eastern cities, and the very commendable character of the work has been widely commented upon. The Workingmen's Self-Culture Club is strictly non-sectarian, and also non-partisan on the social question. The one aim of the promoters of the movement was "to open greater opportunities for personal self-improvement among that class of honest and serious men and women who have neither the time nor the means for expensive forms of diversion and recreation."

The club is mainly directed by the members themselves, the lecturer of the Ethical Society being *ex officio* a member of

each committee. The character of the work done by the club is outlined in the following paragraph, taken from one of its recent reports :

"It has its head-quarters at the Free Reading Rooms, where are to be found the daily and weekly papers, all the leading periodicals, and a library of selected literature numbering nearly one thousand volumes. It has a course of weekly illustrated lectures from the professors at the University and others, on astronomy, art, electricity, natural history, travel, literature, etc. It has a weekly study and reading club, where the members come together and take up some biography or literary subject for discussion and examination. It has a Monday evening club for boys, who come together to take up literary reading which is suitable to their taste and years. It proposes also to have lecture courses for working-girls. It arranges excursions to the Museum of Fine Arts, for the purpose of visiting and seeing the objects of interest preserved there, as well as the picture-gallery. While being educational, it seeks to encourage interest and education in just those branches which are so much neglected,—art, natural science, literature, travel, history, etc."

The club has rooms in two different sections of the city, which are open every evening and all day Sunday. Working-girls have the exclusive use of the rooms in each section one evening in the week, for whom lectures, readings, and music are being provided; and one evening a week the rooms are occupied by boys, who are entertained and instructed by illustrated talks, readings, stories, games, etc.

The educational opportunities of the club are free to all, to non-members as well as members, and all classes and races are availing themselves of its privileges. The expenses of this important undertaking are met by contributions from the citizens at large.

—THE NEIGHBORHOOD GUILDS of Philadelphia, New York, and London are doing similar work to that of the "Working-men's Self-Culture Club" of St. Louis. These Guilds aim to provide attractive rooms in the different localities of the working-people, and to make them the centres of a high order of social and educational opportunities for the people of the immediate neighborhood. The New York Neighborhood Guild, which Dr. Coit started three years ago in the basement of a tenement-house on Forsyth Street, now occupies an entire building. The Guild is now under the management of Mr.

Charles B. Stover, who publishes a monthly "Neighborhood Guild Journal," which is widely circulated in the ward in which the Guild is located, and which greatly increases the local influence of the Guild. The journal is distributed free, its expenses being met by advertisements.

According to the schedule of work of the Neighborhood Guild, recently organized in London by Dr. Coit, it has already become an active centre of social and educational work every evening of the week.

The Philadelphia Neighborhood Guild is in a flourishing condition, being frequented every afternoon by a throng of children, for kindergarten games, singing, etc., and every evening by young men and young women and older people. Besides class-work of various kinds each evening of the week, there are two courses of evening lectures on political economy and natural science, and a miscellaneous Sunday afternoon course, including lectures and concerts. Several of the lectures are by professors from the University of Pennsylvania and from Bryn Mawr. Saturday evening is set apart for purely social purposes.

The Baldwin Locomotive Works have recently given the Guild, free of rent, the use of an entire floor in one of their large new buildings. This provides several class-rooms, a library and reading-room, and an auditorium that will seat three hundred people. Another entire floor is given for a restaurant, conducted under the auspices of the Neighborhood Guild. Dinners are served to several hundred working-men from the neighboring shops at fifteen cents.

The Philadelphia Neighborhood Guild has, from its organization three years ago last December, endeavored to foster the family idea. It has encouraged families to join as families. The membership includes young and old of both sexes.

The Philadelphia Guild is the outgrowth of work begun in behalf of street-boys by the Ethical Society. In order to enlarge and extend the work, the lecturer of the society took the initiative in organizing a "Neighborhood Guild Association," composed of citizens at large from various churches, under whose auspices the work is now carried on. The

Ethical Society has no official connection with the Neighborhood Guild, though its lecturer is one of the board of managers, and some of the members are active workers in it.

—THE ECONOMIC CONFERENCES between workingmen and business-men, set on foot in Chicago two years ago by Mr. Salter, have been regularly continued since, and are now under the auspices of the Economic Club, which is composed of a small number of representative workingmen, business and professional men. Twelve lectures have been given this past winter, and it is gratifying to record that, while workingmen have crowded the meetings from the start, the attendance of the so-called "better classes" has increased.

—*The Conservator* (Philadelphia) is the name of a new monthly journal of eight pages, whose appearance we welcome and gladly bring to the attention of the readers of the ETHICAL RECORD. It is edited by Mr. Horace L. Traubel, a member of the Philadelphia Ethical Society, and a close personal friend and daily companion of Walt Whitman. Mr. Traubel's name is, doubtless, already known to many of our readers by his contributions to the *Index*, and to its successor, *The New Ideal*, and to other liberal journals.

The fine unifying spirit and high, positive purpose that enter into the management of this new journal is expressed in the following editorial "Greeting" in the first number (March, 1890):

"*The Conservator* originated in the conviction of a group of members of the Ethical Society that the different Liberal Societies of this section (as of all sections) ought to know more of the intimate social and spiritual life of each other than circumstances, if not unwise inclinations, now make possible. This knowledge, it was argued, would lead to a recognition of those things held in common,—those ethical verities, those humanitarian impulses, which defer to none but universal ends.

"It is not pretended that this idea, especially at the outset, can be perfectly embodied. Philadelphia has Unitarian, Hebrew, and Ethical societies, all working in similar lines. Heretofore these have been as strangers one to the other. *The Conservator* will aim to glimpse in each such cardinal utterances and occurrences as will, brought together, insure mutual benefits. The record of the daily life of these societies—for example, of studies pursued, charities furthered, whether by platform representatives or the laymanry—is sought for preservation. Moreover,

we design to make this a means of brief communication between the ethical societies at large, which at present have no frequent channel of intercourse.

"Our necessary immediate purpose is of course local. But it is determined that this word "local" shall not narrow the scope of our work. However local the field, we shall keep the spirit to universal methods. Not less than Thoreau at Walden shall we spiritually realize all climes and seasons here at our doors. Chiefly, the intention is to give a voice to the voiceless, and in a sense to give a united voice to liberalism as variously spoken for in this community. Whatever the differences, the unities are many more.

"*The Conservator* is not an organ. It keeps itself free to welcome all the broader tendencies and ethical growths, in orthodox life as in radical. It hopes in the course of its career to have much, indeed, to tell of what the orthodoxy of Philadelphia may be doing to enlarge the vision of man. Although the outcome of the labor of members of the Philadelphia Ethical Society, it is not the organ of that society, but, in the dream of those controlling it, the broadest welcomer and chronicler of efforts, however partial, towards richer moral possessions. By right of our name we come into limitless ownerships. Experience alone can show if we justify our heritage."

The price of the *Conservator* is fifty cents a year; single copy, five cents. All communications, of whatever character, should be addressed to HORACE L. TRAUBEL, Camden, N. J.

—MR. SIDNEY H. MORSE, who appears among the contributors to this number of the *ETHICAL RECORD*, was the editor of the famous monthly journal, *The Radical*, published in Boston twenty years ago. Mr. Morse has for several years been devoting his entire attention to sculpture. His bust of Emerson is an eminently successful likeness, and has been highly praised by Emerson's closest friends.

—DR. STANTON COIT, of London, is preparing a book, which will soon be published under the title "The Ethical Movement." The first edition of Mr. Salter's book, "Ethical Religion," is exhausted. A new edition will soon appear.

—MR. SALTER lectured before the Harvard Philosophical Club, in Sander's Theatre, Thursday evening, March 27, on "What can Ethics do for us?" A large and distinguished audience was present. Mr. Salter spoke the next day, at the invitation of Boston members of the Ethical Union, in Pierce Hall, Copley Square, Boston, on "Reforms Good Men might agree about."

——“RESPONSIVE EXERCISES FOR THE YOUNG,” by Mr. W. L. Sheldon, is an enlarged and much improved edition of the “Responsive Exercises,” printed in the *ETHICAL RECORD*, October, 1888. The responses to be made by the children have been shortened, and the present edition contains two responses, either of which may be selected. Appropriate selections from the poets precede each set of responses. An address at the beginning and another at the close of the exercises is to be read in silence. These responsive exercises are used in the Children’s Ethical Classes in St. Louis.

——THE *ETHICAL SOCIETY* of St. Louis has met with a great loss in the death of Dr. Charles W. Stevens, the former president of the society. Dr. Stevens was a man eminent in his profession and of high standing in St. Louis, where he had lived for many years, occupying important public positions and winning the esteem and confidence of all. Having retired from his professional labors he came forward with enthusiasm, in his leisure old age, to help organize and support the Ethical Society of St. Louis. At the Chicago Convention of Ethical Societies, held in November, 1887, he said, in a short public address,—

“The Ethical Culture movement, in my opinion, stands pre-eminent in embracing principles and objects as a foundation upon which all men and women of the highest type of intellectual and moral qualities may unite for their own welfare and for the good of the world around them.

“I know that in this city alone there are thousands who in their hearts are in earnest sympathy with the cause in which we are now engaged, and who are ready in thought to say to us, God speed you in your good work, who at the same time, for an infinite variety of reasons, stand aloof and alone. With very many it is only a lack of courage, with others a life-long association with those to whom they are allied in social conditions and whose esteem they cannot bear to forfeit. To be truly honest, and to act accordingly in matters of such moment, indeed requires true courage.”

Dr. Stevens was for two years a member of the Executive Committee of the Union of Ethical Societies. Mr. Sheldon’s warm eulogy upon Dr. Stevens’s life, the Sunday after his death, was called by the St. Louis papers “a deserved tribute.” At the funeral service were gathered lawyers, business-men, physicians, and clergymen, to pay their tribute of respect.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

- PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: SOME SOCIAL STUDIES. By Joseph Henry Crooker. Boston: Geo. H. Ellis, 1889. Pp. 293.
- FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS. THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY AS A SYSTEMATIC ARRANGEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE. By Dr. Paul Carus. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1889. Pp. 267. \$1.00.
- THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTENTION. By Th. Ribot. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1889. Pp. 122. 75 cents.
- THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF MICRO-ORGANISMS. A STUDY IN EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. By Alfred Binet. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1890. Pp. 122. 75 cents.
- THE LIBERAL CHRISTIAN MINISTRY. By J. T. Sunderland, M.A. Boston: Geo. H. Ellis, 1889. Pp. 96.
- PROLEGOMENA TO IN MEMORIAM. By Thomas Davidson. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1889. Pp. 178.
- CAMDEN'S COMPLIMENT TO WALT WHITMAN, MAY 31, 1889. NOTES, ADDRESSES, LETTERS, TELEGRAMS. Edited by Horace L. Traubel. Philadelphia: David McKay, 1889. Pp. 74.
- SOCIAL IDEALS: WHAT THEY ARE: THEIR VALUE. TWO ADDRESSES. By W. L. Sheldon. St. Louis: W. B. Lange, 621 Chestnut Street. 10 cents.
- WHAT MOSES SAW AND HEARD; OR, THE IDEA OF GOD IN THE OLD TESTAMENT. By A. O. Butler. Chicago: R. R. Donnelley & Sons, 1889. Pp. 434.
- GIRARD'S WILL AND GIRARD COLLEGE THEOLOGY. By Richard B. Westbrook, D.D., LL.D. Published by the author, 1707 Oxford Street. Philadelphia: 1888. Pp. 183.
- SKETCH OF A NEW UTILITARIANISM, INCLUDING A CRITICISM OF THE ORDINARY ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN AND OTHER MATTER. By W. Donn Lighthall, M.A., B.C.L. Montreal: Witness Printing House, St. James St., E., 1887. Pamphlet. Pp. 40.
- DER AUFENTHALT DER NEU PHILOLOGEN UND DAS STUDIUM MODERNER SPRACHEN IM AUSLANDE. Von Professor Dr. Schmeding. Berlin: Verlag von Robert Oppenheim, 1889. 97 seiten.
- DIE ETHISCHE BEDEUTUNG DER FRAUBEWEGUNG. Von Helene Lange. Berlin: L. Oehmigke's Verlag, 1889. 23 seiten.
- THE CONSUMPTION OF WEALTH. By Simon N. Patten, Ph.D. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1889. Pp. 70. 50 cents.
- THE KINGDOM OF THE UNSELFISH; OR, EMPIRE OF THE WISE. By John Lord Peck. New York: Empire Book Bureau, 28 Lafayette Place.
- THE WAY OUT OF AGNOSTICISM; OR, THE PHILOSOPHY OF FREE RELIGION. By Francis Ellingwood Abbot, Ph.D. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1890. Pp. 76.

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THE ETHICAL RECORD.

JULY, 1890.

THE ETHICS OF THE ASSYRIANS AND BABYLONIANS.

BY MORRIS JASTROW, JR., PH.D.,

University of Pennsylvania.

THE materials for a satisfactory exposition of the ethics of the Assyrians and Babylonians are not yet forthcoming. Of their daily habits and ways, which alone could furnish the basis for such an exposition, we still know very little. The remarkable discoveries beneath the mounds of Mesopotamia, during the past fifty years, have borne chiefly on the public life of these two peoples. The contents of the cuneiform inscriptions have made us acquainted with their history so far chiefly as it effects their relations with other nations, besides having revealed to us their culture, their art, and literary activity; but of what we may call the *inner* history of Babylonia and Assyria, neither excavations nor decipherment have up to the present advanced our knowledge to any great extent. We know how they waged war, as well as what wars they waged; we know how they built, as well as what they built; we know their methods of commerce, their laws, and their religion; but of their home-life we have yet the most to

learn. And, certainly, it will be admitted, we cannot properly judge the ethics of a people unless we are able to enter their homes, watch them at their daily toil, observe them in their recreations, and, in short, note all those seemingly unimportant acts and sayings which yet may be said to make up the whole man.

All, therefore, that can be attempted in the following pages is to furnish some considerations, of a general character, bearing on the ethics of the Assyrians and Babylonians, and drawn from a study of their culture, their religion, and their literature. Moreover, the present condition of the material at our disposal for a presentation of the subject in hand suggests the rather disconnected mode of treatment which has been adopted as best conducive towards bringing out a fair estimate of the standards of morality, distinguishing the two nations that once held sway in the land of the Tigris and Euphrates.

Closely related as the Babylonians and Assyrians are in race, language, and religious beliefs, a sharp distinction is to be drawn between the two empires of antiquity that bear their names. The Babylonian empire was essentially a civilizing force. Art and literature found an early home in the valley of the Euphrates. The originality of the former, which served as a model for subsequent periods, and the uniqueness of the latter, covering, as we now know, a vast area of human activity, are proof sufficient that we are here brought face to face with indigenous productions, and are not dealing with foreign importations; and to art and literature we may add science, if we will bear in mind certain qualifications of the term. True, the Babylonian rulers were not entirely free from the ambition of the military conqueror, which was the besetting sin of antiquity as it is still a menace to our modern civilization, but it is eminently characteristic of them that they placed their chief pride, as their inscriptions show, in the magnificent edifices which they reared and in the internal improvements which they directed. No less significant for the position occupied by this southern and older of the two Mesopotamian empires is the high degree of development attained by commerce and mercantile intercourse, as reflected in the numerous

legal documents* that have been discovered. Commerce, while no doubt the outgrowth of necessity, becomes, after a certain stage of development has been reached, the foster-child of tranquillity, and it is only among a nation cultivating the arts of peace that it will take rank as a living motor and a propelling force.

Quite otherwise the Assyrians. Ernest Renan, in a recent admirable characterization of the Assyrian power, describes Assyria as marking the first appearance of organized tyranny in the world.† Conquest seems to have been her one and only mission. The Assyrian monarchs, in striking contrast to their Babylonian cousins, speak almost exclusively, on the clay cylinders which they deposited in the corners of their palaces, of the wars they waged, of the captives they made, of the pillage and sacking of cities, of cruel tortures inflicted by them, and of the tribute which they received. To further emphasize their claims upon posterity,—their only ones, forsooth,—they illustrated their narratives by sculpturing on their palace walls the scenes of their successful campaigns. A glance at these bloody and cruel scenes, depicted with a realism worthy of a better theme, show that war was the real element of these “butchers.” Force was their only logic; and we must subscribe to the severe judgment of an ancient Hebrew seer who compared Assyria to a lioness that fills her lair with booty, and forcibly designated Nineveh as “a city of blood.” Nor does Renan exaggerate when he concludes that there was not a single idea which Assyria helped to spread, not a single good cause which she served. Still such conditions, it must be borne in mind, were not incompatible with the development of a high culture; only that this culture, born of power, was a foreign importation and not a home production. In the construction of their temples and palaces, the Assyrian monarchs slavishly followed Babylonian

* The so-called “contract tablets,” recording sales and commercial transactions of all kinds, and of which no less than one hundred thousand, dug up out of the mounds at various times and places, are to-day scattered throughout the museums and private collections of the world.

† *Histoire du Peuple d'Israel*, ii. pp. 454-456.

models, and much as Solomon called in the assistance of Phœnician architects, so, no doubt, the rulers of Northern Mesopotamia brought the artists of the south to their courts. But not only the art of Babylonia, her literary productions, likewise, were carried into Assyria. Seized by the ambition to pose as patrons of science and art, which appears to be the compensating virtue of conquerors, the Assyrian kings vied with one another in making their residences centres of learning and intellectual activity. With this in view, they sent their scribes to the old seats of Babylonian culture, where the vast literary treasures of the country, the national epics, the religious poetry, the sacred rituals, the compilations of astronomy, medicine, and law, lay stored up in the archives of temples and palaces. These literary productions, dating from a remote period, and to which a permanent form had been given by being committed to bricks of burnt clay, were carefully studied by the Assyrian scribes. Under royal command, copies of them were made and placed in apartments of the magnificent palaces, reared by the Assyrian kings as monuments to their glory. In this way, during the centuries of Assyria's greatness,—roughly speaking, the ninth to the seventh centuries before this era,—the great libraries of Assyria were gathered, of which considerable remains have already been found and more may be expected. But comprehensive as the influence was which Babylonia exerted upon her northern rival, it did not succeed in changing the general traits of king and people. Assyria retained to the close of her dominion that general aspect of fierceness which was the source of its strength. Her culture was hardly anything more than a thin veneer, which, as it wore off, exposed the roughness beneath.

With this distinction between the two empires sharply defined, we shall be prepared to find a corresponding divergence in their ethics. Indeed, in the general picture which we have attempted to draw of Assyria, there will be found the material required for forming an estimate of her moral status. By that same law which dictates that a stream rises no higher than its source, we are permitted to conclude that the fierceness,

cruelty, inordinate ambition, love of strife, proneness to display, which mark the Assyrian rulers, were but a reflection of the national traits. If Assyria's mission were distinctly one of power, it was solely because the genius of the people led her in this direction. Her kings were but the tools by means of which the edifice was reared, not the originators of the plan. True, among the most peaceful nations a warlike leader may arise who may for a time dominate the fortunes of that nation, but when a long line of military conquerors springs up, when force is the basis upon which the greatness of a people is built up, when violence presides over all efforts, then the conclusion is inevitable that such a people occupies the ethical plane represented by her leaders. And this conclusion is fully borne out in the case of Assyria, when we turn to the Assyrian religion, where, by virtue of that close union between religion and morals, which is as characteristic of antiquity as is the union of what is commonly known as church and state, we are justified in looking for an embodiment of popular ethical ideals, or, if we will, lack of ideals. At the head of the Assyrian pantheon stands the god Ashur. All the attributes ascribed to him have reference to his power. He is the great lord, the ruler of the divine hosts, who gives the sceptre and the crown to kings, bestowing the sovereignty upon his favorites. When the kings and their armies march out to battle, it is with reliance upon the "might of Ashur," and when victory enters their ranks, it is because Ashur was present with his invincible weapon in his hand. There is not the slightest trace of spirituality in this conception of deity, and, what is significant, so completely does Ashur dominate the Assyrian pantheon, that his attributes are transferred to his numerous fellow-deities, including those whose worship was imported from Babylonia, and to whom originally qualities were ascribed of an entirely different order. All the Assyrian gods became, in the course of time, mere reflections of Ashur. Sin, the moon-god, becomes the lord of the sceptre and crown. To the Babylonians, the sun-god Shamas was primarily the just judge of heaven and earth, but by the Assyrians his justice was seen only in the punishment he in-

flicted upon their enemies, and he finally becomes, like Ashur, the "ruler of everything." Again, the supreme goddess Ishtar, whose origin escapes us, because of the exceedingly complicated notions that connected themselves with her worship in Babylonia, is for the Assyrian simply the mistress of war and battle, who, prior to a decisive engagement, appears to her favorite in a dream, and encourages him with the assurance, "Fear not. I walk by thy side." But perhaps most striking of all, Nabu, who among Babylonians is known only as the "god of wisdom," although adopted also as such by the Assyrian kings,—especially by those who collected libraries,—yet is invested with material powers, and is invoked as the "governor of heaven and earth."

Such being the religious ideals which governed the lives of those who stood highest, we may surmise what the popular standard of morality must have been. With religion in the service of military power, such feelings as gratitude, justice, mercy, upon the development of which the attainment of high ethical principles so greatly depends, could have but a limited sway. The natural consequence of the supremacy of brute force is that success becomes the measure of the universe. When they saw the fields covered with the mutilated bodies of their enemies, the Assyrians offered up sacrifices to their great warrior-god Ashur and his associates, but though prompted to do so by an instinct in itself commendable, the gratitude born of the battle-field is not conducive to a high morality, nor does it even promote that humility which it appears to emphasize in attributing success to the aid of higher powers. As for justice, it is idle to suppose that it could have obtained a firm footing in a country where the ambition to rule overrides all other considerations. Strangely enough, the Assyrian kings often speak of the mercy which they granted to their humiliated opponents. True, the "mercy" is usually a cover for their own inability to reek the vengeance they desire, but still they speak of it in a way that would lead us to believe that it was a virtue highly prized in the eyes of the Assyrians. Upon looking closer, however, the conviction is forced upon us that this mercy, even where we have no reason to suspect

its genuineness, differs but little from insolent pride and bears no resemblance to that quality which "droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven." And so in general, it may be said of the better qualities which, as a matter of course, entered into the composition of the Assyrian character, that they were tainted by the grossness inseparable from the pursuit of power, and found an impassable barrier to their progress in the worship of force. If called upon to designate one trait that more than any other might properly be designated as the national one, the impartial verdict of history must be—cruelty. Pass along the halls of the British Museum, which contain those remarkable representations of Assyrian warfare that once graced the walls of Assyrian palaces, and note the cynical smile which the skilful artist has portrayed in the countenance of the soldier who stands in the act of piercing with his spear the eyes of the unfortunate victim trembling at his feet. Indeed, the whole battle-scene, pictured with a remarkable vividness, gives one the impression of being a jollification festival (though a one-sided festival), so happy do the participants on the Assyrian side appear to be, as they spread slaughter to the right and left; and not satisfied with overpowering their enemies, they mutilate their bodies by severing the head from the body, or, by way of adding to the pleasure of their royal master, pile the ghastly heads into a pyramid. They fairly revel in warfare, and there can be no doubt that the artists have caught the true national spirit in thus representing them, while, as a further confirmation, the numerous passages in the inscriptions, furnishing the commentary to the illustrations, may be adduced in which the kings extol the cruelties inflicted by them and their hosts, and are at pains to tell us the misery and suffering which they strove to bring about.

It must be remembered, also, that these sculptured bas-reliefs were either ranged along the outside walls of the palaces, where they were visible to every one, or placed in apartments to which the public was admitted. They constituted the picture-galleries of those days, and no doubt intended as an education and edification to the people. Even in their sports the Assyrians manifested the national traits of fierceness and cruelty.

Lion-hunting was the favorite pastime of the kings and nobles, and in the sculptures illustrative of this sport, there is depicted the same thirst for violence and the same cruel pleasure upon seeing the hunted beast pierced with arrows and writhing in its last throes.

Turning now to the Babylonians, the contrast is as striking as we would naturally expect. Beginning with their religious conceptions, we find their deities in the highest state of their development, characterized by spiritual qualities. The oldest of them are personifications of the heavenly bodies and of natural elements, such as the moon, the sun, and the watery deep; but in the course of time certain attributes were associated with them which gave them a much higher character than mere nature-symbols. Thus, the sun-god was regarded as the great judge of heaven and earth, while Ea, originally the water-god, was the one who presided over the destinies of humanity. And so the entire development of the Babylonian religion may be summed up as a tendency towards spiritualization. With the advance of culture, we have a special "god of wisdom," Nebo, the inventor of writing, who, together with his consort, Tashmit, gives understanding and furnishes intelligence to man; but the highest stage of Babylonian religion was reached in the conceptions that grouped themselves around the deity who became the head of the pantheon,—Marduk, or, as he is more popularly known, Merodach. He starts out as a water-spirit; afterwards we find him, as it would appear, identified with the sun-god; then he appears as the tutelary deity *par excellence* of the city of Babylon, and when Babylon extends her sway over an entire district of Mesopotamia, Merodach obscures his fellow-deities to such an extent that scholars have been tempted to credit the Babylonians with a close approach to monotheistic doctrines.

In keeping with this tendency of their religion is the Babylonian cult, which already at an early period is marked by the endeavor to rise to far higher levels than those usually occupied by the religions of antiquity. The hymns to the gods breathe the true spirit of religious devotion. Their diction is pure, poetic, and occasionally reaches the sublime. Although

—as is but natural—strongly tainted by beliefs and superstitions of a lower order, we come across conceptions frequently which surprise us by their force and elevation. In their prayers to the sun-god, of which quite a number have been preserved, it is not the fear of his power or even the desire to secure his favors which forms the prominent feature, but next to an appreciation of his beneficent qualities, complete absorption by the thought of his grandeur and beauty. It is real love of nature that inspires these hymns, and their authors have been caught by the same spirit of devotional enthusiasm which leads the Hebrew psalmist to step out into the fields on a clear night, and, carried away at the sight of the starry heavens, to exclaim, “Oh, how wonderful are thy works, O Lord!” A few brief quotations will not be out of place. Here are the opening lines of such a hymn addressed to the sun upon his rising :

“O Sun-god, thou risest at the horizon of heaven; thou dost unlock the shining bolts of heaven; thou openest the doors of heaven, O Sun-god, when thou raisest thy head over the world, all lands are covered with thy glory.”

Another, addressing the sun at his setting, begins,—

“O Sun-god, when thou settest in the midst of heaven, may the enclosures of heaven give thee greeting; the gate of heaven bless thee; may the guiding deity, the messenger that loves thee, direct thy path; . . . may the glory of thy divinity be established for thee. . . . O Sun-god, judge of the world, the director of its laws art thou.”

The picture is that of the traveller who, upon his return from his wanderings, waits for the welcome from his kinsfolk, and the little touch that is added of the messenger sent out to guide the traveller to the right spot is certainly exquisite. A companion picture is presented in still another hymn, where the gods, upon seeing the sun-god rising out of the great mountain, are represented as bowing in adoration before the great orb of day, and all the spirits, like servants, stand reverently by awaiting the command of their master.* Again, their

* Translations of many of these hymns will be found in Sayce's *Hibbert Lectures on the Religion of the Ancient Babylonians* (London, 1887, pp. 479-520), to which, however, despite their merits, the same caution applies as to his renderings of the Babylonian psalms. (See below.)

prayers, even when they are prompted by lower motives, are filled with a pure religious spirit that proves the existence of ethical standards of no mean quality. Thus Nebuchadnezzar, at the close of a long inscription in which he describes the temples he reared and other of his building operations, offers up the following prayer to the supreme god, Merodach :

"O ! Marduk, my lord, first-born of the gods, mighty prince, thou has created me and hast intrusted to me the sovereignty over thy people. As my very soul, so do I love thy lofty abiding-place, thy city Babylon ; and yet among all cities I have chosen no residence to which I cling so fondly as I do to thy awful majesty. I seek thy sovereignty : Let me then find grace. Hear my prayer, for I am the King, the beautifier of thy temples who rejoices thy heart, the high-priest who rebuilds all thy cities."

The prayer concludes with a request for long life and a multitude of offspring.

For the highest exponents, however, of the ethical basis of the religion of the Babylonians, we must turn to those religious poems among the remains of their literature in which we find such advanced religious notions as the consciousness of sin, and the need of forgiveness, coupled with a spirit of real penitence, entering as significant factors in the lives of the people. There existed, as it would appear from remains found in the library collected by the Assyrian king Ashurbanabal, complete rituals among the Babylonians for a penitential service, with prayers adapted to various contingencies and conditions. In these prayers the petitioner at the throne of grace is represented as pouring out his soul in the deepest contrition before his deity,—“Full of sighs, I, thy servant, come unto thee, oh ! my lord,” one of them begins. In language at once powerful and simple, the anguish of the sin-laden soul is described. Tears, we are told by one of these penitents, constituted his nourishment, weeping his drink. He is in utter despair and throws himself upon the mercy of his god. Usually in these “penitential psalms,”* as they have been appropriately termed, the priest is introduced in the double capacity as a comforter to the afflicted spirit and as inter-

* For specimens, see Sayce's *Hibbert Lectures on the Religion of the Babylonians*, pp. 521-531, though it ought to be added that the translations there given are not altogether satisfactory and reliable.

ceding with the deity on behalf of the sinner. He adds his own prayers to those of the penitent, calling upon the divine powers to look mercifully upon the sinner that "he may live." Despite admixtures of a lower order of ideas, of which none of these psalms are entirely free, they must still be regarded as satisfactory evidence for the high moral status reached by the people among whom they arose. It will be sufficient to point out that, by the general consent of scholars, they have been placed on a level which justifies a comparison with some of the biblical psalms, and this becomes all the more significant when we remember that in primitive Semitic religions, there is no place for consciousness of sin on the part of the individual. The basis of relationship to one's deity, among the early Semites, is communal and not individual. The community, the united clans, or the single tribe, or even family, may offend the god, but the individual is not held responsible. Expiating sacrifices were offered up by the clan, but there was no individual atonement. The tribe shares the guilt for the crime committed by one of its members, and there being no individual atonement, there is no place for individual penitence. Such principles, therefore, as we find reflected in the Babylonian psalms, show that the religion of the Babylonians had cut loose from the common Semitic stock, and, like the Hebrew, had struck out in a path for itself, which led it ever further and further away from its starting point.* Similar, therefore, though the religious *beliefs* held by the Assyrians were with those professed by the Babylonians, yet the religion of the former retained to the last its communal or tribal character, enlarged only by the national growth, whereas the latter was marked by a pronounced advance towards individualism. Here, then, in this tendency towards individualism, we must seek for the explanation of the higher ethical standards reached by the Babylonians. With the assertion of individual responsibility, a proper sense of right and wrong was developed, and the *differentiation* of the finer instincts began to

* W. Robertson Smith, in his recent first volume of the "Religion of the Semites," recognizing this, has therefore excluded the religion of the Babylonians in his treatment of the "Fundamental Institutions" of the Semites. (See p 15.)

appear which ultimately leads to the formation and establishment of sound moral principles.

Despite, therefore, idolatrous practices which the Babylonians outgrew as little as the Assyrians, despite superstitious beliefs in the power of charms and incantations, to which they clung as tenaciously as all other nations of antiquity, the Babylonian religion directly promoted the growth of principles of right and justice among the people. We find them accordingly devising regulations for the protection of the weak. They formulated humane laws, compelling the employer, in case of any injury resulting to his hired laborer while in his employ, to make restitution for the loss of wages thus incurred. Disobedience towards parents was severely punished, and it is significant that rebelliousness against the mother was considered even more disgraceful than similar conduct against a father. In the latter case, the son was forced to do common service, and wear some external sign of his disgrace; but when a son said to his mother "thou art not my mother," which was the formal way of declaring himself free from obligation to her, he was driven out of house and town. At the same time it is but proper to note the limitations of these enactments due to the subordinate position held by the wife (not the woman) in ancient Babylonia. Thus, while a man had the right to divorce his wife upon the payment of alimony, the woman, in case of deserting or rejecting her husband, was drowned.

As already intimated, the growth of commerce and the rise of a special commercial legislation is a further evidence for the existence of high moral standards among the Babylonians. A study of the "contract tablets" impresses us with the fine distinctions of equity that were recognized as the basis of mercantile transactions. For every sale and every contract, no matter of what kind, a clear statement of the details had to be inscribed on these curious little clay tablets, whereupon the names of the witnesses and frequently the seals of the contracting parties were attached. In the case of a dispute over some land, or as the case might be, it would seem to have been a requirement that all the documents bearing on

the property in question—the deeds for several generations back—were to be brought in evidence, and upon a careful investigation of these, the decision of the court was rendered.

But again, the limitations imposed by the general social conditions of antiquity, to which Babylonia formed no exception, are to be noted as significant. Thus slave-traffic flourished in Babylonia as much as elsewhere, and it would even seem that the father had under certain conditions the right to sell his own daughter. Marriage retained, as it does in the Orient to this day, the character of a purchase, and the position of the wife, while secure, was one of abject dependence upon the will of her lord and master. In explanation of the limitations pointed out, which exist both in the religious and moral standards of the Babylonians, the example of Assyria in her immediate vicinity must be urged as a potent factor.

It could not be otherwise, but living as it were under the shadow of fierceness and cruelty, that the development of Babylonia was seriously hampered. Moreover, the power of Assyria was a constant menace to Babylonia's independence, and as a natural consequence of the efforts she made, whenever the opportunity presented itself, of throwing off the heavy burden of Assyrian tyranny, much of her energy was drained which might have been directed into better channels. But it would also seem that in return for the civilizing influence Babylonia exerted upon Assyria, the Babylonians in later times caught the warlike spirit of Assyria, so that upon the final overthrow of Assyrian dominion, the mantle of authority in Mesopotamia fell upon her shoulders. The kings of the second Babylonian monarchy, notably Nebuchadnezzar, strove to emulate the warlike deeds of the Assyrian conquerors, but it is significant that the duration of the young heir to Assyria's *Weltmacht* was brief. Scarcely a century rolled by before the sceptre of authority had passed into other hands. The genius of the Babylonian people lay in another direction than that of conquest and the acquirement of power, and it may be said that when Babylonia was placed in a position for which she was neither fitted nor destined, her apparent exaltation was already a symptom of her moral decline.

THE STUDY OF ETHICS AT OXFORD.

BY S. ALEXANDER, M.A.

THE study of ethics forms one of the most prominent features of the Arts course at Oxford. In the ordinary education for the pass degree, ethics is most commonly studied in a portion of Aristotle's *Ethics*. This, together with some historical author, forms one of the innumerable combinations of subjects in which a person may qualify himself for a degree. But it is not necessary to enter into details of this course.

The education for honors is kept entirely apart from the education for the ordinary degree. The nature of the examination may be briefly described, since it largely determines the instruction which is offered. There is no special "school" of philosophy at Oxford, in the same way as there is a special "tripos" at Cambridge. Philosophy forms one part of the subjects prescribed for the school of *Literæ Humaniores*, or, as it is familiarly termed, "Greats," which includes also Greek and Roman history (studied in the original authorities), and classical scholarship. Oxford philosophy acquires its peculiar flavor from its association with the study of classical history and literature. The greatest part of the students' attention is given to Plato and Aristotle. Merely to read the statute which prescribes the examination gives little idea of the actual course of studies pursued. Besides "Logic," the statute requires the "Outlines of Moral and Political Philosophy," but under cover of these and other fortunately vague designations the education has been decided by custom and tradition. Bacon's *Novum Organum* is mentioned by name among the subjects included in the examination. Otherwise no particular text-book is obligatory, but a list of books is given from which the candidate is recommended to choose, the one condition being that he must offer from the list at least two

treatises by ancient authors. From the list which is quoted in the foot-note,* it will be seen that the *Republic* of Plato and the *Ethics* of Aristotle are only two out of this selection, but practice has determined that every student reads these two books. The *Republic* contains not only ethics, but political philosophy and metaphysics; and to judge by the work done in the examination, it produces the stronger impression on the majority of the students, but probably more time is spent over the *Ethics*. It must not, however, be supposed that the study of ethics is confined to these two books. On the contrary, the whole subject is studied both in its history and as a living science, so far, of course, as the broad questions are concerned. Thus, probably every student studies Mill's *Utilitarianism*, and most study Mr. Spencer's *Data of Ethics*, while Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics* and Dr. Martineau's *Types of Ethical Theory* are also widely read. Great attention is paid to the history of ethics, especially to the great English writers down to Bentham, though there is not time to study them except in extracts; and on the other side to Kant's *Theory of Ethics*, especially the *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals*.

This plan, unsystematic as it is, possesses many obvious advantages. It secures a considerable acquaintance with the great Greek philosophers, an acquaintance made by students who are at the same time reading the Greek historians, and have already acquired some familiarity with the poets and orators in their studies for a previous examination (*Moderations*), during the first eighteen months of their University course. Some text-books must be used for the study of ethics; and Aristotle's work, despite the corruptions of the reading, is an admirable book for the purpose. Moreover, the system leaves perfect freedom with regard to modern ethics for teacher and student to follow his own particular bent. Some, and

* The list is as follows:—(1) Plato's *Republic*; (2) Plato's *Protagoras*, *Phædrus*, *Gorgias*, *Laws* III., VII., X.; (3) Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*; (4) Aristotle's *Politics*; (5) Locke on the Human Understanding, with either (a) Butler's *Sermons*, or (b) Hume's *Enquiry*; (6) certain selected portions of Kant, to be offered in German or English.

probably most, incline to the history of the subject. Others, of a more speculative turn, prefer the study of the contemporary science. The questions in the examination are so chosen and constructed as to afford opportunity for the most various tastes and points of view. Students who have a bent in a particular direction may, and often do, offer a special subject, in addition to the ordinary work of the school.

One important feature of the study, also largely due to its being pursued so much through the medium of Greek authorities, is that ethics is constantly kept in connection with political philosophy, which also is an integral part of the course. All students read the *Republic*, but they are encouraged to read also Aristotle's *Politics*, the weaker men to read selections, and the best men to read the whole. This book and Kant's philosophy have lately been frequently offered as special subjects. It may be added that here, too, as in ethics proper, the great modern authorities are studied, such as Maine (especially *Ancient Law*), Mill, portions of Austin, and of Bluntschli, while some students read also the elements of political economy. This last science is also offered sometimes as a special subject. Though in the actual examination the political philosophy is now associated with ancient history, the student of ethics by being perpetually led on to politics as well is compelled to think of morality as a social phenomenon.

Most of the lectures bear directly or indirectly on the work of the examination. There are often as many as twenty or twenty-five persons, including the professors and college lecturers, lecturing in philosophy, and the larger half are occupied with ethics or politics. In thinking of this large (perhaps too large) number, it must be remembered that the "Greats" school is still the most popular of all. Several lectures are given on the *Republic* and *Ethics*, the two books which are practically obligatory. The treatment varies with different lecturers: some are more concerned with interpreting Aristotle and Plato as Greek thinkers, others tend to use the books as text-books for the subject of ethics in general. There is always some lecture on the history of English ethics, very often one upon Kant's ethics. Some lecturers

discuss the principal questions in an independent treatment. The professors usually treat some historical or scientific aspect of the subject. Thus among the lectures of the last year or two there have been, besides the lectures on the *Republic* and *Ethics*, such titles as these: "Moral Philosophy: the Intuitionist School," "Outlines of Moral Theory," "Introduction to Moral Philosophy," "The Moral Sense and Rational Schools," "Kant's Moral Philosophy," "Modern Ethical Systems," "Idealistic Ethics," "Utilitarian and Evolutionist Ethics," "Socialism" (these three last professorial.) It is worth while adding that there are lectures on Aristotle's *Politics* and on general political philosophy. Professional lectures are, of course, open to the whole University, but by an arrangement between colleges, all college lectures are thrown open as well.

The list of lecturers, however, gives a very imperfect idea of the mechanism of teaching. Perhaps the greater part of the instruction is done privately by the college tutors and lecturers. The practice is for each student to bring an essay, once a week, on some subject of his course, and ethics has a certain number of terms given to its share. The essays are used partly as a means of testing the student's knowledge of his text-books, partly to discuss the leading questions of the subject with him. The tutor is able to consult the abilities and tastes of his pupils, and he is able to direct them to the special portions of books which it is profitable for them to read, but of which it is impossible for them to read the whole. It is probable that a majority of teachers believe that this so-called "tutorial" system, as it is the most characteristic, so it is also the most effective part of the training, on account of the personal contact of the teacher with the pupil and the freedom to treat different individuals differently, which it affords. Some, on the other hand, while acknowledging its great advantages, believe that it does not produce large enough results to compensate the drain upon the teacher's energies.

It was stated above that the greatest latitude was allowed for difference of philosophic views and tastes. But this statement must not be understood to imply any very great variety

in actual fact. The work of the school is so heavy that none but the best students have leisure to strike into lines of their own. A great deal, therefore, depends on the teachers, and though there is very considerable diversity among them, yet it is natural that a great number of men living in close relationship, and largely occupied with teaching, should be more or less uniformly influenced by some one important thinker. The consequence is that though the atmosphere is rather one of criticism upon every philosophy, than of positive devotion to any particular one, there is a certain uniformity of tone through a large number of the staff. Some years ago, Mill was in the ascendant; at present he is still more studied than any other modern writer, but he is generally very adversely criticised; and the Empirical School, who were his predecessors, share the same fate. Mr. Spencer is studied less, but not less severely handled. The most potent influence in Oxford is certainly that of the idealist German philosophy, as it has been impressed on the University through the life-work of T. H. Green. A great many of the present lecturers on philosophy were his hearers, and came under the spell of that profoundly inspiring personality. The professor of Moral Philosophy, Mr. Wallace (who is the president of the London Ethical Society), and the new professor of Logic, Mr. J. Cook Wilson, were both much affected by Green, and the same may be said of one of the most influential teachers of philosophy, Mr. R. L. Nettleship, the editor of Green's works, and of Mr. D. G. Ritchie, one of the most popular lecturers on political philosophy, whose name will doubtless be familiar to many American readers. On the other hand, Mr. Case, the new Waynflete professor of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy, and the emeritus professor of Logic, Dr. Fowler, occupy very different positions from Green's. Professor Sidgwick's work is also studied, though not so much as would be expected. How long the present condition of things will last it is impossible to tell, but the empirical philosophy is at present decidedly undermost. Already, however, some of the younger men are beginning to take a more independent line, and there are even signs of a reaction, or rather of a movement forwards.

In the interests of the science itself, and of the vitality of the study of ethics at Oxford, it is to be hoped that this movement may continue.

Green's influence and example have contributed to bringing about a phenomenon which is very striking in modern Oxford,—the interest which is taken in social questions. Experts in these questions constantly come down to the University, and they are welcomed by a great number of the best undergraduates, as well as of the teachers. This phenomenon cannot, of course, be ascribed to any one cause, such as the teaching of a particular philosophy. It is in reality only a part of that general quickening and enlargement of the University-life which has resulted from its more direct contact with the outer world. And the most directly active influences in producing this practical interest, especially as regards the poorer classes in East London, have been those of Arnold Toynbee and the Rev. S. A. Barnett. But Green's public life in the city of Oxford, and his teaching, have greatly helped both directly and indirectly to the same issue. With Arnold Toynbee, his connection was direct and intimate, and the practical tone of his ethical theory is echoed in the teaching of many of his former pupils.

There can be no doubt that the teaching of philosophy, and especially of moral philosophy, at Oxford has reached a high degree of perfection. The quantity of good work done in the examination each year is astonishing. If it suffers from a certain monotony of tone and want of freshness and originality, this is an evil due, to a very great extent, to the severe strain of the examination, the demands of which are probably too great for most students. A critic might easily find fault with the Oxford plan of studying philosophy, especially in its neglecting to encourage any systematic treatment of psychology, a defect which is, however, now being partly remedied. But taken as a whole, it has been admirably successful, and the ethical part of it at least is eminently attractive, while its power is manifest. There is an atmosphere of philosophy about the place, which insensibly affects the student's mind. Many a man who leaves Oxford for public life, or for the

Church, or the Bar, or Commerce, when he has too little time or has lost the taste for speculation, feels grateful to the University for tincturing him with philosophical principles and the philosophical temper at a time when the mind was still accessible to these influences.

MALTHUSIANISM AND WORKING-WOMEN.

BY FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS, A.M.,

Bryn Mawr College.

THIRTY-FIVE years ago all serious thought sprang from the premise that in the beginning was the individual. All interpretations of life went back to primordial cell, indivisible soul, or man "in a state of nature." Philosophy has not gone to the opposite extreme—it has not become socialistic—but it is becoming distinctly sociological. We are beginning to recognize that individuals are as inexplicable apart from society as society is unthinkable apart from individuals. Perhaps no other phase of the intellectual revolution, begun in 1855, is quite so characteristic as this. As M. Guyau has expressed it, the highest task of the nineteenth century has been "to put in relief the social side of the human individual and of living beings generally." This way of regarding things touches every human interest. The philanthropist and the student of criminal phenomena seek in social conditions for the genesis of pauper and criminal character. The psychologist, obliged by phenomena of double personality and other pathological states to regard conscious personality as composite, finds in the social environment the most important factors of intellectual and moral life. Even religion and art are formulated anew in sociological terms, as in Robertson Smith's significant book on the Religion of the Semites and M. Guyau's *L'Art au Point de Vue Sociologique*, with the result that a flood of light is thrown on points that hitherto were hopelessly obscure.

This conviction, that to know man we must understand

society, forces us back to a position that, at one time, seemed to be almost abandoned. The so-called law of population must be brought again into the scientific foreground. If it is useless to study human personality apart from social relations, it is worse than idle to attempt the investigation of social relations without going down thoroughly into those principles of population by which social relations of every kind are conditioned.

No theorem ever was more bitterly debated than Malthus's proposition that population tends to multiply beyond the limits of subsistence. Yet it was only in political economy that it had scientific recognition. To-day its real magnitude begins to be apprehended. Besides the part it plays in economic thought, it underlies the whole theory of civilization; for the fact itself, that mankind tends to a relative over-multiplication, is related to human progress in a way that earlier writers only dimly perceived. In the discussions of half a century to a century ago, it was assumed by the disputants on both sides that over-population is an evil, and an evil only. We now know that it is only the over-multiplying population that makes progress. Wealth, art, learning and refinement, presuppose a certain density of population and active competition. Where these coexist the struggle for existence has been known in full severity. Social sympathies and powers of abstract thought have not appeared until men have had to stand by one another, and have learned to live by their wits; and these beginnings of wisdom have come to birth only when numbers have pressed hard upon subsistence,—not upon resources, not upon potential subsistence, but upon that actual subsistence obtained by the industrial methods at the time in vogue.

Yet the fuller knowledge of our day has not cancelled the list of miseries that Malthus enumerated. It has added new ones, and worse. The struggle that sharpens thought, that brings out the beauty and power of human life at one extreme, leaves at the other more than that poverty which is the mildest penalty of failure. It leaves physical and moral wreck. "They judge wrongly," says Dr. Morselli, "who

think that the evils of civilized society, such as misery, disease, prostitution, madness, suicide, are accidental and avoidable. These social evils represent the inevitable result of the struggle for existence."

Are we then shut up to the conclusion that everything which makes life beautiful and worthy to be enjoyed by those whom nature has chosen to favor must for all time be purchased at the ruin of the outcast? Without over-populating vigor and resulting struggle no progress; with over-population every indescribable form of degradation and despair: is this the final word of our philosophy?

Happily not quite. The population problem is being studied to-day not only more comprehensively than in Malthus's time, but by better methods, and with different and more specific results. Social statistics, crude as they are in many respects, are yet sufficiently exact in regard to a few things to enable us to say positively that it will not do to generalize in this matter of population-ratios and results irrespective of social classes and modes of life. Birth-rates and death-rates are not the same in country and city; in the richer and the poorer classes; among the native and the foreign born. Nor do the evil and good results of a tendency to increase beyond the existing limits of subsistence spring from the increase of all classes indifferently. Late statistical results, and studies in medical demography, go to show that the different social classes are only different stages in the development of the same stock. Thus the existing working population of the cities did not descend from the urban wages classes of past generations, but, in part, from the unsuccessful individuals of the mercantile and professional classes, and in part from the unsuccessful elements in the agricultural population of the country. The mercantile, manufacturing, and professional men of the present day are for the most part from country stock; very few of them from an urban ancestry. No stock can survive for unlimited generations under the conditions of city life. Sooner or later it runs a downward course and disappears, leaving its place to fresh energy from country homes.

The agricultural population, then, is the perpetual seed-bed

of human society. An overflow from the country it is that builds and dwells in cities, and develops there the higher forms of industry and intellectual life. It creates civilization, but at a heavy cost. The price of success in urban enterprise is a nervous strain that only the strongest and keenest endure. Of the defeated, numbered by thousands, those that are shattered in nerve fill up the insane asylums and the morgues; the wicked seek careers of vice and crime; the honest drift into the ranks of the industrious wages class. The well-to-do class of the cities does not over-multiply. It marries late, and its few children start in life with impaired vitality. The working-class, on the other hand, multiplies beyond the demands of the labor market, and the overflow becomes the great body of the unemployed. From the urban unemployed, reinforced by vicious and idle elements from the country (for the country generates not only the best, but in its neglected solitudes and thriftless villages some of the very worst human stuff), are spawned forth tramps and the permanently pauperized wretches of the lowest slums.

In these facts we have the one true key to all our social problems. It is in the highest degree desirable that the better part of the country population should be maintained in over-multiplying vigor, so that, generation after generation, it may feed the cities—and in the cities the great enterprises, the professions, sciences and arts—with fresh vitality and power. It is equally desirable that the birth-rate of the poorer half of the urban working population should be greatly reduced, for it is perfectly certain that this half is composed, for the most part, of the doubly unsuccessful in the social struggle, and that its vitality is so near the point of exhaustion that it falls an easy victim to inebriety and every lower form of vice. If social evils are to be not palliated, but in a measure prevented, the increase of the wages class must be kept well within the social demand for labor.

But are not all tendencies the other way? Is it not the choicest country stock that tends to become sterile, or to consume itself in towns, and does not the most hopelessly inefficient portion of the wages class exhibit the most utter lack

of procreative prudence? Here again we have questions that get somewhat different answers from the latest data than would have been given to them a few years ago.

In nearly all discussions of Malthusianism that students of political economy are familiar with, the question is regarded from the stand-point of the prudence or imprudence of men. Thus the Rev. Dr. Thomas Chalmers wrote that he knew of no "right or comfortable or efficient way" of restraining population "than by the establishment of a habit and a principle among the laborers themselves. If they will in general enter recklessly into marriage, it is not possible to save a general descent in their circumstances." Now, as a matter of fact, birth-rates depend very little on the age at which men marry, while they depend directly on the age at which women marry. A young woman who marries at sixteen may easily enough have a dozen children or more. If she marries at twenty-seven she is not likely to have more than two or three. This most obvious fact in the whole problem has received the least attention. Economists and divines have vied with one another in preaching prudence to men, while all the while the rate of population-increase has been actually determined by the economic position of women.

John Stuart Mill alone had some perception of the truth. The desirable result that population should bear a gradually diminishing ratio to capital and employment "would be much accelerated," he affirmed, "by another change which lies in the direct line of the best tendencies of the time, the opening of industrial occupations freely to both sexes;" and he added, more specifically, "I shall only indicate, among the probable consequences of the industrial and social independence of women, a great diminution of the evil of over-population." But even Mill did not foresee the facts quite as they are. He anticipated that great numbers of self-supporting women would forego marriage altogether. He did not understand, any better than other writers of his day, that the really important influences lie in the conditions that determine not whether women shall marry at all, but at what age they shall marry.

These conditions are changing, and changing in a way that promises a great diminution of social ills. We hear a great deal just now about the probable influence of the higher education of women upon the birth-rate of the cultivated classes. The discussion is a good example of how a conspicuous thing may overshadow a momentous one. The momentous thing is that for every score of girls of the cultivated classes who receive a college education a thousand girls of the working-classes are postponing marriage for a time on account of the opportunities now open to them for self-support. In order to live they are no longer obliged to marry and begin bearing children as soon as fathers or mothers have ceased to provide for them. The burdens of maternity coming only when they are ready to assume them, their families can no longer be large in the old-fashioned sense of the word.

Evidences in support of this conclusion are found in the report of the United States Commissioner of Labor on *Working-Women in Large Cities*. The information was obtained by personal interviews with 17,427 women, employed in twenty-two cities, and is fairly representative of a great many thousands more. Of these 17,427, only 745 were married, 1038 were widowed, leaving 15,387 single. The average age was twenty-two years and seven months. More than seventy-five per cent. of the whole number were less than twenty-five years old, and, of these, 8302 were more than seventeen years old. This means that nearly or quite one-half of the working-women are at present single during several of the years in which, in former generations, women of the same class were rearing children.

To realize the full significance of this delay of motherhood, another most important consideration must be called to mind. The girl that marries at sixteen or seventeen (and how very common such marriages have been in the English-speaking working-classes no reader of industrial history needs to be told) has enjoyed no opportunities for self-improvement. The prospect is far from good that she will be able to make a home in which children will learn foresight and self-control and grow up with that strong regard for the decencies of life

which is the sole guarantee of thrift and prudence. But if marriage be delayed for even four or five years, the whole intellectual and moral life may be lifted and expanded. An effective desire to live respectably and worthily may be awakened, and the woman who has once known this desire will never permit her children to sink into indifference, or worse, without an effort to quicken their finer sensibilities. She will think twice before giving her hand in marriage, and will demand a reasonable assurance that she is not to step down to a lower standard of living.

Here, then, would seem to be the real strategic point in the attack on social evils. To aid in multiplying to the fullest possible extent the opportunities for young women to earn their own support and to surround them during their wage-earning years with uplifting and refining influences; are not these plainly the most fundamental duties now confronting society? The multiplication of opportunities has been brought about thus far almost wholly by the unconscious processes of economic evolution, and it will go on in the same way. All that conscious effort can do is to make war on the ignorance and prejudice that hinder and waste. But in providing educational influences and wholesome environments the field for organized effort and individual self-sacrifice is practically unlimited. Nor is it being neglected. Perhaps in no other kind of ethical activity is there at this moment more earnest work going forward, nor any that has been already more richly rewarded. The working-girls' societies, which recently held their sixth annual convention in New York, have grown far beyond the experimental stage. They have become a power in the mental and moral life of working-women, affording, by means of their meetings, discussions, and classes, a large measure of that education which teaches the value of sanitary surroundings, cultivates a love of books, music, and art, and awakens a sense of the moral responsibilities underlying family and social relations. Just such work is being done also, with growing success, by neighborhood guilds, college settlements, and similar organizations under many names. The movement for university extension will in time helpfully touch the

lives of thousands of working-women as well as of working-men.

The sober student of sociology can be neither pessimist nor unqualified optimist in his estimate of human progress. What he sees going on is a slow betterment of conditions, and a gradual lifting of the many no less than the favored few. The improvement is slow not only because it demands unflinching endeavor and self-sacrifice, but because so much of the best-intentioned philanthropy is misdirected. The practical service of sociology will be to reveal the points at which educational work will tell; and if there is one truth to which all sociological conclusions at present point, it is that if society would expend its ameliorative resources to the utmost advantage it should concentrate them strongly on the work of raising the standard of living of the self-supporting young women of the wages class.

ETHICAL SOCIETIES AND THE LABOR QUESTION.

BY WILLIAM CLARKE, M.A.

My view of the proper function of an Ethical Society is that it works not so much for any specific reform as for a new social order; that it wages war not so much against particular vices and crimes as against mere conventionalism and the spirit of formal secular routine. The message of the ethical reformer must be like that of Jesus,—“Except your righteousness exceed the righteousness of the scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no wise enter into the kingdom of God.” This is where the ethical movement parts company with the present organized church system of Christendom. The grave charge brought against that system is that it is essentially of a piece with the society around it; and that it has largely lost its initial impulse in a mere decorous respectability and acceptance of the *de facto* social order around it. In saying this I refer not of course to the yearning and striving of particular

individuals in the churches here and there, but of the general system. Our English churches are as truly a bulwark of bourgeois society as is parliamentary government or the Bank of England. They keep things quiet, make as many "respectable" people as possible, support law and order, and provide cushioned pews in neo-gothic churches for the millionaire and a corrugated iron mission chapel for the unwashed. They accept society in the main as it is, and merely propose to do a little patching and mending here and there. Our higher Anglican clergy dine with the lord mayor, drink to the army and navy, and bless piratical expeditions to steal land in Africa in the interests of London financiers. Its curates can rarely rise above the ethics of the "soup-kitchen" and the "coal committee" and the other institutions for doling out charity. The Nonconformist minister has such snug relations with his middle-class hearers that he does not often care to speak out plainly on the vital social question.

Now, in working for social righteousness a real Ethical Society must strike a blow at this mere conventionalism. It must endeavor to develop an heroic attitude of mind and a wide view of man's needs and nature. Instead of mending and patching a hopeless rotten social order it must teach men that it is necessary and possible to bring in a new and better order. Not that the ethical reformer should ignore or do away with any genuine existing morality or spiritual impulse. He should rather seek to help the growth of all true moral work already existing; he should extend the sphere of moral relationship. But what we need is a wholly different temper from that which prevails. We must have done with what Jesus called "play-acting," or, as it is translated in our Bibles, "hypocrisy." We must drag social conventionalities to the light as Dr. Stockmann, in Ibsen's "Enemy of the People," exposes and tears in pieces the canting platitudes of "the compact, liberal majority." We must rouse from their pleasant torpor the comfortable classes whose sole notion of heaven is a heavy balance at the bank and a well-stocked suburban villa, and whose hell is diminution of income and loss of social position. The middle classes have got into a

sort of comfortable routine existence, swathed round with a number of pleasing maxims and easy commonplaces. Like those who dwelt in the days of Noah, they eat and drink, marry and are given in marriage, and smile incredulously when you tell them that the working-people of the world, whose lives are spent in gloom and sorrow, will not allow this state of things to go on indefinitely.

As a mere matter of formal history, the middle classes know in a vague way that their manner of living is quite a modern growth, but they do not *feel* it to be so. They regard it practically as the normal state of things instead of being, as it is, an excrescence on human society. They want to glide along smoothly in a world where the stern divinities have never long permitted this emasculating process to continue. A timid, comfortable, dull, humdrum prosperity is the ideal aimed at. For this base object men who might be fulfilling the beneficent purposes of progress will spend the best years of their lives, the best energies of their manhood. To the worship of this despicable deity, "Mammon, the least erected spirit that fell from heaven," comfortable matrons dedicate their sons and daughters. I regret to say that I cannot exempt a large section even of the working-class, at any rate in England, from the same reproach. In one of her letters George Eliot says, when writing of the revolutionary movement of 1848, that the ideal of the French workman was a just social order; that of the English workman, a few shillings more per week. Things are somewhat different now in England, thanks in a great degree to the energetic Socialist propaganda; but there are still thousands of workmen who actually admire the lazy class above them, and would be delighted to be admitted within that charmed circle, were it possible. Workman still looks down on workman; and the wives of the "amalgamated joiners" will not visit the help-meets of the humbler laborers. Each is trying to raise himself to the class above him, instead of trying to raise his own class as a whole; and smug bishops tell them that this is exactly the right thing to do. When the workman who "gets on" has effected the object of his poor ambition, he is often the

most tyrannical and least worthy of his class, as the records of British and American capitalism will abundantly prove.

Now, an Ethical Society, working for social righteousness, ought to appeal to both this middle and this workingclass. To the workingman it should show that the social problem can never be solved by individuals here and there rising out of the working-class into a better middle-class condition, but only by the raising of the whole working-class. For this great object workman should stand by workman in one vast solid phalanx of honest labor. The ideal of becoming a small employer is not only a paltry one, but economic causes are rendering it impossible of realization ; and there should be substituted for it a social ideal to be worked out in a community of equals.

To the respectable middle class the ethical reformer must show that justice and goodness, not respectability, are the ends of human life. The idea of the good citizen must be changed. The bourgeois ideal of the good man is one who is kind to his children, indulgent to his wife, punctual in pew on Sunday, with well-brushed hat, gilt-edged prayer-book, and other Philistine appurtenances. This worthy returns straight from office to villa every night, and, safe within the walls of the latter, shuts out the wrongs and sufferings of the world, the public affairs, the movements of the masses, the cry of the oppressed ; flattering himself all the time that he is "cultivating the domestic virtues." Such a creature (a hundred thousand of them pour into the city of London every day) is so characterless that one might defy God himself to find any soul within the sleek, well-fed, well-oiled, well-dressed body. Here such a one stands to-day, owing his civilization (such as it is) to the state of which he is a member, to the great family of states which make up civilized mankind, to the faithful labor of thousands of human beings, the majority of whom he would spurn from his door-step, or whom, if they demanded justice, he and others like him would urge on the soldiers and police to beat and kill. Such a person must be told that there is a larger morality than that which incarnates itself within the four walls of his villa ; a

public, human, universal morality which knows no distinction of race or family, but which insists always on the claims of the human being. The ethical movement must set itself against what Mr. John Morley has called "greasy domesticity," the creation of the smug commercial class who rose to power in England on the ruins of a stronger and nobler aristocracy,—nobler because, in their hard, strong, unlovely, but genuine way, they did feel themselves to be in some degree at least trustees for the common good. The Ethical Society should regard no man as moral who is not in some degree devoted to large, generous, social aims. Members of an Ethical Society, instead of being timid and conventional, should be encouraged to sympathize with the great revolutionary movements of our time, and to see in them the working of the vast human soul ever ascending in its aspirations to a larger, freer, and more organic life.

So much for the temper and spirit in which ethical work should, as it seems to me, be carried on. I now come to a more difficult subject. I have at different times heard many of the lectures of the London Ethical Society, and at the close of each this thought has occurred to my mind: All this is very fine and good; but the question now arises, What are our immediate duties if we believe in the principles just set forth? The practical question comes home to the ethical reformer, What are the necessary implications of your ethical teachings? This plain question will be asked by every workingman and cannot be evaded. The very complaint brought against churches is that, while wrangling about obscure doctrines, they do not even attempt to carry out the plain precepts of Him whom they honor with their lips. It is left to an outsider like Tolstoi to recall to us the urgent commands of the Founder of Christianity. Now, we cannot say to men, "Be warmed and fed," without showing them how, in modern times, under the conditions of our life of to-day, this can actually be done; and if we fail in some degree at least to do this, we shall be feeding our hearers with the barren east wind. We cannot merely say to the employer, "Be kind to your workmen," or to the mistress, "Treat your servant well."

Such phrases have no meaning; they are mere platitudes. We must rather say, "If workman or servant is a human being with passions and capacities like those of employer or mistress, then the whole question of the relation of these various persons to each other must be fully examined, and no relationship which involves moral degradation or loss of freedom must be permitted." Mere theorizing or ethical lecturing without any honest attempt to make our theories into actualities inevitably leads to sentimentalism, which gradually eats away all the firm, fine fibre of our moral nature and reduces it to pulp. The sentimentalist is useless to others and dangerous to himself. When the Christian Church was really potent, it always enjoined positive, definite, social duties. St. Ambrose did not content himself with talking pious platitudes to rich people about using wealth well, but told the rich man plainly that he was a thief in language as vigorous as any that may be heard at any social democratic meeting. And that was the age when toiling men felt life and reality in the Church.

And now, what is it that an Ethical Society must preach in an especial degree? It must give the message that the world most needs; it must supply the most obvious world-wide demand. What this is it is not difficult to discover. The world over to-day the question of labor, its status and reward, stands out conspicuously as the prominent question which in some way embraces, includes, implies every other. I will challenge any social reformer to undertake any moral problem to-day without being brought sooner or later face to face with the labor question. You complain, it may be, of the corruption and trickery of politics, the dishonesty of trade, the sense of social insecurity, the degradation of women, the dangers of our huge cities, the class hatreds, the greed and love of gain all around us. You will find, the more you study, that the labor problem lies at the bottom of all these and many more, that it is the root question.

The present conditions of labor, by general consent of all competent observers, render universal human improvement impossible. You are interested in education, it may be, in

the widest sense. There is some boy or girl of the working-class whom you wish to develop into a noble, full-grown human being. Well, whatever may be the state of things in the chief American cities, in London this is well-nigh impossible. The boy may get a good start, though that is difficult enough; but he arrives at the age of thirteen or fourteen, and is bound to go and work. Under the conditions of actual life to-day he is fortunate if he finds regular, fairly-paid employment. Supposing he does, what is his daily life? While your boy is in his warm bed, from which he will descend to a good breakfast, this other boy is up before daybreak, makes his scanty meal of bread and weak tea in the dark and is off to his work. Hard, uninteresting, monotonous toil is his portion till night comes. Perhaps he will sit at a machine which everlastingly turns out nothing but heels of boots. Perhaps he will draw out cinders from a furnace and put fresh coal in with a long shovel. I heard the other day of a boy who was employed ten hours every day, week after week, month after month, year after year, in breaking eggs. Think of your worshipful self engaged in such an occupation. The greater part of the energies you have tried to awaken in the boy lie dormant. At night he is often too tired for anything but a "penny dreadful" or "dime novel," from which he learns that forgery or burglary is a much more interesting and profitable occupation than his own life of toil; and he has probably heard that no sane man carries on business except for profit. He resists the temptation, however, works on, has a momentary gleam of romance in the shape of marriage, and then enters on thirty or forty years of dreary slavery, relieved, it may be, by occasional starvation, which, he is told by some people, is due to the working of economic laws, and, by other people, to the inscrutable designs of a God whose name and nature is Love! His wife soon loses almost every charm of womanhood, his children grow up with even worse chances than he had, and he is very lucky if he does not end his days in a workhouse.* Do you realize that this is to-day a true

* One person in every five in London dies either in workhouse or hospital.
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picture of the condition of tens of millions in the civilized world? Read the report of the House of Lord's committee on the "sweating system," or the papers submitted to the labor congresses in Paris in 1889 or that in London in 1888, or Mr. Charles Booth's book on "Life and Labor in London." Or, interrogate men, as I have done, and find out something about their lives. I once talked to a waiter at Versailles, and asked him how he liked the town. "I know nothing of it," said he. "Then you have only been here a few days?" "Oh, no! I have been here nine months." "And never seen the palace and gardens?" "I have never been beyond that tree (pointing to one one hundred and fifty yards off); I am employed in this place every day from six in the morning to midnight." It is pleasant to sit in a clean, bright French restaurant over a bottle of Burgundy; but that is how your pleasure is obtained, that is how men's lives are sacrificed for you.

Certain inferences from these considerations are undeniable. No such person as I have sketched can possibly expand his faculties. Freedom must mean opportunity to expand, and without this there is but an imperfect and stunted morality. Neither can such a person develop these intellectual and artistic powers which are latent in all. Another inference is obvious. If a person is engaged all day long in producing what society needs or in doing useful social work, and yet can barely manage to live and maintain his children, some one else is engaged in robbing him. I do not see any escape from that conclusion; and surely it is the business of an Ethical Society to denounce robbery and help to put a stop to it.

There are also persons interested in questions of sexual morals. These questions are inseparably connected with the question of labor. If a girl or woman cannot, by her utmost exertions, earn sufficient to maintain herself, what shall she do? Our laws forbid her to commit suicide, and the street is the only other alternative. For there are men who themselves eat the bread of idleness, and are vicious, as every idle person is, and these men help to support the women in a life of dishonor. Out of the eighty thousand women on the London

streets to-day, it is safe to say that one-fourth at least have been driven there by want. Does any one suppose he will solve this problem by preaching to either idle men or poor women? The answer is, that it has been done and has failed. Let it be remembered, too, in this connection, that tens of thousands of families are compelled by their poverty to live in one room; and their offspring are generated, born, and reared in indecency. From such thorns will you gather grapes?

In England now clergymen and others are denouncing the sin of betting; a sin committed, according to the *London Evening News and Post*,* by eighty out of every hundred adult males in England. But what rational ground of condemnation can you urge, except you base your condemnation, as Herbert Spencer contends, on the ground that a man who makes a bet expects to get something for nothing? In which case the most vulgar blackguard who does the pea and thimble trick on a popular race-course is exactly in the same economic position as the rich man who depresses stock for the purpose of winning on a rise. Will you preach at the one and afterwards go home to dine with the other? If so, you are a "play-actor,"—*i.e.*, a hypocrite. Or you are interested in the peace question, it may be. But all wars to-day are commercial wars, made for gain; and you cannot, therefore, deal with the peace question without going also into the question of the just distribution of material well-being. In short, whichever way you turn, you find the labor question starting up before you; and, therefore, if you are a real ethical reformer, you must try to solve the labor problem first.

Jesus and his apostles and many of the fathers and confessors of the Catholic Church had to face essentially the same problem. But the problem was very much simpler then, and their solution cannot be ours. For they preached a gospel of asceticism, and urged the richer to share voluntarily with the poorer. That is an impossible attitude for the men of to-day. For good or for evil, asceticism has forever departed from the

* May 26, 1890.

world. The ideal of Syrian hermits and mediæval monks is not, never will be, the ideal of modern man. No doubt, the ethical teacher should urge simplicity of living and the desire for spiritual rather than material wealth. But we have to face the fact that, whereas in the days of Jesus, commerce was in its infancy, wants were few, nine-tenths of modern luxuries unknown, and the bare needs of life easily satisfied ; to-day we are nearly all engaged all day long in the production and distribution of wealth. It is the chief characteristic of the modern world that, as Emerson says, " Things are in the saddle, and ride mankind." " Take no thought for the morrow," said Jesus ; but *we* must take thought, we cannot help ourselves. The whole fabric of modern society depends absolutely on constant, engrossing care about material things by at least ninety-five men out of every hundred, and by an ever-increasing number of women whom the economic conditions force into the strife. I can see no escape from this so long as the present economic structure lasts unchanged. The shopkeeper in his shop, the workman at his machine, the signalman on the railroad, the broker on the exchange,—all must expend their energies during the greater part of their waking moments, day after day, year after year, on the routine of business. No time for meditation, " no leisure to grow wise," no pause, or a catastrophe would ensue. It is an economic condition which Jesus did not foresee, and for which consequently he did not provide. There is, in short, to put it briefly, an economic revolution, practically independent of our volition, and of which most of us are the victims. I say independent of our volition ; by which I mean that this state of things must go on so long as the causes which brought it about are permitted to operate uncontrolled and unmodified by man.

We may take, in reference to this economic condition, one of two lines of action. In the first place, we may deliberately elect to retrogress in social development. Like the people in Mr. Butler's story of " Erewhen," we may break up our machinery, destroy our telegraphs, tear up our railways, and sink our steamers. There are persons like Ruskin, who would be rather glad to see this done ; but no one can seriously believe

that we shall do it. But if we do not, there is but one other alternative. We must accept the immense and growing production of material wealth by machine industry as an inevitable fact from which there is no escape, and labor to secure a just distribution of that wealth and to make it serve all men, instead of most men existing to serve it. In a word, we must not concentrate our energy on the futile task of "moralizing" individuals after the fashion of the Comtists, but we must seek to moralize and rationalize our system of industrial relations.

I do not contend that an Ethical Society, as such, should deal with the details of legislative reform or labor politics, forced upon all civilized countries by the great Socialist agitation, though the more of its members there are who do concern themselves with these, the better. But I do contend that no ethical movement is worth its salt which does not deal with the principles which should and must regulate economic development if we are not to go forward into helpless slavery or backward into helpless barbarism. The organic nature of society is a doctrine fundamental to ethical reformers. It involves the treatment of every human being as an end in himself, and it implies that his end can only be reached in a society of free and equal persons. Take these doctrines into the industrial realm and what do they involve? Assuming that we cannot go back to individual production and distribution, that we must accept the material results of modern progress, these fundamental doctrines evidently involve social co-operation in production and distribution, or the substitution of the co-operative for the capitalist middle class republic. Opinions as to the means by which it may be (a) prudent, (b) morally legitimate to effect this social revolution, will vary. In this connection will arise problems connected with jurisprudence, the ethics of physical force, the duty of submission or the right of insurrection, which no Ethical Society, it appears to me, can ignore. We need to speak on these problems with consciousness of moral power and the authority of reason. The Catholic Church in its best days did speak to men on the problems of the time in this way; and no one can esti-

mate the immense service it thus rendered to humanity. And to-day the world needs a spiritual power which shall sway the minds and hearts of men. We do not desire, indeed, that the modern legislator shall repair to Canossa and kneel with the foot of an ecclesiastic on his neck; but we do need a race of teachers who shall speak with power and inspiration a reasoned doctrine of moral action in relation to social life; and who shall so speak that men of affairs shall be compelled to listen, and that the working masses shall know that they have champions and friends on whose side are fighting the enduring forces of the moral universe.

One of the chief curses of our time, as Mazzini has pointed out in many noble passages, lies in the divorce of thought and action. As a consequence we find, on the one hand, an ignorant, rash crowd who mean well, but who, on account of their rashness and their ignorance, can achieve nothing; and, on the other hand, a cold, unsympathetic, cynical, cultured class, dead to all the nobler emotions of the soul and ludicrously afraid of those whom they call "the mob." It is for the ethical movement to put an end to this separation. If it does this it will have to utter a disagreeable message to many pleasant, cultivated people. It will bring not peace, but a sword. For it must aid in the breaking up of many social conventions, in the destruction of many comfortable hypocrisies, and in apparently swelling the prevailing discord. Many will not listen to any message of this kind, but some will; and a sufficient "remnant" of those who will listen is, as Matthew Arnold told America, the only barrier which separates us from social anarchy. But that remnant, if it is to be really touched and convinced, must not only be lectured on general ethical principles, but must also be shown by resistless logic what are the actual necessary implications of these principles in society to-day.

It may be said that it is not the business of an Ethical Society to concern itself with (1) material well-being, and (2) affairs of state. Both objections come from those who, whether they are orthodox or agnostic, are essentially reactionists in that they are under the bondage of the old dualism.

They think that morality is something outside material life, that it is an external entity having no connection with trade and industry. They still believe, no matter how "advanced" they think themselves to be, that there are two worlds quite separate from each other, in one of which we may sing hymns and say prayers or (if we prefer it) read our "sacred anthologies," and in the other of which we may trip each other up and make money anyhow. "What do you mean by other world?" said Emerson; "there is no other world; the whole fact is here." Now the very essence of morality is the right ordering of our actual life so that the individual may be harmoniously related to his social environment, to the humanity of which he is an organic part. We cannot develop our moral nature in the air or in the fathomless depths of space, but in the real world of man and institutions, and it is that we are here for. And the life of man and the permanence of institutions are based ultimately on the facts of our material life, on our food, our clothing, our shelter. Therefore the just distribution of material well-being is as truly a spiritual question as any of the propositions contained in the Athanasian creed. Our spiritual life is not an entity quite apart from our bodily powers and their relations, but is inextricably blended with, and expresses itself through these. Modern society will not be saved either by asceticism or by a neo-pagan "rehabilitation of the flesh," but by a reasoned doctrine which looks for an incarnation of the spirit of truth in the actual material forms of the world of man.

Let us not always say,
"Spite of this flesh to-day
I strove, made head, gained ground upon the whole!"
As the bird wings and sings,
Let us cry, "All good things
Are ours, nor soul helps flesh more, now,
Than flesh helps soul!"

The second objection, that directed against interference with the province of the state, seems to me based on the same superstition as the previous objection,—viz., the superstition of dualism, the assumption that there are two worlds

that have no necessary connection with each other. I am well aware that, in the Middle Ages, the theory of dualism under which the temporal and spiritual powers were separated, and the best exposition of which is contained in the "De Monarchia" of Dante, aided provisionally the progress of mankind. But it surely was nothing more than a provisional arrangement rendered necessary by the disturbing revolutionary element of Christianity, which could not be fully incorporated in any *de facto* political state, and for which, therefore, an external sphere of operation must be left. Christianity, like anarchism, denies the validity of the state, since the latter is grounded in the soil of a supposed fallen nature. The world is regarded by it as hopelessly bad, and the province of the Christian teacher is to draw men out of it into a voluntary society in which they shall find their true life. But the actual state claims almost indefinitely the allegiance of men. Hence arose the great collision, which is nowhere quite ended, between the state and the Church. When Christianity began, anarchism seemed quite natural to the Christian; for, under the political conditions then obtaining, any such conception as that of the progressive state of modern times was impossible. The huge, corrupt fabric of the Roman empire, with its irresistible power, was the only state known, for the Greek commonwealths and the Hebrew theocracy had fallen in pieces. On the other hand, the persecutions of the Christians, cruel as they were, were nevertheless quite natural from the imperial point of view, since the emperors regarded the rising church an *imperium in imperio*, much as the United States government regards the Mormon Church or as the Russian government regards the revolutionary committees in that country. The incorporation of the Church into the empire under Constantine was, in a way, analogous to the attempt being made by the German Emperor to effect a *modus vivendi* between social democracy and the empire. Such attempts must always come when a new revolutionary idea has penetrated with sufficient force into the popular consciousness. The subsequent history of European civilization has involved a continual struggle between the two powers.

Under some of the great Popes, the Gregories and Innocents, the power of the Church triumphed, but it triumphed just because that power was exerted in the main to secure actual justice in Christendom. The law was a school-master, says St. Paul, to bring men to Christ. The Church may be said to have been a school-master to educate men for the modern progressive state. And the contest is now drawing to a close in the victory of the state everywhere. The old theory of the division of human life into two different spheres, the secular and the sacred, has broken down; and men are beginning to see the sacred in the secular. Modern science, modern philosophy, modern politics, modern ethics, are all based on the idea that life is one and the world a unity. The heterogeneous may indeed have proceeded from the homogeneous, but it was always implied there and will be once more united in a higher synthesis.

If this be a correct view of the present situation, we may expect in due time to see the dualism of the Middle Ages completely surrendered and the state invested with the solemnity and divinity which, under the mediæval forms, attached to the Church. Only this state will not be the old political state evolved in Western Europe with an external class-government superimposed on the people, but the free industrial commonwealth. How long it may take to evolve this new state from the chaos of the present I do not know, but to this ideal the forces of the modern world are working. The ethical reformer, therefore, who hopes to teach with intelligence, insight, and practical effect, must find his true sphere of activity in the common life of the states and must effectually purge himself of the ideas of retirement and quietism which we associate with mediæval Christianity. That is to say, the success of the ethical reformer will be exactly in proportion as he helps to transform the state. Tell me if your municipal government is improving, if your public schools are better, if your wealthy criminals are soundly punished, if taxation is proportioned to wealth, if preventible disease is stamped out, if the rights of the city are stronger than the greed of individuals, if there is a genuine attempt

made to subordinate monopolies to the public welfare, if public employees are worked reasonable hours for fair wages, if all get the blessing of pure water, good light, and healthy homes; tell me about these things, and I will tell you whether your Ethical Society is a failure or a success.

The development of a moral power in this actual world, once thought to be the legitimate prey of the devil; the building up of a *Civitas Dei*, not apart from, but out of actual humanity; the utilizing for this great purpose all that art and science have taught us; and the informing of the vast fabric with the spirit of love,—this is the work of the ethical movement. Its inward spirit is expressed in these lines of Wordsworth:

Paradise, and groves
Elysian, Fortunate Fields—like those of old
Sought in the Atlantic main—why should they be
A history only of departed things,
Or a mere fiction of what never was?
For the discerning intellect of man,
When wedded to this goodly universe
In love and holy passion, shall find these
A simple produce of the common day.

LONDON, ENGLAND.

OUR NEED: BETTER CITIZENS, FEWER LAWS.*

BY MR. CHARLES NAGEL.

PERHAPS there are not many Americans who did not at one time in their lives think to see in our institutions the perfection of human government. For my part I shall never forget my pain at the first warning statement, that our form of government might not be calculated to secure the greatest happiness for the largest number. So well arranged were our school-books, so well drilled were we in our churches, in our homes, and by the influence of our authors and our public speakers, that the mere expression of a doubt was like a cruel awaken-

* Address before the Ethical Society of St. Louis.

ing. My own impression is still that there is good reason for the early unbounded admiration of our institutions, and that the present doubt of their sufficiency is not well founded. My own fear has been, for some time, that the serious troubles at our door are to be attributed less to the form of our government than to the character of our citizens. In saying this I fully recognize that a successful government must reasonably meet the standard of its citizens; and I mean only to say that in so far as the doubt is to be charged to either, the real question is, whether or not we shall be able permanently to rise equal to a system, which gives so much freedom and demands so high a degree of individual responsibility.

To my mind few things can be more profitable to us than candid and public discussion of these questions, particularly by way of comparison between the past and the present. It can hardly be doubted that the very active interest in our early history, manifested to-day by authors and readers of all kinds and classes, is to be attributed very largely to a desire to understand the origin and purpose of our government, and in that way to find a more trustworthy guide out of existing complications. While the American is in many things strikingly superficial, he is usually pretty thorough when he meets a difficulty face to face; and he may be expected to come out of this investigation with reasonably reliable information as to the intentions of his forefathers; and with the entirely unlooked for, and therefore the more valuable, impression that his forefathers were exceedingly respectable and deserving individuals as citizens, in war and in peace, whose standards are by no means universally emulated at the present day. Holding that belief, I cordially welcome every effort or accident that may be calculated to bring the American citizen to self-recognition.

We know that it is equally popular, on the one hand, to speak of the good old times, and, on the other, to slightly dismiss that statement. No doubt both positions are to an extent justified. To admit that there is no general progress would be disheartening; but to assume that we must be deserving because our ancestors were, would be as clearly dan-

gerous. In moving civilization from the East to the West, we encounter some decided ups and downs; and the question is, whether our fathers may not have climbed the hill-sides, while we are at present in the swamp.

For the purposes of my position I do not find it necessary to unqualifiedly admire the American of a hundred years ago. Let it be admitted that in some respects the modern man is superior. But I do not hesitate to say that, as a disinterested citizen, he so greatly excelled us that we seem too far removed to even discern the difference. To show this I propose to briefly touch upon some of the marked changes in the public life of the American people.

To find the standard and the finest type of the American of revolutionary days, I would not go to the old story about the tea-chests in Boston Harbor; nor even to Bunker Hill; nor to any of the recitals of military heroism and endurance. These things have been told too often. The real loyalty of a people to its institutions, and to any cause, can be tested best in times of peace. I would go in another direction for my proof, which should appeal with peculiar force to the American of to-day. I would point to the fact that in those days the leaders of the people were great men; doubtless as great as ever were known to participate in the formation or management of any government. Now, it is true that other countries have had great men; they have come into power and have prudently ruled in monarchical countries often enough; but it would not therefore be safe to conclude that the spirit of the people in those countries was particularly elevated. But when, under a republican form of government, you find the people almost invariably selecting for their representatives the strongest and most independent men among them, then you may conclude, from that circumstance alone, that the nation is in a sound condition, politically speaking. It took strong and loyal Germans to make possible Bismarck; liberal Englishmen to recognize Gladstone and Bright; liberty-loving Italians to sustain Cavour. But what was true of them, was much more true of the American people, who, from before the war with England down to and including the election of John

Quincy Adams, almost without exception, selected its most competent men for public place.

Allowing all credit to the leaders, I feel that the people were the more remarkable. Their course argues an earnestness, a thoughtfulness and courage, a degree of moderation, and, above all, an appreciation of the true idea of equality and patriotism, to which we are certainly becoming strangers. For no one will deny that such is not the condition of things with us now. And it is interesting to examine wherein consists the change, how much of it means good and how much bad, and how it was brought about. Why were the leaders down to Andrew Jackson's time so well prepared to meet all the questions of their time, and why were the people so generally willing to leave the settlement of the issues to their natural leaders? Because every one, from the highest to the lowest, was interested in the principles involved. The people had by a superhuman struggle walked from under the great cloud of oppression. By their own efforts they had secured the right of self-government,—the old dream of universal equality. Great men could speak and write on those questions, because they were charged with them,—because they lived in the conflicts of the day. Inferior men could at least listen and follow greater ones, for they too gave their thought to the same questions. The very being of the people meant devotion to these sacred rights, which to them formed the foundation of life itself, all else being but superstructure, humble or lofty, according to desire or chance. The ambition of the individual was to rise as a member of the community; the community could be made strong and safe only by united effort; and for reasons, which would seem as natural as they are wise, the guidance of the cause was placed in the hands of the best-equipped men among them. It is a spectacle to be wondered at and to be gloried in. It is to be recommended to those to contemplate who are wont to despair of our cause at the present day. Under such influence the country proceeded to settle its questions and controversies, down to the time of Andrew Jackson. We have no difficulty in calling and remembering the names of Presidents up to that period,—

Washington, Adams, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, John Quincy Adams,—men who differed, who occupied positions almost as much at variance as the poles, but great men, selected by a great people for their excellence, for their capacity to manage and to represent.

But now came a change. It is perfectly true that up to this time there had been one element at work in the selection of the leaders which had not been entirely satisfactory. The choice was not quite as voluntary and free as it might seem. In spite of the now free institutions, there remained enough of old British tradition to select men partly because of their station; and Jackson's prominence marked a distinct revulsion from that old inherited feeling. There is one credit to which Jackson is entitled; there is one feature which is the source of consolation in reflecting upon the choice of the long list of nonentities who succeeded him. It is this: The people had been guaranteed equality as citizens, and they had now been distinctly aroused to a recognition of that thought, though they blundered in its realization. For a long time these influences had been at work. Jefferson had always preached ultra democratic doctrine. Even Madison modified his early views, and as President leaned more decidedly to the same doctrine. And in John Quincy Adams we really have the last President who claimed the place strictly on the ground of merit and fitness. As a consequence, he failed of election by popular vote, and only succeeded in the House of Representatives, whose members had not yet been taught that they were there merely to record the determinations of immediate popular excitement and whim. It is disheartening to observe how such a man—the justest and bravest of men—could be fairly persecuted with accusation and condemnation, and could be made to succumb before them, merely because he dared to let his life say that he was just, that he was brave, and that he was capable.

As a nation we seemed no longer to realize that the unheard-of advantages secured to us placed upon us corresponding obligations. The aim seems throughout to have become one of mere enjoyment of privileges and indulgence. And

what was true of the nation, certainly was of the individual. The citizen stopped at the most superficial notion of equality. He boldly insisted on his right to do anything and everything; but he utterly failed to see that it was his obligation still to qualify himself for the exercise of that right. Such was the spirit of that entire period. And it was the first distinct manifestation of the weakness from which our country may expect its great danger.

In that spirit the nation lived on. There were still individual strong men like Webster, Clay, Calhoun, Benton, etc., in public life. They came forward in their native States by dint of their superior power and ability. But not one of them succeeded in reaching first place, and only one of them was ever seriously considered for it. There was a protest against superiority of any kind,—a jealousy of manly strength and self-reliance,—and under that mistaken feeling the people proceeded to select representatives who were not distinguished by their personal worth, but who, by reason of their willingness to obey every beck and call, were supposed to be best calculated to carry out the people's all-ruling will. The inevitable result was not only that small unknown men came to the front, but the stronger ones found it doubly difficult to remain steadfast and true to conviction. Such men as Webster and Clay, though true to great causes and ideas, though successful in establishing the idea of union and nationality in our country forever, in obedience to an intolerant public became essentially compromisers on the slavery question, and ended smaller than they began. And more and more frequent became the instances of men prominent for their opinion on public questions, and for their exclusion from public life; and more and more frequent became the cases of peremptory instructions of men in public place by their constituents at home, followed either by abject obedience or by resignation.

But the great questions were not all settled (as they can fortunately never be); and gradually there crept upon the nation the practical question of union tested by that of slavery. No man prominent in those all-absorbing discussions was ever selected for public place by the whole people

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until the conflict was upon us, when, half by choice and half by chance, perhaps, the greatest of all Americans emerged from chaos to take Washington's chair. Then came that other brief and stormy period for leaders and commanding men. I do not think it can be said that, with all the devotion and all the sacrifices, even those men who guided us through that time were prepared as statesmen, in the sense in which the Revolutionary heroes were. But leaving that aside, it is a source of infinite comfort to feel that in times of great moment, when the danger is recognized, our people may always be found to rise equal to the occasion. Once more principles were involved; once more to belong to a party meant a belief in principles; and once more men were selected, at least in a measure, because by reason of their past they were deemed able to represent us in the future. At the present day these principles are established. The principle of nationality is as firmly embedded in the breasts of the people now as were the words of Daniel Webster for union then; slavery is abolished; and we, a great free nation, are once more face to face with the great problem, how to enjoy in time of peace the inestimable privileges which have been thrust upon us in times of war and distress.

The great conflicts have established that we are all equal; that we may govern ourselves; that we are one nation; and that there shall be no slavery. In the settlement of those conflicts we sent to the front great men, who defended their views with great ability and with strict good faith to their principles. Whenever the period of imminent conflict is passed, and we come to the plain problem of enjoyment of what we have, our strong men are swept down, small men appear on the surface, and selfishness and partisanship rule the nation politically and socially. This was the tendency long before the war; it has been so since the war; and it is to a much greater degree so now.

I have endeavored in these few words to trace the gradual decline of the standing of our citizen from stage to stage. To me the conclusion is inevitable, as I said at first, that our trouble must be less with the form of our constitution and

legislation than with the character of the citizen himself. And since the best way out of a difficulty is first to recognize the fact of its existence, then to examine into its true inwardness, and then to devise the best means out of it, I shall endeavor briefly to apply that method to the present condition of affairs.

To begin with, I see no reason for despondency. He who believes in our system as a system, must necessarily believe that the people either are or soon will be suited to it. For me the question therefore is: Conceding the relative perfection of our form of government; conceding that just at present the citizen is not living up to its demands, what is to be done? And it must be confessed that the main difficulty lies in this. We are not permitted in this instance to rely upon our old remedy, the making of new constitutions, and the enactment of new laws. That has been done. It is now a question of the employment and the enforcement of the laws which we have made. To do this we need men, officials and citizens; and since it is not easy to legislate men better and stronger than they are, we are confronted with the problem how to reach these men. In other words, our trouble lies much less with the politics of the state than with the morals and the ethics of the individual. And the novelty of it is, that we at last have a form of government in which the individual is really the source of all power, and the trustee and guardian of the state's dignity, but in which it is still impossible (as it must always be) to compel him to be better than he is. The fundamental idea of our system is that the citizen's chief contributions shall be voluntary. He should gladly exercise the rights which he has peremptorily demanded. And our problem therefore is, how to induce or coax him to voluntarily do what is actually necessary to the success of our government.

But let us dwell more directly on the complaints of our time; let us look at some of the remedies which are now advocated to remove them; and let us see whether they can ever be expected to reach the root of the evil. We boast of being a highly blessed people. The riches and natural re-

sources claimed and unclaimed, the fabulous growth of cities and towns, the enormous public and private enterprises, the sudden and vast fortunes, the tremendous material prosperity, are not only the wonder of the rest of the world, but are sounded in our own ears from early morn till late at night by every conceivable means. But with all this, under a form of government which has been thought as near perfect as wisdom could devise, and as liberal as imagination dared picture, we cannot deny a pronounced dissatisfaction and distrust, socially and politically speaking. The charge is that we are a party-ridden nation; that our political parties represent indifferent issues, and are sustained for the personal influence of its chiefs; that questions of general importance are sacrificed to local pride; that those who would seem most interested in good management of public affairs show no concern at all, while those least interested have taken entire control; that elections are rarely entirely fair, and too often altogether unfair; that our representatives from the highest to the lowest do not own their convictions, and have become mere dexterous recorders of the latest whims of the majority.

There was a time when the demagogue belonged to neither party, because he tried to go with both; to-day the independent man belongs to neither, because he is afraid of both. The concern of men in public life for the welfare of the majority, and their willingness to recount their own deeds and services in its behalf, tempt us to cry aloud for some Coriolanus, too proud to show his scars.

What is true politically, must be true socially. I am not willing to place all the blame upon the politician. He sins no more than he is sinned against. Society is one, and our chosen men represent us just as fitly as did Hamilton and Jefferson their constituencies. In other words, free citizens, who are not anxious to be well represented in public, cannot be concerned with very elevating interests socially. The citizen who neglects public duty not only commits a direct offence, but incidentally proves that his heart is set on false treasures. The man who has no thought for others must be limited to schemes for himself. And that is true of us. For-

tune and prosperity have turned the head of many a good man; they are about to try their effect upon a whole nation. The test of our happiness seems to be the pocket. Upon it turn the joys, the sorrows, and the jealousies of men. Authors and speakers offer it as the cure for all ills; new theories of government are based upon the division and assortment of pockets and the best method to keep them always reasonably full. About the pocket we read and write and plot and dream. Forgetful of the many woes of which there is no cure, forgetful of the many joys for which there is no price, we rise as a nation to condemn the money kings, and to compete with them.

If you fear that these colors are too dark, remember that I am not speaking of individuals, nor of classes, but of the prevailing political and social spirit of our people. If all the charges are not true, they are popularly supposed to be true, which is nearly as bad in their effect upon the people's frame of mind. If you doubt it, look at the remedies that are proposed. Certainly there is no better and safer way to study the complaints of a people than to consider the changes which are demanded by them, and the legislation which is suggested by their own freely-chosen representatives. It is needless to name particular books or agitators. To me they still seem symptoms rather than cures. But we have men before us with plans for society subversive of every fundamental principle of our government; and others with suggestions, which, to an extent, may be eminently practical and valuable, but which, even allowing them the full limit of their own claims, do not necessarily involve a change in our system in more than one respect. And yet a great portion of our people see in this or that theory the cure for every ache, real and imaginary, and embrace the new doctrine as the solution of all our troubles. What does all this show? Upon full investigation one or the other new theory may be found to be good; but the manner of its reception shows discontent, want of self-reliance, a desire for change and for assistance. We have many citizens who accept in the same spirit two or more theories, which are utterly antagonistic to

each other. There are altogether too many men who want absolute individual liberty without its risks and dangers. There are too many among us who want to enjoy good health, but remain within reach of the nurse and the smelling bottle. They want to happily combine the freedom of the Democrat Jefferson, and the protection of the Federalist Hamilton. How much more sound would it be to at least give our system a trial before we fly to such changes. And right here I want to say that, as a rule, these changes are most warmly advocated by men who have not taken the pains to understand the system that made it possible for them to come here. To me it seems that a newly-accepted citizen could do little better than to show respect, loyalty, and love for the government which he has just sworn to support.

But when we come to consider some of the individual measures, we cannot fail to see what ails us. Take those most pathetic of all laws, those laws made for the protection of the laborer against his employer, that require that he be paid in coin, and not in property upon which the employer fixes a price, and other laws of similar import. I have spoken against these laws, and do so still, for it fills my heart with dismay to think that a hundred laborers, each one armed with the franchise, must put their votes to the base use of protecting themselves against the wrongs of their principal. If this be true, what is to be said of the principal, for he is a citizen? And what of the laborers, for they are citizens? One willing to oppress, the others ready to confess that they can be oppressed, and all free-born American citizens. Now, I oppose these laws solely because they offer no protection. Political favor means dependence. Political dependence means practical slavery. I do not care how long it takes; the result is inevitable. Look at the cause of those laws, and you must read the spirit of the people whom they concern.

Again, this same desire to escape the consequences of our own shortcomings, not by improving ourselves, but by new regulations under which we hope to work more successfully, is shown by a multitude of laws. It is only a few years since we adopted a new Scheme and Charter for the government of

the City of St. Louis. It is admitted to be a perfect piece of work, designed for the protection of the city's interests against all the recognized dangers incidental to political life, and to secure for it the assistance of the best talent. It worked like a charm, and became the subject of study by men interested in the science of government. How does it work now? I need not say, but I do know that the indignation meetings occur with reasonable regularity, and the protesting editorials appear about as usual. Only a few years ago we adopted a new system for the election of School Board Directors, calculated to put the choice of its members beyond the most common evil influences. I do not see any improvement in the result since then. Now, what is the trouble? The new system is good enough; so was the old; but the citizen does not work under the system. The machinery is perfect, but there is no motive-power.

There are other laws of a more strictly public character, the necessity for which makes prominent the shortcomings of our citizens in public life. The civil service act is nothing but a cumbersome and stilted regulation, of what would be vastly more effective if voluntarily done by officials, in the spirit which the people have a right to expect. The Australian Ballot Reform is evidently needed in many quarters. But what a reflection it implies! It must bring the blush of shame to every cheek. A measure to prevent fraudulent voting and counting of votes and oppression in the exercise of the franchise by American citizens. What a condition of things to make this necessary, and to make possible the cheerful adoption of such a measure as a cure!

I have taken your time with reference to these measures and tendencies, not to express my individual views about them, but to prove that the remedy of constitution and law-making has been exhausted. Some of the changes are good and more may be needed; but in the main we have the letter of the law, and now stand in need of the spirit of the man. The cause of the trouble is at the source of all power,—at the heart of the body politic. You may shape your instructions and your laws, to coax and to encourage. But believe

me, if measures alone could secure our salvation, they would be readily passed. The men who want others to do right are in a large majority. Our courts and penitentiaries attest that. Not so with the men who will insist with themselves to do right. They are not in the majority, and it is that influence which our state must have, and without which our state cannot survive. It is self-evident that our theory and practice stand apart. Which shall be abandoned to make our political and social life harmonious? I plead to have our practice conform to our theory. When that has been done, we may talk further about new theories.

I am perfectly willing to admit that the reform for which I contend cannot be easily achieved. We are not dealing with a trifling question. On the contrary, we are laboring under peculiar disadvantages, because the great wealth of the country, and the promise of long-continued peace, are calculated as no other conditions to postpone genuine reforms of any kind. But then it will come; not directly, influenced in this or that way, but like a great wave. Some day those indignation meetings, of which we are accustomed to read, and at which we have learned to smile (temporary disturbances, which play with the surface dust, to be lost in the deep sand), will contain for us a whirlwind; some day the spirit which prompts them will overflow the ward, the town, the city, and the state, and will seize the nation to condemn and to convict, to govern and to command. How relatively serious the storm will be must depend altogether upon how long we permit the clouds to gather, and by what means we undertake to disperse them.

Is it a mere dream to see the solution of the chief social and political ills of the day in the realization of that citizenship, which, to such eminently practical men as Washington, Hamilton, Madison, Adams, Franklin, and Jefferson, seemed but a reasonable expectation of the future? Is it too much to ask men to say yes or no, to do or refuse to do; in a word, to live at the risk of their purse, where their fathers risked their heads? That is the only difference between the sacrifice of war and of peace. Is it a mere dream to say, Give us

such citizens, and you shall see a state that will rival her sisters in the Federation, true to the ideal of the Constitution. Give us such citizens and such states, and you shall see a nation that will lead in civilization, in word and in spirit; and you shall once more see chosen leaders of men, the peers of the best, because, in the conflicts between nations, they will stand, not for international gain and greed, but for international right and justice.

POST-GRADUATE COURSES IN PEDAGOGY.

THE Workingman's School* (at 109 West Fifty-fourth Street, New York City) has for years been striving to develop an improved system of education in elementary grades. The success of the undertaking and the frequent requests for teachers who can teach according to this system have determined the Executive Committee of the School to offer to graduates of Colleges, or of Normal Schools, or to teachers of at least one year's experience, a number of post-graduate courses in Pedagogy. For many years past a normal class has been trained in the Kindergarten. This will be continued with the additional advantage of being hereafter part of a larger organization.

Only a very limited number of students can be admitted. The complete list of courses is as follows:

Manual Training (including Mechanical Drawing, Clay, Pasteboard, Wood, Metal, and Needle Work), Designing, Free-hand Drawing, Modelling, Kindergarten, Primary Work, Elementary Botany and Zoölogy, Vocal Music (Holt's method), Physical Culture, a System of Moral Instruction for Children.

In addition to these, courses of lectures will extend through the year on:

Kindergarten Principles, History of Educational Theories, Methods in Education, and Psychology.

Occasional lectures by eminent authorities in various departments are contemplated. (Announcement will be made later.)

* This institution was founded in 1876 by Professor Felix Adler, Ph.D., who holds still the Directorship. It now has three hundred and fifty pupils and sixteen teachers. The present superintendent is Duren J. H. Ward, Ph.D.

The aim of the general Kindergarten lectures is to present an outline of the principles of Froebel's system, and to show by observation of the practical work their relation to the later education of the child. The principal of this department is an eminent Kindergarten of broad experience.

For Physical Culture a graduate of Dr. Sargent's school at Cambridge has been engaged. Special opportunity will be afforded the students to learn and practise the best methods of physical development.

The System of Moral Instruction will be given by Professor Adler himself. The course will have direct reference to the needs of those who wish to instruct in schools. It is also hoped that this course, coupled with others, may be a partial answer to the demand for some means of training persons to engage in the work undertaken by the Societies for Ethical Culture.

The History of Educational Theories will be conducted by research as far as possible. The principal authors will be taken up, and representative statements and views from their works will be studied. Theses on various topics will be written by members of the class, and discussion will be elicited.

In Psychology the purpose is not so much to cover the field as a science, as to lead to an understanding of the nature of the problems and of the mode of mental development. The course begins with an outline of Anthropology and the application of the scientific method to problems of human nature. The nervous system will be studied, and its relation to, and the mutual influences of, the other systems will be discussed. The early natural history of the child will occupy a part of the time; and, finally, a study of the early tendencies of the young life will lead to suggestions and principles of education.

The tuition fee in the Kindergarten course will be sixty-five dollars per annum; in the other courses, seventy-five dollars. Application should be directed to the Superintendent of the School, Duren J. H. Ward, Ph.D., 109 West Fifty-fourth Street, New York.

GENERAL NOTES.

—“THE POSITION OF AN ETHICAL SOCIETY” is the title of an interesting and important address, given recently before the London (Essex Hall) Ethical Society by J. H. Muirhead, M.A. The attitude of an Ethical Society towards Science, Theism, the name “Christian,” and Social Democracy is considered. The Ethical Society, Mr. Muirhead holds, opposes any view which attempts to base morality upon supernatural laws and sanctions, and thus parts company with popular theism. But, according to him, there is a theism which “starts from no division of worlds and essences, but recognizes in what we call nature or the world one onward-moving, self-differentiating, self-comprehending life. . . . In so far as we understand its meaning and enter into its purposes we obey its law, which is also our law—our morality.” With this theism and its religious interpretation of morality, Mr. Muirhead says it would be “suicidal for us as a society” to quarrel. We think it is equally out of place and even “suicidal” for an Ethical Society to oppose those who base morality upon supernatural sanctions. The American Ethical Societies profess to welcome all, whatever may be their theological or philosophical opinions. Consequently the Societies as a whole are no more opposed to supernaturalism than to pantheism, or agnosticism, or atheism. As to the name “Christian,” he says, “The followers of Jesus were not called Christians at the beginning. Perhaps they will not be so in the end.” In commenting on Social Democracy, he contrasts an Ethical Society with the advocates of particular reforms, and takes the deeper view that it is “the sentiments of the people, their likes and dislikes, their habits of praise and blame, that have to be altered.” The platform teaching of a Society, Mr. Muirhead holds, should be both doctrinal and practical,—on the one hand contributing to the

classification of ideas and, on the other, to edification. Bernard Bosanquet contributes a prefatory note, as chairman of the Society's committee, stating that while no exposition can be treated as binding on the members, this address gives "a substantially just expression of their feeling" on the topics considered. In this connection the strong and earnest article of Mr. William Clarke, a member of the London Society, will be read with interest.

There are doubtless many in the Ethical Societies who would not indorse all of Mr. Clarke's radical utterances, but no one can fail to be stimulated by his earnest presentation, from his stand-point, of the attitude the Ethical Societies should take towards the labor question. The *Christian Union* of June 19 contains a noteworthy article by Mr. Clarke on "The Working-Classes and Religion," and an able editorial on "The Church and the Workingman."

—ON INVITATION of the Board of Trustees of the Chicago Ethical Society, Dr. Paul Carus gave three lectures in the Society's rooms the first three Sundays in June. The subjects were, "Is Ethics a Science?" "The Date of Ethics," and "Theories of Ethics." The lectures were received with marked attention and interest. They will be printed in a little volume.

—THE ADULT CLASS IN ETHICS, of the Philadelphia Ethical Society, is holding its meetings regularly on Sunday mornings during the summer. The class is making a systematic study of "The Duties," as outlined by Professor Adler for the use of his Ethical Classes in New York. Short papers are read by members of the class on the subject assigned for the day, and each paper is fully discussed. The meeting opens each Sunday with a report of the papers and discussion of the previous week by the secretary of the class.

—THE THIRD ANNUAL REPORT of the Saint Louis Ethical Society makes a good showing. Besides the regular lecturer, Mr. W. L. Sheldon, the platform has been occupied, during the past season, by Mr. Charles Nagel, Mr. William

Schuyler, and Mr. Thomas Dimmock, of St. Louis, Professor Edward Bemis, of Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tenn., Mr. Henry T. Lloyd and Mr. William M. Salter, of Chicago, and Professor Felix Adler, of New York.

The Wednesday Evening Club, organized for special study of the problems of ethics, has been reading and discussing the writings and teachings of Ralph Waldo Emerson. The method has been, first, to have a short paper read by one of the members of the class on some special aspect or portion of the life of Emerson, and then to read and discuss for the rest of the evening one of the essays, concluding the hour with one of his poems. The papers that have been read are (1) "Transcendentalism in New England," (2) "Emerson in His Boyhood and Youth," (3) "The Birth of Unitarianism," (4) "The Man as a Preacher," (5) "The Man as a Lecturer," (6) "Emerson's Attitude on the Slavery Question," (7) "The Correspondence between Emerson and Carlyle," and (8) "Different Estimates of Emerson."

A Normal Class in the Ethical Instruction of the Young has met fortnightly on alternate Friday afternoons. A series of four lessons was prepared, treating of "The Stories of the Golden Age," "The Best Way of Introducing Ideas of the Deity to the Young," "The True Way of Viewing the Sacred Books and Literature of the World," and "The Best Spirit in which to Regard Past Ages of History." These lessons were drawn up to be used as an introduction to a study of the stories of the Bible. Under Professor Adler's supervision the stories of the Old Testament have been carefully written out for the use of the children's ethical classes, and Mr. Sheldon has completed the series by writing out a similar series of New Testament stories, which makes about two hundred pages of typewritten manuscript. There are sixteen main divisions or subjects,— "Palestine," "Stories of the Birth and Youth of Jesus," "The Baptism," "The Temptation," "The Twelve Disciples," "The Sermon on the Mount," "The Brother of Mercy," "The Teacher of Parables," "Jesus as a Judge," "Jerusalem," "The Last Supper," "Gethsemane," "The Betrayal," "The Trial," "The Crucifixion," and "The Resurrection." Each one of these

divisions is divided into from one to several portions, so that the whole material consists of about forty lessons on the "Life of Jesus."

A Report of the Workingmen's Self-Culture Clubs, which the St. Louis Ethical Society has formed, was given in our last issue. As a branch of this work there has recently been opened a "School of Domestic Economy," in which the ladies of the city have taken an active interest.

—THE FIRST FREE KINDERGARTEN west of the Rocky Mountains was established in San Francisco twelve years ago through the stimulus of addresses given there by Professor Adler in 1878. A similar Free Kindergarten movement has recently been started in Denver, Colorado, by some of the leading citizens. Professor Adler was invited to give two lectures there in June to help on the movement, and was cordially received by people of all denominations.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

DIE ETISCHE BEWEGUNG IN DER RELIGION. Von Stanton Coit, Ph.D., Berlin. Vom Verfasser durchgesehene Uebersetzung von Georg von Gisycki. Leipzig: O. R. Reisland. 1890. 228 seiten.

Inhalt: I. Die etische Bewegung in der Religion.

II. Warum Ethik statt Religion?

III. Welche Ethik?

IV. Die Ethik des Gebets.

V. Wie das innere Leben zu erbauen ist.

VI. Die Anbetung Jesu.

VII. Die Gefahrung des Radikalismus in der Religion.

VIII. Intellectuelle Redlichkeit auf der Kanzel.

IX. Die socialen Aufgaben junger Männer.

X. Häusliche Kindererziehung.

XI. Die Ethik Shakespeares.

XII. "Robert Elsmere."

XIII. 1. Etische Cultur als eine Religion für das Volk.

XIV. 2. Etische Cultur als eine Religion für das Volk.

ARTICLES AND DISCUSSION ON THE LABOR QUESTION. By Wheelbarrow. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co. 1890. Pp. 303. \$1.

A STRIKE OF MILLIONAIRES AGAINST MINERS; OR, THE STORY OF SPRING VALLEY. By Henry D. Lloyd. Chicago: Belford-Clarke Co. 1890. Pp. 264. \$1.

SOCIAL UNIVERSITY MONOGRAPHS. I. The Plan of a Social University. By Morrison I. Swift. Ashtabula, Ohio: Charles H. Gallup. Pp. 40. 20 cents.

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